verbatimI see it the other way around: Il76/476 would suffice for any conceivable need of Russia, because it will be backed by An124s.
There is no need to develop a brand new logistical infrastructure to mantain the Il-76/476 fleet, and it’s a 100%, or near 100%, russian aircraft.
Whatever the development costs of An-70 have been, there is neither a production line nor a logistical infrastructure.
Even in Ukraina I doubt there is a real production line, maybe something for a very low rate, almost by hand production, still it’s likely it will need at the very least a comprehensive retooling process, if not a brand new production line, if An-70s should be rolling out at decent numbers.
I’m pretty sure in the end some An-70s (perhaps strictly and fully built in Ukraina) will find their way into Russian Air Force, but I see it as a way to get a political goal, i.e. to intermingle russian and ukrainian aerospace industries, to generate ties between the two countries able to last even if a new russophobic cabinet take hold in Kiev, the same very way Russian Government is giving support to An148/158 in its domestic market.
But I’m not persuaded Russia really needs An-70, and because budget constraints I don’t see any chance for a timely replacement of the whole Il-76 fleet even there would be no Il-476 at all.
verbatimSpeaking of development costs, I was referring to the notion of an enlarged airframe for the Il-476, no mention to the development process of An-70 at all.
Production lines are not existing both for Il-476 and An-76, either in Ukraina or in Russia, but the whole, or almost the whole of the expensive chain required to actually operate such an aircraft, either il-476 or An-70, is already existing for the Il-76/476 in Russia, and to an extent there is a global support for foreign customers in place as well.
It’s something somebody is going to pay adopting An-70, something almost free adopting Il-476.
So, actually An-70 could provide a boost in capabilities, the questions are how much Russia is in need of such a boost, and how much Russia has to pay for such a boost.
I think many Il-76’s users will look at prospective upgrades for their present aircrafts, acquisition of new built Il-746, or a mix of the two.
Is there a reasonable assumption An-70 would be able to attract such customers, requiring them to throw away anything related to Il-76 to switch to An-70?
I see the point this way: you could spend 100 in An-70, to get some capabilities, and maybe getting 20 in export orders (meaning you could have anyway to support upgrade packages for Il-76 and its derivatives, to keep customer satisfacton and fidelity), or you could spend 80 in Il-476 without getting some capabilities (but getting an aircraft maybe less demanding and expensive to operate compared to Il-76), getting 40 in export orders, as upgrades or brand new airframes ordered.
Money being a finite resource, it’s debatable that An-70 would be a better choice for Russia.
Maybe it’s a better aircraft than Il-476, nevertheless it doesn’t imply it’s the best choice.
verbatimThe Mistral project is not that huge, any provison for an HEW detachment on board would dictate both less room for Ka-29s and Ka-52s, and more room (and equipment) for a tactical air command on board.
It could prove a bit too stretchy for Mistral to provide all those capabilities and still being a real amphibious warfare ship.
And there would be a big question point about effective integration of Ka-31s electronic suite with the french CMS and systems allegedly sold with Mistrals.
As a very minimum requirement, deploying a Ka-31 detachment would imply some naval asset like a cruiser providing air defence, and I would bet if you actually need Ka-31s coverage and a cruiser proding long range SAMs, you are going to need (or you are better with) the Kuznetsov providing air cover, so there is little need to embark the HEWs in the Mistrals.
verbatimStill, most cargo delivered in Afghanistan is hauled through Il-76s, such a requirement for oversize equipment handling is not mandatory having An-124s still soldiering in good numbers.
I can see the point about even a slight enlarged cross section, but it has to be carefully weighted against additional development costs.
The pros on the Il-476 development are quite valid ones: great commonality with the existing fleet, cheap options for further upgrading of legacy Il-76s, likely low total cost of ownership due to reduced needs for new training, logistical and maintenance infrastructures, speedy assimilation both within Russian Air Force and foreign users.
Russia can handle any prospective oversized payload through the An-124s fleet, while delivering most of its cargo needs with a proven and more long range oriented backbone of Il-76/476, while most Il-76 users around the world are simply not concerned with oversize payloads, because it is far beyond their needs and means.
On the opposite, while An-70 seems a sound design from a broader point of view, I wonder whether there is a real demand for such an aircraft within Russian armed forces, and it has yet to prove it could achieve significant export orders.
It’s ways a more risky project, I doubt the russian involvement in it is really dictated by operational requirements.
verbatimWell, if you are keeping the simplest CAP available, i.e. just a pair, you are not going very far from your deck, or you could discover a threat coming right from the opposite side your CAP is cruising at the moment.
And modern aircrafts are able to perform on a regular basis two (some more) cycles before regeneration, so actually you beef up your fighter line putting in more pilots than airframes.
Something around 12 to 14 airframes suffice to have a permanent CAP, but it is the bare minimum, any additional airframe you can squeeze on your deck the better.
A reasonable schedule, assuming you have a fighter able, without drop tanks, to cruise a little more than two hours, is anyway around 1 hour CAP, plus reserve plus recovery time, this is an undisputable fact.
About permanent parking on deck, there is nothing wrong in real war scenarios to mantain both a reasonable overload (in terms of airframes embarked) and a good share of your airframes on the deck, so I suppose in any practical way, even an hull like BSAC could operate a resonable airgroup, and with multirole aircrafts you can even plan some ad hoc offensive patrol on top of your permanent CAP.
verbatimyou must ask a guestion if industry able to produce Su-35S in numbers even with sufficient funding. KnAAPO for example is busy all around with several programs
I agree, but this raise another question: is it really cost effective a production and assembly line with an average output rate of only one airframe every month?
Maybe KnAAPO is busy, i.e. its skilled workforce is busy, but rigs and any other hardware tool should be very product specific.
Or the other way around, is it still feasible to have two distinct Flanker assembly lines, each with an average output around one airframe/month?
Could it be more cost effective to expand either KnAAPO or NAAPO closing down (converting to other aircrafts assembly) the other?
Even numbers do not sum up.
Around 96 Su-35S and 70 Pak-Fa till 2020, mean VVS will have, post 2020, less than two hundreds modern heavy fighter, and a shrinking force of ancient, outmoded and increasingly unreliable Mig-29 and Su-27, most of them ways over 30 years old (past 2020, I mean).
I dare to say starting right now to retire all the Mig-29s, converting units to Su-35S or disbanding them, and putting far more faith and resources in the Su-35S program would help much more than keeping those relics around.
IMHO, it has to be related more to politics, than in military needs.
Maybe every single factory (KnAAPO, NAPO, IAPO and so on) has its good ties within RuAF and Kremlin, or nobody would like to make the final call for Mig as an aircraft designer and producer.
Maybe there is no real thread to Russia until far later than 2020, and it makes the savings far more critical than the shrinking fighter line.
verbatimSorry, I’m going to reply on the Russian Aviation News thread to not derail this one anymore.
verbatimyou must ask a guestion if industry able to produce Su-35S in numbers even with sufficient funding. KnAAPO for example is busy all around with several programs
Whatsoever production activity in going on at KnAAPO, the RuAF order for 48 Su-35Ss to be delivered within 2011-2015 timeframe means an average production rate of just one airframe every month, quite puny.
It raises the question whether Su-35S is really a project aimed at substantial export successes, or a way to provide Sukkhoi with funds and more work and providing VVS with some relief at tfe same time, waiting for Pak-Fa.
Assuming Pak-Fa won’t be for a fairly long time an item available for export, Su-35S should account as the main export offer in russian portfolio since the very last years for many years to come, and stepping up production tempo, i.e. placing a first domestic order large enough to justify the involved investments, would help both driving down production’s costs and giving confidence in prospective customers it will benefit future upgrades and backports from other top of the line russian programs (i.e. avionics, engines, armaments).
The relatively lack of interest showed by VVS (or maybe RusGovt) put a negative shadow on the future, at least at this stage.
Even if in the following years more russian orders have to come, it is not the best message to send to international market.
It will appear to some extent like a new stop gap, as opposed to a single large order showing a clear confidence of RuAF in the Su-35S future role in its ranks.
verbatimNothing but they are old, getting older, and it’s likely onboard systems are not really modern ones, even at the “SM” standard.
The same, maybe even worst, should be true for the whole Mig-29’s fleet.
So those Su-35Ss are badly needed to give some strength to the fighter line until Pak-Fa arrive, and to save some flight hours on the Su-27 fleet, I don’t think neither Mig-29s nor old Su-27s could last until and maybe little past 2020, and are by far getting outdated more and more.
On the other hand, just a small batch of Su-35S in service will become a waste of resources to mantain operational even past Pak-Fa induction.
I would say, funds sufficing, a total disbanding of the whole Mig-29 fleet, and a partial replacement with a large batch of Su-35S would serve better VVS both on the near term, giving a huge boost both on operatonal capabilities and on long term standadization, and could give more faith on its future support on prospective customers.
verbatimI would define quite absurd to mantain more than three tactical combat aircrafts in service.
Frankly speaking, I don’t see any rationale behind any further evolution of the Mig-29 too.
As for Russia, it needs to get a far more comprehensive standardization of its combat line.
Assuming Pak-Fa will form the backbone of the Fighter line, and Su-34 will be the backbone of the tactical strike line, there is little room left even ofr Su-35S, not to say for Mig-29/35.
As for medium or little countries, even assuming there is a quite remarkable price increase both in acquisition and maitenace costs choosing something like a Su-35S opposed to a Mig-35, I would say is far better a fighter line of two to three Su-35S squadrons than one
of three to four Mig-35 squadrons.
I can see Su-35S both as backbone of the russian export portfolio, and as an interim solution to beef up RuAF fighter line until Pak-Fa enters service in numbers (I suspect even the refurbished Su-27SMs are neither very up to date nor so much dependable as airframes), but what about Mig-35?
If a third tactical combat aircraft should enter service, i would bet it would be something aimed to replace to some extent both Su-25 and the air to ground roles of Mig-35.
On the other hand, if Russia, and India as weel, want a “lightweight” multirole and LO aircraft, they will go more or less for something along the lines of the F-35, maybe a little less expensive but nonetheless sophisticated and hardly affordable in large numbers.
verbatimAnyways, Arabel is not employed in any real DDG, and both french and italian DDGs employ the very same triad LRR+MFR+Aster30 as the Darings, in the same very way, plus the DART system as extended CIWS to be refitted later on the italian DDGs.
It could be that SAMPSON is a better MFR than EMPAR or the british CMS is better than the italian and french one, as could be true the opposite, but the philosophy behind is just exactly the same.
verbatimArabel radar is part of SAMP-T, the mobile land based area defence variant, is not par of any naval variant.
On board of Forbin and Andrea Doria DDG classes, PAAMS employ S1850M long range radar exactly as UKPAAMS, and use EMPAR as 3D MFR.
Herakles is employed on board of frigates, like Singapore’s Formidable class and french FREMM’s variant named FREDA.
Italian Navy uses PAAMS, coupled with Aster30, the same very way Royal Navy uses UKPAAMS coupled with Aster30.
Aster15 will be employed just for local defence on FREMM frigates, to be compared with the future Type 26 frigates, coupled with EMPAR.
As for the innermost defensive layer, Italian Navy will deploy on board of almost all the vessels the DART system, based on the OTO 76/62s employing radar beam riding projectiles fired on short salvos of three to four shots at a time, first salvo fired to engage the target at around eight km away, additional salvos to be fired if first one fail to shot down the target.
verbatimKeeping the top speed confined at around 20 Kt save the need ofr large engines and large amount of fuel required to run them.
This allow to get more in term of men and equipment from the same hull size.
And electric azimutal pods are quite friendly in terms of maintenance and repair, you can just detach them qhen required without any real work on the hull, and you have practically no moving parts between the generators sets and the pod themselves, easing even further maintenance and accessibility requirements inside the hull.
verbatimInteresting. Given that structurally, SSNs and SSBNs are identical aside from the VLS cells in the latter I always wondered why their operators had to maintain two separate design and production lines for them. Why not just put VLS cells for ballistic missiles on an existing SSN design? I understand SSBNs need to be larger in order to accomodate enough missiles, but what other specific differences are there?
It seems to me they mean unifying SSGN and SSBN hulls, keeping SSNs a separate breed.
Instead of deriving a SSGN project from an SSN one, they intend to develop a common project they can equip with VLS SLBM capable or VLS SLCM capable.
verbatimI agree, three, maybe four Kashtan as CIWSs would be enough.
About Projekt 20380, I’m more and more convinced it was just an ill conceived project.
It is actually more a cramped and light fregate than a corvette, and I believe displacement has little to do with that.
Russian Navy could choose to go for a smaller design, or could get sticky with such size and displacement, but should seriously think again about missions and equipment.
Even the powerplant, rated at more than 17,000KW, is a little oversized in power for a corvette, and I doubt the stated maximum speed is a little underestimated at around 25 knots, it is just not consistent with that displacement and hull form.
By the way, last year Wartsila signed an agreement with Transmash for th licensed production and design of several diesel engines, even marine ones, maybe this could open the way to the adoption in the future russian naval vessels of some modern, light and compact diesel engine .
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