It is the utility of carriers that is decreasing world wide. You can see the Mistral deal. first it was 4 now it is 2 and next 2 will depend after operating the first 2. there is always one or two unique things for research and skill maintaince but it does not mean it has any operational significance.
Sorry?
If any, every country around the world able to afford them, is trying every way to get at least one aircraft carrier.
I respect any point of view, but so called denial or anti-access weapons, provided they are or will be affordable and they work, are only static or semistatic defence systems.
Any aircraft carrier in the history has had and still has the nasty capability to sail around the world wherever it’s required.
Even in a pure defensive posture, having carrier task groups enable to bar any chance to any aggressor without aircraft carriers to harass SLOC and give the defender the ability to have an highly mobile defensive force.
Mistrals, by the way, are LHD, AKA amphibious assault ships, they won’t never be able to play the role of an aircraft carrier, bar simulating one in some Navy’s HQ tactical simulation.
If any, Russia would need actually three to four carrier battle group with capabilities similar to the british QE Class.
Problem is, until russian naval design bureaus won’t be able to step forward from old soviet school’s concepts and technologies, even a new fregate program would prove an hard task, and a new carrier class will lay far in the future.
And how would you fit 36 MiG-29K/KUB’s on Kuz? Through magic? Praying to Baby Jesus? Or both? Even if you remove P-700 you won’t be able to fit that many realistically.
And funny how certain people think MiG-29K/KUB is good enough for Navy, but the even more advanced so called MiG-35 is not good enough for RuAF. So what is it? Is MiG-29K/KUB sh!t or is MiG-35 just not good enough for RuAF because RuAF somehow need better planes than navy?
In any healthy naval aviation, you do not need N airframes to embark N airframes.
You need let say N-X airframes embarked, some spare airframes for rotating through maintenance and overhaul cycles, some airframes for basic training on land bases, some airframes land based for recovery training of pilots past a long on board service.
Starting with 36 airframes, I think around half of them being embarked for large training sets or operational deployments would be a pretty decent estimate.
If the Russian Navy will go through a 4 fingers formation as the basic unit, a standard 16 aircraft detachment, to boost up to 24 for high tempo operations, would nicely fill the bill, while the other airframes would provide both a good output of new pilots and rotation through maintenance cycles.
About why Mi-29K would be fine for Russian Navy while Mig-35 would not for RuAF, I think the multirole capabilities inherited from a program fundend largely by India would be a huge boost to operational doctrines development in the Navy, granted almost for free and without any development delay or risk.
Nothing that could be said for RuAF, being largely provided with all the capabilities and suffering from its too much heterogeneous fleet.
The less models RuAF will operate in the coming years, the best it would be.
Well, they are announcing the retirement and prospective sell of vessels over 30 years old, mainly after their respective replacements will be inducted in service.
There is a huge gap in the specs listed by JangBoGo: He’s assuming A330MRTT to off-load 60 tons of fuel at 930 Km, while Il78-MK90 is assumed to offload 75 tons of fuel at 1.000 Km.
Only leveling the two requirements, i.e. assuming Il78 has to offload 60 tons of fuel instead of 75, give back an healthy 200% increase in fuel available for reserve and on station time. Leveling even the range requirement, i.e. requiring Il78 to orbit 70 Km closer to its base, will give an additional, even if negligible, additional fuel for reserve.
I would say under those assumptions 3 hours on station are more or less granted.
These are not direct counterparts – the C-17 is the *successor* to the Il-76’s counterpart, the C-141. This comparison should be C-17 vs. Il-106 which – lo and behold! – was supposed to have a larger hold than the Globemaster.
There was no directly related mission requirement between C-141 and Il-76, no in terms of payload, no in terms of STOL or austere base capabilities. It’s like comparing a truck made for highways with an all terrain logistic vehicle, they carry both stores, but still are two kinds apart of beasts.
Come on. Of course EMI works both ways, but if they could afford to replace the Il-76’s avionics with completely new, EM-compatible systems then they could have just as easily replaced the Il-96’s avionics with completely new, EM-compatible systems. Once more, there is no difference between converting the Il-476 and Il-96 – in fact, since there is no reason to replace them based on obsolescence, any Il-96 systems found to be EM-compatible could have been retained!
EMI is not only related to onboard systems, even the plain electrical system, not to mention data lines. Japan opted for a fly-by-light architecture on its new ASW aircraft to minimize EM interference with the MAD, between other reasons.
To be confident with the whole integration process, a comprehensive model of all EMI sources within the original platform is a good start when not a mandatory requirement, and it’s always a time and resources consuming process. On Il-76 they already get the broader picture, moving to EMI compatible or EMI free systems would only get a better confidence on the end result.
CAD/CAM do not predict anything, they are used to design part geometry, assembly fit and manufacture said components and neither is related to BITE in any way, shape or form. I’m sorry but you are only demonstrating that you have no understanding of the actual meaning behind these buzzwords.
BITE is something relying on predictable characteristic of all systems, pieces and bites (no pun intended). Turning to the mechanical/structural part, it calls for a mathematical model of every tiny bit, something usually easier to get through CAD, but most important a predictable e tight error tolerance about physical and mechanical characteristics, usually mandating a CAM process.
As always, you could always turn to check one by one every single part manufactured by hand (well, by manually controlled machines), but it’s not practical and at the end plainly impossible by the economic point of view.
If all modern aircraft get the BITE thing and on condition maintenance, is mainly because they can assure from start every part’ design will be from start available to integration’ software, and even more crucially because they can assure every part will be manufactured within tight error tolerance, that’s what CAM is for.
These are not direct counterparts – the C-17 is the *successor* to the Il-76’s counterpart, the C-141. This comparison should be C-17 vs. Il-106 which – lo and behold! – was supposed to have a larger hold than the Globemaster.
Are you real? Are you comparing Il76 vs. C-141? Why not vs. Short Belfast? (being the latter quite a better conunterpart, IMHO).
As for requirements, there is almost nothing in common between Il76 and C-141, it could be said USA realized the soviet concept behinf Il76 was far more effective than their own behind C-141, and turned to C-17 as a more useful airlifter. Still C-141 and Il76 wouldn’t be comparable, even by respective payloads.
With all due respect, but this is incorrect. The Il-96 and Tu-204 pre-date the An-70 and are certified for on-condition maintenance to a large extent – the benefits of which will hardly have been lost on Antonov when they were developing the An-70 several years later.
Maybe they are civilian aircrafts, developed to meet current civilian operators requirements? I would look close to what actually “on condition maintance” implies in terms of actual workload required by diagnostic checks when referred to Il-96 and Tu-204.
Also, what makes the Il-476 better in this regard? It has new electronics, but they do not functionally offer anything (FBW, glass cockpit including BITE) that isn’t also available on the An-70 (on the contrary, the latter has a HUD and now a FLIR turret). Structural reinforcements? No impact on operating cost.
Besides, most of the Il-476 is still the 1960s vintage Il-76.
Maybe it has nothing more to offer, but fact is, without a totally CAD/CAM design it’s impossible to develop a true “on condition maintance” aircraft.
Having performed this task with the il476, at least the road ahead toward such milestone is clear and marked, An-70 would require to do the same.
It does a fairly decent job of strategic missions – so much so that there isn’t really a gap left between it and the An-124 for the Il-476 to fill. It’s not that an aircraft for that market segment could not be designed (the C-17 is a great example), but the Il-476 just burns way too much fuel to be a worthwhile complement.
Sorry, it is the opposite.
Il-76 until now, Il-476 in the next decade, are the mainstay of VVS when it comes to strategic airlift capabilities. It’s An-70 the one looking for a niche to fill.
Until now, Il-76 has been and still is paramount for VVS, An-124 is a complement to it, An-70 would possibly be another complement if it will ever become operative. Fuel consumption is not the most relevant issue, even speaking of economic efficiency, otherwise we would still have turboprop long range liners, while even in the short range market turbofan liners are the most common choice. When speaking of military airlift, turboprops are the preferred choice when dealing with rough field STOL performances. When turning to strategic airlift, turbofan are the preferred choice, A400M and An-70 being the only modern turboprops, neither being operational until now, by the way.
Even Embraer, conceiving a military airlifter in the same class of C-130 found turbofans to be a more expeditive and safe solution.
Patently false. The complete opposite is the case – did you even bother to check the specifications of the C-141, Il-76, C-5, An-124, C-133, An-22, A400M, An-70… the An-12 is practically the only exception (_slightly_ lower ceiling than the Herc).
Hell, Ilyushin themselves are at it once again these days with the MTA vs. the KC-390 and C-130J! The Soviet/Russian counterpart is pretty much INVARIABLY larger inside!
We could start confronting An-8 vs. G.222, and An-12 vs. C-130, then switching to C-17 vs. Il76. C-5 and An-124 are two totally different beasts, we cannot compare one with the other, being born from radically different requirement. And C-141, barring even older projects, had simply no analogous in VVS.
In plain terms, if we compare the most of the soviet/russian and USA airlift fleets in term of equivalent capabilities, the firsts have always given emphasis to cruise speed and overall aerodynamics efficiency.
MTA would be, related to Il-476, what G.222 and C-27J are to C-130. Feeder/receiver of election for Il-476, no more no less, hence the very same cross section and most likely the very same specific weight tolerance of the loading floor. Plus maybe very similar flight characteristics and the very same flight deck, easing type rating conversion for crews.
Hardly, quite a few transport Il-76s are being upgraded to keep them going longer. And if we simply deduct from the current schedules the 2+ years during which the An-70 project was essentially stopped by the Russian funding cut, we end up with the Il-476 entering service at least one year _after_ it.
It would take a decade before having a decent number of Il-476 sodiering in the VVS, Il-76 won’t fade away before well in the ’20s, so an upgrade in overdue.
Add to the equation there is a fairly large market of foreign Il-76 customers interested in keeping their own airframes operational and the upgrade don’t deny at all the urgent need for a replacement.
There is zero connection between computer-aided *design* as well as *manufacturing* on the one hand and *maintenance* on the other hand.
Computer aided *engineering* makes predictions of certain things like loads and service life easier and faster, but not fast and easy enough to trump the huge lead the An-70 had in 2006. And unfortunately by leaving much of the Il-76 unchanged, many potential benefits from these modern engineering methods were simply never realised on the Il-476.
Where’s the difference between digitising a late-1960s design (the Il-76) or a late-1980s design (the An-70), to begin with? Except that there is likely already more data available in digital format for the newer design…
CAD/CAM are the only way to predict structural fatigue and to develop self diagnositc systems, at least when it comes to actually get at it.
If somebody is willing to task hundreds of engineers and technicians with numbers crunching for months every time a slight change has to be performed in a project, well I wish them all the bests, they need all the luck they could get their hands on.
Russia has performed the effort to turn the whole Il-76 design to a CAD/CAM one, this task has not been accomplished for An-70 and thats all.
But they do NOT know the EM and structural data – even the aerodynamic data relies on the as yet unproven assumption that the new radar will closely parallel one of the existing A-50 versions. There is practically NO worthwhile commonality with between the Il-76 and Il-476 from the point of view of converting into an AWACS and tanker – I don’t see how anybody could deny these indisputable facts.
I talked about aircraft data, the aircraft in itself is a big source of EM inteference. And having already developed an AWACS out of Il-76, means they experimented with a whole different kinds of solutions, so there is not only data related to actual A-50 configuration, there is experimental data related to several competing configurations giving a broader knowledge about constraints, structural and aerodynamic, that specific airframe is going to have.
All of this is lacking for whatever you choose as alternative airframe.
I talked over and over about the rational being to have a quick and affordable replacement for Il76, Il78 and A-50.
An-70 could be whatever you like it being, now Russia cannot actually afford to bin Il76/Il476, and that’s all.
I’m still higly suspicious about claims of An-70 actually entering service with VVS, there is too much political cloud right now in giving it a lifeline (because of the new, pro-russian cabine tin Kiev), but it has to be kept afloat for several years more to come before turning in an operational and serially produced aircraft.
Who has suggested three new radically different platforms?
Well, RuAF need in a hurry three new platform, to replace three paltforms centered around Il-76.
So you have two viable options:
A- to bin Il-76, complete An-70 development, then to turn Il-96, an almost dead project, in a tanker and in an AWACS (that counts by itself like two radically different projects to develop from scratch).
B- develop Il-476, and by it a new tanker and a new AWACS.
The latter will cost far less both in term of money and in term of human resources required, and will likely be far more expeditive.
I have no evidence, ut there is at least a clue that the whole system worked at least to some degree as a testbed.
Boeing won the South Korean tender against the IAI offer, and it had to show some actual capabilities to the koreans, not only paper specs.
At the very least, laboratory tests’ results and a “demo” suite.
This assuming the Australian government assigned its contract to Boeing just because specifications declared on paper.
By the way, such problems are most or all the time solved anyway, it’s true.
But it would require, here we are again, additional resources to russian companies and RuAF.
I don’t think I’m misunderstandig arguments.
Il-476 has been designed to meet present, not past, Russia’s requirements.
As a side effect, it will havve appeal on some if not most of Il-76 users.
An-70 has been conceived when Russia, better to say Soviet Union (technical specification were specified in the ’80s), when supposedly an ad hoc replacement for A-50, another for Il-78, and so on were conceived as feasible, and when actually the schedule allowed for decades to develop such replacements and put them in service.
Now Russia’s commitment in the world’s affairs has changed, economic environment has changed, and time has been running out relentlessy.
Now, not within another decade or two, Russia need a new tanker, a new AWACS, a new strategic lift workhorse, all at the same moment and sharing the same somewhat limited resources.
Plainly speaking, Russia has NOT all the human resources to develop three different replacements all at the same time (let’s say within the same decade).
And inducting in service three radically different platforms would cost far more in logistic and training infrastructures.
Il-476 has ended being the most sensible choice available, the political turmoil between Ukraina and Russia has just given to An-70 the final blow.
I’m not disputing the fact that An-70 (as C-17, A-400M) is far more modern as concept (but I’m very skeptical about how much it is up to date in terms of technologies applied in the project.
But being a more modern concept doesn’t make it the right choice for Russia in the 2000’s.
Not a conversion problem. Due to integration of the radar & other electronic systems. That would have happened whatever platform was used.
An electronic suite working fine on a landbased testbed, that’s strugglying to simply work while on board of the designated platform, is likely to suffer from the integration in the airframe and its systems as from its own integration per se.
Integration within a platform bringing its own amount of EM interference, physical constraints in term of cooling, electric power available, room location, vibrations etc. is neither a trivial task nor a far less demanding one than the electronic suite integration as a group of systems.
So what?
So oversized cargo hauling is a requirement only when conceiving expeditionary missions in a landlocked, or from a practical point of view as landlocked, theater.
And still, An-124 is wonderfully suited for such a requirement.
Please note ISAF has leased a lot of Il-76 hours, to make for the airlift capacity shortage, and still the amount of oversized cargo hauled to Afghanistan has been marginal with regard with the whole picture.
And 90% of ALL the stores sent to Afghanistan, has followed the classical route through sea and through land.
There is no point for Russia to discard Il-76 and conversely Il-476 because of its cross section, as there is no point for most of its former, present and future operators worldwide.
With regard to prepositioned units, if you are envisaging to deply them there should be, at least on local scale, a suitable road network or a permissive orographical enviroment (as for plains or deserts).
You don’t need to deploy a unit in every conceivable area, you need to deploy it beyond natural obstacles as mountain ranges or large swanp areas.
Even if there could be limited areas where prepositioning would not be feasible or politically viable, as for some of India’s border area, it is in no way a general requirement dictating Russia’s requirements.
And Russia’s requirements are a lot different from the indian ones at least while speaking of strategic air lift.
Let’s pile some basic facts one upon another.
First, An-70 is actually an old philosophy’s project.
It was conceived and designed when ex soviet aerospace industries were still relying on (now) very old concepts:
– schedule-based mainteinance
– manual/paperwork design
– limited or non existant on board self diagnose capabilities
All the An-70 is providing is a larger cross section and, maybe, a better wing.
RuAF would need it as a intratheater lifter, not as a strategic one.
Soviet/russian strategic lifter have been always designed with comparable smaller cross sections than western ones, because the focus has always been on cruise speed, aerodynamic efficiency and so on.
They were not, and I suppose still are not, required to deploy forces, they were logistic lifters, tasked to deploy large amounts of stores in the shorter time on long ranges.
Deploying MBT and oversize cargo for the sake of concept in itself, has never been a requirement and in the really small scale it could be conceived by RuAF its just an An-124 task.
Il-76 was never meant to act as feeder/receiver for An-124, hence it has not a cross section comparable to An-124.
It was meant to be the workhorse on the very same routes served by the An-124, the latter being tasked to lift the small percentage of loads Il-76 would not handle or would be inefficient in handling (inefficient as requiring two Il-76 sorties when you can handle it within a single An-124 sortie).
Now, Il-476 is required because the three strategic fleets centered around Il76 are all requiring a quick replacement.
Turning to modern CAD/CAM technologies the whole project, means both a more efficient production and to switch to an on condition based maintenance.
Turning every single bit and screw in an electonic design, means you can simulate and predict workloads, structural fatigue and deterioration.
You can even predict most if not all side effects of any future structural change.
And knowing already all aerodinamyc, EM and structural data realted to AWACS and Tanker conversion, means few years of testing compared to the effort required by a blank sheet project.
Have a look at the Wedgetail saga, you’ll see the troubles hiding in every new conversion.
And deploying MBT and heavy forces in general through airlift IS a myth.
Only the USA has a very limited capacity to deploy a meaningful amount of heavy forces by airlift, and it is only a legacy from the Cold War and the need to send reinforcement in Europe in a matter of days.
Any other player around the globe, would send a company, maybe two, and stop. This speaking of giants like India, the smaller countries would be able send what, a platoon maybe?
A token amount of heavy forces not worth the efforts required to send them, at least ways more expensive than prepositioning the same heavy forces and likely more expensive than expanding on a permanent basis such heavy force to make for the additional units required by such prepositioning.
How so? This view is not supported by the known facts, I have no idea how you could think so
It’s not me thinking that way, it is a fact.
There is simply nil, zero technical data ready for any hypotetical conversion of Il-96.
An AWACS derivative would cost hundred of million, hundreds of Engineers, and years to develop, not because to validate re-manufactered wing, because it would have to be developed the whole thing: EM, structural, aerodynamics and everything else.
The same would apply for a tanker, so you can double it and still lacking an Il-76 replacement.
Then you have a civilian aircraft of near zero commercial base (you can count the servicing airframes on your own fingers alone) without any technical premise across the whole country, apart maybe Moscow and St. Petersburg.
So you can add other money for bases adaptation, new equipment, whole new training for air and ground crews and so and so and still counting.
All of the above resources, would be negated for years to come to other projects, and it’s a fact too.
Yup, but the An-70 can haul ammunition, spare parts, tools, food and so on too, it’s not as though the wider fuselage somehow makes it unsuitable for that job. In fact, it will offer an adequate approximation of the Il-476’s payload/range at much lower operating cost and with better STOL/dirt-strip capability, making it much better for the intra-theatre mission. For long-range re-supply to fully equipped bases on the other hand the An-124 and Il-96 will be far superior.
Because of its legacy design there isn’t really a task which the Il-476 could perform better than existing alternatives.
It cannot replace the whole Il-76 family by itslef, and along with the political strain between Russian and Ukraina it’s far more than enough to dictate, not simply justify, the Il-476.
It’s not the best aircraft, or the most fitted, it’s simply the aircraft needed now and the next years, and that’s all.
I cannot see how there would any other option for Russia than upgrading anyway the Il-76 platform.
Any other proposed solution, as inducting Il-96 as tanker and AWACS, would have been far more expensive and time consuming, even if feasible.
Workforce (engineers, technicians, skilled workers) are a finite quantity, time is a finite quantity, money is a finite quantity.
Developing at the very same time a new tanker based on Il-96 airframe, a new AWACS based on Il-96 airframe, and completing the development phase of the An-70 would have required resources far too large for Russia, in all the three aforementioned dimensions.
And it would make little sense to develop prospective strategic assets on a civilian airframe doomed to fade away with little operating base.
Updating Il-76 means getting in few years, all a the same very time with the same very resources, a viable way to sustain strategic airlift, AWACS and tanker fleets.
And there was nothing wrong on the russian side sidelining the An-70 on political grounds, at least as long as Ukraina was striving to kick the Black Sea Fleet out of Sevastopol and confronting Russia on almost any international issue.
The stretched version of he Il-476 is a false issue: as for the C-130J, they need first and foremost the best arrangement for the standard loads, then they could pull out a stretched version for some special needs.
A new wing is not a remote chance, but again is a time consuming task, first they need to put in service the Il-476 ASAP, even to secure customers’ fidelity (and there are still dozens of Il-76’s operators worldwide), then they could induce next decade a new wing.
The cargo bay cross section is the only, real issue, but again it could prove better to get some intratheater aircraft as the An-70 and rely on An-124 for the strategic airlift of oversize cargo, than trashing away everything related to the Il-76 family.
If a modern APC or MBT could prove even impossible to load, still 90% of the weight airlifted is made of ammunitions, spare parts, tools, food and so on, all stuff Il-476 will take on board without any issue and will be doing so forever.