Originally posted by Vaiar
Isn’t it so that the F-16 block 60 will be used (mainly) for aerial superiority and the Mirage 2000-9 (mainly) for the strike role?

Both are completely multi role.

No body spend for the development cost of new aircraft for a small number. Manufacturing was the intention from the begning. they should have started with simple airframes and then tried to upgrade it in India later. The same is the case of upgrading MIG-21. I read about this deal since 1996 and this will be completed in 2005. Instead of wasting 10 years on upgrading MiG-21. India should have purchased small number of newer and modern aircraft.

Originally posted by sharmaji
The AIr Force Chief and head designer have said that the first block of Tegas will be powered by the American engine, as far as negotiations are concearned, the Americans are willing to sell and the Indians are willing to buy as soon as possible, besides minus Gorshkov and the AJT and Indian defence procurement speed is comparable to the rest of the world.

I have read the Su-30 deal talk as far s back in 1993 in AW&ST and now it is 2003 with only 28 aircraft and still all are not fully upgraded and full operational in next two years. I don’t want to comment any further than people will feel it as a flame.

Could this be the reason. But Syria is strictly socialist system and it is always hard to get information. Russia always announce deals with acceptable nations.
Kenneth Williams” wrote in message
news:1aca287.0310110728.754177dc@posting.google.com…

> Now I’m really confused. I got out two fairly new aircraft reference
> books to verify the aircraft listed and both list the Su-27 in Syrian
> inventory. These books are:
>
> – the Directory of Military Aircraft of the World 2001 by Peter March
> – the Pocket Guide to Military Aircraft and the World’s Airforces 2001
> by David Donald

Kenneth,
the editors that prepare such books do not research in the true sence of
that word: they lack the time for doing anything similar, and instead depend
on the informations from other sources. They instead use other “sources of
reference” for compiling their work. In the case of the “Su-27s in Syria”
topic, however one turns it, the basic information is that from the AFM
published in 2000.

There are frequently such cases. Let me offer you a brilliant example.

I’m sure that you have hard about that well-known Iraqi claim one of their
Mi-24s has shot down an Iranian F-4?

This claim was originally published on 27 October 1982, by the Iraqi
magazine “Baghdad Observer,” a publication controlled by the former Iraqi
regime, published in Baghdad, and targeting Western reporters underway in
Iraq.

In the report with the title “The Day of the Helicopter Gunship” an air
battle was briefly described that supposedly developed several days earlier,
and in which one Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter had shot down an Iranian F-4
Phantom. According to the “Baghdad Observer,” the engagement happened “north
of the Eyn-e Khosh area” and the Phantom was destroyed by a “next
generation, long-range, AT-6 Sprial ATGM,” fired by a Mi-24 helicopter
specially prepared and brought to Iraq by the Soviets in order to test the
AT-6 missile in the air-to-air mode.

Ever since, this claim has been making rounds in many Western, Ukrainian,
and Russian publications. The basis of this reporting was the fact that the
article from the Baghdad Observer was forwarded by the FBIS. FBIS is Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, a Washington based company, scanning the
press, TV&Radio reports all around the world. On 28 October, 1982, FBIS
issued its Communiqué No. 885, FBIS-MEA-82-209, on the page E2 of which one
can find the forwarded report from the Baghdad Observer.

This story then spread approximately in the following order:
– Steven J. Zaloga & George J. Balin, Anti-Tank Helicopters, Osprey, 1986,
p. 36; “Hind, Overpowering or Overrated?,” Air International, May 1984, p.
252;
– David C. Isby, Weapons And Tactics of the Soviet Army, Jane’s, 2nd Ed.,
1988, p. 442;
– John Everett-Heath, Soviet Helicopters, 2nd Ed., Jane’s, 1988, p. 131;
– Steven J. Zaloga, “ATA: Helicopter Dogfighting”, Mi Seitelman; Ed.,
Advanced Combat Helicopters, Evolving Roles, Motorbooks Int’l, 1988, p. 10;
– John Fricker, “Russian Round-Up”, Air International, September 1989, p.
131:
– John Fricker, “Recent Soviet Rotary-wing Revelations”, Air International,
January 1990, p. 19;
– John W. R. Taylor & Kenneth Munson, “Gallery of Middle East Airpower”, Air
Force Magazine, October 1992, pp. 68-69;
– Yossef Bodansky, “Iraq’s Rotary Assets”, Part 1, Defense Helicopter World,
Vol. 9, No. 5, October-November 1990, p. 24;

Each of these authors and publications actually only repeated the original
claim: they did not add any new informations to it, their authors did not
start a separate research to this topic, trying to locate the eventual
Russian or Iraqi crews, or to find out if the Russians really tested the
AT-6 as AAM in Iraq, or trying to find the eventual Iranian crews. They only
“forwarded” the same info originally supplied by the Baghdad Observer, and
forwarded to the West by the FBIS.

By 1990 there was only one person (not me) trying to find out what happened.
So, after the end of the Cold War the man in question (a highly experienced
US Army attack-helicopter pilot, especially interested in helicopters in air
combat), went out to try to find what happened. He interviewed several
former Soviet dignitaries, trying to find out more: but there was nothing
more. No additional details; no gun-camera pictures, no names, nothing.

During the 1990s this claim then became “en vogue” in Polish, Ukrainian and
Russian publications too, the authors of which for an unknown reason started
thinking that the original source for the publication of this claim would be
the “US intelligence” (see Y. Gordon’s article about the Mi-24 in the WAPJ
37). This “US intelligence”, however, was nothing more than the FBIS. A raw
confirmation for this is Gordon even went so far to explain that during the
IPGW (Iraq-iran War), there was a specific number of air-to-air combats
involving Iraqi and Iranian helicopters etc. But, this specific number was
nothing else but the summary of the figures mentioned in all the reprots
forwarded by FBIS during the whole IPGW: i.e. the whole research about the
helicopter warfare between Iraq and Iran actually consisted of somebody
there calculating how many helicopter vs helicopter engagements were
reported in different Iraqi and Iranian press communiqués that were later
forwarded by the FBIS.

A true “science”, isn’t it?

But, that’s not all. As everybody better informed here should know, the FBIS
is _no_ “US intelligence,”: it is an information service that compiles
reports from all possible foreign media sources and broadcasts, and reports
these to its clients in the USA. The FBIS neither confirms nor denies
reports it is forwarding: it simply reports what was reported by somebody
else. This fact is, however, was completely ignored in this case by almost
everybody involved. In fact, Y. Gordon went even so far to explain that the
Iranian F-4 in question was shot down by that Mi-24 on 27 October 1982 –
i.e. the date the original report had actually been published for the first
time in Baghdad Observer, which in turn obviously described that the
engagement had happened several days earlier! Gordon, however, was not the
only one: several other Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish authors did exactly
the same, with the slight difference that specific authors explained it
wasn’t the AT-6 that was used, but a salvo of unguided rockets, or gunfire
or whatever else.

However one turns it, this claim is widely been accepted as “authentic,” and
considered as “confirmed” even by observers with immense and undisputable
knowledge about helicopters and anti-armour warfare, or former dignitaries
of the Soviet Air Force and airspace industry. Most Russian and Ukrainian
students use it to “confirm” the capabilities and firepower of the Mi-24
attack helicopter and the AT-6 missile, even if actually very few people
know anything about the background of the claim, or its initial source,
while others are obviously ignoring these, while maintaining that the claim
was confirmed by “US intelligence.” Significantly, even Western armoured
warfare experts who are usually sceptical to accept any kind of “Arab”
claims – especially for destroying such an advanced product of Western
technology like an F-4 Phantom II fighter-bomber – have shown more than
ready to accept that this incident really happened. Considering the number
of sources and their authoritativeness, it seems therefore not easy to
dispute anything in this context.

However, a research with the help of the former Iraqi Mi-25 (that was the
version delivered to Iraq) pilots showed that none of them – not even those
that flew Mi-25s in the given area in the given time in 1982 – ever heard
about any such claim. Research with the help of former and active Iranian
pilots, as well as IRIAF records showed no F-4s being lost at or near the
given time and place. In addition, research with the help of the US Army
files about the testing of the AT-6 (released according to a FOIA inquiry
procedure) showed that the weapon wouldn’t be able to hit a target moving as
fast at all. The Russians have tested plenty of their equipment in Iraq
against Iran: but, no Mi-24s, and especially no Mi-24s armed with AT-6s. The
AT-6 was also never delivered to Iraq.

In short: there is no kind of firm evidence that this has ever happened.

Quite on the contrary, given the political situation in Baghdad at the
time – especially after tremendous defeats in the spring of 1982, and in the
face of heavy losses sustained during the Iranian offensives in autumn
1982 – there is a very plausible explanation for the claim being published
in the Baghdad Observer of 27 October 1982… You can find the full story in
the volume 104 of the AirEnthusiast magazine, published in March this year.

And so, there is a similar situation with the Su-27s in Syria: the AFM
published it; the AFM is considered an “authoritative” source; the
deliveries of Su-27s to Syria are “logical” and “plausbile”; and so every
editor of such books concludes that the SyAAF “must” have 14 Su-27s.

A closer examination of the case proved, however, that nothing of this was
the case. The original eyewitnesses were not wrong, they have seen the
Su-27s in Syrian markings on two Syrian air bases, but these were not in
service with the SyAAF. It was then on the author of the report to have the
guts to correct his own report, and this was done. There was a
misunderstanding of what the people have seen, and this misunderstanding was
now corrected. Things of this kind happen: thanks Lord, nothing bad came out
of this one.

> These books also fail to list the Su-25 in Iranian inventory.

The situation is very similar as above: bear in mind that the manuscript for
a book can be adapted for the last time at best some six months before the
book is being published. Now, given that the Su-25s entered service with the
IRGCAF only very recently, and both of the books you mentioned were
published in 2001… well, that’s self-explanatory.

> I see you disagree Tom, but every book and online source I’ve seen
> says otherwise. The facts seem to be that 14 Su-27s were purchased by
> Syria in 2000 and remain there, operational by the Syrian AF.

No way. To be honest, I can’t care less about what some books report: they
are of absolutely no relevance in this case.

The fact is that the Su-27s were sent to Syria four times, of which two
times painted in Syrian markings. The fact is that the sighting of these
aircraft in Syria was explained as if they would be in service. The fact is
that there are no Su-27s in Syria since 2001, and the fact is that the SyAAF
operates no Su-27s. That’s all that counts here.

> I also can’t find any reference material that supports your claim that
> the Iranian AF actually flies the Su-25. It is my belief that the
> aircraft are kept as war trophies and used for propaganda purposes.

This is your belief, I don’t have a problem with this, but have you seen at
least a picture of an IRGCAF Su-25?

No, you have not. So, your belief remains your belief, and you will only be
able to continue talking about beliefs unless one of the photos is published
somewhere, and so you get the facts.

> If not can you provide some information on the training units for this
> aircraft and/or proof of operation?

This will be done, no need to worry about. You will, however, hopefully
understand that a “hobby” of this kind is a pretty expensive one, so there
is a need to make at least some kind of money first when publishing such
stuff.

What can currently be published is this:
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_249.shtml

If you attempt to carefully compare these photos with any other published so
far about this parade you will hopefully notice the difference.

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/title_detail.php/title=S6585

——————————————————————————–

Originally posted by SOC
Syria and Algeria have no FLANKERs. There have been FLANKERs in each country for display purposes and/or evaluation, but if any orders have been placed, they have yet to be delivered. These two countries possessing FLANKERs are one of the biggest myths in military aviation that for some reason keeps getting perpetuated.

According to those two websites Syria did receive Flankers.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/syria/airforce.htm
Throughout the rest of the 1980s and into the 1990s Syria’s Air Force experienced difficulties keeping its aircraft operational and providing sufficient flight hours for pilots. Syria was able to recently acquire Russian 14 Su-27Sks. The bulk of Syria’s Air Force is comprised of Su-22s, MiG-23s and MiG-21s. The number of more modern aircraft is rather small, with only 20 Su-24s, possibly 14 MiG-29 SMTs, some 25 MiG-25s and 22 MiG-29s

http://www.scramble.nl/sy.htm
After the death of Hafez al Assad (his son taking over from him) the Syrians strengthened their ties with the Russians and delivery of new MiG-29 and Su-27’s were a result of it. So far only a few MiG-29s and Su-27s are delivered and they are apparently based at two bases

Originally posted by Himanshu
I agree h177 that out here the negotiations take a looong time… but not in all the cases… exceptions are there.. I don’t think that this decision will get delayed.. but then my own wordings .. exceptions are always there.. I am positive though.. 🙂

I thought that thing was settled because every India board member was giving me this impression in every thread. so Exception means in your own wording.

Indian1973 your Statement regarding F404 engine procurement have been found inaccurate for past 3 months by saying tha India has already signed for procurement of 50 engines. these are the same engines for which only intent has been shown and then the “Negotiation for ever” it may be creating headache for GE by now.This is from GE site as of today
GE F110/F404 Fighter Engines Poised To Expand International Presence
June 16, 2003 — LE BOURGET – June 16, 2003 – GE Aircraft Engines’ (GEAE) F110 and F404 military fighter engines are poised to further expand their worldwide presence through new platforms and technology.

F110 engine family: Initial deliveries of F110-GE-129 engines for the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) fighter program will occur later this year. The ROKAF selected GEAE’s F110 fighter engine to power 40 new Boeing F-15K aircraft, launching the popular F110 on the twin-engine F-15 application. For almost two decades, GEAE’s F110 engine family has been the best-selling engine for single-engine F-16C/Ds worldwide.

First flight test of F110-GE-132 engine, the highest-thrust fighter engine for the Lockheed Martin F-16E/F, was completed aboard a Block 50 aircraft modified for flight testing in April 2003. The higher-thrust F110-GE-132 was launched in 2000 with its selection for 80 Block 60 F-16E/F aircraft.

The F110-GE-132 is derived from the highly successful F110-GE-100 and F110-GE-129 engines powering 70 percent of the latest-generation F-16C/Ds worldwide. The F110-GE-132 will produce up to 32,500 pounds (144 kN) of thrust. A derivative version of the –132, under consideration for F-15 and F-16 applications, can potentially increase the life of the engine by 50 percent compared to previous designs.

The -132 will greatly enhance the F110 engine family, which continues to expand its global presence. Recently, the air forces of Chile and Oman selected the F110-GE-129 to power their new fleets of F-16C/D aircraft. In addition the F110 engine family has been selected to power F-16s for the United States Air Force (USAF), the United States Navy (USN), Bahrain, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Japan’s F-2 fighter. More than 2,600 F110 engines have been ordered worldwide since the engine was first selected by the USAF in 1984.

Development of an ambitious Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) is funded in the USAF F110 Component Improvement Program (CIP). Starting with the highly successful CFM56-7 commercial core, the F110 SLEP program incorporates the military technology needed to upgrade the combustor, high pressure turbine, compressor and augmentor. These enhancements can help provide up to a 3X time-on-wing increase, significant decreases in cost-per-flying-hour and a 50 percent extension in engine phase inspections. Currently undergoing final design and development testing, delivery of SLEP hardware is tentatively planned for FY2006.

F404 engine family: F404 performance and reliability continue to set the standard for fighter engines. More than 3,700 F404 engines are in service, powering the aircraft of military services worldwide, including the F/A-18 Hornets of the U.S. Navy, plus the U.S. Marine Corps and the F-117 Stealth Fighters of the USAF. The F404-powered Hornets are also operated by the air forces of Australia, Canada, Finland, Kuwait, Malaysia, Spain and Switzerland. F404 derivatives also power Singapore’s A-4SU Super Skyhawk, Sweden’s JAS39 Gripen, and Korea’s T-50. The F404 has more than 10 million flight hours of outstanding operating experience and is combat-proven.

Several international customers have selected the F404/RM12-powered JAS39 Gripen for their fighter replacement programs. South Africa has 28 Gripens on order, with deliveries scheduled to begin in 2005. Hungary has committed to lease and buy 14 Gripens from the Swedish Air Force beginning in 2005. In addition, the Gripen is a candidate in fighter competitions of several other countries.

Another derivative of the F404 engine, the F404-GE-102, powers the single-engine T-50 advanced jet trainer/light fighter. Successful first flight occurred in August 2002, with first supersonic flight following only six months later. Initial the T-50 delivery is scheduled for 2005. Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and Lockheed Martin will produce the T-50 Golden Eagle for the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF), which has announced plans to procure 94 aircraft initially. KAI and Lockheed Martin have also formed T-50 International to jointly market the aircraft to potential export customers.

The F404-102D was selected by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and U.S. Air Force to power the X-45B Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV), currently under development by The Boeing Company. In addition to single-engine reliability features, low observable technology will also be incorporated into the engine, which is scheduled to fly in 2005.

The F404/F2J3 is powering the India Light Combat Aircraft (Tejas) during its flight test program. Indian defense officials have also expressed their intent to procure 50 F404 engines to power the initial Tejas production aircraft.

GEAE, an operating component of General Electric Company (NYSE: GE), is the world’s leading manufacturer of jet engines for civil and military aircraft, including engines produced by CFM International, a 50/50 joint company of Snecma Moteurs of France and GE. GEAE also manufactures gas turbines, derived from its highly successful jet engine programs, for marine and industrial applications. In addition, GEAE provides comprehensive maintenance support, through its GE Engine Services operation, for GE and non-GE jet engines in service throughout the world. Visit GEAE online at: http://www.geae.com.

Originally posted by sharmaji
The LCA and FC-1 are completely different and the LCA incoorporates newer technology than the FC-1, you know this very well PLA and are simply trying to flame, add this loser to your ignore list guys still hanging around Indian related threads I see you hypocrite, get lost or I’ll make you eat your moron words of no Pakistani and Chinese ppl ever visit Indian threads or flame!

Now you have to give a proof where i used “UNCLE” in the thread.
If i give example of S.Korea or former Soviet Union in any thread what it has to do with India.