exmpaMarcantilan,
I would be very interested if you could provide me with a few details of the AQA4 as fitted to the Argentine Navy Tracker. (I flew in a Dutch one in 1967 but it really is a little too long ago to remember the details and I visited the “Karel Doormann” in 1965!) I seem to recall the AQA4 could monitor 4 buoys at a time but what were the fixing techniques available? Obviously Logical Comparative Lofar (LCL) and hyperbolic fixing (HyFix) are the basics, but was the AQA4 capable of CODAR processing and was it employed? I would also be interested in the buoy spacing used in barriers on direct support?
exmpa
exmpaHi Marcantilan,
Thank you for that additional information regarding the actions of 5 May. Given the water depth I would be very surprised indeed to encounter an SSN in that area particularly as the potential target is 70 miles to the North. But, never say never. I am particularly interested in the distance between the first attack and the second. Given that the Tracker that made the first attack was unable to monitor sonobuoys the datum must have been established at the weapon splash point. So, the question is how did the second Tracker and the Sea King manage to relocate the target? What tactics did they use? I am aware of the source levels of the presumed target and given the acoustic conditions in such shallow water about the only way you are going to find an S class boat with Lofar and AQA4 is if the hydrophone cable gets snagged by the target and towed along!
Moving on to the events of 6 May, these appear to me typical of air operations in direct support. There are a number of low confidence contacts, that are prosecuted inconclusively. It could equally well be an account of a day’s operation’s on a NATO exercise in the North Atlantic. However I am puzzled by decisions to expend weapons without attack criteria. If you have a datum then you must do everything you can to regain contact, dropping weapons on the off chance will not help you do that. Do you know the mission tasking for the Trackers? Was it primary detect, secondary deter with target SSN? Who made the decision to expend the weapons without attack criteria? Was it the aircraft commander or did it come from the OTC?
The incident on 7 May could be a low confidence contact. However it all depends on the LOFAR information, just what was present on the gram? Could the line(s) be positively identified as being related to the presumed target? What action was taken when they were observed, was there any attempt to contain by ringing the buoy in contact? Was artifact or a surface related source eliminated at PFA?
The F27 contact raises other questions. The classification of Certsub has to include “identification by a trained observer”. Were the air force crew in that category, how many submarines had they seen before and where where their photgraphs? I have had experienced maritime aircrew call whales as contacts when observed fleetingly. I have seen them myself, just below the surface and the swirl as it goes deep. Crews will err on the safe side and call it as a submarine contact and proceed to prosecute. The RN attacked a few whales in the South Atlantic as well.
I´m quite interested in possible soviet submarines in the ops area. Anyone have any info about the topic? Was the fleet warned about soviet sub activities???????
I expect that someone has that information but I don’t expect that they are going to say! I feel it unlikely that the Soviets would risk getting close to the action. They would assess reaction to an unkown subsurface contact in their own terms, i.e. what would they do about it? Look at the logic that drove PVO Strany to shoot down the Korean Airlines 747 and make up your own mind. The Soviet AD classification sytem did not allow the categories of Unknown or Neutral, I doubt that the naval sysyem did either.
It´s intriguing to me that (according to Lawrence Freedman) the Chief of the Defense Staff, Adm. Lewin, was inclined to bring nuclear weapons to the South Atlantic just in case Soviet submarines got involved in the conflict on the Argentine side
I don’t have access to Friedman’s original text. IIRC the argument hinged on events occurring in the North Atlantic that would take priority over Corporate. Lewin’s remit was to maintain the RN capability assigned to NATO. He questioned whether this was possible if the nuclear weapons were offloaded and then a rapid redeployment north was required. There was never any plan, intention or contingency to retain them for possible use associated with Corporate.
If there are any copies of the carrier’s tactical plot around, particularly if they include the criteria assumed for constructing the Limiting Lines of Submerged Approach, I should be very interested to see them.
exmpa
exmpaSUBMERGED CONTACT.
Contact, 10 miles out!
May 5, 1982. A Tracker antisubmarine plane from the Argentine light carrier “ARA 25 de Mayo” (or POMA, after her administrative designation in the Argentine Navy) was ordered to search an area near the mainland, looking for the patrol boat “ARA Alferez Sobral”, which was attacked earlier by British helicopters.The plane (Lt. Carlos Cal at the controls – one of the best ASW commanders of the squadron) soon detected, by radar and latter visual, a small periscope or snorkel over the surface. Lt. Cal dropped then an Mk 44 and a sonobuoy.
However, he could not track the torpedo run: the plane, because was configured for surface search, had not a sonobuoy receptor.
Alerted by the attack, another Tracker and two Sea Kings from the carrier were ordered to take off and rush to search and destroy the intruder.
Arrived at the area, the new Tracker (Lt. Fortini) and one of the Sea King (the other had sonar problems) located and tracked (passively) a subsurface contact.
It is worth to mention the Tracker acustic operator heard mechanical sounds coming from three JEZEBEL (LOFAR) sonobuoys, and confirmed the source by nine MAD contacts. In addition, the Sea King helicopter heard the contact by its dipping sonar.
After the helicopter confirmed the target, it guided the Tracker to a certain point, and then Lt. Fortini dropped a new Mk 44 over it. He saw the torpedo entering the water and he heard the torpedo duplicating its ping and it speeding (a sign of the torpedo acquiring a submerged target).
But none happened then.
After the attack, they lost contact with the POSSUB. In addition, it could not be regained.
I accept that the above is from a magazine article and not verbatim extracts from after action reports, however there are so many inconsistencies that I feel that it lacks credibility.
A diagram of the action is essential to assessing what went on and this is lacking. Where the action occured both geographically and relative to the surface units is important in assessing its credibility. Does anyone have one?
The plane (Lt. Carlos Cal at the controls – one of the best ASW commanders of the squadron) soon detected, by radar and latter visual, a small periscope or snorkel over the surface.
The title says 10 miles detection, but that’s only a headline. Basic submarine tactics, ESM mast up before periscope. In a hostile enviroment it would stay up. If the ESM was unserviceable then the exposure time of the periscope would be limited, very limited. Radar contact into visual in a Tracker from a range of 10 miles would be about 2 minutes minimum, longer than a mast would remain exposed if the ESM was unserviceable.
Lt. Cal dropped then an Mk 44 and a sonobuoy.
Dropping a single Mk44 is more an act of faith than an act of war. The sonobouy served as a datum marker.
Alerted by the attack, another Tracker and two Sea Kings from the carrier were ordered to take off and rush to search and destroy the intruder.
So these aircraft are tasked and launched. What is the time late at datum? What action did the surface units take, did they alter course, increase speed, where were they?
Arrived at the area, the new Tracker (Lt. Fortini) and one of the Sea King (the other had sonar problems) located and tracked (passively) a subsurface contact.
Having worked with a few S class boats I find this very hard to accept. Neither crew can have had any experience whatsoever in tracking a nuclear submarine on its raw signature. The Tracker would be fitted with a basic AQA5 set and the Sea King would have had to rely on broad band noise. I just don’t find this credible particularly in view of the probable time late at datum and size of the resulting containment circle.
It is worth to mention the Tracker acustic operator heard mechanical sounds coming from three JEZEBEL (LOFAR) sonobuoys,
Great stuff, but this is 1982 not 1942, audio on 3 buoys just doesn’t happen. It just doesn’t happen with the radiated noise levels from the presumed target.
confirmed the source by nine MAD contacts.
He had audio on 3 buoys and 9 MAD contacts. Once again detail is lacking, these are lumped together we do not know the time sequence and that is essential. But audio on a buoy and 3 MAD marks must equate to attack criteria in anyone’s book. So, how deep was the water and was the wreck chart up to date?
Let’s stand back and look at this whole incident again. Aircraft gets a radar contact and then sights something that is assumed to be a mast. Drops a weapon and observes no results. Some time later two other units arrive over the datum that has been expanding at 15kts since the intial sighting, it’s now quite an area of sea. It’s a quiet target against which they have no experience but they succesfully regain contact and track it before obtaining attack criteria and drop another single MK44! If they only dropped a lone torpedo then the water must have been very shallow indeed. UK forces dropped MK44s in pairs in order to achieve at least a minimal chance of success and even then it wasn’t very likely. They took off to prosecute a Certsub and found enough to convince themselves that there was something there, because they already knew there was. Would they have been so bullish if it had been only a weak intermittent radar contact that had been lost at a range of 5 miles and there had been no visual confirmation?
The on-scene ASW commander (the sonar officer on board the able Sea King) classified the contact as a PROBSUB – confidence 1.
It’s easy to get taken along with the crowd. It seems like he saw it as it was and made a reasonable assessment.
Your call.
exmpa
exmpaWhat is likely to happen to the current fleet ?
1750 people lost their jobs immediately when XL ceased trading. No notice, no redundancy pay, nothing except a P45. If they are lucky they might eventually get whatever pay is owed to them.They all have food to buy, bills to pay and many have dependants. The remainder of XL’s employees will lose their jobs when the administrators have finished winding up the company. What happens to a few airliners in these circumstances is of very little consequence, but if you really want to know; once the outstanding bills have been setled and the airports release them, the leasing companies take them back.
exmpa
exmpaThis was fun:
exmpa 😉
exmpaAt around the same time I recall Gannets being towed through the streets of Paisley from HMS Sanderling, Abottsinch now Glasgow Airport. It was a fairly regular occurrence for a year or two. I never knew where they were being taken, I assume Glasgow docks to be loaded for export.
exmpa
exmpaexmpaWe sometimes get a problem with SRS on take offs at low weight using TOGA power on the A346 as the SRS also limits pitch angle to 15 degrees nose up which can put you close to flap speed exceedances if not dealt with swiftly.
Under those circumstances it would be prudent to reduce the TRA.
exmpa
exmpaIt is the check of the Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA) at the top of the Primary Flight Display (PFD). It confirms that the Flight Director (FD) is in the correct mode for takeoff. The callout would normally be “Man-Flex (or TOGA), SRS, Runway”. These are Airbus calls, I don’t know what the equivalent would be for Boeing.
SRS (Speed Reference System): Mode used at takeoff, or Go- Around to maintain SRS speed (V2, V2+10, VAPP …).
RWY (Runway): Mode used at takeoff to guide the aircraft along the runway centerline, using LOC.
FLEX/TOGA: The selected thrust rating
exmpa
exmpaThe reason was one of reliability, the Mark 8** was over fifty-years old and was utterly reliable, the Mark 24 Tigerfish was new, untried in combat and had performed badly in trials.
Mk 24 was (and is) an ASW weapon. It was never considered a primary weapon for use against surface targets. Mk 8 filled the anti-surface role until superseded by Sub-Harpoon. However to put it terms of a tactical decision, Conqueror had an attack solution that indicated a high probability of success with the Mk 8, therefore that was what was used.
exmpa
exmpaAs for the carriers in the falklands, if one of the carriers had been lost, the task force may have been withdrawn, however it probably would have been back several months later with bulwark and illustrious as well as more Type 42 destroyers fitted with the brand now and more capable 1022, rather then the 1960’s era type 965 radar.
And resupply of the Islands would have to be via aircraft as the UK Nuclear submarines would make any attempt to resupply by sea, suicide.
What you have to bear in mind was that throughout Corporate we still maintained our NATO committment. Had the initial attempt to retake the islands failed then a subsequent operation was by no means certain. To make good the losses suffered would have been one thing, to put together a larger more capable force was entirely another. I have some knowledge of the force levels available in some areas at the time and feel it unlikely that we could have done much more without significant strategic realignment. A second operation would have required an committment of naval assets that would have necessistated a major reduction in our contribution to NATO. The committment of more SSNs would have be measured against the secuirity implications for the SSBN force, this would have been a “hard line”.
I feel that we could have undertaken a second operation, but I have seroius doubts that we would have done so. In my view Corporate was our single best chance.
exmpa
exmpaExocet Impact Damage
Panzon,
I have seen, actually I have a copy that I would like to post as soon as I find it, of the damage to the side of the Sheffield in which it is very clear that the “entrance hole” has like “flower petals” protruding outwards from the hull of the ship…….. that, from my point of view, is a clear indication that at least that Exocet DID explode…….. we can agree I think, that if there was no explossion, then the “hole” should have not “blown outwards”. To sustain this, I prommise I will show you the picture…….. if I can not find it in my disastrously organized collection of pictures, I wil ask them from a friend of mine who to my knowledge was the first one to notice this.
To me it looks like something hit the ship and I am quite prepared to believe the subsequent analysis that the warhead did not explode. Why I hold this view is as follows:
On 17th November 1978 I acted as Range Safety Officer for the high seas firing of an Exocet from HMS Norfolk at the hulk Undaunted (incidentally this was the vessel that Eisenhower used as his seaborne command post for Overlord). The missile had no warhead and was fitted with a telemetry package. Having established that the safety trace was clear for firing we than had to retire behind the firing ship and position to follow the missile down range, arriving at the target vessel as soon as possible after impact. The purpose of this procedure was to acquire immediate damage assessment photography lest the target sink soon after the missile struck.
On arrival over Undaunted we observed that the missile had struck amidships above the waterline (not dissimilar to Sheffield). The steel decking above the impact point was peeled back for a distance of 10-15 mtrs on each side. I was surprised by the damage caused by impact alone, particularly as the target itself was inert with no power or inflammable material. When I saw the photography of Sheffield some years later I was well able to understand that the damage was caused by the missile impact alone.
Incidentally, Undaunted remained afloat after the Exocet firing, survived a Seaslug attack (an unusual mode for a SAM, it missed!), 2 Seacat launches (one misfired) and gunfire. It was finally sunk by an accompanying submarine with a Mk8 torpedo. That sounds a bit familiar as well.
exmpa
exmpaIt’s a known fact that the USMC A-4 chief instructor
I should be interested to know where that fact may be verified.
exmpa
exmpaEnrique,
Thank you for that, it confirms what I believed with respect to the Nimrod missions. I shall ask about the planned/actual profile for the 1st Vulcan sortie.
Rgds
exmpa
exmpaThank you Enrique,
That is interesting about the lack of passive capability. Did you at any time detect the Nimrod aircraft?
Rgds
exmpa
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