pjhydroAbsolutely!. Most expensive to buy and most expensive to run!. Some people will have to hope that 35B comes in very expensive and 35C really cheap or their predictions of ‘cheaper and more capable’ CATOBAR ops are going look extremely dumb!
Ain’t that the truth, I reckon Dr Fox just loved Top Gun when he was younger.
pjhydroWell . . . depends on what UCAV you mean. An enlarged Taranis derivative, optimised for high subsonic cruise, could have a very long range, which could be traded off for endurance. It could therefore strike targets much further inland than any carrier-borne fighter or sea-launched cruise missile, or penetrate then loiter, waiting for targets of opportunity. It could be made more stealthy than a manned fighter, thus enhancing its survivability against air defences.
Given that we won’t have many carrier-borne fighters (or many fighters at all), they’re horribly expensive, & pilots are rare, valuable, & take a long time to replace, using UCAVs for the most dangerous tasks (see above) makes sense.
Its tantalising to consider the reach a carrier based son-of-Taranis armed with a couple of son-of-storm shadows would give the UK. Even land based all the rumours are pointing to very long, strategic level range. Its the one area of defence devlopment/procurement where the MOD has actually demonstrated real level headedness and fore thought. Its going to be interesting to watch this develop, especially with so much going on out of sight.
pjhydroWell, you can hardly deter very much without a fleet in being can you? I am sure the Argentines would have had a copy of Janes to consult, to see what Britain could bring to the party.
Do you actually know what a “fleet in being” is? Because you obviously don’t. If you did you would realise what a silly sounding comment that is.
A fleet in being is one that stays in port and does not venture out to give battle. The Doctrine was first dreamt up as a way the RN could survive and still provide some sort of war effort during the early part of the 9 years war (1688-97) They were outnumbered and outgunned and to venture out would invite annhilation. So they stayed in port and provided a phantom threat that could not be entirely ignored, tying up French resources. Germany in world war 1 would be another example, the German Grand Fleet only venturing out on one major sortie. The RN could not ignore them however, the Germans provided a fleet in being – its not however a winning strategy. A very good example would be Argentina post Belgrano – it sat in port, took no further part in the war but the RN could never ignore the potential that it might venture out on a sortie so had to have a strategy and resources to deal with the potential, the Argentinean Navy became a “fleet in being”. The Strategy in the modern era though is pretty obsolete mainly due to air power. A fleet in being concept was supposed to keep your fleet safe and still make it a potential threat that has to be considered. Taranto and Pearl Harbour demonstrate the potential air power gave in that you could now reach into these safe ports and neutralise such a fleet in being. Of course the UK was constrained in the Falklands as it was only a limited war fought for limited aims so Argentinean ports were out of bounds.
So saying you believe in a “fleet in being” suggests you believe in keeping the RN safe in harbour, out of trouble as some sort of imaginary sword of damocles, in what history has proved is rarely a winning strategy,
Yes, an SSN sank the Belgrano, but no submarine could ever retake the Falklands could it? For that you needed amphibious assault, and for that you needed control of the air, which could only be done with a carrier.
Yes but thats not deterrence you are talking about is it? I agree with you, if deterrence has failed and you need to fight then carriers yes please. My point is that a single SSN neutralised the whole enemy fleet in one move – it demonstrates the potential of SSNs in reference to your point about 1 sub not being enough.
For you to say a carrier has no more deterrent or strategic reach than other platforms really takes the biscuit. It is more of a deterrent and has greater strategic reach than just about any weapon system. One might say that’s the whole point.
You are obviously a dye in the wool carrier nut. When it comes to strategic projection sometimes a carrier is best, sometimes it isn’t. I would argue that SSNs have a greater strategic reach given they are self sustaining and self protecting and have a potential effect out of all proportion to their size and manpower. A single SSN often (not always) has a neutralising effect over a greater area of sea than a whole carrier battle group, mainly because a carrier is difficult to hide and therefore predictable. If you have an air base available then deploying land based air is often better, its cheaper in manpower, you get greater sortie rates, deployment is quicker. Obviously if you need air power and have no base then a carrier is best, but conversely there are places in the world you wouldn’t use a carrier or an SSN as it would be far to vulnerable. It is horses for courses, but the carrier is not a magic cure all.
pjhydroYou cannot dismiss the “fleet in being” so glibly.
Of course I can. Its the strategy of the loser, its the strategy of the fleet that has given up the notion of sea control. You cannot win wars or deter invasions on distance lands with a fleet in being. It was a doctrine created in 17th century when the RN found itself out gunned and out manouvered. It has been used ever since as the doctrine of the underdog and generally the loser, Germany in WW1 for instance. Its no way to run a navy and now in the days of airpower (you see you suprise me, such a fan of Carriers would surely understand that “fleet in being” was rendered obsolete by Taranto and Pearl Harbour) its even more pointless. Its an imaginary fleet, it does nothing and rusts at anchor.
If all that Britain had in 1977 was an SSN and two frigates, I doubt it would have stopped an invasion. The purpose of Operation Journeyman was surely to show to the Argentines that we were prepared to use force if necessary.
Yes and no. It was to show (or indeed bluff) that we would use force BUT!!! THAT IS WHAT DETERRENCE MEANS!!!! As for an SSN you seem to forget that it was a single SSN that sent the whole Argentinean fleet back to port after it sunk Belgrano. SSNs are hugely powerful, unpredictable, difficult to counter weapons. A single SSN well used could have made a right mess of an invasion force, to the point of netralisation. A single submarine can close a port. Two submarines today could close the med.
The Argentines would thus look at what force Britain actually had. Any battle for the Falklands would clearly need Britain to have naval air power, and in 1977 we had it.
If we lost the initial battle to prevent an invasion I agree with you. In 1977 we didn’t and a carrier was not needed.
By 1982, we did not have it in a way which impressed the Argentines, and indeed many people thought that the small force of Sea Harriers we could embark would not be enough, and it was a close run thing.
It was an element yes, but not the decisive factor at all. Its obvious we disagree, i’m not going to labour the point any further. If the UK government had sent a nuclear submarine to the South Atlantic in winter 81-82 backed up by political intent there would not have been an invasion.
After 2011 we will not have it at all. If the Argentines were to seize RAF Mount Pleasant in a commando raid, it would all be over.
What kind of abject nonsense is that? IF IF IF, so close MPA and just rely on the carriers then? We are back to your “carriers are the only deterrent” argument. Lest scrap everything and just have carriers eh?
I support carrier aviation, I would prefer we keep it, but I also do not imbue it with some magical property, the ultimate deterrent, able to stop invasions 8,000 miles away “while in being” in Portsmouth, able to ensure victory in any war. It is a weapon system like any other, it is both useful and falible. It has no more deterrent or strategic reach than other platforms and in some cases less.
pjhydroThis is where I disagree with you. I believe a “fleet in being” is an important instrument of deterrence, quite apart from the policy of the government of the day.
Believing in a “Fleet in being” as opposed to believing in the imaginary one? Yes the “fleet” is an instrument of deterrence, we don’t disagree with that, who would? I (and others) have not said that “policy is the only deterrent”, of course the actual weapons in your armoury make up the deterrent you back your policy up with, so I’m not sure of your point here.
Your logic essentially extends to fleet carriers being the ONLY viable form of deterrence. That leads to an unaviodable conclusion, if you follow your logic, without a fleet carrier any navy does not provide deterrent, therefore is essentially pointless. So why do we have other classes of ships in a fleet and why do so many nations invest in navies with no carriers?
In 1982 the Argentines might have been quite right in believing that the British did not care about the Falklands, and that, given the low priority given to them, an invasion would succeed. The question they would then have to ask is what the British would do about it? They might accept the fait accompli, but if Britain had had a strong carrier force, the Argentines would have had to take into account the fact that Britain would have been able to retake them without much trouble.
Ok while to some degree you are correct, we have always agreed about this point, there are three flaws to your argument.
1) You state that carriers are the main deterrent, in which case if they are nobody would have contemplated or attempted a landing if you had one, which given 1977 is patently not true. Britain had one, Argentina tried it on. Your ‘deterrence at distance’ argument is flawed.
2) You are assuming that a Fleet Carrier would automatically ensure British Victory in an any attempt to retake the Falklands, which of course it does not. No weapon gives that level of assurance. How do you know your carrier won’t be sunk?
3)You are assuming that the military dictatorship that was deeply unpopular and runs a police state would think entirely rationally about consequences of a given action. It was a gamble, thats the point, carriers or not.
Whatever they thought of the British government, they would have had to realise that in a democracy, governments come and go, and the Thatcher government could easily have fallen, but if the Royal Navy had had fleet carriers, that was a fact which could not be ignored in their calculations.
Of course that would figure! As would the size and capability of all the other ships in the RN as well as the Royal Marines, the Parachute Regiment, Vulcans, Victor Tankers, RAF Transport fleet etc etc etc A good general staff will of course consider, wargame and plot various scenarios. This still does not mean fleet carriers are the only decent deterrent that exists, which if I remember rightly is the orginal cause of this discussion i.e the RN still provides formidable deterrent even without the carriers.
What the Callaghan government did in 1977 was of course better, as it left the Argentines in no doubt of British intentions.
EXACTLY! A whole invasion was averted with a few hundered sailors, 1 sub, 2 frigates and a couple of oilers and the strong will of a government to act quickly. That would still work now. If Argentina made noises, began to scratch around all it would take is a strong statement from the Government and the 48 hour deployment of a sqn of Typhoons, the dispatch of the Army contigency battalion and perhaps backed up by an SSN. Accomplished in hours while a carrier is still 8,000 miles away taking on stores.
pjhydroI may be wrong, but being the son of a missile engineer and having seen several launches of various missiles my first impression was that this wasn’t a missile. The trail has the ‘wrong look’ about it and to my eyes look far too slow.
As I said I may be wrong.
pjhydroYou see these declarations drive me nuts. I am a fan of carriers, we should have them and I would prefer a scenario where we kept the ones we have. But exaggerting the truth, presenting the ignorant public with some phantom, scare-mongering scenario does little to help the case.
They have not presented a good, water tight case for why Britain needs carriers. The scenario they present is a very remote, barely possible, certainly not possible now or in the near future so in a perverse way as you point out they have actually helped the case against the carrier force.
The way a junior minister was able to swat away the points made by Admiral West this morning on Radio 4 was a case in point. There are excellent arguments for why we need carriers. Deterring Argentina from the Falklands is not one of them for all sorts of reasons.
pjhydroI’m afraid I can’t agree with that. Clearly, a platoon of Royal Marines and HMS Endurance were not enough to stop an Argentine invasion.
Quite correct, would entirely agree with you there.
Neither would two frigates and an SSN have been, on their own, and we still had plenty of frigates and SSNs in 1982, so no change there.
AH thats where we definately differ. I think I see one of the problems in our discussion, you have very little concept of
1)The power and ability of an SSN.
2)The fact that the the Argentineans would have wanted to avoid a stand up fight with anything so even the presence of a couple of frigates was good deterrence- sinking or seriously damaging a UK warship would have got blood boiling.
3)Had “iron” maggie had the will to launch Journeyman 2 in 1981 then that would have been enough.
What was missing in 1982 was both the resolve to deter aggression and the means to deter aggression, a fatal combination.
Right on your first point, wrong on your second. 1977 proves an SSN sent with apparent intent was enough.
Without a fleet carrier, the Argentines obviously thought that if they seized the Falklands (which they were always going to be able to do), Britain would lack the means to recover them.
Well indeed, I can agree with that, point being though you use deterrence to prevent an invasion in the first place, your point is valid if they invaded in the first place, but if you prevented that as was done in 1977 then job done, no carrier required.
Without the means, you can have all the resolve in the world, but it won’t make any difference. Getting rid of HMS Endurance signalled to the Argentines that we did not care very much about the Falklands, getting rid of HMS Ark Royal, and then planning to sell HMS Invincible and retire HMS Hermes told them that we did not even care to keep hold of the means of recapturing them, hence the green light for the invasion.
To a certain degree I can agree with that, especially the signal that the HMS Endurance decision was sending out – that the UK did not care about the region at all. The lack of carriers compounded the weak resolve and flakey policy, but had the policy been strong and decisive then the lack of carriers would not have mattered, not a green light to invasion in itself, just a weighting of the dice.
It would certainly make more sense if the Argentines had been informed about the SSN deployment. I do recall hearing that they had not been told, which did rather detract from its deterrent effect. Then again, one of these authors seems to think Britain had Poseidon subs. However, you are obviously unwilling to accept that though Ark Royal was not part of Operation Journeyman, she was nonetheless part of Britain’s deterrent to Argentine aggression.
No I have repeatedly said that Ark Royal was part of the overall umbrella of UK deterrence (I feel like a stuck record) and would have been taken into account by the Argentineans. But what I am also saying is that had Ark Royal not exsisted in 1977 or had been in dry dock unavailable for service then Journeyman would still have worked perfectly, the threat was an SSN.
We are agreed that the British response to Argentine provocation was indeed crass and led to war. Nonetheless, if Britain had, for the sake of argument, 20 CVNs with F14s in 1982, then no matter how pathetic and/or careless the responses of Britain to Argentine provocation, they simply could not have ignored the obvious calculation that if they invaded the islands they could have been swatted back off them without any trouble. And therefore, no matter how limp wristed they thought Britain was being, they could not have taken the risk of invading the islands.
Is that clear?
NO of course they could take the risk! Thats the point! The Argentineans took a gamble, they rolled the dice. It was a regime that had nothing to lose, they were banking on a quick seizure and then UN backing and world opinion to keep the UK at bay. In 1977 the swift deployment of Dreadnought stalled their plan, they couldn’t be sure that the UK wouldn’t oppose an attempted landing. In 1981-82 it quickly became clear that the change in UK government had also signalled a collapse in resolve over the issue so they took the gamble. It would not have mattered if the UK had the largest most powerful carrier force on the planet, if the political will to use them was not there then an unpopular regime who was up to taking a risk would still go for it, they were banking on the UK backing down.
On the other hand if in late 1981 HMS Swiftsure had made a courtesy call into Port Stanley then I very much doubt the invasion would have happened.
I agree with you, Defence policy was grist to the mill, it was sending out the wrong signal, but it still does not mean you require a large flat top to deter an invasion.
pjhydroThat’s the whole point I was driving at, we had those assets and even though the rules of engagement for Dreadnought were for it not to return fire if attacked but surface, its presence and that of the other ships delivered the message ‘bring it on’. In 1981-2 we lacked those assets primarily Ark Royal and that, meant the Junta fancied their chances. I also wonder whether Mrs Thatcher’s gender was a factor in the Junta’s calculations.
Not primarily Ark Royal, that didn’t matter at all. 1982 could have been countered with a single nuclear sub just as it was in 1977, it mattered not one jot if Ark Royal was sailing on the high seas, in the knackers yard or taking pope John Paul II on his holidays. In 1977 Ark Royal was not deterring Argentina from trying it on, they seized South Thule. The response was to send Dreadnought and tell them we had, game over. If we had sent Ark Royal then I would agree with you, but we didn’t. In 1982, we could have had no carriers at all, not even the harrier carriers. If we had dispatched a timely SSN to the south Atlantic the Falklands war would have been averted as it was in 1977.
It had nothing to do with Thatcher’s gender. Her foreign policy was weak and flakey and they gave the Junta all the right signals.
pjhydroJohn K
Please read the following article from the Guardian with regard to operation journeyman, with particular note to paragraph 4.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/jun/01/argentina.military
Also a review of “we come unseen” in paragraph 5 “Operation JOURNEYMAN, now regarded as a classic of deterrence.”
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_3_55/ai_92745794/
What is bizzare is that you seem to consider you know better than accepted deterrence theory, that some how you have some greater understanding of the nuances of military strategic reach than the accepted reality used by governments and general staff in planning.
What is also bizzare is that you don’t actually read what I type. To quote one of my earlier replies….”Ark Royal was part of the overall umbrella of British deterrence, it would of course figured in contingency planning in Buenos A…”
Of course had Argentina invaded in 1977 AND the government had decided to launch a military operation to recover them Ark Royal would have been at the heart of that recovery. Fair enough. BUT if Argentina had invaded as they had planned to do so and were essentially doing so (They had obviously decided it was worth the gamble and seized South Thule to test the waters) then deterrence would have failed.
As I have been trying to tell you and as the two quotes I give you above demonstrate AND if you wish to join me in the Public Record Office where we can read the Operation Journeyman file together (I’ll even pay for access and you can stay in my spare room, Kew is ten minutes drive away) The Argentineans were deterred from invading by the placement of HMS Dreadnought in the South Atlantic, a deployment that they were made aware of at the time (otherwise it would not be deterrence). Ark Royal did not figure in the Op Journeyman and at the time was sailing away from the crisis towards Malta.
Are we done now?
pjhydroYou are both wrong, and that is NOT what it says on the links you posted.
If you build a home or other property in a foreign country, it does not make it community property in which anyone can enter or use as they please and for any reason. Unless you live in a police state, it is called trespassing without your expressed written or spoken consent, except when you sign an agreement that says otherwise in clearly defined words.
Then you obviously didn’t read what it says. Quite clearly and unequivocally says the base is not American, they don’t rent it, lease it or own it. They borrow it and have built some facilities that they own and run but that are there by sanction of the Bahamas Agreement of 1956. The Base is still British, it can be used by the UK whenever it likes. The “extra” facilities that the US built were put at the disposal of the UK but essentially the US could not have said no as it is not their base to say no about.
If the U.S. had said no, there would have been a very different kind of war over the Falkland islands.
How? What were they saying no to?
pjhydroThe Foreign Office, where to start? How about the British Ambassador to Thailand in 1941 who vetoed the plan to attack Japanese forces in Thailand before they invaded Malaya (Operation Matador). This put British forces on the back foot throughout the Malaya campaign. How about the Ambasador to Guatemala who didn’t want the Navy to “provoke” the Guatemalan junta by a show of force from Ark Royal in 1972? How about the efforts of the FO to offload the Falklands? How many examples do you want?
Well more than two very tenuous ones frankly. Two ambassadors does not the entire FO make. We have started, created and engineered as many wars as we have dodged and avoided. Suez? Oman? Iraq? Iran? (its almost sport to wind up Tehran).
Do you seriously think the Argentines would have been worried by Vulcans and Nimrods? The Paras and Marines are only a deterrent if they can be delivered (in 1977 we had Hermes and Bulwark as well as Fearless and Intrepid), and they can only be delivered if they can be protected, eg by a large deck carrier’s air group.
Ok lets take hold of this, we are almost there! keep going with that logic. IF THEY CAN BE DELIVERED….i.e. if they are actualy sent to the crisis, are at least in the right hemisphere of the globe, closer than the length of the Atlantic. Ark Royal was part of the overall umbrella of British deterrence, it would of course figured in contingency planning in Buenos A, but unless it was actually in a position to contribute it’s deterrent effect, or had been ordered to prepare to do so then it would not have been the key deterrent preventing an invasion. At the time it was steaming from Gib to Malta, have you looked at a globe? Draw a 1000 mile circle round Malta, make it 2000 to be generous. The Argentinians could have landed, seized and taken the Falklands and not had any concern about Ark Royal for at least two weeks.
I really think you are trying to defend an impossible position, which is forcing you take ever more convoluted arguments in an effort to avoid accepting the obvious.
There is nothing convoluted here, I am just “differentiating for ability” as we say in my current trade. You are arguing against accepted deterrence theory, the theory that governments actually work with, what they teach you at officer college (of what ever shade). A weapon system is a deterrent only within its defined effect.
Much the same way as a Police car on a motorway is a deterrent to poor driving but as soon as we can’t see it we all stick our foot down, you don’t forget it exsists, you always check your mirrors, you know the consequence if you are caught, but does it deter everyone on the motorway from breaking the law? SO like wise, Argentina would have been aware of Ark Royal, but she “wasn’t in their mirrors”, she had never even been seen in that part of the world.
So how can you possibly state that Ark Royal was the primary reason Argentina did not invade in 1977 and conversely her non-exsistence was the primary reason for the 1982 invason, you are making what scientists would recognise as a false causality. The logic of that statement appears true on first appearance – Event X didn’t happen when object Y was “present” and did happen when it wasn’t. But the problem of false causality is that it tends to ignore the other miriad of factors or suggests that two events are even the same when they are actually not.
pjhydroI have read “The Cruel Sea”. It’s the story of how a crew of civilians are taught from scratch to become the crew of a warship. Rather different from having experienced sailors carry out jobs they are already trained to do, I’d have thought.
No thats the film.
pjhydroThis is getting abit tedious, because the fact is that Britain would almost certainly not have operated an Iwo Jima LPH in 1982.
Its a miracle! Break through again!
But if we had, under wartime pressures, none of the things you seem to think are huge problems would have been insurmountable. The Task Force sailed south three days after the invasion. In wartime things happen quickly. The Iwo Jima class were simple, straightforward ships, there is no getting round it.
Sigh….Read the “Cruel Sea” One of the two finest british novels about World War II IMHO. Its written by a man who knew, see how long it takes them to work up in wartime, not just a minor scrape, full on national emergency. Its a very accessible book which everyone with this interest should read anyway. But what you will see is that it takes them months to work up on a tiny corvette, a type the RN was very familiar with.
pjhydroStill not proof is it? The idea that you would send an SSN but not tell the Argies is indeed an odd one, because unless they knew it would not be a deterrent.
By jove your getting it….
However, sending an SSN could also be seen as a provocation, and you know how the Foreign Office hates to provoke foreigners. The “solution” is to send the SSN to maintain a watching brief, but not to tell anyone about it. I’m not saying it makes sense, but then not much that governments do does make sense.
I spoke too soon. You see thats a very tired cliche. Most of what governments do make complete sense. Not everyone agrees with them (you clearly) but that is not the same thing as “not making sense”. If it doesn’t make sense I would suggest that tells you something.
And I don’t now how the Foreign office hates to provoke ‘foriegners’, care to expand?
And talking of things which don’t make sense, your strange belief that the Argentines would not have taken into account the fact that Britain possessed a large deck carrier at the time surely come under that heading.
You see you are reading the bits you want again. I have clearly stated that in the overall picture of deterrence Ark Royal would of course be part. But that is a long way from saying that because she exsisted in 1977 she was the primary reason that prevented an Argentinian invasion. The Parachute Regiment and the Royal Marines, Vulcan Bombers and Nimrods would all have featured in the Argentinian planning I am sure, so do they get equal billing with Ark Royal? They were all 8,000 miles away as well….
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