Russia Claims its Zircon Hypersonic Missile Hits Mach 8
BraHmos II, the export version of Zircon. (Photo : BrahMos Aerospace)
Russia claims its new hypersonic 3M22 Zircon anti-ship missile hit Mach 8 (9,900 km/h) in a recent test, which makes this weapon the fastest hypersonic missile on Earth — if the unverified results of this test are true.
“During the tests of the missile, it was confirmed that its speed on the march reaches eight Mach,” said Russian state-owned media. Russia didn’t specify which submarine, surface ship or land installation launched the Mach 8 Zircon, nor did it specify when.
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Western experts doubt the Russian claim as Russia in December 2016 admitted that Zircon (or Tsirkon) is capable only of Mach 5 or 6,200 km/h. Hypersonic weapons such as missiles and aircraft can reach speeds in excess of Mach 5.
Russian state-run media, however, confirmed previous reports the first operational Zircon will be installed on the Kirov-class heavy missile cruisers, RFS Admiral Nakhimov (080) and RFS Pyotr Velikiy (099).
Zircon has a range of 450 kilometers. The weight of 3M22 Zircon remains unknown but will likely be heavier than the 200 kg warhead on India’s BrahMos supersonic cruise missile.
It’s widely believed BrahMos II is the export version of the 3M22 Zircon. BrahMos II, which will have a speed of Mach 7 (8,600 km/h), will be the world’s fastest cruise missile when it enters service with the Indian Armed Forces some eight years from now.
Production of the 3M22 Zircon is expected to begin in 2017. Tests of this warhead began in March 2016.
The 3M22 Zircon is scheduled to be added to the missile armament of the RFS Admiral Nakhimov,which has been undergoing extensive refitting since 2015. The Nakhimov should re-enter service in 2018 at the earliest.
The RFS Pyotr Velikiy will be outfitted with the 3M22 Zircon in late 2019 as part of a large scale refit. She was commissioned into the Soviet Navy in 1998 and is part of the fleet that escorted the Russian aircraft carrier, RFS Admiral Kuznetsov (063), to the Mediterranean Sea in October.
The Russians say their hypersonic weapons can defeat all existing types of U.S. anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), which are designed to intercept Russian ICBMs with more predictable ballistic trajectories.
Because that’s all their manfacturers can produce with incredibly obsolete foundry equipment purchased from European countries 10-15 years ago (Russia doesn’t produce its own mmic production equipment).
Jo has already shown us proof with the photos of the equipment from inside the foundries.
Cute, that “gun” is a truck sized, poor man’s laser. 6km range… impressive… back in the 80s.
Russia has two type of Zhuk-A radar
Zhuk-A (FGA-35) = AESA GaAs
Zhuk-A (FGA-35 3D) = AESA GaN
Japan similar
J/APG-1 = AESA GaAs
J/APG-2 = AESA GaN
And China
KLJ-10 = AESA GaAs
KLJ-7A = AESA GaN
APG-80 vs APG-83
APG-63V2 vs APG-63V3
Distinctively through its appearance, AESA GaAs has a number of striking microchips on its surface, while AESA GaN is a flat surface.
both of APG-77/81 are GaAs tech ?
China offers export version of YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship missile
The CM-302 missile exhibited at Airshow China 2016 is being marketed for export as “the world’s best anti-ship missile”, according to Chinese news media.
The missile’s manufacturer, state-owned China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), reportedly justifies the claim on the grounds that the missile is supersonic throughout its flight, can be launched from air, land, and naval platforms, and used in a land attack role.
A report published by the China Daily newspaper also confirmed that the CM-302, which was allegedly one of the exhibits to have attracted the most enquiries at this year’s air show in Zhuhai, is closely related to the YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship missile (ASM), which is in service with China’s armed forces.
The report states that the CM-302 has a range of 280 km, a warhead of 250 kg, and a 90% probability of hitting its target. CASIC claims that the missile is effective against large warships, such as aircraft carriers and destroyers, with a single missile having the capacity to disable a 5,000-tonne warship.
While the news report provides few details about the CM-302’s propulsion and flight profile, it said that the missile sea-skims for most of the flight and manoeuvres during the terminal phase to defeat the defensive weapons of ships.
Previously published reports about the YJ-12 indicate that the ramjet-powered missile achieves a mid-course speed of Mach 1.5-2, accelerating to Mach 3 or higher during the terminal phase of the flight.
The missile is guided by satellite navigation – specifically by China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System – to a target location, which can be updated by data link. Terminal homing is driven by an active radar seeker.
Assuming the missile’s physical characteristics are similar to those of the YJ-12, the CM-302 is likely to be a large missile of around 7 m in length, 0.6 m diameter, and with an estimated weight of around 2,000-2,500 kg.
http://www.janes.com/article/65364/china-offers-export-version-of-yj-12-supersonic-anti-ship-missile
SPECTRA system can help Rafale stealthy
SPECTRA ( Système de Protection et d’Évitement des Conduites de Tir du Rafale (literally: System of Protection and Avoidance of enemy Fire-Control for Rafale) or “Self-Protection Equipment Countering Threats to Rafale Aircraft”) was jointly developed by Thales Group and MBDA for the Dassault Rafale fighter aircraft, now in service with the French Air Force and Navy.
Thales Group and Dassault Aviation have mentioned stealthy jamming modes for the SPECTRA system, to reduce the aircraft’s apparent radar signature.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thales_Spectra
If the Fighter is equipped with 360 deg sensors (as Rafale) , a powerfull bragg cell suite (as Rafale) and some active AESA antennas (as Rafale) , it can make a LPI radar think that it only scan an empty sky or an empty background…It’s mean: “Active Stealth”. With the SPECTRA, The Rafale completely stealthy around 360 degrees
Range Deception
The most common type of deception jammer is the range deception (range-gate stealer), whose function is to pull the radar tracking gate from the target position through the introduction of a false target into the radar’s range-tracking circuits. At start, the jammer sends back an amplified version of the signal received from the radar. The deception jammer signal, being stronger than the radar’s return signal, captures the range-tracking circuits.The deception signal is then progressively delayed in the jammer by using an RF memory, thereby “walking” the range gate off the actual target (range-gate pull-off or RGPO). When the range gate is sufficiently removed from the actual target, the deception jammer is turned off, forcing the tracking radar into a target reacquisition mode.
p/s: jammer can sometimes perform Range gate pull in , which is the similar technique as Range gate pull off , the main different is the target will appear to get closer to radar instead of getting further aways
Counter-countermeasures:
PRF jitters : a radar calculate range to a target by measuring the elapsed time between pulse transmittal and target return reception.Thus, the maximum required range of the radar determines the maximum pulse repetition frequency of the radar .In Jitter mode, the time between successive pulses is allowed to vary in a totally random manner over a series of set intervals as long as the maximum range condition is met.In theory, an infinite number of PRI patterns can be generated by combining stagger and jitter. Varying pulses render the jammer incapable of anticipating when the next illuminating pulse is due to arrive.
Frequency-hopping : as the jammer need time to analyze signals and turn into it.
Leading-edge tracking : taking measurements not according to where the center of the return signal is but rather at the leading edge.All RGPO/RGPI cover pulse jamming tends to lag the target’s returns by some increment of time
ew104_fig2
Monitoring signal strength.
Double Tracking : in airborne radar, the fast Fourier transform ( FFT ) is used to process the signal on both the range and velocity axes. In this way the target produces an echo that, being characterized in both range and velocity(Doppler) allows double tracking.If the jammer attempt to open a one gate not coherent with the other, it is ignored
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Velocity Deception
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In velocity deception jamming, the Doppler shift is interfered with. At the start of jammer operation, the illuminator signal is detected by the jammer and an exact false, strong Doppler-shifted signal is sent back to the radar. The radar locks on to the incorrect Doppler signal and the jammer slowly sweeps the false signal’s frequency more away from the actual Doppler frequency of the target. When the radar has been led far enough away in frequency, the jammer is turned off and the radar is once more left without a target.The basic principal of velocity deception is similar to range deception ,thus it is sometimes called Velocity Gate Pull-Off ( VGPO )
Counter-countermeasures:
PRF jitters
Frequency hoping
Leading-edge tracking
Double tracking
Guard gate: a counter techniques that entail presenting sensors around the gate in which tracking is performed so that as soon as the presence of additional echo is detected ,the tracking system switches to memory for a short time and then reacquires the old target .Accordingly , when a deception jammer tries to lure the tracking gate to a false target , as soon as the true echo and the deceptive echo separate , the true echo will enter the guard gate, thus blocking the tracking gate. When the sensors indicate that the deceptive echo has gone, the gates will again position themselves correctly .
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Cover Pulses
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This is a hybrid type of jamming which incorporates some of the features of both spot or
barrage noise and deception jammers. . This type of jammer generates a noise burst which is ‘on’ before and after the actual target return thereby covering the true return. This type of jammer allows a low powered repeater to respond to a number of threat radars by time
sharing.
Counter-countermeasures:
High gain , high power radar to burn through jamming signal
HoJ missiles
Inverse Gain (Inverse Con-scan ) Jamming
liu7
Inverse gain jamming is used to capture the angle-tracking circuits of a conical scan tracking radar. This technique repeats a replica of the received signal with an induced amplitude modulation which is the inverse of the victim radar’s combined transmitting and receiving antenna scan patterns. Against a conically scanning tracking radar, an inverse gain repeater jammer has the effect of causing positive feedback, which pushes the tracking radar antenna away from the target rather than toward the target. Inverse-gain jamming and RGPO are combined in many cases to counter conical scan tracking radars.
Counter-countermeasures:
Monopulse radar
Random conical scan frequency : changing the scanning speed in a pseudorandom way within a given domain
Lobe on receive only (LORO )
Conical Scan on Receive Only ( COSRO)
Frequency hoping
PRF jitters
Cross Eye Jamming
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Cross-eye jamming is an angle deception ECM technique that employs two spatially separated jamming sources. Each source acts as a repeater-type jammer transmitting the same signal at the same time, and if the two signals arrive at the missile monopulse antenna approximately 180° out of phase, wavefront distortion occurs. The missile seeker, presuming that the signal source lies along the normal to the wavefront, tries to re-aligns its antenna at right angles to the distorted wavefront. This antenna re-alignment results in incorrect missile tracking which in turn results in incorrect steering information being passed to the missile autopilot. This may potentially result in a substantial missile miss distance.In a cross-eye jamming system, a 180° phase relationship between the two jamming sources may be maintained by setting up a retro-reflective transmission system. In this type of system, each of the jamming antennas is acting as the signal source for a repeater- type jammer. However, the signal received by one antenna is transmitted by the other, and vice versa. In this way, the total propagation delay from seeker to receive antenna to transmit antenna and back to seeker is identical for both signal paths and, everything else being equal, the phase of the two signals arriving at the seeker will be identical. A 180° phase shifter is then added to one of the paths to create the wavefront distortion effect.Successful operation of cross-eye jamming creates an interferometric null between the jamming signals in the direction of the victims radar. The jamming signal must compete with the real target return to capture the radar angle tracker. To achieve that the angle noise caused by the real radar target must perturb the radar’s antenna off the jamming signal null by an amount sufficient for a positive jamming to signal ratio to be generated .As a result, the jamming to signal requirement of at least 20dBsm is required for successful cross-eye jamming operation.
Counter-countermeasures:
PRF jitters
Frequency hoping
High gain , high power radar to burn through jamming signal
Increase radar duty cycles
Cross-Polarized Jamming
The polarization of an electromagnetic wave is defined as the orientation of the electric field vector. As we know electric field vector is perpendicular to both the direction of travel and the magnetic field vector. The polarization is described by the geometric figure traced by the electric field vector upon a stationary plane perpendicular to the direction of propagation, as the wave travels through that plane.Reflectors type antenna response to cross-polarized signals very different from normal polarization signals , and cross-polarized jamming exploited that fact. The jammer use 2 transmitting antennas which are 90 degrees out of polarization ( for example : one can be vertical and the others horizontal ) , this cause the victims radar to react erroneously with very significant tracking error.
Counter-countermeasures:
Polarization filter
Cross-Polarized jamming cannot affect flat plate antenna (such as AESA , PESA radars) since there is no forward geometry
Cross-Polarized jamming requires very large J/S to overcome weakness of condon lobes ,thus, high gain , high power radars are possible counter to this kind of jammer.
Skirt Jamming
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In skirt jamming, the jammer exploits the phase response of filters in the radar receiver by injecting a strong jamming signal into a region just above or below the filter frequency. This can cause non-linearity in the phase response across the wanted band , which can affect the radar’s tracking circuitry.
Counter-countermeasures:
Skirt frequency jamming effectiveness, depends on the unbalance between the sum and difference channels, at these frequencies where rapid phase shifts are present in each channel .Thus , it can be counter by careful design and construction of radar.
Active Cancellation
inter
Active cancellation is a theoretical military jamming technique that involves the sampling of an incoming radar signal, analyzing it, then returning the signal slightly out of phase, thus “cancelling” it out due to destructive interference. While there are no official information about jamming systems using this technique in service, it is rumored to be in use on Rafale with SPECTRA suite.
Counter-countermeasures:
Frequency hoping ( active cancellation require exact information about pulses to produce cancellation pulses , thus frequency agile radar are likely unaffected )
PRF jitters ( cancellation pulses need to be transmitted at exact moment to produce desirable interference effect , random PRF render the jammer unable to predict when the next pulse coming )
Multiple radars
Jamming Tactics:
Blinking Jamming
Blinking jamming is an effective jamming tactics against monopulse radar seeker and home on jam missiles. It causes line-of-sight angle to step continuously between the two angular positions through 2 jamming assets emitting by turns.The 2 assets can send returns to hostile radar at the rate close to servo bandwidth( typically a few Hz), this can cause resonate at radar target and result in large overshoot, if apply again HoJ missiles , it would cause missiles to yaw wildly and miss both targets.
Stand-off Jamming
Box-Spring.RU.green_side-3D-Models-Openflight-VBS2-Simthetiq
Support jamming signal is radiated from one platform and is used to protect other platforms,for stand-off jamming (SOJ) the support jamming platform is maintaining an orbit at a long range from the radar – usually beyond weapons range.The advantage of this method is that jamming platform can be safe from HoJ missiles, the disadvantages is that it much harder to maintain sufficient J/S ratio.
Stand in Jamming
aesa-radar
Support jamming signal is radiated from one platform and is used to protect other platforms.For stand in jamming (SIJ) a remotely piloted vehicle is orbiting very close to the victim radar while transmitting jamming signal .Since the jammer is closer to hostile radar , the power required to screen the same target of SIJ is much lower compared to SOJ.
Terrain Bounce Jamming:
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Terrain bounce jamming is a unique jamming tactic created to deal with HoJ missiles . Normally the electromagnetic beam from jammer is transmitted toward the victim radar in a direct path thus,home-on-jam missiles will be able to track the angle(direction) of the jammer signal and fly at that direction.Terrance bounce tactic exploits the fact that ground/sea surface can reflect radio waves.Jammer operator will direct jamming beam toward these surface instead of directly at the hostile radar so the jamming beam will come from a difference direction from the actual jammer. As a result, this tactic can be used to trick HoJ into believe that the jammer located somewhere on ground.Terrance bounce tactics work best when aircraft fly at low altitude , near flat surface such as the sea. Main disadvantage of this tactics is that effective radiated power of jammer is reduced
Jamming-to-Signal Ratio:
When Jamming is factored into the radar equation,the quantities of greatest interest are Jamming to signal ratio (J/S) and Burn-Through Range.”J-to-S” is the ratio of the signal strength of the jamming signal (J) to the signal strength of the target return signal (S). It is expressed as “J/S” and often measured in dB.
aesa-radar
Jamming-signal ratio
Apart from their unique requirements of each specific jamming technique, for jamming to be effective J must exceed S by some amount , therefore , the desired result of a J/S calculation in dB is a positive number .It is a common misconception that J/S ratio required to jam any radar is a fixed value.In reality, however the required J/S varied significantly depending on jamming techniques and radar type.
aesa-radar
Burn-through range is the radar to target distance where the target return signal can first be detected through the ECM and is usually slightly farther than crossover range where J=S. It is usually the range where the J/S just equals the minimum J/S requirement.
Since jamming signal only has to travel one way, as the range get further , the jammer has more advantage than the radar because jamming power decrease at slower rate
burn-through-effect
phased_array_illus
As shown in J/S equation earlier, factors affecting burn-through range are :
ERPs = Effective radiated power of radar
ERPj =Effective radiated power of jammer
G = Antenna gain
RCS = Target radar cross section
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