France should pursue their own program independently, that doesn’t exclude using the CVF hull design, but if they go beyond just buying the basic hull design and enter a common program I’m sure they’ll regret it. France has the technical skills to do this on their own (hell, it’s a French company that made the CVF design!) and their builders are more experienced in large ship construction than British yards. Not to mention companies like Alstom have more than enough expertise for the propulsion package etc. To me any advantages to France in a short term gain with initial hull design will be offset later in arguing with the UK about every little detail if co-operation goes any deeper.
This is not me being a nationalist or anything, both the UK and France are good enough to do this on their own and I have no bad feelings at all about France, but both navies have their own ideas and preferences, operational responsibilities etc. and given the importance of this to both navies i think both countries would be better going it alone for the most part. That does not exclude joint efforts in some areas, for instance if both companies bought the Hawkeye they could co-ordinate their efforts to reduce costs and share support etc.
The big advantages of nuclear are power and endurance. Their turbine engines are very powerful which gives them astonishing performance, and endurance isn’t an issue unless they need weapons and stores replenishment. However the costs are immense, not just building but effective and safe disposal, they tend to be big boats (Astute is something like 7,000T), there is the whole pandoras box of the nuclear question and how people see that (personally I have no objections to nuclear but I know many do) and they need a lot of skill to build for quiet operation. The size enables them to be very powerfully armed however, and for deep ocean ops (the RN still has a need for boats capable of long endurance deep sea ops) they’re still unrivalled. I am not anti-SSN as they definitely have a place, but at the same time for littoral ops and special forces co-operation as well as the more practical reason of maintaining hull numbers then the SSK certainly has a place. The SSN’s out there do carry special forces equipment, but taking a 5000T+ boat inshore is a lot less than ideal not just for their size but also you’re exposing an asset worth billions to risk in an environment they’re not really intended for.
Wouldn’t neccessarily need to fire that many torpedos, and a 6 fish spread should be quite adequate to disable a CVN and almost certainly sink it. Hull damage is a funny thing, hulls can look absord huge punishment and stay afloat needing relatively simple repairs yet at the same time damage the structural rigidity and it’s surprising how seemingly minor damage (at least to the naked eye) can render a vessel dead. A bit like damage to aircraft where visual indicators are often no guide at all to condition. Also, in many situations you don’t actually have to sink it, just damage it enough to remove it from front line ops for a few months to have the same effect.
They were big boats for SSK’s, especially when built, but still a lot smaller than the British SSN’s (circa. 4400-5000T) and a whole lot smaller than Astute.
One other thing about SSK’s is that they’re a lot easier to get rid of, decommissioning the old reactors and their systems is technically demanding and very expensive. Unless you do it the Russian way and just dump them.
Thanks for the links. I’ll try and read them later 🙂 The funny thing is, although they were built for the cold war, in recent years many RN people have regretted losing them.
Any idea how much these submarines will cost to Germany?
Not yet in the public domain AFAIK, but realistically I’d say it’ll be US$1 Billion+.
The whole Upholder/T2400 program was a joke and a shocking indictment of UK MoD incompetence. Not the boats themselves, which had real potential, but the way procurement and disposal was handled. First there is the question of why the MoD invested so much in building four boats that they then decided they didn’t want even before they’d properly entered service? Then there is the question of how they were mothballed with no consideration given to protecting them for future activation and/or sale to a new operator. Both questions should be seen as a reflection on failures at a terrible level.
The Canadian pre-purchase inspection, from what I’ve been told, wasn’t a good reflection on Canada either, to anybody who has had to do this sort of inspection (I did it with oil rigs and vetting supply vessels) knows it’s a minefield at the best of times. My own suspicion, and it’s just me so may be total trash, is that Canada thought they were getting a bargain too good to be true (four modern and powerful boats with almost no use from build) and this blinded them to just what they were taking on. Even without the problems from the lay up, Canada must have known they were taking on the post delivery shake down and trials to sort out delivery issues, and that would have been a headache for any navy.
I’m no expert but my understanding is that the Upholder/T2400 design was sound, a very capable and effective SSK. Their well publicised problems stemmed from not being fully debugged following commissioning, in fact some of the class were never properly commissioned. If the class had recieved the usual period of grace to sort out production faults and design inadequacies only highlighted following service entry that almost every new major warship needs then they’d have matured into excellent boats, I think that is generally agreed. Unfortunately the Canadians have had to take on that task to some extent. Even so, Canada would have been hard pressed to buy new submarines anywhere near as capable for the price they paid for the four Upholders.
Germany must be pretty happy with the U212, they’ve just ordered two U212A’s for delivery in 2012 and 2013.
The British O & P boats were the very definition of “nothing special” yet were used to great effect by the RN and RAN long after they were considered obsolete.
I think it’s nice to see Thales and the RN thinking about innovative and fresh solutions to the AEW requirement, but at the same time suspect that whatever the MoD says the Navy would still like the Hawkeye. This is an area that could very well make sense for the UK and France to pursue a joint procurement program as both countries needs the aircraft and requirements will be very similar. Personally, I’d like to see the RN now abandon the STOVL configuration and go CTOL, and pursue a collaborative integration of the catapults and arrestor gear, if you’re going to invest 3 billion GBP+ in carriers why argue over the few millions that’d be needed for CTOL? Now the program is a joint venture with regards to the hull design then it makes sense to risk and cost share things like the cats etc.
The “L” class conversions came in at approx $250 million each, and that was for a far less ambitious conversion than the ITP concept.
Nice graphic Francois, a good family tree.
The decision to axe the Sea Harrier F/A2 without providing an alternative with an air defence capability (such radar equiped GR7/9 derivatives similar to the AV8B+) is certainly short sighted. However, not much worse than allowing the RN air warfare destroyer force to decline as much as it has, where they still rely on Type 42’s with a missile pretty good in the 1970’s but hopelessly outclassed today and their replacements still several years from service. In some ways the Type 45’s are more urgent than the CVF IMO as without a viable escort the carriers are of limited value, and this is even more acute since the retirement of Sea Harrier.
Its not about being bombed by a foreign power. Its about air policing. Most of the violations come from German airspace anyway.
Which takes us back to the argument that buying a state of the art multi-role fighter designed for operations in the most hostile of threat environments is HUGE overkill for just policing airspace, that could be done by the Hawk, L159, Alphajet, T50 {insert other lightweight fighters}.