Hello Enrique,

Good to hear from you. I wonder if you could answer a couple of questions? Did you have any passive radar intercept equipment and if so did you detect the Vulcan radar? I would also be very interested to know if you detected the Nimrods on any occasion and if so whether on radar or by passive intercept?

exmpa

Just remind me how much this project has really cost? You expect someone to run it for a few coppers?

Against all the odds the project was successful, the Vulcan is flying again. I freely admit that I did not think it was achieveable.

Remember the old adage:

“You pay peanuts and all you’ll get is monkeys”

Real money was paid and the result was positive.

exmpa

The primary threat to the task force was the Argentinian carrier. This was the only unit that could mount had the capability to mount a credible attack on the UK carriers. The effort that had to be maintained to counter this threat and the assets employed for the contingency to neutralise it were considerable. Regrettably the Argentine Navy would not cooperate by putting their air arm to sea so that a speedy conclusion to the problem might be achieved. Whilst the carrier remained in port it had the status of a “fleet in being” and represented a major problem.

The Belgrano was another matter, whilst it did represent a threat to the task group its scale was much less than that posed by the 25th of May. The Belgrano was however available as a target. Make no mistake about it though, the decision to sink the Belgrano was a political one although clearance for the action would have been requested by the military. The direct effect of the sinking was to remove a potential threat to the task force, but it was the indirect effect that was much more important.

To deter an enemy force or unit is a common naval tactic. Sinking is ideal as it removes the threat from the equation permanently but if that cannot be achieved, preventing the opposing units from carrying out their mission either short term or longer term is adequate. For example flooding an area airborne radar will discourage conventional submarines from snorting. Do this for 36 hours before your force passes through the arae and you have substantially reduced the risk of submarine attack. The Belgrano represented the “deter” tactic on another level. It demonstrated quite clearly to the Argentinians that we were prepared to attack any of their units wherever they were found, regardless of exclusion zones, level of threat to our own forces or (although it was never put to the test) territorial waters. The stark message was that their carrier would be attacked if it put to sea for any reason, that we had the resolve to do so and the capability in place to sink it if the opportunity arose.

So, was the tactic as sucess, did the 25th of May play any further part in operations? You all know the answer, so you may judge for yourselves.

As postscript to the above, there were a considerable number of options examined for dealing with the 25th of May. Some of these were “non-starters” and some were interesting to say the least. But some years after the event I had opportunity to discuss our respective roles in Corporate with a RN officer who had commanded a submarine at the time. I came to the conclusion that he would have been willing to sail his boat up a damp wall to get at the target. I really didn’t give much hope for the carrier’s chances.

exmpa

I say claimed, because he didn’t know about that famous supersonic flight!-is it likely that a Victor pilot wouldn’t know about that?

The majority of aircrew will have read nothing more about their aircraft than the Aircrew Manuals and Groundschool Notes (we are talking about the carbon technology era here). It is entirely possible that he had never heard of the “famous” event that you mention but he would have known the airframe limitations in the ACM. A list of the Essential Electrical Loads would have been significant to him when operating the Victor, the fact someone had once flown it above Mach 1 would not.

To put it into context, I learned things about the Vulcan when I recently read Tony Blackman’s book about test flying the aircraft. Should I have known these things nearly 40 years ago, when I was flying it? No, it wouldn’t have made a blind bit of difference, so we weren’t taught them. We were taught that certain things might happen if we exceeded certain limits, but the nitty gritty of how this was established was not relevant.

By rights if he had flown them then he would have practised in the crew egress trainer. Said trainer was the cockpit section of the offending Victor complete with plaque placed clearly in view describing the date, conditions of the flight and tail number of the a/c. I do believe that the cockpit is still extant.

Excuse me but he was there to do his Basic Training Requirements (BTRs) not read the plaque. No reason why he should notice it, read it or be interested.

Very possible, not everyone is interested in the history of type of aircraft they end up flying, or care.
Sounds strange to us enthusiasts, but I have met military aircrew that just arn’t that interested.

I would say that that statement probably applies to the majority of aircrew. I was once cornered by a Flight Simmer who wanted to discuss the minutae if the Airbus FMC. He seemed to have difficulty in understanding that I only knew what it did because I had to use it, not because I found it interesting.

I have had flights were pilots have said things to me that were clearly wrong, and I have corrected them. That is something they don’t like neither, so kept my trap shut in the end!

He also had difficulty with the fact that the Airbus FCOM might have said something different from the Microsoft “FCOM”

So to answer Oxcart’s original question, no I don’t find it at all surprising that he didn’t know. After all he probably didn’t want to be at Marham in the first place!

exmpa

Originally Posted by XH668
Does a flypast count a display?

No.

Joe,

Could you please explain how you arrive at that interpretation given the definition of a “Flying Display”:

CAP 403 definition of a ‘Flying Display’: “Any flying activity performed for the purpose of providing exhibition or entertainment at an advertised event open to the public”.

provided by Mark V in his post.

In a previous post you stated:

There is a big difference between a flypast and a display.

That may be so, but not it appears in the view of the regulator.

exmpa

RR still produce the Industrial Avon

The Avon is still in widespread use in the oil and gas industry and I have an acquaintance who runs courses on these and other RR industrial powerplants. It is credit to the Avon’s reliability that he describes the routine inspection system as “Maintenance by Binoculars”. If you can see heat coming from it, then it’s working. Just drive on to the next one.

exmpa

The interesting thing was their pholosophy re. the aircrew, usually SNCO pilots and JNCO crew.

I was in the maritime world in the ’70s (both ends of the country) and my experience was that the RCAF/CF structure was broadly similar to the RAF. I recall a good many “JMC debriefs” in the Scruffs at Kinloss.

exmpa

Very interesting, brings to mind a supplementary question:

Can anyone name an operational powerplant with a centrifugal compressor that was fitted with reheat?

I cannot think of one, perhaps it was because the rapid development in engine design meant that centrifugal powerplants were effectively sidelined by the more efficient axial engines.

exmpa