Just a couple of days back read in a newspaper that an outgoing Russian Diplomat had commented that Russia and India were thinking of inviting China to co-develop the Fift Generation Aircraft. This if true will certainly set the cat amongst the pigeons.

http://www.indiadefence.com/

LCA and BEYOND VISUAL RANGE AIR TO AIR MISSILES

An IDC Analysis

(With inputs by Sayan Majumdar)

New Delhi, 27 June 2004

Indian defence scientists have embarked on an ambitious project to develop an active-radar homing (ARH) ASTRA, a beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air missile (AAM) capable of destroying enemy targets located at ranges up to 80 kilometres. The missile will hopefully be able to outturn a 9g target at that distance, which means it should be able to engage a non-manoeuvring target in excess of 100 kilometres. The project will be guided and led by the Hyderabad-based Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL). ASTRA will weigh 150 kg, making it the lightest in its class and thus enjoying a wide range of applications.

Interestingly some advanced countries and multinational corporations have indicated willingness to join hands for the ASTRA project and this should be welcomed to ensure rapid development and Initial Operational Capability (IOC) with the Indian Air Force (IAF) and Indian Navy. In the long run the ASTRA AAM is set to complement the ultra-long-range Ks-172 and long-range RVV-AE (AA-12 Adder) family of BVR AAMs and R-73RDM2 or possibly Python 5 NBVR/WVR (Near Beyond Visual Range/Within Visual Range) AAMs in the IAFs AAM inventory.

The emergence of top quality Phased Array radars in IAF service has made it possible to detect enemy fighter-sized targets at ranges well beyond 100 kilometres. Only high-quality stealth platforms will remain “invisible” at those ranges. The primary concern of the IAF and the ASTRA development team will be of positive identification of enemy targets at those extended ranges. IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) still remains a challenging complication and even while the United States Air Force (USAF) tactics are BVR dominated, very few BVR shots occurred in combat prior to Gulf War I ‘Desert Storm’.

During ‘Operation Desert Storm’ the United States Navy (USN) were disallowed the use of their AIM-54 Phoenix BVR AAMs for IFF at extended ranges, because they lacked two-sources of information. USAF fighters did posses on-board systems to supplement data from Airborne Command Posts (ACP) like E-3B ‘Sentry’ airborne warning and control system (AWACS) platforms and were allowed to conduct BVR engagements.

Thus since IFF remains a problem because of incorrect and absent returns and “spoofing”, AWACS platforms are presently deployed for reconfirmation of enemy airborne targets at extended ranges and in this respect the IAF will naturally be benefited by induction of PHALCON AWACS platforms. No more the fighter pilots need to follow the risky “eyeball/shooter” sequence, where the flight leader comes unacceptably close to the enemy formation for positive identification and passes the data to other fighters. His associates then fire the BVR missiles. In the long term, development of electro-optical seeker technology coupled with on-board threat database will let the missiles themselves determine the legitimacy of the target and this seems to be the logical option. This option should be considered for the ASTRA Project.

ASTRA should also have provisions for the futuristic concept of “Cooperative Fighter Operations” or Mixed Fighter Force Concept (MFFC) that is essential for future BVR engagements and optimum performance and results. Pairs of aircraft need to be data-linked, allowing one to launch the missiles against the targets while it is illuminated by another. In such engagements a fighter like our light combat aircraft (LCA) TEJAS, will be able to impart the greatest kinetic energy to the ASTRA by accelerating up to Mach 2 and then manoeuvring out of the engagement. The illuminator fighter such as the Sukhoi-30MKI with powerful radar capable of performing like a mini-AWACS would remain firmly subsonic keeping a decent distance from the target, and providing either command-guidance updates or illuminating the target. The option for an Imaging Infra-Red (IIR) seeker for ASTRA should remain open, as ARH is effective in one set of conditions and IIR in another. The open choice of different seeker heads also complicates the problems of the adversary.

The propulsion system appears to be a Rocket/Ramjet because of “dimension and weight constraints”. Adopting a Rocket/Ramjet approach has certain limitations. The need for controlled airflow to the ramjet ducts means that the “skid-to-turn” manoeuvring of a conventional rocket-powered missile is not acceptable because it will risk masking an intake. Instead “bank-to-turn” manoeuvring needs to be adopted resulting in a reduced instantaneous turn rate. Thus close cooperation with the European Consortium MBDA, the manufacturer of Meteor high-performance BVR AAM will prove to be beneficial. The protracted delay in IOC of missiles like Trishul, Akash and Nag are partly because of absence of joint-cooperation with an established foreign manufacturing consortium. This mistake should not be repeated during development of ASTRA especially as MBDA now enjoys very close relationship with the Indian defence industries.

MBDA Meteor is capable of engaging air targets autonomously, whether fighters, bombers, transport aircraft, AWACS or cruise missiles by using its active radar seeker by day or night and in all weather or dense EW (Electronic Warfare) environments. Meteor’s solid fuel variable-flow rocket/ramjet propulsion system will ensure a range in excess of 100 km and a speed of more than Mach 4 and high terminal velocity. Even when launched from extreme stand-off ranges, the missile will have the energy in the end game to defeat fast, manoeuvring targets. To ensure total target destruction, the missile is equipped with both proximity and impact fuzes and a fragmentation warhead that is detonated at the optimum point to maximise lethality. Guidance is ISN, two-way datalink and active Ku-band radar seeker. It can receive targeting data after launch from the launching fighter, another fighter, or AWACS platforms. The two-way data-link partially solves the IFF problem at long ranges. Naturally inputs from the Meteor project will benefit ASTRA development immensely. Also the control surfaces of ASTRA need to be folded for installation in internal missile bays of fifth-generation fighters and for self-defence installations as Bomber Defence Missile (BDM) and in internal rotary-launchers of long-range Indian Navy Tupolev-22M3 ‘Backfire-C’ aircraft.

The “primary carrier” of ASTRA BVR AAM is slated to be the indigenous LCA Tejas, which made its first flight on January 4, 2001. During the year 2001 LCA TD-1 made a total of twelve flights split between Wing Commander Rajiv Kothiyal and Wing Commander Raghunath Nambiar. Now along with two TD (Technology Demonstrator) a PV (Prototype Vehicle) mor tests are also being conducting with more PVs to follow. The LCA is slated to attain IOC with the IAF sometime during the year 2007. This can be termed as a remarkable achievement considering a relatively smoother transition from “first-flight” to IOC. The Fly-By-Wire Flight Control System of the LCA has generated great international interest and LCAs low-speed handling and low-altitude manoeuvrability at an early flight-testing stage points to emergence of a formidable fighter.

A recent visitor to our website had lamented the inordinate delay in IOC of the Tejas and it will be interesting to see how other such efforts had fared worldwide. The dates of “first-flight” of few other four-plus or fifth generation fighters are given below:

Company
Aircraft
First Flight

Lockheed Martin/Boeing
F-22 Raptor
September 29, 1990

Dassault
Rafale
May 19, 1991

Eurofighter
Typhoon
March 29, 1994

Saab
Gripen
December 8, 1988

In each case there was a gap of nearly 10 years between the “first-flight” and IOC and so the progress of our LCA project is comparable. The aim of Indian Defence Research scientists and the IAF should be to field a similarly upgraded LCA before 2010 with upgrades allotted to Swedish Gripen, which is somewhat similar in size and configuration. These should include Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar and a formidable defensive avionics suite, which detects the threats of not only incoming radar guided missiles, but also of missiles that use the infrared and ultra-violet spectrum. Laser warning should also be an option. Add to all these a laser “device” capable of generating enough directed energy to snap the guidance of incoming radar and infrared guided AAMs seem to be obligatory on all fighters by the middle of the next decade. It was reported in the media that a 25 KW to 100 KW laser weapon was being developed for the projected United States F-35 JSF (Joint Strike Fighter).

Considering the fact that LCA is set to serve for a good part of the first half of this century, it should be a highly competitive design in terms of aerodynamics, engine, radar, avionics, EW suite and weaponry in relation to the JSF. In terms of stealth attributes JSF will retain an advantage, but LCA will also be low observable and even marginal superiority on other attributes may turn it into a great equalizer.

In some respects a delay in the LCA programme may be a “blessing in disguise” as now it derives or will derive the benefits of incorporation of the technological excellence of Sukhoi-30MKI and the Russian fifth-generation fighter projects in future. Development in “Block Update Versions” is now ensured.

http://www.defensetech.org/

USAF BRASS: WE LOST, NOW PAY UP
It’s happening. Already, the U.S. Air Force brass is trying to spin their pilots’ defeats against Indian fighters into cash for two new controversial, budget-busting jets.

As discussed yesterday, Indian flyboys in creaky Russian and French planes trumped their American adversaries 90 percent of the time during a recent exercise.

“We may not be as far ahead of the rest of the world as we thought we were,” Gen. Hal M. Hornburg, the chief of Air Combat Command, told reporters.

He then made a pitch (scroll down) for the troubled F/A-22 and F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. Pentagon-watchers have called both planes money-hogs that the military can’t afford during wartime.

“The jets are designed as stealth ‘air-superiority’ fighters — planes whose main mission is to shoot down enemy planes… [But no] air force in the world, except perhaps those of Israel and France, could shoot down more than a few American non-stealth fighter planes in even a large, protracted dogfight (and most of those shoot-downs would be by dumb luck),” Slate’s Fred Kaplan said last fall.

Now, the Air Force has new ammunition to fire back at its fighter critics.

“We’ve taken air superiority for granted,” Gen. Hornburg said.

THERE’S MORE: How could refurbished Russian MiG-21 jets even be a threat to American fighters? “When you stuff them full of Israeli electronics, multi-function [air-to-air] radar, and a helmet-mounted sight for cueing its Python-3 missiles,” said a Defense Tech pal in the USAF, pointing us to these two sites. http://www.defense-update.com/news/lancer.htm

He adds, “Now does that justify an F-22? Not on its own, but old Russian clunkers can be made over pretty nicely.”

AND MORE: Air power’s dirty little secret is that the airframe pretty much doesn’t matter these days,” says Defense Tech reader JA. What it does is “provide mounting points for weapons, sensors and engine(s). The MiG-21’s airframe is quite sufficient for acting as a placeholder for state of the art toys. To my way of thinking the USAF’s Fighter Mafia has never made the case for the need for either the (A)/F-22 or A/(F)-35. Rumsfeld’s failing has been in not bringing these overeducated idiots to heel

June 24, 2004 01:08 PM
INDIA 1, USAF 0
The whole world knows that if you mess with U.S. Air Force pilots, you’re going down. Hard.

Except, someone forgot to send the memo to India, apparently. Because, in recent exercises, Indian flyboys in low-tech Russian and French jets defeated American F-15C pilots more than 90 percent of the time.

Now, granted, the Indians had the Americans outnumbered: usually 10 or 12 to 4, during the Cope India air combat exercise held last February around the Gwalior Air Force Station. But American officials also credited Indian pilots with being “very proficient in [their] aircraft[s] and smart on tactics. That combination was tough for us to overcome,” USAF Col. Greg Neubeck told Inside the Air Force. (The article is off-limits to those who don’t subscribe. But The Times of India is running major excerpts.)

“The adversaries are better than we thought,” Col. Mike Snodgrass added. “And in the case of the Indian Air Force both their training and some of their equipment was better than we anticipated.”

According to the magazine, “The Indians flew a number of different fighters, including the French-made Mirage 2000 and the Russian-made MIG-27 and MIG-29, but the two most formidable IAF aircraft proved to be the MIG-21 Bison, an upgraded version of the Russian-made baseline MIG-21, and the SU-30K Flanker, also made in Russia.”

The ability of these planes to “repeatedly defeat America’s best fighter is a troubling development. So troubling, in fact, that it calls into question a core assumption of the Bush Administration’s plans for military transformation,” says Loren Thompson, a defense analyst with the Lexington Institute.

That assumption, widely repeated by military reformers since the mid-1990’s, is that U.S. military power is so overwhelming the Pentagon can afford to take risks by delaying modernization of Cold War weapons while it pursues development of leap-ahead technologies. Examples cited by policymakers of areas where the U.S. lead is unassailable in the near term include heavy armor (tanks) and air superiority (fighters). We already know from the experience of the Iraq war that heavy tanks have proven far more important to occupation and counter-insurgency operations than anyone expected. Now comes news that third-world countries may be able to challenge U.S. command of the skies.

The Pentagon’s initial take on lessons learned from the Iraq war was so dismissive of traditional warfighting competencies that it barely mentioned air superiority. But even a cursory examination of how U.S. strategy for the conflict unfolded reveals a heavy reliance on air power to compensate for numerical deficiencies on the ground. The possibility of having to conquer some future Baghdad without air superiority should make every general in the Army pause and reflect on what victory might require in the way of casualties and resources.

“The actual story is not nearly as bad as it may seem,” Chirstopher Coglianese counters on the National Security Roundtable (NSRT) discussion group. “Remember that the Indians have two hostile nations on their border, both with credible air forces. Indian pilots actually fly almost twice as many hours a month as ours and much of it is under operational conditions. Even though equipped with Russian-designed aircraft, as the Air said to me, they ain’t the Russians (notorious for being undertrained).”

THERE’S MORE: The Cope India could actually work to promote a much-maligned Air Force project, now in development, one Defense Tech pal in the USAF notes.

Opponents of the F/A-22 stealth fighter plane say the jet is designed only for Cold War-era, mid-air dogfights. That’s a waste of billions, the logic goes, because “the USAF has (and would not have) no peer competitor in air superiority.”

“But the F-15 is the representative of that “air superiority,'” our pal points out. So “its poor outing against a country with improving technology and good tactics would seem to do damage to the argument that there is no need for a modern air superiority fighter.

But back over on the NSRT list, one poster responds: “At my age I’m entitled to be cynical so let me suggest this whole episode smells like Delhi on a hot day…What better way to keep an aerial boondoggle like the F-22 program healthy and sucking up funds needed to pay for light infantrymen than to let a bunch of INDIANS flying planes bought from the RUSSIANS win some aerial engagements over India.”

AND MORE: On the eDodo message board — often populated by Air Force types — some are saying that the results of Cope India are not quite what they seem.

USAF pilots were flying “Red Air” — meaning they were simulating the (presumably worse) tactics and (presumably lower) capabilities of enemy flyers.

That means they walked into the fight with their arms tied behind their backs. It makes for a good media coup in India… But in a full-up fight, I’d put ALL my money on the Alaska F-15C’s over the Indian Air Force…

They may have ‘lost the war’ in the excercise. But it was an excercise. In the real thing, our boys won’t be flying as ‘Red Air.’

AND MORE: “I have a hard time getting a justification for the F-22 from our planes losing to refurbished Mig-21s,” says Defense Tech reader MB. “What I get from that is look at how to upgrade the planes we have and take some of the money saved over F-22s to buy some more jet fuel so our guys can get some more flight time.

Wasnt someone complaining about to many India related threads :rolleyes:

Navy takes plunge for nuclear muscle
SUJAN DUTTA
New Delhi, June 23: The Indian Navy today announced a “doctrine” for itself, making a case for its primacy among the armed forces and arguing that it was the most potent force to launch an attack with nuclear weapons if circumstances warranted.

The Indian Naval Doctrine has been articulated when India’s relations with its neighbours, particularly China and Pakistan, are possibly at their best in three years. The security establishment makes it clear that the doctrine is not a statement of policy.

The unclassified portion of the naval doctrine called the Indian Maritime Doctrine is now being circulated among politicians, bureaucrats, analysts and naval officers.

In line with the government’s policy on nuclear weapons of “no first strike” and development of credible second strike capability for deterrence with a “nuclear triad”, the navy has said that it is most suited to carry and deliver the deadly arsenal.

“Nuclear triad” is a jargon for the potential ability of all the three armed forces to be equipped with weapons capable of striking with nuclear warheads from air, land and sea. The naval argument is drawn from the logic that a launchpad in the high seas presents the enemy with a target that can minimise collateral damage. Simply put, this means, that a launchpad on land is more detectable and if the enemy strikes it, the risks of civilian casualties are high.

The navy has also said that nuclear capability should be undersea, meaning that it wants to equip its submarines with the ability to fire missiles carrying nuclear warheads. The Indian government is in covert talks with the Russians to lease two Akula class nuclear submarines (that have both longer undersea duration and ability to fire nuclear weapons) and has, for nearly two decades, been engaged in making its own nuclear submarine coded Advanced Technical Vehicle.

The army and the air force are also in the process of writing their doctrines even as there is some debate on whether the armed forces of a sovereign republic that report to a civilian establishment actually need a set of rigid principles.

In 2002, India announced that it had formed its Nuclear Command Authority that vests responsibility with the civilian-political leadership, which will act on the advice of a subordinate military and executive committee.

“The Indian Navy recognises that while any formalised maritime doctrine is authoritative, its application should be embarked upon judiciously and astutely,” a release announcing the doctrine said. “The maritime domain is changing rapidly. We must appreciate these changes and shape our strategies and policies to further national interests,” said the doctrine.

The Indian Maritime Doctrine does not delve into the details of the background in which it sets out the principles for the navy. It takes note of Pakistan’s “hostile posturing” and plans by China to configure its navy around two groups, each led by an aircraft carrier.

The recognition by the US of Pakistan as a major non-Nato ally has also been taken note of. The navy would be concerned by an inflow of American technology into Pakistan and China’s potential to operate much beyond the limit of its territorial waters.

“In an increasingly complex world, the missions of the navy are correspondingly more diverse and complex than ever before. This complexity is global as well as regional, and is unlikely to diminish in the 21st century,” the doctrine noted.

It said activity around India’s maritime area was increasing and pointed to the movements in and around the Persian Gulf in the west and the Straits of Malacca in the southeast. Naval strategy in future wars would be to deny access to the sea to enemy forces, the doctrine laid out.

In line with this approach, the doctrine said the navy would monitor and, if necessary, seek to control movement in parts of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, secure the coastline and islands and offshore assets like Bombay High.

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Anyone have any Idea what the joint services command in the Andaman islands will comprise of? How many troops , aircraft and Ships. They need a huge number of ships for that command to be really effective.