Originally posted by jkw
The Number 9935 Ship Building Program

In order to speed up her naval modernization process, China needs to produce an aircraft carrier first, and then build an experimental fleet centered on the carrier. Such a fleet will have to have aerial, surface and underwater operation capabilities and, based on the lessons and experience gained from such an experimental fleet, China’s military experts will then set up a foundation for further establishing a large ocean fleet in the future. In 1992, the Chinese authorities decided on a program for studying, researching and developing aircraft carriers and Chinese leaders of various levels have done extensive feasibility studies on this project since then. In 1993, senior leaders of the Chinese Navy publicly announced that China would start researching, developing and building an aircraft carrier. In January 1993, the Chinese political leaders decided to step up their carrier program and allocated several billion dollars for it. China had planned to finish building the first aircraft carrier by 2000, but the plan has been delayed repeatedly due to lack of carrier experts and technology such as the deck catapult for take-off and landing and hooking facilities. Eventually China’s top leaders have decided to complete the carrier program in two stages.

During the first stage, to quickly improve its own carrier technology, China has bought several scrapped carriers from overseas in order to study the parts. The first such carrier was “Melbourne,” a light carrier from Australia, bought in 1994 at a cost of $1.4 million, which was subsequently towed to southern China to be disassembled, analyzed and studied by experts. The second carrier was “Minsk”, a TABKP heavy cruiser, bought in 1997 for $5 million, which, after going through 18-months’ repairs and renovations, has been turned into a floating amusement park now anchored in the bay not too far from Shenzhen. The third carrier is a same model cruiser “Kiev”, bought for $8.4 million, which was towed to Tianjin in 2000 and is now going through an overhaul to be used in the future as another tourist floating amusement park. China bought its fourth carrier in 1998, the “Varyag”, from Ukraine for $20 million, which at the time was only 70% completed, and towed to Dalian between 2001 – 2002. This carrier appears to be going through the same renovation as if it would be used as another floating amusement park, but in actual fact, its true purpose is to provide an object of study and analysis for China’s naval experts.

During the second stage, China plans to build an aircraft carrier of between 40,000 to 60,000 tons. According to Russian intelligence information, China started working on its own carrier since 1999 at Shanghai Shipyard. It would be the first one of purely Chinese design. This carrier, code named “Project 9935,” would have a 48,000 ton displacement, capable of carrying 30 – 40 fighter jets, most of which would be multi-functional SU-30MKK jets bought from Russia. It is said that this carrier would have a built-in vertical anti-air and anti-ship missile launching system. According to NATO’s categorization, such a ship can only be called a heavy aircraft cruiser, not a true aircraft carrier. China has already started working on its naval bases and harbors in Shanghai, Zanjiang and Dalian to improve docking facilities for this carrier in the future. Started in 1999, this carrier is expected to be completed by 2006, but the proper formation of an experimental ocean fleet centered on such a carrier would take another three to four years to come into shape. According to the past experience of other countries’ aircraft carrier fleet formation, it is certain that China will start building 10,000 tonnage cruisers in the near future to be convoy ships. It is also possible that China will purchase such cruisers directly from overseas, most likely the “Ukraine,” a missile cruiser from Ukraine, which is now 93% completed, and then build China’s own similar cruisers modeled on the “Ukraine.”
http://www.uscc.gov/researchreports/2004/china‘snavyroute.htm

Chinese Navy – Is China building several aircraft carriers, to a modified Admiral Gorshkov design?
Federation of American Scientists: PLAN Project 9935 (PDF format)
http://nosi.editthispage.com/2004/03/19

Originally posted by jkw
Is this your doing also, jk??? no

CDF
wer2
Chinese Military Aviation Forum
wer2
http://www.stormpages.com/jetfight/wwwboard/index.html

While the PRC leadership has not yet decided to build aircraft carriers, it has approved of an aggressive research and development program. Beginning in the early 1980s this program has included the testing of hydrodynamic models and the building of a simulated carrier deck complete with a catapult and arresting gear. In 1987 a J-8II is reported to have been test flown from this deck. [106]
Shi Fei, The General Development Trend of the Chinese Military, Chengdu: Sichuan Kexue Chubanshe, pp. 2-22, cited in You Ji, p. 196.
http://www.uscc.gov/researchreports/2004/04fisher_report/8_navy_systems.htm
China’s First Aircraft Carrier Ready for Service in 2005: Report
http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-01122000-Aircraft-Carrier.htm

The PLA Navy Air Force

Table of Organization

Revision 3.3

1. General: PLANAF fixed wing combat aircraft were historically organized into 10 Air Divisions, numbered without gaps from 1 to 10. PLANAF support aircraft, both fixed wing and rotary wing, are organized into Naval Independent Regiments, numbered from 1 to 10, probably without gaps. There were historically two types of Air Divisions: Fighter Divisions and Bomber Divisions. The PLANAF was historically triangular, except where a small number of specialist aircraft did not allow this. The PLANAF is now converting to a binary organization where each Air Division will have two regiments and each regiment will have two squadrons. Formations with older aircraft retain triangular organization. Formations with newer aircraft may retain deactivated units with older aircraft in reserve status.

2. The First Air Division: Neither the base location nor the aircraft associated with the First Air Division is reported in any open source material. It is assigned to the North Sea Fleet and it must historically have been a Fighter Division. A statistical analysis of aircraft assigned to other divisions and the total number in service indicates this unit may still be a standard Fighter Division equipped with J-6 and J-5 aircraft. A map analysis of the North Sea Fleet area indicates this unit may be based at Dailan (Luda).

3. Aircraft Identification Numbers (Air Divisions): The PLANAF uses a simple and logical aircraft number identification scheme on all fixed wing combat aircraft. The first (of five) digits is ALWAYS an 8 if the aircraft is assigned to a PLANAF air division. The second digit is ALWAYS indicates which regiment (1st, 2nd or 3rd) of the division the aircraft is assigned to. The fourth (second to last) digit ALWAYS indicates the division [and therefor the base(s)] the aircraft is assigned to. This fourth digit is in fact the air division number itself, except that 0 is used for the 10th division. This system is integrated with the PLAAF aircraft numbering scheme in the sense that there are always five digits and no PLAAF aircraft number begins with 8. But while the PLAAF first and fourth digits combined DO indicate the division to which an aircraft is assigned, they do so in a coded way. [Decoded in PLAAF report]. Also, in the PLAAF, the second digit historically can be zero, if a 4th regiment is in the division.

4. Aircraft Identification Numbers (Independent Naval Regiments): The PLANAF may use a similar aircraft identification scheme for all aircraft, including rotary wing, assigned to Independent Naval Regiments. The first digit of the four digit series is always a 9. The second digit of the series appears to indicate the regiment. The last two digits of the four digit series appear to identify a specific aircraft. This system is

integrated with the PLAAF and Chinese civil air unit identification scheme in the sense

that air organizations smaller than air divisions have four digit identification numbers

and no such number begins with 9.

5. New Aircraft and Unit Conversion: The PLANAF is now buying the J-8IID fighter and JH-7 fighter/attack aircraft for its Fighter Air Divisions. It appears that the new standard Fighter Division will be one regiment of two squadrons of 10 J-8s plus one regiment of two squadrons of 10 JH-7s. [A third regiment of older aircraft may be in reserve.] The old standard organization appears to have been two regiments of three squadrons of J-5s and J-6s. At some point one of these regiments had its J-6s replaced with Q-5s (a MiG-19 derivative). These older divisions, with the exception of the 4th, now appear to have only a single active fighter regiment of two squadrons plus one Q-5 regiment of two squadrons. Military reports indicate the PLANAF is buying about one H-6D new production ASM variants each year. Aviation industry reports that only the H-6H is in production make it more likely new planes are H-6H, also a cruise missile carrier. The PLANAF is also investing in development of the J-8III fighter, the J-10II fighter bomber and the FC-1 II fighter-attack aircraft.

6. Bomber Air Divisions: The PLANAF operates three Bomber Air Divisions. All of these operate the old H-5T (unlicensed copies of the Il-18 torpedo armed variant of Soviet origin). The 10th ONLY operates the H-5T, so it might be termed an attack air division. IISS data indicates this unit may have reduced to two active regiments. Like the 4th Fighter Air Division, this unit remains triangular, operating a regiment at a different base from the rest of the division. The other two Bomber Air Divisions operate two regiments with a single squadron of H-6D bombers each of which carries two anti-shipping air launched cruise missiles. The Second Bomber Air Division operates from Sanya (Yulin International Airport). This base was the first joint PLAAF/PLANAF operating base. There are reports that the older (non-cruise missile) Navy H-6As have been converted to tankers. While still Navy owned, they operate from Leiyang with the PLAAF 48th Division. If correct, this is the second joint PLAAF/PLANAF operating base. It appears that cruise missile armed PLAAF H-6s can be assigned to the Second Bomber Division for combat operations over the South China Sea or the East China Sea. Less is known about the 3rd Bomber Air Division, based at the Shanghaiguan air base, but presumably it would supervise long range operations in the Yellow Sea or the Sea of Japan.

7. Fighter Air Divisions: Fighter Air Divisions now operate one regiment of fighters and one regiment of attack aircraft. However, these attack aircraft have a secondary air defense mission, and capability. The Q-5I was modified for Naval service by fitting it with a ranging radar and AAMs. In addition, it was fitted to carry two C-801 cruise missiles or two torpedoes. These aircraft are designated Q-5IN here (uniquely) to distinguish them from standard Q-5Is in the PLAAF and other air forces. These modifications were so successful they were incorporated into the Q-5II by the PLAAF. Similarly, the JH-7 has the ability to carry AAMs, SSMs and possibly torpedoes.

8. Patrol Aircraft: Historically, all PLANAF patrol assets have been assigned to the North Sea Fleet, with aircraft detached to other fleets as required. The Chinese Navy operates a squadron of 4 locally manufactured PS-5 flying boats. [A fifth aircraft often reported is an attrition spare and has never been used operationally. A flying prototype never outfitted with electronics also exists as a water bomber in civil service. Finally, there is or was a non-flying prototype.] These are relatively traditional four engine flying boats with surface search radars and some intercept equipment. They are known to operate from Qingdao, HQ of the North Sea Fleet. They were supplemented by 4 ex-Soviet Be-6 (Madge), which seem to have been retired. [One exists as a museum piece]. These aircraft belong to the First Naval Independent Regiment.

9. AEW and ELINT Aircraft: It is now reported that the PLANAF is operating 4 Y-8X (modified An-12 transports with AN APS-504 radars) in the maritime reconnaissance/ELINT role. They are known to carry sonabouys and IR detection gear. A further 4 Y-8J (also equipped with AN APS-504 radars, a total of 8 having been purchased) are operated by the PLANAF (apparently with less intercept equipment) as AEW aircraft. The Y-8X patrol variants could also be used in the AEW role. This combination of equipment and aircraft gives the PLANAF an impressive, if modest, patrol, signal intercept and radar warning capability. More than adequate for peacetime requirements, nevertheless these assets are insufficient to sustain operational wartime attrition for more than a short period. These aircraft belong to the Third Naval Independent Regiment.

10. The PLANAF Future Carrier Air Group: All pilots of PLANAF Fighter Air Divisions are required to “carrier qualify” at an airfield on a mock-up of HMAS Melbourne’s flight deck. [HMAS Melbourne was scrapped in China]. For this reason, it appears likely that PLAN carriers may operate aircraft from these air units, rather than dedicated carrier air groups (which have not appeared, even though two carriers are reported under construction in Shanghai). It is reported that these carriers are designed to operate about 48 aircraft . In this context, it is interesting to note that the new Fighter Air Division will have 40 active aircraft: 20 J-8II fighters and 20 JH-7 fighter/attack aircraft. The PLANAF appears to prefer the FC-1 (“Fighter China”) project to the J-11 (Su-27) as a future aircraft. [The FC-1, designed with assistance from MiG, is similar to the MiG-33, a single engine development of the MiG-29. It is designed to replace the J-6 and Q-5 at reasonable cost, having only one engine.] If this aircraft is indeed adopted, it is possible that future Fighter Air Divisions might operate about 20 J-10 or FC-1 and 20 JH-7.

11. PLANAF Carriers: While three graving docks have been built at Shanghai large enough for the new (reportedly 48,000 ton) carriers, only two seem to have been laid down. [Janes Fighting Ships 2001-2 is listing only one; Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2001-2 is listing two; Combat Fleets of the World 2002-3 says none]. While three graving docks are sufficient to build six carriers in 6-9 years, actually doing so is probably cost prohibitive. Since no dedicated carrier air groups are being organized, and since PLANAF Fighter Air Divisions are being required to “carrier qualify” it appears that they will provide the air groups for the first generation of Chinese aircraft carriers. There are apparently five such divisions. [If the First Air division is a Fighter Air Division and if the 10th Bomber Air Division is eventually converted to a Fighter Air Division, there would be seven such divisions.] Given that the air defense of bases and naval units over the entire length of the Chinese coast remains, it appears likely that there is no medium term requirement to outfit a large number of carriers. Instead, it seems likely the two ships under construction will be the first generation of Chinese carriers. Note that the use ability of all PLANAF fighter units to land on and fly off carriers is unique in history.

10. PLANAF Rotary Wing Assets: The PLANAF operates about 49 ASW helicopters (16 KA-28 Helix, 10 Z-8, 27 Z-9A/C). There are also 18 transport helicopters (12 Mi-8, 6 Z-5) plus 14 SAR (10 Z-8, 4 Ka-28) in PLANAF service. The ASW helicopters are operated in small detachments assigned to ships and shore bases. Presumably the Mi-8s are operated by a squadron, but specific details and basing is not known. Approximately 29 PLANAF helicopters are not armed, operating in utility and search and rescue modes. These include an experimental AEW Z-9 variant. Z-9C serve Luda DDGs. Ka-28 serve Luhai and Sovremenny. 7 machines are spares.

11. Training Aircraft: Each PLAAF air regiment normally has a training squadron equipped with trainers. Training in air academies normally lasts 48 months. Pilots then spend 48-60 months training with air divisions before becoming “third class pilots.” All pilots in the regiment may normally fly unlimited hours in the PT-6 trainer and about 150 hours in type trainers of the training unit. PLANAF training organization and practice is unknown as such. However, the types of trainers in the PLANAF imply a that a similar policy (a long period in the training establishment) is probably in place. It is known that the 7th Air Division operates training aircraft.

12. PLANAF J-7E: Photographic evidence indicates that the J-7E in PLANAF service has drop tanks for extended range missions. This aircraft has “HUD, air data computer, radar warning receiver, PL-7 missiles (4 underwing pylons)” and is otherwise a rewinged variant of the J-7. All PLANAF J-7E are operated by the 12th Regiment of the 4th Air Division. There is also a detachment of 4 JJ-7 trainers. No longer being acquired because about 12 J-8IID are being acquired per year. The J-7E is flown by the air demonstration team and might be encountered in expert hands. It is considered to be “clearly superior” to the Su-27 in close combat maneuvering.

13. Joint Tanker Operations: The PLANAF operates two aircraft capable of air refueling. The J-8IID and the Q-5 can be refueled from tankers converted from old H-6 bombers by the PLAAF. Operations and exercises involving air refueling are routine in the South Sea Fleet. It is certain that no less than 10 such tanker conversions existed in 2000 (when they were flown at 50th anniversary celebrations). It is reported that the Navy has converted its 7 old H-6 bombers, retained a loaned PLAAF “HL-6” tanker, and obtained two additional air force conversions. This group of 10 tankers, while still “owned” by the Navy, operated with the PLAAF 144th Regiment which was assigned to the 48th Air Division at Leiyang. The 48th Air Division is reported to have consolidated with the PLAAF 8th Air Division by transferring the 144th regiment to Datong. It is also reported that 4 Il-78 tankers are on order. It is not known if any of these are for the Navy. This joint operating base/unit insures that both services have tankers available for operations in or near SE China while sharing the costs. An L-6 tanker can refuel a total of four smaller aircraft, two at a time.

15. Regimental Organization: The Chinese term “flying unit” is translated as “squadron.” The term the Chinese like to translate “squadron” corresponds to the Western word “flight.” [There are typically up to five “squadrons” per “flying unit.”] Each regiment is organized as two to four “flying units” plus a “maintenance unit.” Technically, “flying units” do not have any aircraft. Rather the “maintenance unit” owns the planes and issues them as required. PLAAF regiments also normally have a “training unit” which operates basic and advanced trainers. It appears the PLANAF may have concentrated its training assets in the Seventh Air Division. The listing of aircraft “assigned” to squadrons in the database is a nominal maximum. In fact, a “flying unit” typically launches one flight of two (large) or four (small) aircraft on a mission. Launching two flights on the same mission is exceptional. But it is not impossible a single “flying unit” could launch three flights on a single mission, if pilots and aircraft were available, especially on the first day of operations.

16. Data Sources: This considers information from standard reference books from 1989-2002 including IISS Military Balance, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, Jane’s Fighting Ships, Brassey’s Combat Aircraft of the World, Combat Fleets of the World 2002-2003, The International Directory of Military Aircraft and the Aerospace Encyclopedia of World Aircraft. It also considers articles in the military and aviation trade press, news articles and web articles which the writer has collected in extensive files, also since 1989. The data is somewhat confusing and contradictory and requires interpretation. There are indications that the long decline in equipment numbers significantly reversed in 2002. The rate of acquisition and integration of new equipment also appears to have accelerated moderately since 1999.

17. Aircraft Identification Numbers (Minor Units): Prototype aircraft have two digit identification numbers. In PLANAF service (unlike the PLAAF) these two digits are preceded by the model (e.g. J8II01). If the PLANAF were to assign pre-production aircraft to an evaluation unit, they would have three digit identification numbers.

Originally posted by google
You do that, and there will be no ships left over for the North/South Sea Fleets. No one denies that China has carrier ambitions; but that time is not now.

CVBG by 2010
Soth Sea Fleets
1CV 48,000T
DGG 170/171
DDG 188/189
FGG T54

Originally posted by google
It didn’t mention anything about building a carrier, did it? So it’s an expansion in their naval forces- still not enough for a carrier battle group.

Action: The screen shows a list of the number and type of ships and their primary role for a typical carrier battle group:

1 Carrier (CV/CVN) — Strike warfare
2 Cruisers (CG) — Air warfare (TBMD)
3 Destroyers/Frigates (DD(G)/FFG) — Surface and undersea warfare
2 Attack submarines (SSN) — Surface and undersea warfare
1 Fast Combat Support (AOE) — Replenishment
http://www.cadre.maxwell.af.mil/warfarestudies/wpc/wpc_txt/navy/cvbg.htm

Cruisers
10,000
Additional construction is possible, depending on results with the initial units. There is some speculation that after the second unit of this class, anew design would be constructed, with a 10,000 ton displacement. This might be equipped with the “Rif” Naval S-300 system in a vertical launching system (VLS).
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/luhai.htm
Destroyers
Type 052C Guided Missile Destroyer
http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/surface/052c.asp
FFG
PROGRAMME
In addition to the two classes of missile destroyers (Type 052B/C) currently under construction, the PLA Navy is also building a new class of frigate for its surface fleet. Reportedly designated as Type 054, the new frigate is a 3,400t class stealthy surface combatant similar to the French-built Lafayette class. Meanwhile two ships are under construction at Hudong Zhonghua Shipyard in Shanghai and Huangpu Shipyard in Guangzhou respectively. The ship 525 built in Hudong Zhonghua Shipyard was launched on 11 September 2003.
http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/surface/newffg.asp
SSN
The new Type 93 SSN is expected to be similar in performance to Russian second generation designs such as the Victor III. In summer 2001, one or two newly constructed “093 project” attack submarines participated in Dongshan maneuvers near the coast of Fujian province, about 200 km from Taiwan.
By 2006, PLAN could acquire at least four “093 project” submarines, equipped by anti-ship cruise missiles with a range of up to 500 km (somewhat similar to Russia’s Granit anti-ship missiles) and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) with a range of up to 2,500 km (similar to Russia’s Granat LACMs).
http://homepage.eircom.net/~steven/pla_navy.htm

Originally posted by GoldenDragon
If you look at the Chinese carrier rumours carefully, nearly all of it comes from Western conjecture.

There really isn’t anything from the Chinese side except for buying up old Russian carriers and turning them into theme parks.

CHINA ACCELERATES NAVY BUILDING

By Richard D. Fisher, Jr.

A naval arms race is now underway across the Taiwan Strait that has wider implications for the United States and its Asian allies. While the government of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian had hoped to make the Taiwan Navy its top military modernization priority, it is becoming increasingly clear that China will handily exceed Taiwan’s modest goals–which are now in some doubt.

In early 2001 U.S. President George Bush made a commitment to assist a long delayed naval modernization for Taiwan by agreeing to sell to Taipei eight new conventional submarines, four KIDD-class air defense destroyers, and twelve P-3 ORION anti-submarine patrol aircraft. The decision reversed an eight year period of neglect by President Bill Clinton. Like Clinton, however, Bush did not sell to Taiwan the long desired AEGIS air-defense destroyers. In mid-2003 it appears that Taiwan cannot afford new submarines, and could opt for used ones. Taipei may also seek to purchase less expensive, used P-3s over newly built models. The purchase of AEGIS ships looks more distant.

In sharp contrast, and with the possible exception of sophisticated sub-hunting aircraft, it now appears that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will acquire within this decade a larger number of all the naval systems that Taiwan had hoped to purchase. This build-up will likely advance two goals: 1) increase China’s ability to pursue a range of coercive strategies toward Taiwan, including a naval blockade; and 2) impede or prevent U.S. forces from coming to Taiwan’s “rescue.” To accomplish these missions, the PLA seeks to meld new long range satellite and radar sensors to coordinate attacks by air, surface and submarine platforms armed with deadly new long range supersonic missiles.

Because military acquisitions are undertaken within a Five Year Plan, Beijing’s naval build-up decisions were formulated in the late 1990s. While the PLAN received widespread negative press over the accidental loss of a submarine crew in mid-April, the PLAN’s current build-up has been less widely reported. But in a perhaps unintended gesture toward military transparency, many elements of the PLAN build-up can be monitored via the Chinese Internet in unprecedented detail. The ongoing PLAN build-up includes:

NAVAL AIR FORCES

In late 2002 or early 2003 the PLA signed a contract for its first batch of Russian Sukhoi Su-30MK2 and Su-30MK3 attack fighters for the PLAN. These will supplant the long obsolete Xian H-6 (Tupolev Tu-16) bombers and will give the PLAN a long range strike platform that can carry modern precision weapons and new supersonic anti-ship missiles. In an interview last November a Sukhoi official indicated the PLAN could purchase up to forty Su-30s. In addition, about eighty PLA Air Force Su-30MKKs may soon be available for naval strike missions. Recent reports also indicate that, with the help of Britain’s Rolls Royce, China has finally mastered the ability to produce an improved version of the Spey turbofan engine. This will enable greater production of Xian’s JH-7A, a more potent version of the JH-7 already in one PLAN unit near Shanghai. The JH-7A will carry at least two types of supersonic anti-ship missiles, a new indigenous model and the Russian Zvezda Kh-31.

PROJECT 093 NUCLEAR ATTACK SUB

The Pentagon expects the PLAN to launch its first second generation nuclear powered attack submarine around 2005. Several reports indicate the Project 093 will benefit greatly from Russian design, powerplant, combat system, sonar and weapons technology. The 093 will also form the basis for the new Project 094 nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine, expected in PLAN service around the end of the decade. U.S. estimates hold that the 093 will equate to the Russian 1980s vintage VICTOR III class nuclear sub. This would be a major improvement over existing PLAN Project 091 HAN subs, but still not as capable as late model U.S. nuclear attack subs. There remains an outside chance the PLAN could also purchase the very capable Russian AKULA nuclear attack sub, as India is doing.

KILO ATTACK SUB

In early 2002 the PLA signed a contract for eight new Russian KILO 636 diesel-electric powered attack subs by 2007, on top of four already in service. The new KILOs are expected to incorporate improvements in quieting, sonar, and weapons–which are to include the 288km range Novator CLUB-S anti-ship missile. India is the only other Asian state to have these potent weapons. They will make China’s KILOs among the quietest and clearly the best-armed subs in any East Asian navy.

“SONG” ATTACK SUB

Despite encountering problems with the prototype, the PLAN has now settled into series production of an improved version of the indigenous SONG class diesel-electric powered submarine. The SONG bears a resemblance to French sub designs and uses German diesel engines. It also incorporates better sonar and weapon systems than the Project 035 MING class conventional submarines. About five SONGs could now be complete, and perhaps more than ten, plus about twenty MINGs in the PLAN by decade’s end.

NO. 168 AIR DEFENSE DESTROYER

By the end of last summer the PLAN had launched two new general purpose destroyers with stealthy hull designs and, according to reports, Ukrainian turbine engines. This design marked a significant improvement over previous PLAN combat ships. By April this year it became apparent that the ships would carry new Russian weapons–the effective SA-N-12 anti-aircraft missile plus a long-range Russian search radar, and another radar similar to the Russian BAND STAND over-the-horizon targeting radar. The latter indicates that a new, long range anti-ship missile will be carried. These ships are basically comparable to Taiwan’s new U.S. KIDD class destroyers in size and capability, but much more stealthy.

NO. 170 “AEGIS” DESTROYER

On April 29 the PLAN launched destroyer No. 170, the first of two new destroyers that will incorporate a large phased-array radar similar to the U.S. AEGIS radar system. Using the same stealthy hull and engine configuration of the No. 168 class, this destroyer is armed with forty-eight new type vertical-launched anti-aircraft missiles of either Russian or Chinese origin. As such they will be the first dedicated long range air defense ships for the PLAN. The radar configuration offers at least the potential that this class of destroyer may eventually perform anti-missile missions. This is a capability that Taiwan has sought to obtain via U.S. AEGIS destroyers.

SOVREMENNY 2 DESTROYER

In early 2002 the PLAN also ordered an additional two SOVREMENNY class destroyers. While this contract has also been mired in controversy between Russian shipyards, it is expected that the ships will be delivered. Russian reports indicate they will be armed with more powerful supersonic anti-ship missiles, either the 300km range NPO Mashinostroenie YAKHONT or a new 200km range version of the Raduga MOSKIT. An AEGIS radar system with appropriate missiles is the only sure way to counter these missiles.

“TYPE 054” STEALTH FRIGATE

Early this year Chinese Internet sources revealed a model of a new stealthy frigate that bore a striking resemblance to Taiwan’s French-built LAFAYETTE stealth frigates. Referred to by some as the Type 054 frigate, series production is now underway, with the first to be launched later this year. The frigates are expected to offer improved performance over the current JIANGWEI class frigates.

NO. 886 REPLENISHMENT SHIP

After a long hiatus, the PLAN launched a new replenishment ship earlier this year. While this served only to increase the number of such PLAN ships from three to four, it also demonstrated the PLA’s ability to produce these ships, which are necessary to support long term or distant operations.

In addition, Chinese Internet sources indicate that many older PLAN destroyers and frigates are receiving weapon and sensor upgrades. Popular weapon upgrades include new 100mm automatic main guns and C-802 anti-ship missiles. Though a modest improvement, they will make naval vessels more useful for blockade missions in the Taiwan Strait. The PLAN does not yet appear to be ready to build aircraft carriers. Carrier-related research and technology acquisition continue as they have since the 1980s, but the PLAN does not yet appear to have the resources for carrier acquisition. But when a carrier is finally acquired, the ships built during the 2001-2005 period could form the basis for its escort group.

To be sure, the PLAN also faces an even greater challenge in training crews and developing doctrine and tactics for its new ships and submarines. This may turn out to be the PLAN’s main task for the next five year plan, though it is safe to expect that the PLA will continue its build-up of more capable combat ships.

For Washington, Taipei and Tokyo, all of whom depend heavily on maritime security, the PLA’s naval build-up serves to underscore Beijing’s potential to challenge their security interests. It clearly increases the pressure on Washington and Taipei to place more emphasis on naval modernization programs that Taiwan can afford and acquire quickly. Otherwise, an accelerating military imbalance across the Strait should cause Beijing to conclude that it can attempt military solutions to “recover” Taiwan.

Richard D. Fisher, Jr. is a senior fellow with the Jamestown Foundation and the managing editor of China Brief.
http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=19&issue_id=680&article_id=4757

Indian navy to have two aircraft carriers by 2011
http://english.people.com.cn/200403/09/eng20040309_136988.shtml

http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/junshi/513637.htm