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danrh

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  • in reply to: Super Hornet Odds……….. #2540947
    danrh
    Participant

    Forget the fighters, where is the fight, who’s has tankers, how many and who has what AEW&C and EW support.

    Daniel

    in reply to: Closer ties with france could see Mistrals for Australia. #2070273
    danrh
    Participant

    IIRC one of the arguments goes along the lines of using an LHD/LHA based SCS design to replace the CVNs in the forward deployed role. After all is a CVN really needed in the Persian Gulf to support blockade work for example. by reducing the need for forward deployment of the CVNs you can keep them in better condition and more ready for surge operations while the SCS groups hold the line or act as tripwire. If you are going to lose a carrier to a sneaky PLAN SSK then would you prefer it to be a “cheap” SCS or a CVN. Once the big boys have arrived as part of the surge you would hope your own subs would have managed to sanitise the AO. On the whole there are many positives to the idea of a mixed SCS and CVN force hence the USNs steadfast refusal to allow the opportunity to test it by by introducing the necessary equipment into service.

    Daniel

    in reply to: Closer ties with france could see Mistrals for Australia. #2070613
    danrh
    Participant

    The RAN will not operate the F35 in the VSTOL variant.

    The RAAF will operate them, probably in the following mix.

    1 Sqdn F35 VSTOL
    2 Sqdn (may be disbanded)
    3 Sqdn F35 CTOL
    75 Sqdn F35 CTOL
    77 Sqdn F35 CTOL
    2 OCU mix of both types (may be renamed 2 Squadron)

    The RAN has neither the manpower nor the resources to set up an air wing organisation that duplicates the RAAF, they will simply operate the F35 off the LPAs (for which reason I suspect that the Navantia design will win out, its large enough to operate a detachment of the F35B, where the Mistral is not).

    Unicorn

    The current F-111 operators are 1 and 6 Sqn. 2Sqn is being stood up to operate the Wedgetails.

    Daniel

    in reply to: Hezbollah Sagger killing most IDF on ground #1809649
    danrh
    Participant

    I would have thought that such a definition would mean zip to the guys in the front line. What would be more important to them is the trajectory properties of the weapons they are using. The main differences for the grunt in the city would be to hit that MG nest or sniper position half way up that high rise building up ahead a direct fire missile like Kornet that can enter the window they are shooting from is rather more use than a 120mm mortar that has to blow its way down through 16 floors before you get the room they want. Equally if the target is behind a very large and convincing baracade of old cars and bits of concrete block and logs and other rubbish then 30mm grenade shells dropping near vertically on target is more use than the much higher velocity 30mm cannon shells that have to punch through a dozen metres of steel and concrete and dirt to hit the guys in the trench.

    If the target can be viewed by another unit let them engage it. If indirect fire needs to be allocated at higher levels or called in like artillery then why not just use artillery? Isn’t that what it is there for after all?

    Mate those afre the definitions of direct and indirect fire as taught to me by the ADF. If you have a problem with them then I suggest you take it up with the Military Attache in Wellington, I’m sure he/she would love to hear from you.

    As simple grunts (aka the guys on the frontline) we were taught what direct and indirect was and what constituted which. Within the section/platoon direct fire came from rifles, LMGs and grenade launchers. No real indirect assets were avauilable unless you want to count hand grenades. At the battalion level direct fire support meant the Mag-58s and 84mm Carl Gustav’s of the DFSW Paltoon and indirect fire support came from the mortar platoon. If higher level assets were required then that meant ATGMs or vehicle mounted MGs or cannon for DFS or field/medium artillery, NGFS or air support for indirect fire. We were not taught the ins and outs of the weapons systems utilised by other Corps or services. A brief familiarisation within the context of what was direct or indirect and when each was appropriate plus safety distances etc.

    Attempting to use a grenade launcher either of the IW type or a heavy automatic model to provide steeply plunging fire is likely to simply waste ammunition and risk hitting ones own troops. The weapons are certainly not configured for such use.

    Daniel

    in reply to: Aussie Hornet #2585366
    danrh
    Participant

    Hey i thought they had gone with the Harms on the 111 ?? Does this mean i have to take them of my old model ??

    As evidenced by the pic of the White Whale 🙂 they were cleared but we never took the missile into service.

    Daniel

    in reply to: Maj. Showers' thoughts on the Raptor #2585449
    danrh
    Participant

    it really would be nice if usaf came out and officially said just which plane is stealthier. cause over the last decade or so there’s just been bunch of conflicting claims. first that f117 is stealthier than f22 then lately that has been reversed in majority of assesments. b2 vs f22 has also been thrown around a lot, some say one is stealthier, others say differently. but not a single official word. Only thing we officially do know from usaf is that frontal rcs of f22 is a marble while f35 is a golf ball. Would be nice if they came out and gave similar comparable illustrations for f117 and b2.

    What an oversight. Have you witten to the Secretary of the Air Force to advise him of this. It must be rectified post haste. While your at it could you drop the Sec Nav a line too and get some confirmation of the exact capabilities of the SPY-1/AEGIS system oh and just how quiet are the Seawolf and Ohio subs. Cheers.

    Daniel

    in reply to: Hezbollah Sagger killing most IDF on ground #1809653
    danrh
    Participant

    Also the curved trajectory of the 30mm grenade launchers does qualify as indirect fire, as does the 100mm medium pressure rifled guns of the BMP-3s.

    Okay then. Right well little primer called for. The difference between direct and indirect fire is not really the trajectory of the weapons used. Direct fire is fire at a target that can be directly observed by the weapon crew while indirect fire is fire at a target out of sight of the weapon crew (generally observed by another unit etc). I doubt very much 30mm GLs and especially the 100mm guns could be realistically used for indirect fire support taskings.

    Daniel

    in reply to: Aussie Hornet #2585676
    danrh
    Participant

    Such a shame we never went operational with HARMs especially since they can be used by Hornets too. Oh well.

    Daniel

    in reply to: Aussie Hornet #2588367
    danrh
    Participant

    Okay, I give. What am I missing? I only see a single image, head on of a clean Hornet. I can’t see any links to another site apart from the warbirdz addy on the pic. There doesn’t seem to any obvious profile of Hornets there at the moment. Could someone please enlighten me.

    Daniel

    ps Interesting, when I load the page in IE I can at least see there are images there that can not be shown for some reason or another. Whats wrong with my Firefox.

    in reply to: Back-up ordered for next warplane #2589610
    danrh
    Participant

    The next version is the block 2 version and it is allready being delivered IIRC. the block 3 is just something BA is holding incase the JSF sees delays or gets canned , Incase australia wants block 3 they’d have to pay for the development which can start right now or they would have to just go and buy the Block 2 ( which includes Apg-79)

    Go with the current versions for maximum compatibility with the our upgraded classics. Its only an interim type after all.

    Daniel

    in reply to: Hezbollah Sagger killing most IDF on ground #1810660
    danrh
    Participant

    [QUOTE=Raygun]

    check the date on the box’s.these are not 30 yrs TOW.

    Yes I see them now. Hadn’t noticed the date before. Getting back to your original statement then, I’m not quite sure what you’re saying here

    so USA supply TOW to Hizballah?. you got that SENS! it’s dangerous to be friens with US.

    in reply to: Hezbollah Sagger killing most IDF on ground #1810713
    danrh
    Participant

    [QUOTE=Raygun]

    HNN has pictures of a Hizballah observation post including TOWs:

    so USA supply TOW to Hizballah?. you got that SENS! it’s dangerous to be friens with US. :dev2: :dev2: :dev2:

    The former Shah’s regime was one of the best customers for the TOW. IIRC the new regime manufactures new systems based on the TOW that incorporate equivalent improvements to those those seen in the US’s own TOW improvement programs.

    Daniel

    in reply to: Hezbollah Sagger killing most IDF on ground #1810834
    danrh
    Participant

    Just as everyone in Israel should have figured out that it could not have been the Chinese C-802 that hit that Israeli warship (its warhead would have blown a missile corvette that size out of the water) but instead the C-701 which Iran also has and is far simpler to use but has a warhead only half the size.

    As opposed to a C-802 that failed to detonate.

    Daniel

    in reply to: Australian AWD revealed #2045230
    danrh
    Participant

    That’s the new Phalanx CIWS, it dispenses with the 20mm Gatling gun and instead mounts a RAM launcher. There seem to be several variations on a theme, from a straight RAM launcher to something like an 11-shot RAM launcher mated with the Phalanx radar system.

    Actually I think you are looking at the pics of the KDX-III, the generic CIWS on the Gibbs and Cox pics of the AWD look more like the AK630 than anything else.

    Daniel

    in reply to: Hezbollah Sagger killing most IDF on ground #1810881
    danrh
    Participant

    Irans rocket route to Israel

    Iran’s rocket route to Israel
    Tehran is playing a leading role in arming Hezbollah and testing Israel’s response to rocket attacks, writes Geoff Elliott
    10aug06

    TWELVE trucks crossed the Syrian border into Lebanon and rumbled south. When they were stopped at a checkpoint a few days later, the Lebanese Armed Forces found the trucks were brimming with ammunition and weapons, including Katyusha rockets that have been raining down on Israel since July 12.

    What happened next, in this little-reported incident in late January, goes to the heart of the conflict between Israel and Lebanon. The convoy was waved on and travelled unhindered to its final destination: Hezbollah terrorists in southern Lebanon.

    The Lebanese army said the transportation and storage of ammunition belonged to the “resistance”. Once inside Lebanon it was subject to a ministerial policy statement of the Lebanese Government, which considers the “resistance” to be legitimate.

    “As the Government of Lebanon has confirmed, the Lebanese Armed Forces has thus not been authorised to prevent further movement of the ammunitions, which had been a common practice for more than 15 years,” UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in a letter to the Security Council in April. “Hezbollah publicly confirmed that the arms were destined for the group.”

    It’s this uninterrupted flow of weapons, mostly made in Iran, under the nose of the Lebanese Government, that has allowed Hezbollah to stockpile some 12,000 Katyusha rockets. Over the past 29 days of conflict, Hezbollah has fired more than 3000 rockets into Israel.

    Syrian-made rockets, including mid-range 220mm units, have also fallen on Nazareth and Haifa, Israel’s third-largest city. The warheads were filled with ball bearings to maximise civilian casualties.

    Aside from rocket launchers, armoured personnel carriers, night vision goggles, aerial drones and motorised gliders make up the hardware for a 3000-strong guerilla unit that some say is in fact a well-organised and fierce military force.

    “The fact that Hezbollah is difficult to dislodge from their positions is not a surprise for the Israelis or anyone else,” David Schenker, a specialist in Middle East affairs at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, tells The Australian. Schenker also worked for four years at the Pentagon as a Middle East specialist. “Hezbollah fighters are well trained and highly motivated and they are dug in,” he adds.

    Former CIA officer Robert Baer, who has followed the group since 1983, told US News & World Report he has “a lot of respect for Hezbollah’s capabilities”. Baer, whose book See No Evil inspired the film Syriana, spent a couple of weeks with Hezbollah last year, touring its facilities. “You’ve got some of the most experienced operatives in the world there.”

    When the Israelis left Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah fortified its position along the northern border and continued to amass its cache of arms. In 2000, Hezbollah was estimated to have 6000 rockets. But in May, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah claimed to have more than 12,000. “All of northern occupied Palestine is within range,” Nasrallah said, referring to Israel. “Its ports, its bases, its factories and everything located there.”

    Until the Syrian pull-out of Lebanon last year this supply of arms to Hezbollah was relatively easy. Schenker says the route to Hezbollah was traditionally Iranian cargo planes flying into Damascus, Syria, and overland from there. The direct air route to Damascus is over Iraq but Schenker says the US occupation made any airlifts through Iraqi airspace perilous, meaning a more common route became either overland through Turkey and northern Iraq (Kurdistan) and into Syria, or through Turkish airspace.

    While Hezbollah’s burgeoning arsenal of rockets was well known, what has surprised Schenker and others during the conflict is Hezbollah’s use of sophisticated weaponry.

    Just two days into the war, an Israeli Sa’ar 5 class missile corvette, enforcing the naval blockade off Lebanon, was struck by a C-802 radar-guided anti-ship cruise missile, an Iranian-made version of a missile known as the Chinese silkworm. The explosion claimed the lives of four soldiers and the ship had to return to port.

    It was the first time the missile had been used in the war with Israel and military officials reported that the Israeli ship’s radar system was not calibrated to detect the missile, which is equipped with an advanced anti-tracking system.

    Iran denied any involvement and US and Israeli officials say there was no evidence that Iranian operatives working in Lebanon launched the missile themselves. That made the incident even more curious, observes Schenker.

    “It was assumed broadly that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard corp personnel stationed in Lebanon would assist Hezbollah in the technical operation of this equipment,” says Schenker. “That would not have been a surprise. What was a surprise is that according to Israelis, a Lebanese Armed Forces naval radar station was used and it was used to lock on the ship.”

    It meant the land-based radar post communicated with the missile, which allowed the incoming missile to avoid detection.

    “This enhanced capability is why the IDF (Israeli Defence Force) destroyed the Lebanese Armed Forces radar station,” says Schenker, referring to an IDF strike north of Beirut a few days later.

    The incident points to the many sympathies within the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Government to Hezbollah and why the present conflict is so precarious and raising concerns of another civil war in Lebanon.

    Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora has played a delicate act in avoiding the use of the word “militia”, which is the definition in UN resolution 1559 that calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah. In fact just as news of that intercepted convoy of arms was breaking in Lebanon, Siniora told Beirut parliament on February 6: “We have never called, and will never call, the resistance by any name other than resistance.”

    That’s an affront to the US because prior to the al-Qa’ida September 11 attacks, Hezbollah – or Party of God – had the ignominious boast that it had killed more Americans than any other terror group.

    Hezbollah was formed in 1982 in the ashes of Lebanon’s civil war, a fully paid-up subsidiary of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iranian revolution and its vision of Islamic Shia fundamentalism.

    US officials believe Iran finances Hezbollah to the tune of $US100 million ($132million) a year, while the Iran Revolutionary Guard trains its fighters.

    Hezbollah’s terrorist attacks over the year include suicide bombings of the US embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut, the hijacking of TWA flight 847 and bombings of the Israeli embassy in Argentina and US military housing at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.

    And it has grown into a potent political force, with two of its members in the Lebanese cabinet and, until Israel’s bombing campaign, a well developed network of social services, media outlets and businesses.

    As the war drags on, Hezbollah is being severely degraded militarily, according to the IDF, but its political credentials in Lebanon have been enhanced and become “stronger than before in terms of the eyes of the Lebanese people”, says Martin Indyk, a former US ambassador to Israel.

    Hisham Milhem, Washington correspondent for liberal Arabic newspaper Al-Nahar, says Hezbollah is projecting itself in Lebanon as the protector of the homeland.

    “Hezbollah is riding high, not only in Lebanon but throughout the Arab world. (Hezbollah leader) Hassan Nasrallah is lionised. Nasrallah now, from where he is sitting in some bunker in Beirut or in the Bekaa Valley – I don’t know where – can claim with a great deal of credence that Hezbollah managed to create a hole in Israel’s strategic deterrence.

    “He delivered … not necessarily in a very effective military way, but definitely politically in terms of perception. Hezbollah is standing up to the Israelis and doing relatively well.”

    Clearly, Israel is attempting to deal Hezbollah a crippling blow by bombing the highways to Syria, and any convoys on it, to shut down Hezbollah’s supply routes. But military strategists acknowledge that its air campaign targeting mobile rocket launch sites is counter-productive, particularly when the guerilla forces are hiding among civilians. Israel suffered a significant propaganda defeat and widespread condemnation following the strike in Qana which claimed the lives of 28, including 16 children. It’s why Israel has committed more ground forces to try to rout the rocket launchers.

    There is also concern the present conflict is a proxy battle in which Iran is observing Israel’s military tactics.

    “Iran is bringing in to Lebanon sophisticated weaponry,” says Lebanon’s Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt. “The Iranians are actually experimenting with different kinds of missiles in Lebanon by shooting them at the Israelis. Iran is using this violence to test certain of Israel’s abilities,” he adds. Jumblatt heads Lebanon’s Progressive Socialist Party and is regarded as the most prominent anti-Syrian Lebanese politician.

    And he adds of Syria’s role: “Syria will likely try to tell the world, ‘Look, see, since we left Lebanon, the Cedar Revolution and the forces in Lebanon that got our military out through popular support, those forces are not able to control Lebanon. While we were in control, Lebanon was a safe place. Now it’s not. We need to come back in,” he predicts.

    “I would not be surprised if they even try to wiggle their way into a deal by convincing the Americans that Syrian influence in Lebanon will stabilise the region.”

    Syria originally sent forces into Lebanon in 1976 during the Lebanese civil war and its military occupied the country until last year when suddenly its troops withdrew after an international outcry over the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, for which Damascus was blamed.

    David Makovsky, also a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East policy, wrote that last month’s attack from Hezbollah demonstrated the first time the group felt “self-confident enough to claim responsibility for a strike across the internationally recognised border. These events suggest that Iran was pressing for Hezbollah’s initiation of the crisis.”

    And on the day of the Hezbollah attack against Israel, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared: “If the Zionist regime commits another stupid move and attacks Syria, this will be considered like attacking the whole Islamic world and this regime will receive a very fierce response. The stakes for the international community go beyond Israel itself.”

    Makovsky notes, as Iran pushes the world on its plans for a nuclear program, “Iran sees itself as being on the march”.

    “This point is not lost on countries such as the US and European and Arab states, which do not want this crisis to end with Iran and Hezbollah feeling emboldened.”

    Geoff Elliott is The Australian’s Washington correspondent.

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