In the long run PLA wins regardless of whether it’s fighters are J-6s or J-10s or J-20s or it’s ships are Type 053s or Type 054s.

But amphibious assaults are very risky affairs and even when you have 100% air superiority, defence, terrain and even the weather etc can make it a real slog for the attacker. Not to mention breaking out of a beachhead is in itself a difficult affair – e.g. Normandy, Anzio, Salerno.

Interesting article on Taiwanese defence options:

http://offshorebalancer.wordpress.com/2013/08/23/ham-omelettes-and-taiwans-defence/

That is a very interesting article.

I think both ROC and PLA will have some advantages they can bring to bear on the other.

PLA:
-SRBMs, long range MLRS, cruise missiles etc, can be used to saturate taiwan’s air defences and strike at a variety of high value targets (air bases, naval ports, C4, depots, etc) at relatively short notice. I personally think the whole “1500+” SRBM estimate or whatever it is that China is pointing at Taiwan is a little bit overstated, but I don’t think anyone will deny that it is probably a big number and can be deployed and fired, reloaded, fired again, etc, with little warning given the small profile of TELs, their mobility, etc etc

-Air power, while only flankers can only operate at second island chain without tanker support, almost all of the PLA’s 4th generation fleet (and some of their 3rd generation fighters i.e.: J-8IIs) can operate over taiwan from bases with some level of endurance and persistence, even from less vulnerable inland bases (e.g.: flankers and JH-7As, or J-10s with tanker support). PLAAF will have a bit of a fight on their hands if ROCAF is fully operational by the start of hostilties, but assuming a bombardment of SRBMs, LACMs, and MLRS on relevant sites preceding an air war, I expect the scales to be tipped heavily on PLAAF’s side, even if the air force can only bring to bear a fraction of its overall fleet to the taiwanese theatre

-Naval power+air power (again): ROCN will not survive long in the taiwan strait. Fairly straight forward. Taiwanese FACs may try to negate the PLAN’s inevitable amphibious operation, but the strait will probably be surveyed constantly by PLA AEW, and amphibious groups will be heavily defended by PLAN pickets, and if I were planners I’d stick in a few Z-9Ws and Z-19s equipped with ATGMs to counter ROCN FACs, and TY-90s in case any cobras or apaches decide to stick their nose in.

-Newer amphibious assault options: PLAN will shortly have in operation multiple zubrs (say in three years time), and already have three 071s in service, along with many fairly large LSTs. Zubrs open up many more regions as beachheads, 071s can threaten the eastern side of taiwan, and all in all it makes the defenders spread their defence thinner

-decapitation/SOF: one of the more unrealistic ideas, is where the PLA manage to strike at the political and military heads of the taiwanese government/independence leaning wing, which would put much of the taiwanese defensive strategy in disarray. Given the lack of strategic depth in taiwan, and expected PRC espionage, this may be very possible

ROC:
-Beachhead defence — javelin equipped teams, surviving apaches, etc could do very potent damage against landing parties, not to mention their greater familiarity with the lay of the land. Some of the A2AD techniques PLA favours, especially coastal AshM batteries, could be used against them.

-forewarning — chances are there will be a build up to hostilities, and they can try to disperse targets as such. Land power may be relatively easily dispersed and hidden. Fighters, E-2s, frigates and destroyers, less so. Still, it will make PLA SRBM and air strikes, SEAD more difficult

-SAMs — patriot, and their taiwanese clones, are not to be underestimated, and any that survive an initial SRBM and LACM bombardment could make PLA air power operating over Taiwan hazardous, and at least make them relegate fighters for SEAD, and lack of complete air superiority may further delay a PLA strait crossing.

-urban warfare — could be bloody and drawn out, allowing for a US response. but given the urban density of taiwan and the inevitable blockade/no fly zone that PLA will try to impose, I doubt many people will be able to flee the cities to safe zones for the military to fight it out. They’ll be trapped on this island with a war going on around them, and collateral damage caused by PLA and ROC militayr may be high if urban warfare occurs.

Unknown factors:
-Taiwanese morale/support for independence. 3rd Taiwan strait crisis saw most people relatively high support for the dude PRC hated. Depending on the economic and political circumstances of the new guy who calls for independence, this may or may not change the resistance PLA experiences
-Taiwanese support for the military/military health. There was that recent article mentioning an amount of public disillusionment/skepticism towards the ROC military, and also some big problems in recruiting.

All in all, I think both sides have some obvious military advantages they can leverage,

Nonetheless, the odds are very much against either the J-31 or Naval PAK-FA being superior to the F-35C. As a matter of fact both are many years behind the F-35C in development and not just it time. As for the F/A-XX (NGAD) is 30 years off at least. (if it happens)

I think that is making a few too many assumptions and relies on a belief that china and Russia won’t be able to deliver a competitive product. I’m not claiming a chinese or Russian naval fighter will be vastly superior than F-35C I would never claim that considering how little we know and how formative such projects would be, but based on that same information, you cannot confidently claim F-35C will be the best carrier based fighter for the next two or three decades.

30 years is a long time for one plane to hold the mantle of being “best” in its particular class, and it will also be hard to compare the aircraft based off their virtues given air combat and strike capability may only further evolve in coming decades.
Wil EW play a bigger role? Will kinematic performance grow more or less important? Will range and endurance still be as all influencing? Will networking and next generation data links make the individual platform less relevant, where two warring sides should be considered in a systems approach involving off board sensors and mutual fire support?

My point is less about how good F-35C is or how good a chinese or Russian product ends up being, but rather that it’s infeasible to make such a statement enveloping such a long timespan.

Fellas, can we just leave goldlust to his devices? It’s not like anyone takes him seriously. Better, where are the mods? :confused:

LOL The Best Naval Fighter for the next 20-30 year will be the F-35C.

FLY NAVY😎

If we are actually going to humour this, I think there is a chance that any naval T-50, J-20 could conceivably perform better than F-35C, especially considering F-35Cs relatively smaller airframe, limiting payload and range etc.
But I suspect F-35C will definitely be the most mass produced 5th generation carrier borne fighter, which no naval J-21, J-20 or PAK FA will be able to fully match in terms of numbers.

This is basically China’s A2AD vs USN and USAF’s ASB

Such an outbreak of hostilities won’t be instant. There will inevitably be a buildup of some weeks or even months of increased indicators towards independence for taiwan.
Depending on how diplomacy goes between the PRC and USA, the US may either choose to have forward deployed assets or may be further back.

If assets are forward deployed, then you have WWIII effectively, because taiwan declares independence –> china declares war on taiwan –> US inevitably drawn in –> all USN targets in region are potential targets + any continental chinese targets will also be targets due to the doctrine of ASB.

If assets aren’t forward deployed, the PLA will seek to enable a quick invasion of taiwan, likely involving a large LACM and ballistic missile strike on every IDed high priority target (air bases, C and C, air defence etc) with follow on airstrikes coinciding with a large amphibious invasion (with multiple 071s, zubrs, and likelya few LHA’s supported by a carrier or two, this will be a strong force to be noted of). PLA will also likely to strike at US bases in the region (again depending on the US’s diplomatic stance before this crisis boils and pops), and probably use of anti satellite weapons. These will likely co occur with strong chinese diplomatic warnings to any US intervention.
If PLA can shut down taiwanese independence within a week (which would rely on good PLA planning and logistics, aggressive strikes, and US hesitance) then the crisis may end very quickly and US will have to check whether they want to expand the scope of the conflict.
If US are determined to follow their treaty with Taiwan, then who knows. We’ll probably get WWIII.

IF Chinese continental targets are fair play, then we may end up seeing many chinese diaspora in US and other countries starting to form third column movements and you’ll really end up with a much bigger social problem alongside the military, political, economic challenge too.

I suspect Chinese SSKs will be used not in an active way but rather a passive way to linger slowly and quietly and strike at USN taskgroups, so I think it will be quite difficult to neutralize PLAN SSKs.
OTOH, USN SSNs and SSGNs will be the most deadly weapon against PLAN ships, subs, and many land based bases as well.

Timing and political maneuvers leading up to war will be essential in seeing how such a situation plays out.

Clear and present threats for both sides exist though:
For US + Taiwan: SRBM/IRBM/LACM, AShBM, ASAT, entire A2AD system including less exotic weapons such as very quiet and slow SSKs that may strike at USN taskforces or at least dilute their capability
For PLA: SSGNs and SSNs for both surface and land based targets, along with sheer quantity and quality of USN assets. Forward bases in Japan are also a potential threat for a preemptive strike. US ASAT weapons also come into play.

cyberwarfare will hinder both sides. China may try to play the economic card, selling of US reserves etc. US will likely counter by blockading chinese shipping around the world, and would probably be able to overwhelm any forward deployed PLAN presence in indian ocean as well, as by 2025 PLAN still probably won’t be deploying CVBGs on a permanent basis with multiple supporting overseas bases.

So the subject isn’t how an air war in north asia will fare, but rather how will China’s A2AD system fare against US’s ASB in the western pacific at large.

One thing is certain though — PLA capabilities among all domains will rise qualitatively and quantitatively and gain new tactical capabilities like more AEWC, stealth fighters, some air to air refuellers, and also more strategic assets through the form of carriers, a potent amphibious ready group style taskforce, cruisers, a few quiet SSNs and SSBNs, and more importantly, a mature and capable C4ISR system linked to an array of area denial assets.
And US military will continue its modernization as well without a massive surge in quantity — replace F-16s and F-18s with F-35s, more virginias to replace LA, more fords to replace nimitz, more P-8s to replace P-3s — but will have more contingency plans for a westpac war and more assets in region at any one time compared to now.

Again, big factor depends on if inland PRC targets are seen as “fair game”. If they are, all bets are off.

PS: I will be surprised if 200+ J-20s and J-21s are in service by 2025. At any rate, J-21 probably won’t become an in service fighter.

Indians operated ex-UK carriers and would have modeled their operations on those lines.

Quite a bit of difference in operating a 20,000 ton VSTOL carrier and a much larger 37,000 ton STOBAR carrier, methinks.

To return this thread from this Su-35 fiasco…

AVIC are developing a number of new helicopter concepts, with them stated on their website (anyone who follows PLA developments know how rare such examples of openness occur):

There’s the “blue whale” a 20 ton payload, quad tilt rotor that is very similar to the now suspended bell boeing QTR. 800 km combat radii, 8000 km range, and a max speed of 538 km/h. Should be a good Mi-26 replacement, and a supplement to the Y-9.

There is also the K800 demonstrator UAV, which has a coaxial and double pusher propeller orientation not dissimilar to sikorsky x2, for the purposes of demonstration only. 800 kg, designed to reach 450 km/h, with a first flight around 2015.

There are also various rotorcraft, one clean energy type running on batteries, another which resembles the eurocopter x3.

If these models were unsubstantiated we might have been more able to dismiss them (but even then, we should recall how J-21/31 and sharp sword UAV both first emerged as models as well, without any official statement), but the fact that the AVIC website has published such projects, means we may have a chance to actually see at least a couple of prototypes of each.
At the very least, I am glad at least one country in the world is willing to develop a quad tiltrotor.

Janes has a more comprehensive detail of the PLA’s overall rotorcraft developments here,
http://www.janes.com/article/26593/chinese-rotary-wing-plans-spur-rise-in-stature-of-pla-army-aviation-forces

Ah I was mainly talking about Air Force. Agreed on other factors, particularly navy.

I think that by 2050 the PLA will be able to match the US military qualitatively in terms of individual types of assets, but will still lack the numbers, even in the air force.
PLAAF’s lack of force multipliers (tankers specifically) and strategic transports is a large hinderance to the PLA overall, and will take many years to turn around. Their AEWC fleet looks decent, and in a few years may be the world number 2 (how does the VVS’s current A-50 fleet number, and what are its plans for the successor?), but considering Y-20 airframes will be needed between strategic transport, tanker, and AEWC, PLAAF have to decide which capability is more important.

I tend to look at Air Defense as extension of the AF when judging strength, and the Chinese have built up one of the strongest networks in the world. That factors into the equation against a hypothetical westpac opponent, while the US faces large scale force solution in any conflict in the area. Further how much of US defense spending relative to China will be aimed at insurgency wars and the kind of conflicts it has realistically been fighting for the past decade? Much more in all likeliness.
If the Chinese do a decent job of integrating their S-300s and other strategic SAMs with Nebo-M like VHF sets (and especially if these sets can be used for missile guidance input) and pursue longer ranged missiles, the US “stealth” advantage becomes far far more manageable.

SAMs certainly do play a role in their A2AD capability, and I suspect the navy may seek to set up defensive air defense lines using their excellent new APAR equipped destroyers and surface combatants to limit enemy action as well.
But one may argue that if a US stealth threat has reached the mainland in a constant way, then the conflict is already lost.

You mention something interesting with US defense spending. If uncle sam decides to wind back its ME adventurism, will its defense spending decrease overall? Probably not, instead the cash that would have gone to facilitating middle eastern wars may be used to develop and produce weapons that will be more useful against an opponent like china, which may counteract the larger effects of an economic decline.
OTOH, I think a global military power like which the US currently holds is unsustainable, and china probably won’t seek to have ten aircraft carriers in service at one time with ten more mini flattops, or 80 aegis style surface combatants, and I think the US is spending too much on its military, which will be a waste in the long term if no war with another power like China or Russia erupts. So if US discovers common sense and reduces its overall military capability, PLA may reach quantitative parity sooner rather than later. Vice versa if US goes full crazy on its military industrial complex too.

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That’s absurd.

China and Russia bring vastly more to the table than anyone save the US.
Hell, when was the last time any Europeans operated without a coalition or with the US doing the majority of the work? I don’t say that as an insult, btw.
Their AD is miserable for the most part as well. Sure, they can strike Libya with America doing 50%+ of the work. That makes them 1st rate?
We have different criteria clearly. Flight hours and advanced training gets you only so far when you operate a miserable (in comparison) total force/

Also, the definition of “long range deployment” necessarily involve foreign basing, and one may argue whether that is an air force issue or foreign relations issue.