BlitzoHi Blitzo … Nowhere in the article have I suggested that OTH targeting data of the Brahmos missile was based exclusively on the Kochi’s sensors. I wrote “As Kochi defended herself, critical targeting data was being constantly shared between Kochi and the Shivalik, the frigate accompanying her. They were linked through the Indian Navy’s tactical network, a communications highway routed through the Navy’s own satellite, the Rukmini.”
I have also clearly mentioned in previous posts, after checking, that mid-course guidance for the Brahmos need not be provided by an airborne escort since you had sought a clarification on this specific point. This data could, hypothetically, have been transmitted either from another platform or from Rukmini, India’s dedicated Naval surveillance and communication satellite. Thanks.
Yes, data was shared between Kochi and Shivalik, but that data would not have been useful for either of them to launch a Brahmos against Changsha at full range unless either of them could detect Changsha with their own sensors.
Rukmini is a communications satellite as I understand, and it facilitates communication between Indian Naval assets, however it is not a sensor in its own right — it still requires an offboard sensor which can detect and track the target and datalink with the firing platform.
If there was data from another platform, it was not mentioned and is a rather significant oversight within the scenario.
The question still remains, as to how the IN taskgroup managed to detect Changsha at the beginning of the scenario, because if it wasn’t with their own onboard sensors then it had to be from another offboard platform, which can’t exactly be ignored as that factor would determine how any encounter plays out… unless choosing to ignore the need for an offboard platform was deliberate and was just meant to make the scenario easier for casual readers to comprehend.
BlitzoBlitzo … little point in arguing for the sake of arguing … Whether Chagsha was 300 kilometres away from Kochi or 30 is no longer the point. The point is this – the Brahmos missile can strike moving ship targets at a range of 300 kilometres without any airborne assistance. Hence, there was no inaccuracy in this regard in the scenario being described. Secondly, no where am I suggesting that this is the ONLY way in which an `enemy’ ship would be engaged. A heli-borne data link could certainly be an asset but, as mentioned, may not be required.
Vishnu, I’m not arguing for the sake of arguing here — the distance between Changsha and the IN task group is very important, as that will determine whether they were in each other’s expected active sensor range.
So on that note, I just need to clarify — did the naval personnel you speak with acknowledge explicitly that Brahmos launched from a ship can engage a moving naval target 300km away without offboard targeting data?
I’m sure you appreciate the limits of naval targeting, given your occupation means you’d be well versed in these fundamentals — i.e.: a ship seeking to fire long range anti surface missiles against an opposing, moving target at long range, requires midcourse guidance during the missile’s flight, before its terminal stage where the missile’s own seeker goes active to search for the moving target. That midcourse guidance stage requires information about the opposing ship’s location, preferably in real time via datalinks, so that the missile can make midcourse flight adjustments. If a ship is firing against a target within its own active sensor range (aka their radar horizon range), then the missile can rely on the ship’s own sensor data via datalinks to perform midcourse flight adjustments (though chances are it would be well within the missile’s own seeker range, cutting out the necessity of a midcourse guidance phase)… if a ship is firing against a target beyond its own active sensor range, then the missile typically relies on airborne sensors which can fly closer to the target and also has greater radar horizon range, to provide the targeting data instead. Therefore I am confused as to how Brahmos can be fired from a ship at its full range (or any OTH range, really) without offboard targeting data from another platform, because to do so will effectively be firing Brahmos blind in hope that it is being launched at where the opposing ship might be.
In a similar vein, my other question for your scenario, is how did the IN task group detect Changsha at 300km away in the first place? Given both sides only have their shipboard sensors, I’m not sure how both sides knew the other was there, because it sure as hell wasn’t with their own onboard radar.
Precisely … there is a type of reader who likes this sort of thing. Just so you know this article was trending number 1 on our website ndtv.com for the better part of 2 days, a website that has five times as much readership as, for example, the Washington Post’s website- an indicator that it was being read.
I entirely appreciate your interest in learning more about the ship. Let me repeat, if you have some specific questions, and I have the answers, I would be happy to share them.
On a separate note, I have lots of pics of the Kochi I have been unable to put online here on this forum for reasons I cannot figure out.
Thanks
Thank you, I have no more specific questions.
I share some of Jonesy’s views towards such pieces which seem a bit Clancy-esque at best [and chest thumping nationalistic at worst], but I can appreciate that those are the compromises one has to make for readership.
BlitzoYou may find this picture more illustrative ….
[ATTACH=CONFIG]240935[/ATTACH]
Thanks, it most definitely is.
Blitzothe VVS practical combat operational doctrines is really mind blowing.. The Crude infrastructure in that region and airbase.
Its just like a forward fire base. They are right in the middel of the pudding. Does not need much of tanker support eighter it seems.
To be fair, their base is far closer to their targets than some US coalition strikers are from theirs, so they probably wouldn’t need tankers in the first place.
Nevertheless, this entire operation is still very impressive. The speed of execution was quite breathtaking, and the airlift involved was very substantial, and the base’s own ground based defenses are very good as well in the short time it took to actually deploy.
I wonder how long planning for the contingency may have taken….
Also, nice to see VVS using a selection of PGMs.
BlitzoHi Blitzo … You can choose to believe what you want but none of the details published in the article are either contrived or a bit off as you mistakenly suggest –
For starters … the Brahmos missile can operate to a range of 300 kms without targeting or data-link support from the Kolkata class destroyers. Brahmos uses an onboard seeker that has GPS, Glonass and Gagan data. Its onboard seeker gate opens 50 kms from the target and scans at 45 degrees. This is information from men whose job it is to fire the missile so it is entirely accurate. The Kolkata class destroyers may or may not deploy a helicopter for targeting/data-links. It would likely do this if and when the missile is used to strike targets beyond its published 300 km range.
Okay, so first of all, are you acknowledging that in your scenario, Shivalik is indeed 300km from Changsha? That was the original part of my statement you disagreed with.
As for the missile itself — did the personnel you speak with say that they can fire the missile to its full range at a moving naval target without the need for any offboard targeting information? Because there’s a difference between using GPS and GLONASS to hit a stationary land target at full range 300km away (which Brahmos would not need offboard targeting for), compared to hitting a moving, over-the-horizon target beyond the ship’s own active radar horizon (AKA beyond the ship’s own active sensor range).
In fact, how did Kochi and Changsha detect each other in the first place when both were 300km away from each other? I can understand if Changsha maybe had MPA support that would have allowed it to detect the Indian task group, but how did the Indian task group detect Changsha, if they only had their own shipborne sensors to work with?
As far as the scenario I described was concerned, there is no end to the detail that could have been added since it is purely a work of fiction .. Changsha may have been supporting an older Chinese frigate or destroyer or another platform when it was called in to strike. She may not have detected Shivalik or the tanker. The possibilities are limitless but there is something called a word limit when you write an article.
Let’s just say it would have been far more interesting to hear more about your own interviews with personnel of the ship and what you saw inside the ship, for an article titled “Inside India’s New and Deadliest Warship,” rather than a short story technothriller. That said, I can understand the need to draw readership and there are some portions of one’s audience who likes this sort of thing.
If you have some specific questions on the Kolkata, I can venture an answer if I possess the information …
Thanks
I have no further specific questions regarding the ship itself, thank you.
Blitzotahts the p17? what a shame. i was expecting much cleaner lines.
The top one is P17… it’s quite a bit cleaner and sleeker than the Talwar below, and P17A would likely be sleeker still.
Blitzo[ATTACH=CONFIG]240898[/ATTACH]
A shivalik and a Talwar…. I wasn’t aware they were so similar in size, despite the P17 being almost two thousand tons heavier at full load
BlitzoHi Blitzo … I wrote that article. Suggest you read it more carefully. For starters, there is a gap in the timeline of the article between when the contacts were detected and when the Eagle Strike was launched. There is no suggestion that it was launched at 300 kms range. Secondly, the article doesn’t indicate that there was only one Chinese warship. It clearly states that CONTACTS had been detected but yes, only one ship was engaged. Since the timeline for the scenario is patently incomplete (it was used only as an illustration of the capability of the ship) .. I would suggest you DON’T take it that literally. This would have had many more details had this been a chapter in a book or an article for a far more tech savvy reader on websites such as this.
As far as the second bridge of the ship is concerned .. thats the `Flag Bridge’ meant to carry a fleet commander and his crew. It has a handful of MFD’s similar to what exists in the Ops Centre, access to which I did not get. My description of the Ops centre was, however, accurate in that I was given a fairly decent non-classified briefing on it.
Thanks
Vishnu Som
Editor and Senior Anchor
NDTV
Hello Vishnu.
Regarding the 300km range part, this part, seems to describe Changsha as being 300km away (technically it’s “nearly 300km away” but the description is suggestive of it being very near 300km), in the period after Changsha first launched her YJ-18s, and describes a situation where Shivalik is 300km away from Changsha, yet launches her Brahmos at full range:
Blasting off her launch tubes on the deck of the Shivalik, the Brahmos missiles quickly accelerated to Mach 2.8 and headed towards the Changsha nearly 300 kilometres away.
As for one contact vs multiple contacts — yes, other Chinese contacts may have been out there, but my question still continues, i.e.: why did Changsha alone only try to engage two IN surface combatants?
…. that said, I can appreciate that the above is merely a fictional speculative scenario, but imo some of the details are quite a bit off, and some of the logic is a bit contrived, and as a reader, I feel like the good information about the Kochi’s inner workings are lost in those inaccuracies.
Thanks for the information on the second level bridge, I wasn’t aware that they had a flag bridge onboard, though it’s a little curious that they have a windows for a view to the outside; the few modern surface combatants which do have flag bridge-like facilities seem to feature them more like an enclosed CIC than a navigation bridge.
BlitzoInside India’s New and Deadliest Warship – Written by Vishnu Som
It took me far too long to realize that this was a piece of speculative fiction =__= …. my fault for not reading the opening statement, but the title of the article is a bit of a red herring.
The speculative scenario probably reveals more about the author’s lack of knowledge of not only the 052D and the P15A he’s meant to be writing about (both ships having targeting data for each other at 300km away without any airborne assets in play, really?), not to mention overestimating the trigger finger itchiness on the Chinese side by a rather large margin, at the policy and tactical level (would a single DDG be stupid enough to engage an opposing force of a DDG+large FFG??). I’m also a bit surprised that he’d call four inbound AShMs as a saturation attack… and of course YJ-18 has a supersonic terminal stage like 3M-54, by 70km it would likely be far past the subsonic stage.
Good attempt to make the ship more interesting, but the details fail it, 5/10 with rice.
A shame there were no pictures of the ship’s interesting interior parts, like CIC.
On the topic of P15A class, can anyone explain why there seems to be two “levels” of windows/port holes on the main superstructure? There’s one on the top for the navigation bridge which is standard aboard ships, but there’s also another lower one closer, right behind the ASW rocket launchers, can anyone please explain their purpose?
BlitzoWell what you say is true. Now lets turn our attention to the Russian moves in Syria. I will see you over at the Russia – Syria topic thread.
I appreciate that you can acknowledge the logic behind my arguments in a gracious and straight forward way, I consider that vast progress compared to discussions of previous months and years.
BlitzoA lack of transparency seems to be the style of modern China. That’s all that I am saying.
I don’t dispute that necessarily (though compared to China during previous decades they are definitely far more transparent now), but I still don’t see how such a general statement adds to the discussion about the Chinese military’s high opsec.
With the crowded seas Liaoning would be sailing in don’t you agree that with as high value ship as this aircraft carrier somebody would detect its movements?
I’m sure the USN has detected Liaoning and tracked it whenever it went out to sea, but that doesn’t mean they’re going to tell us about it.
This is the fundamental break in your logic which makes your position fall apart — you believe that if the USN or any other military is able to detect or track Liaoning, then we would inevitably know about it, whereas in reality, there is no reason for them to tell us, the public, about what they know and do not know. If anything, it would probably be counterintuitive for them to tell the public about every time they detect Liaoning going to sea, as that would alert the Chinese Navy about the capability of USN surveillance and they could devise countermeasures or change operating procedures to inhibit USN surveillance.
BlitzoBut what has China gained with their attempts at deception? I say very little. Its just like this current economic whirlpool China has found itself embroiled in. Once reality pulled the bamboo curtain back on the Chinese economy, China has been seen as a rank amateur in handling a modern economy. It is as they say: It all comes out in the wash.
The value of China’s opsec is a much larger issue than one that can be summed up in a single post, but I believe that by keeping a lid on a variety of military developments and not publicizing them, it causes China’s potential opponents to underestimate their present and future capability, and it also causes China’s potential opponents to make funding and procurement decisions based on incomplete knowledge of China’s own military developments which may help China as it causes less efficient distribution of resources in its potential opponents.
As for China’s economy, I’m not sure what that has to do with our topic of discussion which is about the Chinese military’s lack of transparency.
BlitzoPlease do not blame me for China’s lack of progress in certain military areas. I only observe and then draw conclusions. Place the blame for Chinese fumbling and bumbling on where it belongs: China
I’m not blaming you for anything, and I’m not even talking about China — I’m talking about you, and I’m criticizing and challenging your positions and the logic behind them, because as I said in that reply, “Your posting history is littered with claims about the Chinese military that is so contrived and based on unfounded evidence and poor leaps in logic.”
BlitzoLets start with China is on earth. In order to master carrier operations they must gain operational experience by going to sea. A ship as large as an aircraft carrier cannot hide for long if it is at sea. This is especially true if this fledgling carrier is the focus of attention by various nations eager to understand what China is up to and to understand Chinese intentions. I don’t know your sources or Rii’s sources but I DO know that carrier operations are a complex undertaking. And carrier skills are EXTREMELY perishable. You must practice and practice and STILL you may make mistakes.
Neither I nor Rii has said that carrier operations are not a complex undertaking, and no one has said that practice is not important.
In fact, just so we’re on the same page, I will state my position clearly: carrier operations are a complex undertaking and practice is important to retain the skills which are very perishable. The Chinese Navy has to send out Liaoning to sea to learn carrier operations, to retain skills, and all that will be risky.
In other words, my position about the nature of carrier operations are the same as yours.
The gold standard is the USN. And even they make occasional mistakes that result in accidents on the deck and how the carrier is handled.
Agreed, this has never been a point of contention.
To imply that the Chinese have some secret training schedule that is giving them an inside track on achieving carrier proficiency in some record time is laughable on its face.
No one has claimed that China has a secret training schedule that is giving them an inside track on achieving carrier proficiency.
What everyone is saying is that we do not know what the Liaoning’s current proficiency is because we don’t know how often they’re spending out at sea.
You can take it to the bank that every time the Liaoning has left the docks it has had a tattle-tail like the Russians did to American and NATO carriers during the cold war. The fact that we are not hearing anything about the Chinese carrier program strongly implies that China is rethinking carrier operations.
It may well be that everytime Liaoning leaves dock, it has a USN tail or is under US surveillance. However, what makes you think that the US will share that information with the media or the public? Do you think the fact that the USN is not providing us information on every movement of the Liaoning means that it must mean Liaoning is always at dock? Obviously such an expectation is unreasonable and illogical.
In other words, we have little to no information of what Liaoning has been up to in the last year or so, because we do not get many if any updates as to the carrier’s status — not from the Chinese Navy, and not from USN surveillance.
You are conflating “lack of information,” to become equal to “staying at dock for the entire time”. I hope you appreciate why this is a failure in logic.
For my personal opinion I believe that the Lioaning suffered a serious accident at sea and this has driven the PLAN back to the drawing board in how they do carrier operations.
Your belief that they have a suffered an accident at sea rests on the idea that they have not been out at sea, however this is a false premise because we do not know how often Liaoning has been out at sea in the first place, as I’ve said above.
The fundamental premise of your conclusion is not a logical one.
BlitzoIf you want to check out respected analysis on Chinese military affairs you would do good in looking at Dr. Andrew S. Erickson who specializes on the Chinese military. He is well respected in the world. Another person I hold in high regard is Peter Mathus of China Brief. He provides a structure deliberately designed to help you build a solid foundation for understanding the PLA and helping to develop a progressively more sophisticated perspective. These guys and others make a living watching China. They get paid for doing it. These sources will point you towards deeper understanding of what China is up to.
I also place Dr Erickson in quite high esteem, and most of his articles around the chinese military are quite accurate, and almost all are very well researched.
However, the original point of contention isn’t about whether respected analysts of the Chinese military exists (they obviously do — they’re far and few between, but they exist) — the original point of contention is that some posters (namely blackadam in this case) are putting up many unreliable articles and putting them up as evidence for their preconceived positions.
And please, spare us the high horse act. Your posting history is littered with claims about the Chinese military that is so contrived and based on unfounded evidence and poor leaps in logic that it’s laughable that you’re trying to speak from a position of knowledge or authority about Chinese military matters.
Sign In
