I think that the Type 45, like the preceeding Type 42, has fighter control as a primary role.

It must be a struggle for the RN to keep the Fighter Controllers up to speed and motivated post Sea Harrier and pre F35 – as was mentioned on the PPRuNe Sea Jet thread. Their role may involve providing control for land based fighters ans not just carrierborne ones. In South Atlantic (today), the frigate or destroyer doing the APT(S) task will sometimes control aircraft based ashore at MPA. Similar activities take place on the North Sea, and FC types are also sent on exchange to the US Navy and others.

Also: Lessons to learn

Former First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Jonathon Band considers the future of the defence landscape and the continuing importance of the Royal Navy in an unpredictable world…

Important as it undoubtedly is to guarantee that our armed forces are appropriately funded and equipped for today’s operations, there is a more enduring task – to help ensure that the armed forces are sufficiently and fully funded for the future.

Thinking strategically into the longer term is vital if we are to arrive at the correct balance of investment in the military capabilities we best assess will be needed, not only to deliver operational success in support of national strategic objectives today, but also for the future in an uncertain world.
Organisations like the UKNDA have a role to play, not only in joining others in lobbying for enough of the right sorts of forces to defend the UK’s interests, but more fundamentally, in helping to shape a consensus about the strategic context in which defence will be operating. Before you can campaign for appropriate armed forces, you need some idea about what you think they should look like.

You have an opportunity to help shape the debate about the UK’s place in the world, and the role of defence in contributing to that and our overall security. This is particularly important as defence gears up for the forthcoming review, which will govern the shape and size of our forces for the next 20 years or so.

We have to first decide what our national interests are, what are the things we must defend, preserve and promote – and, assuming funding is going to be really tight, how best to square the circle between military tasks and the finances available to support them. I am convinced that there remains a very clear and fundamentally important role for conventional forces, but I’m less convinced by the premise that we are living in an unconventional world.

The world in most respects remains a conventional place, characterised by the gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’; by unequal access to resources, especially energy and water; and by the instability that mass migration can cause or threaten. All are factors that continue to shape global relations and dictate national policies.

There is terrorism and a reliance on proxies to wage conflict, as there has always been. And for as long as we have an international system built around states, aggressor states will remain a continuing fact of life. Remember the short but brutal Russo-Georgian War of 2008? For all the talk about an unconventional world, it would be folly to forego our ability to fight and prevail in state-level conflicts.

If there has been a change in recent years, it is that the political appetite for ‘values-based’ interventionism has diminished as states focus increasingly on protecting or promoting their national interests. So I prefer to describe a fast-changing world that is less predictable, rather than one that is unconventional.

And the relative unpredictability of events has taught me four lessons. First, engagement in conflicts always carries the potential to mutate into protracted campaigns that – unless their objectives are understood and supported by the public – carry political, economic and military costs, to say nothing of the cost in lives. It is better to achieve national strategic aims without resorting to armed conflict, if possible.

Secondly, it follows that our forces need the ability to do more than fight. They should also be able and available to deter aggressors and prevent conflict by setting the conditions in which other strategies can be followed, through diplomacy, sanctions and so on.

Thirdly, if conflict cannot be avoided, our conventional forces need to be able to fight and win, of course. For that, they need to be flexible enough to adapt to the tactics and technology that an enemy may choose to use against us. This is no great insight. Even in a conventional world, security challenges have always arisen in testing circumstances or novel ways.

Fourthly, while much of our focus is dictated by our position in Europe, the real areas of interest are east of us – the Middle East and increasingly, Asia – and for this reason, and our need to be able to fight and win, our links to the US will remain fundamental.

These lessons have implications for the sorts of conventional military capabilities we will need, the scale and readiness at which we will need to hold them, and what they might do for you when not on specific operations. For example, the availability of intelligence and surveillance technology is now widespread. This means that the practice of massing conventional forces to achieve military advantage can be monitored and disrupted by an adversary. Boots on the ground, once massed, can be fixed by an enemy. In future, we will need smaller formations and more agile forces that can be quickly tailored for a particular mission.

The unpredictable nature of the challenges we may face, along with our global interests, argue strongly in favour of flexible forces able to meet threats at range. They must be able to deploy, potentially at short notice, with sufficient capability and presence to dictate the outcomes necessary to support the defence and security of the UK and its interests – everything from war-fighting to deterring aggressors and reassuring friends. To my mind, that calls for an expeditionary strategy supported by maritime strength.

So when considering where the balance of investment in defence should lie, it should be remembered that the Naval Service already makes a fundamentally important contribution to the operational success that the government, and the country, demand of defence as a whole. The Navy is global and deployed – fleets just ‘in being’ are wasted unless they are used.

I’m told that 10 per cent of the forces in Afghanistan as I write are provided from the Naval Service. What the Royal Navy does there and elsewhere around the world is in consistently high demand, and there is nothing to suggest that the range of tasks they undertake – from the nuclear deterrent to setting the conditions for stability in the Gulf, from protecting our national interests in the South Atlantic, to fishery protection, counter-piracy and maritime counter-terrorism – is going to change any time soon. Yes, there may be unconventional spikes, but the run of the mill remains conventional, and will be included more formally in the future energy security.

I recognise, as I believe do the service chiefs, that each of the services has an important contribution to make to the work of defence. But I also believe that the strategic realities of life are such that maritime forces will continue to underpin this island nation’s security and defence into the 21st Century.

Getting defence right may never be a vote winner, but if the last six years have taught me anything, it is that if you don’t explain the missions, you are in trouble. Getting it wrong is a sure-fire vote loser, especially with regard to the care and protection of our armed forces.

Well, some RFAs should be counted. The four Bay Class landing ships perform a similar role as the RN LPD, albeit without the command and control facilities, and fewer landing craft – the original design did not include a well dock, but BAE Systems put one in, which has enhanced their usefulness. Cardigan Bay, for example, has played an important role in training the Iraqi Navy/Marines.

The larger RFAs, such as Argus, or the four Fort‘s (both classes), are capable of supporting up to four Sea King/Merlin helicopters, and sometimes deploy as aviation platforms.

More normal RFA tankers sometimes try to act in a patrol role, but close range weapons, a helicopter, and force protection bods do not make them a warship. Sadly, the diminished size of the RN fleet makes this necessary in counter piracy and counter narcotics operations.

Back to HM Ships….

MCMVs should be included as mines contermeasures is a key part of naval warfare. It was in the Falklands, in the confrontations with Iran in the 80s, and with Iraq in both 1991 and 2003. It is possible mines might be laid by or on behalf of terrorists, the Libyan Ro Ro ferry Ghat was used to drop mines in the Red Sea in 1984.

What about survey vessels? In peacetime they just do hydrographic work, although much of this is in support of naval operations – especially submarines. In wartime the surveying role continues, plus they have a role as command and control platforms for mines countermeasures operations (think of Herald in 1991 or Roebuck in 2003 – both off the Iraqi coast).

Patrol vessels? Not really fighting ships, but they do have useful roles in things such as force protection.

Supposedly one of the issues was weight (should I say mass), the added weight of the Blue Vixen radar and the kit to make AMRAAM work meant that it struggled in hot climates. The upgrade planned for 2002 included a more powerful version of the Pegasus engine. The MOD claimed this was technically risky, BAE Systems and Rolls Royce had worked out what to do.

The real issue, as always, was cost.

Post Falklands dual launchers were used for Sidewinder.

The programme will be on Monday, on Channel 4 at 1930, as mentioned here.

The Sea Harrier has not entirely gone from RN service – quite a few are still in MOD/RN hands, and some are used for training aircraft handlers at Culdrose – at the RNSFDO Dummy Deck.

It is possible that given ample warnings, and political will, some could be regenerated in a REAL crisis. However, day to day the loss of the Sea Harriers means the CVS flight deck crews are not used to dealing with a deck full of jets – hence asking the USMC to help us ramp up our carrier skills.

These issues were/are discussed at length on the PPRuNe Sea Jet thread.

As to Indian Sea Harriers, supposedly the upgrade was meant to extend their possible life until 2020 and beyond. Additionally spares are still being made for the mighty Sea Jet.

Now that we do have a new Government, we can now focus on the build up to the defence review, that will take place in about twelve months time. The first question is who will be Secretary of State for Defence – will it be Liam Fox or somebody else? Another thing to bear in mind is the real difference in policy between the Tories and the Lib Dems over the issue of replacing the current nuclear deterrent.

Will a mixed Tory/Lib Dem Government still have a strong hand at the negotiating table?

Interesting idea LJ! However, politicians cannot resist poking their noses into things.