BlitzoThe Iraqis have used quite a number of Chinese Ch-5’s and my understanding is they would probably happily trade them all in for a half dozen Su-25’s. In Al-Bab and in Aleppo you saw rebel and ISIS formation routinely in battalion strength or even greater. 300 to 500 to even 800 men in 30-50-80ish vehicles arrayed at one go. Pin prick one off strikes from a Predator would be a waste of effort against that. Now something like a Reaper with its ability to realistically carry 4 250lb bombs to a useful range and with a useful endurance is another story but a Predator class drone is really only good for assassinations of high profile leadership. In this kind of high intensity urban fight and with this level of resistance — next to useless.
I think in those situations tactical uavs to have persistent surveillance would be as valuable as having the strike aircraft and munitions to target them. A half dozen Su-25s supported with the endurance ISR of MALE uavs would be a deadly combination, and if that aircraft has a few hellfire class missiles to hit targets of opportunity would very much be a secondary role for the kind of war Iraq or Syria is facing.
And I think Iraq is using CH-4s
BlitzoI think Hokum is one of the rare helicopters with ejection seats right?
Blitzothere were some planes that used two wing hooks instead of one on the fueselage
Interesting, which planes are those? Any recent jet fighters with that configuration?
I’m not sure if it would be possible on PAK FA because the tailhook I imagine needs to be closer to the rear of the aircraft and the trailing edge of PAK FA probably isn’t rear enough. Though I think they could adopt two hooks, one each under the engine nacelles, rear, near the nozzles. But I’m not sure how safe two hooks would be, because if one hook misses and one catches a wire, then that would put asymmetrical force on the airframe, which probably isn’t good.
Blitzoits possible to combine both methods, but i would have to get up close to see whats needed and doable,
i’m not aware of any collapsible design but it would be strong enough to hold on the stretching force,
and mechanically simple, it can be activated with a spring and ground crew can simply push it back after landing with a lever
Continuing from the LCA thread,
anyone else know how a hypothetical naval PAK FA could arrange its tailhook? Either extending the tailsting to allow for a tailhook to be established but that wouldn’t be optimal for landing characteristics, or as obligatory suggests, a collapsible tailhook but I’m not sure if such a configuration has been demonstrated in the past.
BlitzoCould these be for Pakistan?
Nah, they’re the same kind of 039Bs that they built for themselves (and seemingly suspended for a while) a few years back.
If they’re for Pakistan then there would be a bit more pomp and ceremony about it.
BlitzoLooks uglier than the first time around.
With the big vertical stabilisers one can only assume that they are pitching it to PLAN as a carrier-based aircraft.
It’s not like the vertical stabilisers were particularly small on V1. I’m sure SAC are hoping the navy will bite for it as a carrier fighter (or better yet, that the air force will pull the trigger on a medium weight stealth jet to supplement J-20), but I don’t see any modifications on V2 that strongly indicate that.
If we saw it had folding wings and a tailhook OTOH that would be a much stronger indicator…
BlitzoWondering if the PLAN AOR’s are compatible with NATO ships? Could this AOR for example refuel a Canadian Frigate or a British Destroyer if they were part of say an anti piracy group?
Not sure — I think the China Navy has practiced simulating refuelling in Gulf of Aden with some ships from EU countries a few times, but no actual underway replenishments.
http://navaltoday.com/2014/03/31/eu-navfor-chinese-navy-warships-train-together-in-gulf-of-aden/
And 901 would technically be an AOE (fast combat support ship) rather than AOR (often used to refer to more general oiler/replenishment ships)
BlitzoI think it is pretty clear China wants to dominate up to the first Island chain and be able to reach out to the Second island Chain. Up to the First Island Chain China can do that from land bases but out to the Second they need carriers and all the supporting vessels. The rapid refits of older ships and constant stream of new vessels including support tankers and dry stores ships show they are keen to move forward with this.
I think in the West we tend to forget the psychological impact of the Taiwan strait crisis in 1996 when the US were able to sail two Carrier battle groups down the Taiwan strait in a show of force with utter impunity. China does not want the US to feel it can do something like that again without potential severe consequences…
Correction! Only one carrier battle group went down the Taiwan strait whilst the other operated in the Region but the Chinese found it humiliating nevertheless.
To be honest the result of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis should also be grouped with the Belgrade embassy bombing in 1999 and other incidents like the Yinhe incident, and combine that with the US demonstration of modern warfare during the Gulf War probably convinced China’s leadership that US intentions to China were far from benign/untrustworthy and that the US had an unacceptable lead in military capabilities.
All that put in a steely resolve to not only to acquire the capability to deter and (if need be) fight the US, but also the kind of procurement and technological advancements that would need to be put in place to achieve it.
I think China’s procurement of carriers is less related to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and more part of China’s overall desire/requirement for power projection overall (think Africa), but obviously carriers would be useful in a westpac conflict scenario against the US when paired with the rest of the Chinese military’s land based air power and missile forces, and the navy overall.
Either way, a lot has changed in twenty years… and even in ten years. Hopefully the world will be stable enough to see another ten years.
BlitzoTo revive a conversation from 2yrs ago…
With the recent confirmation that construction began on China’s third aircraft carrier (and first catapult-equipped carrier) last year, I think we can say that China is, in fact, rushing the fences.
For anyone out of the loop, I assume Rii is referring to this video: http://www.bilibili.com/video/av7611144/
In it, Professor Jin Yinan (who is director of the strategic research institute at the PLA’s National Defence University) at this conference said construction of China’s third aircraft carrier began in March 2015 at JNCX at 3:57 of the video, and it would be “flat deck, catapult take off”. Consistent with known rumours of course.
Also, I wouldn’t say the Chinese Navy are even technically rushing for the fences that much. There are significant indicators that strongly suggest the Navy originally didn’t even want 001A and wanted 002 (with catapults) immediately after Liaoning, but the delay of subsystem development for 002 (probably catapults) meant they decided to procure 001A as an additional stop gap carrier because they didn’t feel comfortable with only Liaoning for the immediate future (pre 2020 I assume).
As for lacking a clear requirement to do so, the new ascendency of China hawks under the Trump administration might suggest otherwise.
With 001A due to be launched in the next six months and commissioned probably around 2020, with 002 launching around the same time for commission around 2023/4, I think we can anticipate that PLAN will operate 4-5 carriers by 2030, probably including its first nuclear and EMALS-equipped carrier.
The major uncertainties at this point would appear to be:
(1) what sort of catapult system 002 is to be equipped with
(2) whether a second conventionally-powered CATOBAR carrier will follow 002
(3) if there will be a construction gap, and if so how long, between 002/002A and a subsequent nuclear-powered design.
(4) how many carriers China ultimately intends to build and operate (only marginally relevant before 2030)
(5) developmental timelines for a 5th generation carrier-based combat aircraft to complement J-15/A.
Yeah… all of this will of course depend on the economic situation at home/abroad, and also the overall strategic situation. If Trump decides to rock the Taiwan boat in the next few years then all of this planning might go out the window if it eventually comes to conflict.
BlitzoThe most difficult aspect of CATOBAR operations is landing, considering landing is exactly the same on a STOBAR carrier building another one is a good low risk way to build up an experienced Cadre of carrier pilots qualified in arrested landing. They could even fly the Catapult configured J-15 off the STOBAR configured carriers allowing China to standardise the type down the line.
Yep, my thoughts exactly.
Once the catapult J-15A enters production I would be surprised if anymore ski jump-only J-15 continues production at all. Not to mention the catapult compatible J-15A should likely field enhanced avionics more consistent with the likes of J-10B/C, J-16/J-11D etc.
Blitzo901 class AOE also began sea trial
quite symbolic of a ship, for the navy’s future.
BlitzoJust not any comparison possible between the two system IMHO.
In the Russian sistem design bureau (now NAPO) and production concen (i.e. the factories actually producing planes) are two separate entities, obviously linked one with the other but with a distinct legal status.
Russian state has so a contract with the design bureau to develop a plane and produce prototypes and another one with the production concern for serial, large scale production.
Even more importantly, great part of the testing phase is directly made by the air force itself, once the projected aircraft passes acceptance tests they buy the successive prototypes and do the so called State Trials for themselves, with a greater level of secrecy that any entity on the market would ever do, hence the spasmodic wait for -8 pictures.
Preparation of the assembly line would ideally happen between the completion of the last propotype and the end of the state trials, so to have it ready for full production as soon as they end.
Usually, however the1st serial batch is made by planes not yet fully developed but at a standard still deemed fit for operational service.
In the PAK-FA case given that this batch is made of just 12 planes i.e. what strictly needed for a training squadron allow me to hipotize that it is just the case.Prototypes are usually 8, four for the initial tests and four for state trials, in the case of PAK-FA russian planned the actual -9 to be the last one, the emersion ofstructural problems, the 5 prototype incident and India requests lead to a cohomprensive rethinking with the construction of the second test bed (i.e. the -7), splitting of the 6th prototype in two (one became the -5SR after incident) and the construction of two additional prototypes for themselves and one for IndAF to put their own avionics in.
Nothing too worring however, T-10 path into Su-27 (and Mig-29) was a much more troubling one.
Thanks for the array of info.
Would the state trials for the four prototypes be similar to IOT&E of USAF, or is there also no direct equivalent of state trials either?
BlitzoHe may be talking about Henri Kehnmann (aka Henri K. owner of eastpendulum.com). He is an airbus engineer who had worked in China and seem to have some good contacts within some companies especially the civil aviation ones. How much contacts he has with the military side as well as the PLAAF is unknown, but he does seem to have some personal contacts from the military side too. He one of the best China watchers in the west.
Oh Henri K. Yes of course I’m aware of who he is. I didn’t know that is who haloweene was referring to.
I must make it clear again, the whole J-20 confrontation results are rumors of varying of believability. What we know for sure is that 2x J-20 are participating in the Red Sword exercises 2016, including aggressor roles.
Well to be even more pedantic, I’d go even more specific: we know for sure that there were at least two J-20s parked at Dingxin at about the time when Red Sword exercises were occurring. Anything beyond that, are as you say, rumours of varying degrees of believability.
BlitzoKnaapo site say -8 http://www.knaapo.ru/press-centre/gallery/124/
They told 12 with the last being for India, production of first batch of serial aircraft is scheduled for last quarter of 2017.
Surely those ones wouldn’t have -30 aboard.
Not really clear what prototypes 10 &11 would have aboard however, they that the 9th would have full avionic package while for the successive ones there are voices about “structural refinements” without any more precise indication AFAIK.
Thanks… So I expect delivery of first batch to occur in early 2018, if production of first batch in last quarter of 2017?
And in that case I presume prototypes 9, 10 and 11 (and 12) will all fly within the next year, before production of first batch begins? I must say 11 flying prototypes seem like quite a lot — does the VVS conduct different testing/evaluation methods for its prototypes compared to western air forces which may explain this, or is 11 prototypes for PAK FA unique even for Russian/Soviet practice?
Please, repeat with me: there is not LRIP in SovietRussia, there is not LRIP in SovietRussia, there is not LRIP in SovietRussia, there is not LRIP in SovietRussia…
As there is not IOC and no total predefinited production numbers at start of any program: they contract every single production batch separately.
I use the term loosely, to describe the equivalent stage of production or development of the respective programme.
(I’m not even sure if calling J-20s built over the last year would be truly equivalent to US definition of LRIP, but I do so out of simplicity’s sake)
BlitzoSo after a quick search and a going back a few pages without clear result… can anyone clarify as to which no. of flying prototype s/n 056 is? Is it the 8th, or 9th?
And how many more prototypes are expected before LRIP or first batch production (and are those expected to use izd 30, or continue with interim engines)?
Much appreciated.
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