Please notice that I mixed the numbers speaking about J11 when I was thinking at the J10(B).

Regarding the J20, although a formidable opponents, there is only a few chances that it would be in the class of any of the other Super Maneuverable fighters ( Mig35, Su35, F18E/F or a F35).

A few year back, someone made here a good analysis of the J20. You might have a look back at it. But sound reasoning tells u sthat it won’t out-climb, out-turn, out Alpha or out-roll anyone. It’s another bread. Another use. And presented as a fighter certainly with the sole purpose to hide a more offensive role. EoA for me.

I don’t know enough about aerodynamics to really speak about any analyses even if I had seen it, however I do have a firm belief having read enough debates about it, that eyeballing aerodynamics isn’t quite reliable. Better if we had access to a decent sized wind tunnel and an accompanying access to a super computer’s time.

Also, much of J-20’s performance will depend on what kind of engine it uses. Many of the western attempts to project J-20’s role seems to be unaware of WS-15’s intended place on J-20. In that sense I suppose if J-20 only had Al-31 or 117S as its permanent powerplants then I would agree to their logic that J-20 could only really perform as an interceptor and cannot survive close engagements with the opposing fighter it was designed to compete with — namely F-22.

i see you class F-35 and super hornet as super maneuverable and in the same league as Su-35? That’s interesting.

I’m not sure what EoA means, but “presenting” J-20 as a fighter to “hide” a more offensive role doesn’t quite make sense. Clearly J-20 isn’t a striker because its weapons bay is far too small to hold any meaningful A2G weapons beyond some SDBs or a couple of large PGMs (not to mention relatively shorter range than what an optimal striker for westpac should have). And it doesn’t make sense to hide J-20 as an “interceptor” either, given any modern fighter these days can fulfill the interceptor role and if speed were a bigger concern I can’t help but think a configuration more like YF-23 would have made sense. And of course, an air superiority fighter aircraft is arguably the most offensive role a nation can field given air superiority is the prerequisite for all kinds of other offensive air operations.

On the subject of YF-23, I feel like that plane is a better comparison to J-20 in terms of role, assuming the sufficient powerplant for J-20 is available: a stealthy air to air fighter primarily, with some emphasis on speed, but also nimble enough to survive close encounters with opposing legacy and stealth fighters, but also deliberately designed to have a large fuel load and long range/endurance… at least relative to F-22.

If anything I feel like most of the western world’s PLA observers are missing a few vital clues which predated J-20’s revelation and were distracted by how supposedly long it appeared and jumped on the band wagon started by bill sweetman without essential contextual information and forethought into just what PLA have stated about J-XX, not to mention the likely capabilities they would have required on their next generation premiere fighter aircraft.

why does PAF have so many different type of aircraft?

they must have a terrible time training and logistics.

Is this a reference to something? Because last I remember they only have 5 major types of combat aircraft?
F-16s, JF-17s, F-7s, Mirage III and V… and I imagine the Mirages would have quite a few common components between them.

Compared to other air forces with larger varieties of fighters, as well as bombers (for USAF and VVS especially) PAF variety is relatively slim?

I wonder if this will prompt the Chinese side to eventually release their side of these kind of encounters…. They’ve previously had similar “reporter on station” type programs when CCG cutters have met foreign vessels during patrols (video below is of vietnam), if this kind of thing becomes common place I wouldn’t be surprised if they stick a CCTV reporter aboard one of the naval ships for exposure of the other side. I’d be interested in seeing an 054A’s CIC in operation during a moment like this… or at least its bridge.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2T9S7XQKNR8

The last guy on radio clearly didn’t have very good english — he repeated instructions in mandarin as well, which was naturally far more natural sounding.

Yeah, I feel like if the fellow on the other end had been a natural english speaker the exchange would’ve been smoother. For instance an english speaker might’ve said “please vacate immediately” instead of “you go,” and “please expedite” instead of something as clumsy as “please go away quickly”.

I suspect the US already are helping other countries such as the Philippines, such as handing them the old Hamilton cutters and refitting them as frigates. However a lack of funds is a significant stumbling block which can’t be easily fixed. Vietnam is another country with the most significant disputes with China that the US could seek to reinforce, but I suspect the Vietnamese are also wary of just how much real cooperation they can get with the US — the are still a communist autocracy after all.
Japan is quite enthusiastic about patrolling SCS, and the US will probably seek to draw Australia in as well although the Aussies seem wary.
China will probably seek to use regional economic initiatives to prevent the formation of an explicit alliance as such.

The question is whether the US is willing to accept a greater Chinese presence (civilian and military) in SCS islands and a potential Chinese airbase in the SCS… even continued probes and patrols within the 12nmi line won’t physically prevent the dredgers and workers from doing their thing. The use of physical military force is the only real way to stop them, and I’m waiting to see where washington draws its red line in SCS if it’s going to draw one at all.

The first 12,000 ton cutter has gone on its sea trial 🙂

I see, thanks.

I wonder if it might make sense for continued 1135.6s to be built, with improvements built in successive flights?
The way I see it, given the constraints of medium term budget and shipbuilding capability, the Russian Navy needs a large number of ocean going combatants with modern capabilities particularly in the screening role for its larger upgraded destroyers, cruisers and battlecruisers (Sovs+Udaloy, Slava, Kirov classes respectively), so 1135.6 could be Russian Navy’s 054A equivalent — a competitive, (presumably) affordable ship with middle end offensive and defensive power and as medium range AAW screeners, that are relatively cheap enough to play tag with submarines in ASW as well as cheap enough be deployed en masse as work horses, all on a blue water capable hull. They’re clearly able to build the hulls at a good pace and I assume(?) there are no issues with propulsion sourcing, so introducing improved capability and/or lighter subsystems to make use of a reliable production hull seems sensible.

The new 22356s OTOH seem to displace quite a bit heavier than the 1135.6s at 4500 tons standard (meaning possibly 5000+ or even 6000 tons full?), and could fill the role of a higher tier AAW capability with its superior sensor and armament set, as a modern medium weight destroyer and complement the high end of short to medium term Russian surface combatant capability while 1135.6s become workhorses.

Such a composition could probably provide a good bang for buck to set the scene for arrival of a new larger displacement Sov/Udaloy/Slava replacement post 2020.

Granted VLS is an advantage, but you are overestimating its importance too much. HQ-16, SA-N-7, Shtil-1 are all SARH guided. Grigorovich, Talwar, Type 54A, Sovremenny classes all have 4 3S90 target guidance radars, two facing each side. So max number of targets engaged is at a semisphere is 2. (4 if we are talking about total)

With two launchers on Sovremenny, absence of VLS is completely irrelevant. IDK about SA-N-7 launcher, but Mk-13 reloads in 10 seconds. Assuming both systems have similar performance, lack of VLS in Talwar merely adds 10 second delay for engaging second target, that is assuming both targets enter launch range at the same instant. If they are apart then performance difference is even less.

The key improvement of VLS over arm launchers, imo, is greater firing rate, and faster response time (which includes the ability to effectively engage targets from 360 degrees without needing the extra one or two seconds for re orienting the arm launcher)

For SARH missiles, greater firing rate means you are able to take advantage of your terminal illuminators to simultaneously engage more targets — but of course, if your illuminators are arranged like 054A and Talwar/Grigorovich, Shivalik, Sovs, etc, chances are you’ll never be able to use all of them as an attack would likely come from a single direction rather than multiple directions.

However greater firing rate does mean a ship can time share their terminal illuminators between more SAMs and more targets, especially if it is an attempted saturation attack where a defender will prefer to engage as many targets per cycle with as fast a firing cycle as they can manage where arm launchers simply far too slow (1 missile per second from Mk-41 versus one every ten seconds for Mk-13) . Greater firing rate also means you can fire more SAMs at a single target in the same amount of time compared to an arm launcher (i.e.: using a single illuminator per target but supporting multiple interceptor SAMs fired rapidly sequentially) for greater pK against that target.

Both, actually. They’re just individual flights of the same class, really. So I’ll partially disregard your post 😉 As for ASW, sonar fit in both classes is quite variable but broadly similar – yet the 1135.6 has a stronger punch with heavyweight torpedoes and long-range ASW missiles.

Fair enough, although I consider the differences between Talwar and Grigorovich to be quite meaningful in terms of AAW simply on the basis of VLS, as much as a Tico CGs from Bunker Hill onwards being quite different to the first five Mark-26 equipped vessels. Certainly it’s worth mentioning if a comparison with a vessel so similar like 054A is the topic of discussion :p

Which long range ASW missiles are Talwar/Grigorovich armed with? Do you mean replacing one of the AShM VLS cells for Oniks/3M-54 with an ASW 3M-54?