Yes I agree the 3rd generation LCA is perfectly capable of replacing the MiG-21 in the simple point defence role, it just about performs that. But my main point is that it doesnt realy bring anything additional. It will already be obselete by the time the last units are delivered to the IAF, hence the reason to drop the project and concentrate full steam on the MCA/PAK-FA. Having a combo of the MiG-35MKI and SU-30MKI will greatly improve the balance relative to the PLAAF, the main threat. Having a lower third tier in the from of the LCA won’t really help here.

I didn’t say that the LCA is either 3rd generation nor that is only capable of replacing MiG-21s in a point defence role, so there is nothing to agree about there between us. the PLAAF maybe IAF’s main threat, but the IAF will always need to keep 2 borders safe if and when there is any aggression from the Chinese side or the Pakistani side. and here, on the western border, Tejas Mk.1 or Mk.2 are more than adequate for the bulk of the PAF’s current and future projected fighters. there is no exceptional 4th generation fighter that the PAF will get, so the Tejas would be adequate for Air Superiority roles.

Because up to 2001 Pakistan was under a US arms embargo with zero chance of getting late block F16. The FC1/JF-17 was the only choice on the table to renew their fleet with a type which has a BVR capability.

The embargo has heavily influenced PAF procurement decisions, they don’t want to be put back into the situation they faced in the 90’s. They have clearly stated that they want to maintain diversity in their defence procurement. The JF-17 offers an affordable type which supports their aerospace industry, whilst it is certainly behind a Block 50 F16 in respect of technology it has an agile airframe and western standard avionics which allow them to pick and mix systems and capabilities (I would say in avionics terms it’s similar to a Block 30 F16).

The JF-17 allows Pakistan to retire the earlier J7 and MirageIII/V from service in a managable way.

The plan is to have the FC20 and Block 50 F16 as the top tier, the JF-17 and upgraded Early Block F16 as the middle back bone tier and the J7PG as the bottom point defence tier. Once the J7 time expire they will be replaced with more JF-17 giving them a nicely balanced force structure.

Combined with the Ukranian tankers and Swedish AEW aircraft (maybe Chinese as well if they purchase the KJ200 balance beam) I think they should be fairly happy with their procurement strategy.

(I will be interested to see if they purchase the probe kit developed for the UAE F16 Block 16, seems an ideal addition to their new F16).

I was actually responding to Flying Donkey..he is a proponent of the theory that the LCA should be dropped altogether since its role can be taken over by a MiG-35..I know the purpose of his post was simply to troll and rile Indian posters, but the purpose of my post was to show just how ridiculous his line of thinking is..trying to explain the benefits of a LCA technology demonstrator programme, from the point of view of how much knowledge has been gained through this programme, and the value of its initial production variant, the Mk1 and the second variant, the Mk2 would be futile, because his aim is not to debate fruitfully, but to rile posters by saying that the LCA is useless.

the only way to respond to such a troll is by using the same logic as he is using to claim that the LCA is useless for the IAF..and so, the JF-17 is totally useless for the PAF, as instead of buying 150 JF-17s, they could go in a for a cheaper mix of upgraded J-7PGs (or whatever is the newest in the J-7 series) which would be BVR capable. and as Chinese and Pakistani posters claim it can even test a F-16 in WVR, with a decent IR/HMS combo it should be as good as the JF-17 in WVR.

newer F-16 Block 50s and upgraded F-16s such as those Chile bought, that they would finance from US military aid money and money diverted from other aid programs, as they have done for decades.

and finally by getting J-10Bs in return for softest of soft loans. from China’s perspective its a strategic sale, so money wouldn’t be that important, which fits fine with Pakistan, which is a pauper, but wants to be belligerant against India.

with this three-layered tier of fighters, all the PAF’s needs are fulfilled, so one could argue as to why they need to bother with JF-17s, similar to the argument with LCA’s go as per Flying Donkey..

You miunderstood my previous posts. I am in favour of dropping the LCA all together and a “light” fighter. Instead, the IAF should operate 2 major types, the SU-30MKI and the MiG-35, completely manufactured in India with customised avionics in line with the MKI. Considering the IAF experience with the MiG-29, the MiG-35 would be the most effective solution for a MMRCA.

Regarding the M2K, if this was sourced in the first place, there wouldn’t have been a need to develop the LCA, and in particular, to have its development drawn out to fulfill the ever demanding requirements of the IAF, not to mention the need to have a MMRCA contest

that is not the IAF’s point of view..they want a 3-tier structure, where the Su-30MKI and then the PAK-FA concentrate on the long range Air-Dominance, but are multi-role to the extent that they can easily take on strike, SEAD and recon tasks if there is a need. One or two squadrons will be tasked with a secondary role of long-range anti-shipping and long range strike using air-launched Klubs and Brahmos. These are heavy twin-engined, twin seat fighters that are expensive to operate and maintain, so the entire IAF fleet cannot be composed of them, even though they are very capable.

the MRCA is the major beast of burden, with it being tasked with long range strike, interdiction, anti-shipping, SEAD, yet being more than capable of taking on escort, recon, and air-superiority roles. the IAF wants certain technologies and weapons- AESA for long range detection and other associated benefits from AESA radars, long range weapons, PGMs, anti-radiation missiles, anti-shipping missiles, recon pods, EW jamming etc. as mandatory for this fighter, because it will fulfill roles that are today or were yesterday, being fulfilled by MiG-21s, MiG-23BNs, MiG-27s, Jaguar IMs and Jaguar IS’ as well take on more because of its added capabilities. These will likely be the backbone of the fleet out till 2040. periodic upgrades will be required from the manufacturer of this fighter.

keep in mind that the combined strike fleet of the IAF today itself, exceeds 200 and those are simply MiG-27s and Jags. by the time the MRCA is fully inducted, there will be no MiG-27s (more than 100 today) and older Jags will be retired (around 50-60), so that will leave a shortfall of 150-160 fighters that the MRCA will fill.

the Tejas Mk.1 and Mk.2 will form the third tier, that of the light fighter that is cheap to buy (half or even lesser cost than that of the MRCA and even Su-30MKI or PAK-FA), operate and maintain (being single engined and light) and capable of escort, point defence, air superiority and recon and strike with PGMs and LGBs. 120 odd Tejas’ will mean that the IAF will be readily able to replace MiG-21 Bison squadrons with a fighter in nearly the same weight category, but with far greater capabilities than the Bison. these can be readily stationed at forward air bases and are adequate for most of the PAF’s current fleet of fighters and future JF-17s. with upgrades, such as an AESA set for the Mk2 and internal EW and RWJ, and podded IRST, the Tejas Mk.2 will be able to stay current till the 2030s, at least in the sub-continent.

I wouldn’t take anything from the BR forums as HARD data, particularly when it comes to Pak/India comparisons, some of the other content on that forum is quite stomach churning, it doesn’t hold much credibility.

Besides, seems like that data is quite outdated. The whole issue here is the appauling attrition rate in the IAF. Flying old airframes hard is going to be an issue, which is probably the main factor, in addition to poor training.

lamest excuses ever for denying that the PAF’s attrition rate per 10,000 hours of flying is HIGHER than that of the IAF..:rolleyes: keep up the self-delusion.

You are just speculating and showing typical bias. Please provide a source.

no, I have HARD DATA, whereas you’re the one showing your Pakistani bias and trolling on this thread..

here’s an article that blows apart the MYTH that the Pakistani fanboys love, which is to talk about IAF attrition rates being higher than PAF attrition rates..it shows how the PAF’s attrition rate has been higher than that of the IAF, on an average, but because of our media, its the IAF which gets a bad name..:rolleyes:

link

ATTRITION IN THE INDIAN AND PAKISTAN AIR FORCES

RUPAK

The Indian Air Force’s (IAF) flight safety record has come in for much criticism lately. The press have called into question the IAF’s ability to adequately carry out tasks assigned to it in light of a recent spate of accidents. “Experts” both in India and abroad have gone so far as to claim that the rate at which the IAF was flying itself into the ground, Pakistan would simply have to wait for the IAF to crash its entire fleet before obtaining air superiority. However, these “expert” opinions on IAF attrition in the 1990s are problematic in that they view IAF flight safety in isolation, both temporally and with respect to its principal adversary. Briefly, IAF attrition rates in the 1990s are half of they were in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet in neither of those decades was the IAF’s operational capabilities compromised. More importantly, no one seems to have bothered to situate the IAF’s attrition rate (and operational capabilities) in a comparative perspective. More precisely, if the IAF is flying itself into the ground what is happening with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF)?

In one sense this unbalanced perception aptly exemplifies the paradox in the kinds of information available on South Asia’s two major Air Arms. Furthermore, it highlights the differing political constraints under which the armed forces in India and Pakistan operate. Since the 1960s the PAF has published three official histories and has vigorously promoted a positive uncritical image of itself, often exaggerating its achievements and capabilities vis-à-vis the IAF. The IAF has, until recently, been shy of any publicity and has yet to publish an official history. Yet keen students of both air forces find that there is a greater volume of detailed meaningful open source literature available on the IAF than on its adversary. This is in great part due to the fact that the IAF is subject to both legislative and administrative oversight. The Joint Parliamentary Committee on Defence and the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India provide detailed (and often unflattering) audits of the IAF’s operations which cover everything from attrition to procurement decisions. More importantly, the auditors’ reports are unclassified and available to anyone interested. The PAF, however, is not subject to public audit.

The publication of a recent article on PAF attrition by the semi-official Pakistan Institute of Air Defence Studies (PIADS) is therefore heaven sent. The article Air Accidents Inspite of High Efficiency by Air Marshal (Retd.) Ayaz Ahmad Khan (PAF) allows one a rare glimpse into the flight safety record of the Pakistan Air Force, and more importantly it helps to put the IAF’s attrition rate in perspective. Although Air Forces Monthly’s page on attrition does a fairly good job of covering accidents in the subcontinent, given the lack of oversight in Pakistan, usually only accidents that occur in built up areas or near population centers are reported. A snapshot of attrition rates for the two airforces covering the 1990s demonstrates that the myth of the PAF’s superior safety record is just that: A MYTH.

The following figures are given by Air Marshal (Retd.) Ayaz Ahmad Khan in the PIADS article.

Annual Attrition Rates – Pakistan Air Force (expressed per 10,000 hours)

Year
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96
1996/97
1997/98

Attrition Rate
1.89
1.11
1.41
1.23
1.32
1.25
1.40

Unfortunately, Air Marshal Khan doesn’t provide a breakdown of the actual number of accidents and flying hours for each of these years. Since we have no information with which to assign weights to the annual averages in order to come up with a figure for the period 1991-1997, we are forced to use a simple average. This works out to an attrition rate of 1.37 per 10,000 hours over the entire period.

In the case of the IAF we can draw on figures for annual flying hours from the CAG reports between 1992 and 1998, and the 1998 Report of the Kalam Committee on Air Safety to arrive at a clear picture of IAF attrition over the period 1991/92-1996/97. The figures for 1997/98 amd 1998/99 are based on the Minister of Defence’s written replies to Parliment in August 1999.

Annual Flying hours: IAF

Year
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96
1996/97
1997/98

Flying Hours
256,200
238,362
239,412
252,822
268,385
275,505
306,190

Total Flying Hours 1991/92-1997/98: 1,836,875

During this period the IAF suffered a total of 194 accidents. Of these 154 aircraft were declared “beyond economical repair”. If one uses the higher former figure to calculate IAF attrition, it works out to 1.07 per 10,000 hours. If one only includes write-offs, attrition falls off to 0.83 per 10,000 hours. Both figures for the IAF are lower than the lowest possible attrition rate for the PAF during the entire period based on a weighted average of their annual attrition rates.:diablo:

Furthermore Air Marshal Khan writes that in a 19 month period from January 1997 (i.e. up to 31 July 1998) the PAF flew 110,000 hours and suffered 11 major accidents. An attrition rate of 1 per 10,000 hours.

While we do not know the exact number of flying hours for the IAF in that 19 month period we can use flying hours from the years 1997-1998 to 1998-1999 to come up a with a reasonable estimate. In 1997/98 the IAF logged 306,190 hours and in 1998/99 it logged 311,412 hours. For the sake of argument we can extrapolate that the IAF logged 181,657 hours during the first 7 months of 1998. Hence for the 19 month period beginning Jan 1997 the IAF logged a total 487,847 hours. During this period the IAF suffered 16 major accidents (7 in 1997 + 9 in first seven months of 1998). This translates into a loss rate of 0.32 per 10,000 hours. Thus as IAF, as a service, suffered an attrition rate that is less than a third of the Pakistan Air Force’s during 1997-1998.:dev2:

However, the figures do not adequately capture the attrition rates for fighters during the same period. Given the IAF’s almost transcontinental responsibilities, the IAF flies large numbers of helicopters and transport aircraft. For this reason attrition rates for the service as a whole don’t adequately reflect flight safety in the combat (fighter/fighter-trainer) elements of the two air arms.

The Pakistan Air Force has traditionally had a large fighter component. For most of the 1990s the ratio of the fighters/fighter-trainers to transports/helicopters in the PAF has been approximately 85:15. Unfortunately, Air Marshal Khan provides no breakdown of flying hours by type for the PAF. Let us, therefore, over-estimate the number of hours that that PAF fighters put in during the 19 month period from January 1997 (and thereby introduce a bias that favors the PAF), so that they are allotted 90% of the flying hours. This works out to 99,000 hours. Furthermore, Air Marshal Khan says:

“The PAF accident rate for 1997 till August 98 was 1 aircraft per 10,000 flying hours, and is a tribute to the high expertise and dedication of technicians, engineers and professional excellence of PAF fighter pilots. “

This would indicate that the 11 losses (all write-offs) were indeed all fighters. However, since this is not conclusive let us use a lower figure. We know with certainty that the PAF lost 7 fighters (4 F-7s, 1 Mirage III, 1 A-5, 1 F-6) during this period. Based on this figure the PAF’s fighter attrition rate for the 19 month period works out to 0.70. If we use an attrition rate which represents attrition in the same ratio as hours flown by fighters (i.e. 9 fighter losses), the figure is a corresponding 0.90 per 10,000 hours.

Now let us turn to the IAF. The IAF’s fleet breakdown (fighters vs. others) is approximately 60:40. However, we know that 50% of the IAF flying hours in 1997/98, or 153,000 hours, were contributed by fighters. Based on this, it is not unreasonable to assume that 50% of the hours, or 90,708 hours, during the first 7 months of 1998 would have been put in by fighters. This means that the fighters logged up about 243,708 flying hours during this 19 month period. Over this period the IAF lost 3 fighters in 1997 (2 MiG-21, 1 MiG-27) and 8 fighters (6 MiG-21, 1 MiG-23, 1 MiG-29) during the first seven months of 1998. This means that the loss rate for Indian fighters was 0.45 per 10,000 hours.

Regardless of what figure we use to calculate the PAF’s losses, it seems that that IAF fighters suffered from lower levels of attrition. Of course the IAF’s high attrition rate remains a matter of concern. The MiG-21 fleet (esp. the FL, M, U, UM and US variants) is the main source of this problem. Given that these aircraft are well past their (manufacturer recommended) airframe lives and that the IAF pushes them to their limits, until new Advanced Jet Trainers are procured these aircraft will continue to be a source of grief for the IAF. Nevertheless, in the future, students of South Asian air arms would do well to remember that if the IAF is ‘falling out of the sky’, it is doing so less rapidly than its main adversary.

With PLAAF of course, we almost never hear about their crashes, so its nearly impossible to estimate how much their attrition rates are, but looking at their ancient fleets in the 1990s, of J-6, J-7s, A-5s, etc. I’m guessing it was as high, if not higher than the PAF’s attrition rates.

What’s the accident rate of the MiG-21 for other users compared to Indias. I’m asking because it seem every time a MiG-21 crashes it always a Indian one.

Also are the causes of the accidents ever explained? Is it really due to mechanical failures, old age of the airframes or is it human error?

:confused:

which other major air force operates MiG-21s in the number that the IAF still does ? most other operators are minor ones that probably don’t operate half the number of hours the IAF MiG-21 fleet puts in on a unit basis. there are even now, with all the retirements, nearly 160 MiG-21s, including nearly 120 MiG-21 Bisons in IAF service. the one that crashed recently is a Type 77, a really old one that is due to be retired soon. and to give you an idea of the intensity of MiG-21 operations that used to happen (now its reduced because of retirements and the Hawk being inducted), please read the article below

link

To give you some idea of the intensity of the flying, the Air Officer Commanding Tezpur, Air Commodore PK Barbora VM, was quoted as saying to the press in October, that Tezpur had recorded the highest number of flying hours of any operational base in the Indian Air Force. He also went on to say that there had been a significant increase in flying hours and that on average 10,500 sorties are undertaken each year, which equates to approximately 70 a day.

and one of the big causes of crashes in the Indian subcontinent are bird hits, as in a few cases, there are major abbatoirs quite close to the airfields, bringing in large birds that are big threat to fighters. in one famous case, the IAF even ceased single engined operations from Hindon AFB, Delhi after the State Govt. of Delhi didn’t do anything about an abbatoir that was bringing in a lot of scavenger birds.

in the North East, weather is a big issue. it can become dangerous to fly within no time at all, and most accidents in the NE are related to weather issues. the terrain is very remote as well, with huge rainforests and very remote hills. the amount of rain-fall this region sees is very high as compared to any other part of India.

from the above article

Weather plays an important part in the MOFT syllabus. Although semesters usually start on 1st January and 1st July, bad weather and operational deployments of the frontline squadrons involved with the syllabus can delay the start and finish of courses. Some courses spend the majority of their flying during the bad weather months from April onwards, but the chances are that they would have graduated from a good weather course whilst undergoing stage 2 or 2A at the Air Force Academy.