Until official statements reporting the actual price calculation formulas would be released, there is no clue at all about both how prices were computed and actual payments performed.

Even when a conventional currency is used to perform the actual payments, there is no limits to the range of counterbalancing mechanisms adopted to prevent wild value’s fluctuation to represent a risk to all the parts involved.

Any value expressed in USD, GBP or Euro should be taken as a conventional exemplification aimed at the general audience only.

It will be interesting to see how they deploy Vikramaditya and Vikrant in the future during exercises with Western Carriers like the Charles de Gaulle and Nimitz Class.

Also, while the Mig-29K’s can’t cross deck with American or French Carriers. The aircraft from the latter should have no problem operating from the Indian Carriers.

I think you should carefully rethink your assumptions.

Per se, nothing neither impede nor assure crossdeck operations between STOBAR and CATOBAR ships and aircrafts.

It’s all upon the specific aircraft involved, and of course the risks you are willing to endure.

I’m becoming more and more inclined to make my debut in the realm of “ignore user function” fan club.

The Russian air force wasn’t all that interested in the KC-135 class of tanker in the past, and neither are most export customers today. If you can only afford a fairly modest fleet of tankers, you might as well make each one as capable as possible.

Fair enough – so use the Tu-204 instead, Wedgetail style. Again way more efficient than the Il-476 which is only about 15% smaller than the Il-96-300 anyway (if you’re going to use such a big aircraft you might as well make it the Il-96 and take advantage of the endurance benefit).

I don’t think so.

It happened only with A330MRTT that 2nd tier Air Forces started employing something resembling aKC10 or a notional Il96 tanker.

All time along and nowadays as well, most of them use either KC135, or Il78 or somenthing else with similar weights and capabilities, the driver behind being the amount of fuel to offload to a strike package or a couple of CAPs, not the amount to offload to a whole detachment of strategic airlifters busy with transpacific haulings.

It’s not by chance USAF devoted most of its resources to build a very large KC135 fleet, and most other userà around the world, even being able to afford just an handful of them, opted for the smaller platform.

The dame applies for RuAF as well, an Il96 tanker being a nice plus but not being required forma the bulk of the envisioned tasks.

Once in a time, I nave to agree with JSC: most likely duties for RuAF’s tankers will be related either to low intensity conflicts around CIS’ borders or in support of contingency limited deployments for disaster relief missions or, last but not least, to support SOF operations, none of them requiring very large tankers and instead requiring a distributed network of medium tankers.

Putting aside the rational behind inducting in military service a civilian aircraft with virtually zero civilian operating base, it would be useful to take in account sizes and performances not always are better when greater.

USAF, the most experienced AAR operator in the world, has been and is still happy with an handful (by US standard) of KC10 (same class of a prospective Il96 tanker), while the workhorse’s role has ben fulfilled by KC135 (more or less in the same class of Il78).

In most tactical mission missions a tanker as large as a KC10 or Il96 is not required, when not counterproductive at all.

It would make sense for strategic missions such as supporting large deployments abroad, a mission not even conceived nowadays in Russia.

Wait, do you mean South China Sea? :confused:

Pretty sure IAF Il-78s can’t fly that far, or at the very least will be immensely vulnerable.

I nave answered this post above.

If I’m right, Blitzo asked if indians ambitions stretched up to operate in the South China Sea, and I don’t think so.

I believe India’s goal is to become the regional mutual security broker, this way assuring itself a good control over Malaccan straits and sealanes passing through the whole Indian Ocean, not to step upon chinese’s feet.

Power projection is an integral part within security brokerage, providing both deterrent to local crysis escalation and prevention of any power’s vacuum that could lure foreign powers to exert control over Indian Ocean.

see, even indian know j31 is logical choice for russia.

Err, this could be relevant, perhaps… http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/humour

Seeing the need for carrier battle groups and power projections doesn’t translate in CATOBAR carrier by itself.

It has to ne related to the foreseen scenarios.

Is India foreseeing Pakistan acquiring carriers ad well?

Or is India thinking there would be the need for direct military confrontation with USA?

Actually there is no regional actor able to induct in service anything similar to a carrier, even less an organic AEW at sea.

There is only China, still far away from a real carrier capability, and located over just a few countries mainly with good relations with India.

About the organic AEW, it could amount easily up to half a dozen Ka-31, more than enough for fleet protection and to grant a good discovery radius against surface targets.

Anything else, bar perhaps a french design, would have meant India aligning itself with the western countries, something India is not buying, as it never did in his history since indipendence.

About Cavour price tag, I’m referring to euro without mistakes, as it happens I’m italian and our balance sheets are compiled in Euro only.

Within italian MoD budgets (several years in a row) it has been discovered PAAMS, Aster, CMS, ESM and so on have been paid for in different chapters, mostly along with the similar ones for the Orizzonti’s DDG and a crude repartition od costs producend a round half a billion euros additional costs.

Translating che final cost in US dollars it means far more than 2,5 billion USD.