BlitzoSomehow I doubt the PLA would operate according to standard Western norms of warfare as in real life only Western forces operate to those norms. In fact those norms often limit Western military capability.
Elaborate?
Sure.
I’d still like to see whether they have the C4ISR to do that effectively. As stated even the Russians haven’t displayed this kind of capability.
In fact only US and Israel have and one of those is pretty much stuck in a state of perpetual warfare while the other has been for 20+ years.
To be fair, the russian uav industry is nonexistant.
PLA’s UAV capability is actually not bad — or at least the country’s UAV industry isn’t too bad (in fact I’d argue it’s second behind US. Or at least third, behind Israel, perhaps)
Just to put this into perspective, china recently sent out a BZK-005 HALE (think heron, but with greater endurance) to the disputed islands with japan, which surprised quite a few people. PLA have operated quite a few large UAVs like BZK-005 since mid-late 2000s, mostly internally, but may now become common practice to extend their reach into westpac.
http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ILlX-LUS9so/Uczi-yDVAbI/AAAAAAAAF4A/CgIMUfsbxmM/s1600/BZK-005a.jpg
a JASDF pic of the BZK-005 in flight
http://theaviationist.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Chinese-UAV.png
The first squadron of predator like pterodactyl UAVs were also raised.
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-IgwpVEItQHQ/Uh4NJS7OoSI/AAAAAAAAGPc/qfLbn7p6kYE/s1600/WL.jpg
And that’s the only UAV elements we are aware of (chances are the current situation is ahead of what we know, given PLA’s tendency to “stagger” developments).
Also, the pterodactyl UAV has been exported as well, supposedly to UAE (and they’re not exactly a third world backwater that would go for any half baked product).
http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-ThCFPbS6I7M/UK_t6v4n3YI/AAAAAAAAC90/dmyaQv7QrpA/s1600/WingLoong1.jpg
BlitzoCouldn’t get into one of them and the other didn’t seem too relevant (SDF seemed more of “my gun is bigger than yours”).
Yeah, SDF does have host gunsize comparisons, unfortunately, and it doesn’t have as many good posters as it did a few years ago.
If you trawl back far enough you can definitely find some more mature and indepth discussion though.
As for CDF, you need to make an account to access it, your request will be denied by the admin etc — but it’s definitely worth it, the discussion is much more mature and complex, with lots and lots of informative pictures.
A crosspost of your seminal question of this thread onto CDF, will probably be much more better received than on SDF, tbh.
Also I don’t doubt some things have changed in terms of human issues.
However those human factors are very hard to change and usually require a major event (usually losing a war or major battle) to promote change.
I think Iraq, china’s opening up, and the third taiwan strait crisis were all china’s instigators in this case, but one can argue it may have produced less of an impact than if China actually suffered a dilipidating military loss — in which case I refer to the less than optimal result of the third sino-veitnamese war.
And even then change is not necessarily forthcoming – a great example is the Russian approach to command which hasn’t changed for 200 years. And this has persisted from Napoleonic times to today.
Military culture even often dictates the types of lessons learned – e.g. IJA learned the wrong lessons from Khalkin Gol.
Also not saying only NATO military culture is good – there have been some articles on problems with some Western European militaries where soldiering is viewed in the same manner as other civil service. Obvious result is this impinges on military performance. Indeed it’s one of the reasons the French wanted to go it alone in Mali when it came to ground ops.
I don’t quite know enough about the history of any of these nations to make an even half knowledgable comment.
The Dragon Extends its Reach youtube thing is very interesting though, especially comments on EW.
As a watcher I found the EW part not too surprising, given that has been one of the biggest sources of investment. Just looking at PLAAF’s EW, SIGINT, ELINT fleet, I think it’s perhaps the third or even second largest behind USAF. And the constant emphasis of conducting exercises under “realistic electromagnetic” conditions speak volumes, even if we don’t know the details or complexity.
I personally was more surprised at wortzel’s proclamation of the formidable PLA ASW capability. Everyone thought that was the largest gaping hole PLA had among every arena, but I suppose they have a very large SSK fleet with quite a few of them that are modern, and if they can use them well in a defensive way against USN they could play a big factor. Also, the fact that most people forget all 054s and 054A frigates (slightly less than 20 in service as of today) have TAS and bow mounted sonar with room for a helicopter that presumably has a fairly modern datalink, along with about 12 similarly equipped modern destroyers with helicopters as well… and I can understand his statement a little.
But PLA needs investment into fixed wing MPA (begun to see with Y-8Q, if they can produce them at a similar pace to Y-8W, they could have a very decent MPA fleet by 2025), SSN (apparently the “fourth generation” nuclear submarine tech just finished development very recently, and may very well be competitive with latest western designs, even if it might be later this decade that we see the first boat enter service), and larger naval helicopters (Z-9Cs aren’t the optimal ASW choice, and Ka-29s lack the benefits of being an indigenous product, etc. We might see the sino-blackhawk Z-20 begin to bear fruit in such regard in five years, I think)
BlitzoGood post Blitzo.
To be fair I suspect Taiwan would be conquered.
But the longer they hold out the more likely the US will get involved (public opinion etc).
And any Chinese warcrimes such as levelling chunks of Taipei or starving people out, help push the US public opninion towards entering the conflict.
Cheers.
And I agree, media and propaganda will play a big role.
Again, if I had my way, levelling taipei with SRBMs and airstrikes would be the last thing on my mind, and instead, I’d round up all the smaller cities and refugee sites POWs and make sure they are well fed, cared for, etc, all while circulating all these images and videos across the world, and hopefully with a well balanced political and social rhetoric.
Actually, PRC as a whole must keep a less belligerent tone of voice than they did during the third taiwan strait crisis as well. Give the western media as few examples to turn into examples of aggression as possible. Adopt a more reasonable, but firm policy. I’d say “terse” is a good word for it.
Define “fortification.”
We’re not talking plainly visible concrete bunkers ala Omaha Beach or Japanese gun positions at Tarawa.
How about urban houses or apartments where opfor can be reliably IDed via FLIR, and struck with a low collateral damage HJ-10 or 50kg LS-6 type munition?
BlitzoPGMs aren’t the magic bullet in an urban environment.
The defender has upside through local knowledge and if their smart they can relocate quickly using subways, sewers etc (again look at urban warfare in past).
The Americans found it amazing that Iraqis and Afghanis would simply hole up in a house and then get PGMd to bits. The Afghanis and Iraqis obviously expected Americans to charge them as opposed to calling in a bomber.
The other thing about PGM CAS is you still need good coordination between ground and air units. Even in Afghanistan, I’ve read of special forces struggling to get hits with PGMs (though practice makes perfect).
And in close quarters urban fighting, dropping a 250 – 500 lb PGM can be disastrous to your own forces even if it’s a direct hit on the target.
Then you get smoke and dust which can make guiding PGMs problematic.
And as stated the USAF has been practicing CAS for decades and has had decades of experience with it. They still get it wrong sometimes.
The Russians still struggled with effective ground-air ops in Georgia, despite prior experience in Chechnya.
What can be said of PLA with no such combat experience?
While the lack of PLA combat experience definitely puts the notion of PLAAF’s CAS ability into doubt, we should also remember 2025 is 12 years into the future, and looking at how far the PLA have come in the last 12 years, factoring in how willing they are to learn from US practices, not to mention the massive array of PGMs available to them if the PLAAF decided to instigate one into mass production…
I think they may certainly have the hardware in place by 2025, and be quite well versed in using them.
I’m not saying PLA will master CAS by any means by 2025, but they’ll certainly be better, and from what I’m reading it’s not uncommon practice for ground forces to call in air support from JH-7s these days. (Again, I’ll stress we have no idea how detaield the various exercises are, whether they’re scripted, etc).
Even if PLA manages a fraction of the US’s CAS coordination, I’d say that would be a decent achievement.
Whether it’ll effect an urban war in taiwan is another matter, because if I had my way, I wouldn’t send in the PLA directly into heavily guarded cities anyway.
BlitzoWe’re seeing it in Aleppo right now.
Place is starting to look like Stalingrad.
We’ve also seen it in other cities ala Vukovar, Grozny and Misrata.
Still, seeing a modern city like taipei suffering that kind of carnage, with the power of PLA and ROC military at play? It would be like a crazy cluster**** mushing together 9/11, stalingrad and mogadishu.
You’re explaining the overall idea a lot better than I am 😛
Aw, shucks.
Which reminds me of a factor we have not considered in the urban combat discussion, which is the role UCAVs may have to play in making air power more usable in urban settings. Given the pace of China’s R&D into UAVs, I wonder if it’s something we should factor in for a 2025 scenario.
MQ-1 type UCAVs would definitely be useful, givne their small profile and high altitude. Harder to down with MANPADS and AAA.
How effectively they use them, especially in a joint manner, is up for discussion.
BlitzoYet you couldn’t repeat your performance against Vietnam and you certainly couldn’t kick the Nationalists off even some of the smaller islands right on the coast of China.
Ah, come on, we all know that was due to korean war and subsequent fast US intervention etc etc.
And we should give the PLA some credit here, their amphibious assault of hainan was almost a complete success.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landing_Operation_on_Hainan_Island
But like you said, we should keep a rational tone and try and ward nationalism away.
As for your question, again, if you really are interested in learning more, I’d suggest you posit this question over on CDF, or at least make an account and look at all the threads and pictures latenlazy linked you to (The SDF link is very dated).
I think you make a few stereotypic inferences, and underestimate PLA willingness to learn (especially post gulf war and third taiwan strait crisis), as well as how critically they can look at their own force capability, but I only know enough to say that your conclusion is not how reality is, and am not sufficiently knowledgable to explain way.
BlitzoInsurgent-COIN? Do you know definition of insurgent/COIN? It certainly doesn’t apply to members of a formal army engaging in a formal combat operation even if it house-tohouse fighting.
A better term would just be “high intensity urban warfare,” but lately that has been transformed into “counter insurgent/coin” in the minds of most people due to the high exposure of similar US operations in the ME.
I don’t think latenlazy meant the term as in the formal definitions of the combatants.
Also air power is of limited value in such conflict zones – just ask the Syrians or Libyans who have levelled much of cities such as Aleppo and Misrata but gained nothing. Urban warfare is the domain of infantry.
It’ll be very interesting to see urban warfare in a modern metropolis, if not a little disheartening for humanity.
And the Taiwanese certainly have better MANPADS/AAA than Syrian and Libyan SA-7, manually guided cannons and or Iraqi and Afghan insurgents equipped with DShk, Ak-47 and RPG-7.
I think MANPADS and ATGMs will definitely be a strength the taiwanese must try and leverage.
Assumptions of Taiwanese not practicing even limited preparations such as camouflage, decoys etc.
Look at 1999 Kosovo campaign for how the “lowly” Serbs often tricked NATO with decoys etc. Russians call this maskirovka and it’s a big part of warfare.
If mighty USA with years of actual bombing experience can get it wrong so much, then what chance does PLA have of doing it right?
And each fortification/ambush just bleeds PLA combat forces.
We’re assuming both sides will try to make the most of their capabilities here, and I’m pretty latenlazy was taking into account taiwanese attempts to camoflauge and deceive the locations of their positions, etc.
Some strikes will be successful, some not, I don’t think we can properly judge which side can gain a net win.
All possible. It depends on how vested they are into their country, how quickly they expect US reinforcement etc etc.
They will be constrained by geography, population size, resupply for said population, etc. If they evacuate most of the populace from the cities of the west, where do they plan on building refugee camps? Taiwan has limited real estate and it’s already mentioned that the eastern side is mountainous and will be very very difficult to heave up a temporary settlement for civilians even assuming you manage to transport them all there anyway.
—
As for how effectively PLA could fight in an urban environment, who knows.
TW military’s ability will be debatable as well (though they’ll have some home court advantage given it would be their own city and may have support of locals, etc — but then again, armies don’t regularly train in their cities and the local populace may or may not hold a steely determination for the independence cause as well.)
I agree that TW’s best hope is to engage PLA in urban warfare, assuming their air force and navy are lost in the initial phases of the conflict, and that the PLA have successfully gained a beachhead. If PLA really were keeping a keen eye on western wars in the ME, they’d know how difficult it is to fight an urban war, and doubly more, if they have modern MANPADS and ATGMs.
So if I were PLA, I’d respond by taking all the easier, more lightly guarded areas including any possible refugee sites and treat the surrendering combatants and civilians well, and issuing terms of a ceasefire, etc.
If the taiwanese government/leaders etc holed up in taipei and other cities still want to go for it — well that’s another question entirely. But China would be able to starve them out if need be, while using what captured areas of taiwan as forward operating bases for aircraft, creating a mobile IADS, using ROCN ports as a forward base for PLAN ships, etc, if a US response seems imminent (of course we don’t know how fast PLA logistics can do this, and we don’t know how fast US will respond and how long it’s taken since hostilities were instigated for PLA to reach this point).
Also, we should consider espionage, ISR, and sabotage for all stages of the conflict for both sides, and who may hold the advantage.
Optimally, if PLA ELINT and SIGINT, espionage, etc are able to find the bunker or safe house where the independence seeking party heads/military brass etc, then air power, LACM, or SRBMs could be used and hopefully render a surrender from the next organ, lower in the chain of command.
If the initial invasion is successful, PLA would be hoping for high rates of defection and surrender as well, especially from troops who aren’t as committed to the independence cause. I’m sure PLA psyops would play a role too, they have quite a few Y-8XZs operational last I counted.
Btw, this is a decent video by Wortzel after publishing his latest book, and he holds some interesting opinions regarding the PLA, shedding some information regarding their specific capabilities, but also a lot on their ability to learn and adapt. There’s a few incorrect parts regarding precise details of systems (e.g.: apparently from him, china still imports tank engines from russia? And that they can’t make a decent jet engine, despite the 150 or so J-11Bs flying with WS-10s)
Quite a long watch, but there’s a few enlightening gems. He also takes the time to actually delve into chinese websites for his information (arguments of “opaqueness” are really BS — one can find a lot of info on chinese net if one simply bothers learning the language), for which I respect him.
BlitzoThat’s not an explanation, it’s just you making noise.
It’s the easiest thing in the world to say one thing is better than another. I could easily say I’m better than Dave Murray (Iron Maiden) on Guitar, but that doesn’t prove anything unless we both plug into a Marshall stack and see what we’re capable of, in any case I’m not, but I could have that mentality and totally believe I am and be ignorant to his capabilities. Much like what you do on here with your “knowledge” of the technology industry.
So, why not wake up and provide some solid, reliable and official evidence supporting your claims? How hard can it be?
Just add him to your ignore list.
He’s trolling and you’re just adding some fuel to the fire.
BlitzoAgain, I think you should cross post this over in SDF or CDF because there aren’t many PLA watchers here, (but there may be some case of bias on those sites too, but you’ll get mug more intimating answers too).
I’ll add a bit more when I get off my phone
BlitzoThis one I’m not sold on.
So much I’m going to start a new thread about it
You’re really better off going to SDF or CDF for a more comprehensive answer.
BlitzoI’m somewhat doubtful the US would be able to turn global public opinion against China. The most fascinating thing about the UN contemporaneously is that China actually has influence over more votes than the US. That said, the US doesn’t need the support of the entire world, just NATO and a handful of East Asian powers.
China’s economic influence will be the determinant in that, I think.
reducing trade altogether and not containing the economic shockwaves in the region might give us global recession 2.0, anyone?
I think Taiwan might be able to acquire some more Block 30/40 F-16s by 2025, as the pressure China is exerting on the US to not sell them would diminish by then. No way would F-35s even be remotely allowed to entire the conversation though.
I keep arguing for this, but it doesn’t seem like that’s what the ROCAF is focused on. This could change of course.
Who knows, maybe PLA will stumble and somehow allow ROC airbases to survive and decide to engage them in the air >_>
Given their studious fascination of US and NATO operations in ME and balkans though, I substantially doubt that.
If they give up on ROCAF and ROCN then they’re effectively conceding that PLA will be able to land ships on taiwan’s shores to engage them assymetrically on home ground.
Not only is that a fairly big military planning gamble, but is also a politically suicidal move I think.
Pretty confident that the Mainland would act if Taiwan declared independence in 2025. I think Taiwan’s best hope, if it wants independence, is to maintain the current status quo for at least a half century if not longer. There needs to be some generational turnover on both sides of the Strait where each side has had far more social and political exposure with one another than the current generation for there to be a peaceful solution.
At a certain point if both sides become amicable enough, politically and socially, and especially economically, we might see a voluntary hong kong style arrangement.
Contingent on a lot of factors though, but again, trajectory suggests this isn’t an impossibility.
BlitzoThe Taiwanese also have a longer history of practicing combined arms in a modern setting, unlike the PLA which has just awoken from a long term slumber.
Hmm… I wonder how often and how extensive the ROC military conducts large scale complicated exercises compared to PLA.
We don’t often hear about them of course, and we can only speculate as to both sides’ degree of flexibility and how real they compare to war scenarios, however if you make an account for CDF, there’s an entire sub forum with multiple threads which document with lots of pictures, some quite complex combined arms exercises.
That said, the entire PLA obviously wouldn’t have been exposed to more modern exercises, but given the size disparities between both sides, only a fraction of the PLA “needs” to be X degree well trained in a taiwan contingency.
BlitzoAnd assumption of everyone playing ball.
After all getting
Assumption of Arab neutrality or pro-Chinese posturing seems less likely than pro-US stamce by Arabs.
The oil princes have massive investments in USA that could be lost if they shifted to China.
I never said the Europeans would go to war. That doesn’t mean they can’t stop buying Chinese through economic sanctions. Remember they already have an arms embargo on CHina.
See sections regarding whether world would put lot with US (that means sanctions too).
It’s interesting you assume China ramps up militarisation but not USA.
If a Taiwanese leader declares independence, China needs to do something quickly anyway. If Taiwan’s “independence” following such a declaration lasts for months or years, then China
Well we’re assuming a few months or years preceding independence.
Whether US ramps up militarisation depends again on public perception.
What would China be doing in this long war? It doesn’t really have much reach outside of Taiwan and initial clashes against both Taiwan and US forces in Japan/South Korea would be bloody, especially in terms of ships and longer ranged aircraft.
Building up any force takes time.
And then what? Is China going to invade Japan or South Korea or Philippines.
In no one’s scenario will china invade japan, SK or phillippines, I think (at most, strikes at US bases in the region).
Once the world sees things coming to a head, I think the countries will have to make a big decision as to whether they want to continue hosting US bases.
Why the assumption of Taiwanese surrender, especially when it was the one declaring independence in this scenario.
Assuming they manage to reach the top leadership very quickly or decapitate it.
That said, high ranking military brass may still continue the fight regardless.
Similarly Taiwan could equally bleed PLA if it actually fights.
Again, depends on how effective a PLA initial bombardment is. Planning, planning, planning.
Your assumption is also the Chinese could perform the action at 100% efficiency. This is an untried force, whose top leadership dates back from the 1980-90s when the quite useless 1940s/50s Soviet doctrine prevailed and which has not fired a shot in anger since 1979.
Amphibious assaults are one of the hardest types of operation to conduct – you’re not only fighting the enemy but mother nature itself. Furthermore the logistics are extremely complicated.
1. Normandy wasn’t all cliffs either – in fact Pont du Hoc was extraordinary. Look at the other beaches (especially British ones) and they’re far flatter.
2. As for Taiwan’s west coast, it depends where you land. You don’t just land anywhere. You want deep water access, your want a place with favourable tides and you don’t want it to be too far from your own territory.
I think a comparison to operation sea lion might geographically more logical, but there are a few differences, namely that the Nazis didn’t have access to an overwhelming air power advantage, naval advantage, with access and ability to rain a tactically relevant number of missiles against the british isles (meaning no “battle of taiwan” air war that will make or break a PLA amphibious invasion).
Not to mention the english channel is somewhat shorter than the taiwan strait, and that germany was invading from occupied france rather than sovereign, industrialized territory which would mean superior logistics along with strategic depth and numbers.
That said, amphibious assaults definitely aren’t a simple maneuver, but given the range of assets PLAN would have by 2025, and if they are able to concentrate them somewhat effectively (i.e.: no splitting of half of PLAN to the second island chain to ward of USN or something), and if they act in conjunction with PLAAF and 2nd Arty’s conventional SRBM and LACM force, the ROC military could definitely have a hard time defending. Especially if their conscript troops aren’t particularly motivated (depends on whether ideal for independence becomes a mass supported taiwanese movement, or an act that may separate the populace, influencing morale).
We should also consider what kind of navy the PLAN may have by 2025, and what additional relevant assets they may have to play.
At least one fully operational carrier (liaoning), probably with another.
A vastly more competent surface fleet than now (e.g.: all the 051s would have been replaced by 052Ds, 055s would be in service, jiangweis and jianghus would probably be almost completely overtaken by 054A/B).
An LHA or two?
Another handful of LPDs?
Those would be on top of the existing three san antonio sized LPDs and two dozen or more 5000 ton LSTs they already have.
And of course, zubrs shouldn’t be discounted. Their range, speed, payload, and all terrain capability is almost perfectly suited to a taiwan scenario. With china having a license and the means to produce them domestically (two are under construction right now, the first ukrainian bought one is waiting for sea trials), we may very well see a leap in the PLA’s ability to rapidly transport troops and vehicles across the strait by 2025.
Having the hardware doesn’t mean you can use them efficiently of course, and it’s up to one’s own discretion if we give the PLA the benefit of doubt circa 2025.
(I can appreciate the US will also have new toys, but I suspect their force will resemble today’s military except with “newer toys,” such as more virginias replacing LAs, fords replacing nimitz, burke flight iii replacing a few ticos etc, and not the “quantum” leap that PLAN will be making. One can argue PLAN shipbuilding may begin to subside, but by the looks and sounds of things, this is just the beginning. It’s just my anecdote of course, but I would venture to say my PLA and PLAN watching eye is a bit keener than yours, no offence)
(Flipside of this is what new toys taiwan may have circa 2025, and whether they have any similar dramatic rise in capability. If it’s only a retirement of old hardware for slightly newer ones with no substantial rise in capability compared to today’s balance of forces, the situation begins to look a bit dire)
3. I’d sooner put money on Taiwanese being capable at defending their country (local knowledge of terrain conditions, prepared positions, defending homeland), than conscripts Chinese troops taking it over with ease.
That the Chinese could take over Taiwan with it’s professional military, relatively modern equipment, and all in an amphibious assault the likes of which the PLA has 0 experience with is a bit hard to believe.
Just a heads up, you have things the wrong way around.
PLA doesn’t actually have a conscription (policy is yes, but all are volunteers and no draft is enforced)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People’s_Liberation_Army#Conscription_and_terms_of_service
Taiwan does. 24 month service obligation.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conscription_in_Taiwan
Furthermore, the cultural perception of the military in taiwan isn’t exactly positive these days (that may change from now to 2025 of course, and serving in the military (or so I’ve heard from friends) isn’t exactly seen as a particularly honourable job.
There’s also been some recruiting issues for the ROC military, so calling them a “professional military” isn’t completely accurate.
This is a recent article from the jamestown foundation that provides interesting reading. One paper doesn’t make reality of course, but I think the trends are there.
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41302&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=688&no_cache=1#.UkkWUIamiSo
They may be able to turn things around if a rift begins to appear many years before the independence date of 2025, but if a rift only appears months before “D day” in 2025, that gives little chance to prepare and upskill their force beyond a light militia.
PS: factor in ROC military morale.
PPS: factor in taiwanese inexperience in defending as well
BlitzoKeep in mind that it would be FAR easier to discourage the US from continuing a conflict that doesn’t involve its citizenry directly than to dissuade China from pushing out a foreign power that it sees as threatening its sovereignty.
Public perception and support is definitely something we must factor in.
If the US continues ramping up rhetoric against china and portraying it as the next nazi germany, USSR, (or ironically) Imperial Japan, and the US public sees a big moral obligation to aid Taiwan, that could throw all these predictions in doubt, as any chinese preparations for war would almost certainly be matched by US sending in forces to westpac as well, and even if china declares an exclusion zone around taiwan, they can’t cover the entire western pacific, and certainly not an area wide enough that USN forces entering the region cannot have a combat influence.
And the chinese public (or at least, overwhelming majority) do hold taiwanese independence as a matter that is close to heart and would be willing to bleed a certain amount for it. By 2025 chances memories of the “century of humiliation” etc won’t have faded, and the central overriding ideology that china cannot be allowed to be “split” will certainly remain.
So the factors in flux are US public opinion, as well as world public opinion. If the western media/US media manage to turn most countries against china effectively (through diplomatic means as well), then china will have a very uphill battle.
But assuming china becomes a more improtant economic partner to many countries in the region and in the world, some “non aligned” countries may indeed want to stay neutral, and US probably won’t be able to strongarm any of the neutral countries into contributing. Actually, I’d be somewhat surprised if even more than one or two NATO countries send forces.
The chinese government’s rhetoric will also play a role, and if they come across as shrill and aggressive (which I have no doubt media will spin regardless), then US may win a few to its cause. If not, then who knows.
Unfortunately, the side of Taiwan that’s facing China is also the side that’s worth having, and it is anything but dense terrain. This isn’t the beaches of Normandy with high cliff sides. Furthermore, China will probably have secured the islands around Taiwan to gather strength for mass deployment, so it’s entirely possible for China to completely overwhelm a beach front with size alone. I’m not suggesting that they would take out every installation and piece of a defence front through naval and air strikes, but I’m doubtful Taiwan would be able to slow an invasion to any significant degree.
We shoudl also consider what state Taiwan’s military will be in by 2025. We only have the current trend to extrapolate from. How feasible would it be for taiwan to acquire F-16Cs from now until 2025, let alone F-35s?
that said, taiwan could still muster up decent assymetrical capabilities and invest in advanced ATGMs and MANPADs, IADS, etc.
Also consider how taiwan’s defence budget would oscillate between now and 2025. With continued economic integration, budget may not rise much, if not decrease. That may change of course, if a rift begins to appear within the next few years the ROC military may receive substantial investment that would effect how they perform in an eventual conflict, as opposed to a antagonisms rising only a few months before a conflict.
EDIT: I should probably apologize a little for detracting from the original focus of this thread. Most of my points have been about how easily it would be for China to take Taiwan before the US could get involved, and not about what would happen if the US and China found themselves locked in a protracted conflict. I do think though that there are some faulty assumptions underpinning your original scenario, mainly the idea of how many countries would instantly side with the US instead of choosing to stay out of such a war, and how likely it would for a war over Taiwan to escalate to the degree your original scenario laid out (such as China striking airbases in Japan) given that that the strategic aim is the control over an island and not an existential or total war scenario. Assuming a Kuwait situation where the international community collectively decides to force China to release Taiwan might be feasible, but that would be more China vs the World than China vs the US. Finally, such a coalition would be difficult to build through the UN given China’s permanent veto power in the Security Council, and given that China is no Iraq, with much greater international influence and ties, and being a much more formidable opponent.
+1
Too much diplomatic, political and economic factors influencing the prelude up to this conflict.
Would Japan, SK, Australia, immediately side with US?
Would NATO powers?
Would ASEAN remain neutral or put their lot in? Same question with ME (crucial) and central europe.
Would chinese economic relationships between all the above countries make siding with US or PRC too risky? Chances are they may have an economic vested interest in actually resolving the crisis diplomatically or even letting it end quickly. That could come through a quick PLA invasion and ROC surrender, or a devastating US preemptive strike on the mainland to degrade all their warfighting capability so an invasion simply can’t be mounted. However if the latter occurs (assuming the US government is that bold, and assuming the PLA of 2025 cannot defend itself sufficiently), would that inflame PRC domestic public even more and lead to a grudging cessation of hostility, but making the entire westpac a hazard zone for the next few decades?
Or maybe the mainland will simply not care about taiwan declaring independence and let it go.
But the entire national, and civilisation story that the chinese are used to, suggests otherwise.
BlitzoWhy is a project 22350 more stealthy compared to MEKO A-200SAN? Or e.g. a British Type 45?
No one said gorshkov class was more stealthy, only that there was little discernible difference.
That said, the first 22350 hasn’t even been fully fitted out yet, so the comparison is somewhat moot (yet by its shaping and mast, and CGIs we’ll know it should be in the same class as most modern ships).
I think most modern ships since the mid 2000s all sit on the same scale of LO — la fayette, shivalik, Type 45, horizon and fremm, meko 200, 054A, 052C/D, 22350, and others — and the biggest differences are in deck and mast clutter, which they all sit on a small continuum on, and for those which do have some clutter, the edges of the bow cover it anyway.
Then there’s your zumwalts and visbys, which I would argue have the right to sit in an upper category by themselves, convincingly above the rest of today’s “stealthy” ships, whose management of RCS is only marginally better or worse than one another.
Obviously this is all opinion and conjecture, so feel through to ignore this post.
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