Bruce

I refer you to the 2nd paragraph of my original post on the subject:

As has been pointed out, the last air display accident resulting in ground casualties was in the 1950s. This resulted in some operational and procedural changes, but by and large things carried on much as before. This is not the 1950s and attitudes have changed quite markedly, rightly so. At present, the rate of accidents per flying hour for display flying is uncomfortably high and unless some action is taken to ascertain the causes and apply remedial action it will become unacceptably high, at which point the restrictions will become draconian.

It is quite easy to argue that given the accident rate (note “rate” not number of occurrences) that we have merely been lucky rather than diligent. You can bet your bottom dollar that there will be some highly paid QCs deploying just that argument.

exmpa

The AAIB will report their findings on both the Intermediate ex military PtF aircraft accidents that have happened recently and I am sure the CAA will review their authorisation criteria for organisations operating PtF ex military jets on PDA’s accordingly if they feel changes must be made. These are civilian owned and operated aircraft.

I have selected Canopener Al’s post because it does seem to illustrate a commonly held view of what will now occur. The fact that there were casualties on the ground does however add a very significant dimension. Were it a straightforward “aircraft accident” then we would expect a coroner’s inquest and an AAIB investigation. However in this case I would expect a police investigation and in all probability a full blown public enquiry as well.

As has been pointed out, the last air display accident resulting in ground casualties was in the 1950s. This resulted in some operational and procedural changes, but by and large things carried on much as before. This is not the 1950s and attitudes have changed quite markedly, rightly so. At present, the rate of accidents per flying hour for display flying is uncomfortably high and unless some action is taken to ascertain the causes and apply remedial action it will become unacceptably high, at which point the restrictions will become draconian.

Accidents are not a fact of life, they occur because of failure; mechanical or human; and there is much we can do to mitigate the risk of them occurring. I am acutely aware of this because when I graduated from flying training in the 1960s the chances were that one in five of us would not survive the next 5 years. Fortunately for me, the Air Force Board had decided that the rate of loss was far too high and had introduced a whole range of measures aimed at improving the safety culture and properly assessing the degree of risk involved with routine operations. I probably owe my continued survival to their decisions in this field. one innovation of this period was the introduction of standard display routines. This removed one or two of the riskier manoeuvres and sequences that individuals had the habit of dreaming up. I feel that display flying is probably overdue a critical and objective examination of its processes, systems and culture.

I have my own views as to what has contributed to display flying with older aircraft arriving at this juncture. There is inevitably a human element which is too complex and varied to adequately address here. However it does impinge on the technical factors involved. It is a fact that many older aircraft exhibit handling characteristics or have technical configurations; that whilst broadly speaking acceptable; you would not expect to experience in a more modern aircraft. Examples of this are:

a. Meteor AirbrakeUndercarriage interaction
b. Vulcan low speed directional control characteristics.
c. Canberra asymmetric control (still claiming lives 40 years after it entered service)
d. Gnat, long mnemonics for memory items associated with primary systems failures – STUPRECCC, CUBSTUNT – Human factors would deem them unacceptable today.

We could cope with all of these things because that was what we expected but those trained later expect different. the same goes for engineering procedures and practice, things we did then would not be countenanced today. Unfortunately those who are used to them are decreasing in number as the years go by and there isn’t the pool of knowledge to fall back upon. We cannot continue to operate “as we did”, we need to examine the culture and experience and accept constraints in order to operate safely.

exmpa

It’s listed in the “Losses” on Spyflight. Incidentally there was an RB66 lost over East Germany about 7 weeks later.

exmpa

And it says the film was released in Battle of Britain Week. So the graduating ceremony had to have been between April and September 1957. How many courses graduated that year?

The College had two entries a year. Odd number entries arrived in autumn, even in the spring. The course in those days was 3 years.

exmpa

Although before my time I seem to recall that Montgomery was Reviewing Officer at a Graduation. My entry drew the short straw and got the then Secretary of State for Defence, Dennis Healey. We must have failed to impress or badly upset someone! The film is quite interesting, if you look closely at around 51 minutes you can see that it was shot before D Wing was built, the college having only 3 accommodation wings prior to 1960(?). The one thing I cannot explain is why the parade in the film marches past the saluting base from the Reviewing Officer’s right hand side. We always marched past from the left, A Squadron leading.

Anyway, it’s only a film.

exmpa

Blimey, that was an extravagant measure, mounting a whole Varsity fuselage in a rig just to test the rear door escape.

Not if you ever had to contemplate using it! The escape hatch was quite a narrow aperture and not the easiest thing from which to make a clean exit if the aircraft was not in reasonably stable flight. However we were told that the chances of survival were considerably better than risking a close encounter with the tailplane when using the rear door.

exmpa

exmpa,
How do you know this ? any info would well received.

Because I flew the Vulcan and the suggestion of it rolling and pulling at low level is ludicrous. In squadron service things like that just did not happen. The NavAE team would have complained long and loud about any pilots with a tendency to explore the dustier corners of the flight envelope.

If you want to know what the V-Force was about you may care to read here and here.

exmpa

The first assumption is that they will be replaced with anything.

I suspect that we only got the Tucano when one of the Black Buck Vulcans lost the probe-tip on the way home from Stanley, AND had some dodgy hardware hung-up underneath. The Brazilians were prepared (as neutrals) to accept this offensive, armed, aircraft, in the interests of humanity. But I would give your back-teeth/right-arms to listen to the recordings of the panic calls from UK MoD to Brazil MoD whilst this problem was “agreed”, or “sorted out”. Fall about material!!

There was indeed much political input to the Tucano decision, but what you describe above has nothing to do with it. Of the 3 contenders, one was described as “dangerous”, there was the one the RAF wanted and another one. The preferred one was too expensive and the other one could be built in Belfast. There you have it.

exmpa