MildaveOh come on, if you tell people not to think about the while elephant, it’s likely they’re going to think about just that.
BTW about 600 French cheeses are currently in production all aspects and varieties included.
I loved how you and the article’s author have a way to calculate cost, forgetting that to date only 24 EFT have been sold/exported to SA…
MildaveThe article while very nice on the narrative stand point has clearly an agenda in promoting the Mig-35 for the MMRCA deal.
I would love to read the point of view of those you flew against the Mig-29 during that exercise.
MildaveLike I said, it looks like Jacko found someone to play with. So many holes in that article it looks like French cheese:D!
Mildaveor in other words they are saying:
“we want the F-35B so we can have two carriers operating sooner, but if we could start over again, we would’ve went F-35C from the beginning”
I don’t know, to me it sounds more like we’re scr** either way…
Does anybody know if the LM’s proposal to use the F-35C as an STOBAR aircraft is still around?
MildaveNo Rafale fan should read the IPCS Special Report No.126 by Abhijit Iyer-Mitra.
It won’t do their blood pressure any good. 😮
(“The Rafale: A Bad Deal”).
Lol did you find a friend?
MildaveUK MOD explains reasons for changes to Joint Strike Fighter capability
Chief of the Defence Staff General Sir David Richards has written in today’s Daily Telegraph why the MOD’s decision to use the short take-off and vertical landing variant of the Joint Strike Fighter to deliver the UK’s Carrier Strike capability is the right one. Here follows the full article.
Military command is about taking difficult decisions in changing and challenging circumstances. Over the 40 years I have had the honour to serve in the Armed Forces, I have consistently found that such decisions demand both vision and courage. The change of course over our carrier programme announced this week certainly required both. It was not easy, but it is right.
It is worth explaining why I, and my fellow military chiefs, proposed this move. Carriers are expensive – there is no way around that. But they offer a capability that few can match: an independent, flexible, sovereign base, not tied to other countries’ wishes, that can operate around the world.
By choosing the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) model of the Joint Strike Fighter over the Carrier Variant that we had previously ordered for our two new aircraft carriers, the UK is significantly shortening the time it will take to deploy our maritime air power.
For me, this is the key factor. We are getting an exceptional military tool that is capable of projecting power, deterring our enemies and supporting our friends. In an uncertain world, this is a capability that I know we all wish to have sooner rather than later.
It is worth understanding why this change is necessary. Two years ago, we looked at the facts we had, and made our decisions. They were right at the time, and based on the best information available. But since the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), some important things have changed.
The more cutting-edge aspects of the carrier jet programme proved very difficult to cost accurately. What we were told in 2010 has changed.
We had an opportunity to put this right, and it has been taken.
Contrary to the criticism levelled at the Ministry of Defence in the past, when the facts changed, our decisions did too.
The reasons why it was right to do this are clear. First, the improvements to the STOVL aircraft since the SDSR are impressive. Once a troubled project on probation, it has now demonstrated its capabilities, flying more than 900 hours. This reduces the danger of complications and cost increases that we feared in 2010.
Second, we could not operate the previous aircraft from a British carrier before 2023 at the earliest. By choosing STOVL aircraft, we have removed the risk of further delays, giving the UK a powerful carrier strike capability years earlier than would otherwise be possible.
Stretching the gap in carrier capability any further is neither desirable nor necessary.
Third, the costs of converting carriers to operate the Carrier Variant have increased by over £1bn, and may rise further. This raised the prospect of this vital capability being unaffordable – or of having to take money from other key programmes.
Whilst it is true that the Carrier Variant offered greater range, this is not a crucial advantage – given our major investment in air-to-air refuelling – when weighed against the greater time to bring it into service, and the increasing cost. The balance has tipped back in favour of STOVL, which has distinct advantages of its own, such as versatility and agility.
Switching to STOVL means we are getting an outstanding capability sooner, for less financial and technical risk. It also gives us the ability to operate two carriers if we choose, a decision that the next SDSR will review.
Managing the Carrier Strike programme is as complex and demanding as the maritime and air environments in which these ships operate. They are not just mobile flight decks, but among the most capable intelligence and targeting tools in the world.
Both the Carrier Variant and the STOVL aircraft represent a generational shift from the jets that we use today. Through their computer technology, stealth and communications they are more capable than their ship- or land-based predecessors. They are cutting-edge, multi-role platforms fit for the battlespace of the 21st century.
They can both carry the full range of weapons we intend to buy.
Source: UK MOD
The bedrock of successful combat capabilities is Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance. This allows us to understand, track, strike and remain poised to react to the unexpected. It is this capability that ensured our success in Libya.
The Joint Strike Fighter increases it immeasurably.
This fifth-generation aircraft is a weapons system unmatched by our rivals, and will be an integral part of the package we offer our friends and allies – not least the French, with whom we have developed such a close relationship, and the Americans, who have been and will continue to be essential partners in developing our new capability.
Yesterday’s decision guarantees that we will have a hard-hitting carrier capability up to five years sooner than looked likely. The advice of the Chiefs of Staff is clear: this is the right decision for the Armed Forces, and the right decision for Britain.
Source: MOD UK
MildaveMildaveMildaveDoes anybody know how exactly did they eliminated that £38bn while keeping all major programs alive?
MildaveDefence Secretary Balances MOD Budget
Through a series of tough but necessary decisions, combined with radical reforms of the MOD’s financial processes, the £38bn black hole in the Defence Budget that the Government inherited in 2010 has now been eliminated.
Today’s announcement means the MOD can now guarantee the delivery of projects for the Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, including:
• 14 new Chinooks, Apache life-extension and Puma upgrade
• a programme of new armoured fighting vehicles worth around £4.5bn over ten years, and a £1bn upgrade of the Warrior armoured fighting vehicle
• the building of the two Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers, the remainder of the Type 45 destroyers and the new Type 26 frigates, and the Astute Class and Successor nuclear submarines
• investment in new Wildcat helicopters, the Merlin upgrade programme and the assessment phase for Merlin marinisation
• introduction into service of the Voyager air-to-air refueller and troop transporter, the A400M air transporter and the Air Seeker surveillance aircraft
• an additional C-17 aircraft
• continued investment in Typhoon and Joint Strike Fighter
• £7bn invested in complex weapons – the smart missiles and torpedoes that give our Navy, Army and Air Force their fighting edge.Balancing the programme means the MOD can now confirm the following projects will also be part of the core equipment programme:
• a £4bn plus investment in intelligence, surveillance, communications and reconnaissance assets across the Cipher, Solomon, Crowsnest, DCNS and Falcon projects
• the outright purchase of three offshore patrol vessels which are currently leased
• capability enhancements to the Typhoon
• a range of simulators, basing and support equipment for the new helicopters and aircraft we are introducing.
MildaveMildaveThe problem is that I made what should have been an uncontentious remark – that while range and payload will always be a Rafale advantage, and while Rafale is currently a much more versatile air to ground platform, with a wider choice of more useful weapons, Typhoon is making progress towards greater multi-role versatility, and that while Typhoon will remain inferior to Rafale in some areas, in some aspects of air-to-ground it may even be superior.
The problem is that you’re again taking your personal opinions for scientific facts.
Good for Typhoon to be at last making some progress toward greater multi-role capabilities, which I’m not disputing, but if your only argument toward Typhoon potentially been “even superior” in some aspects is a “cheaper” GBU bomb then you’re grossly mistaken.
Two Rafales in AtG are capable to bring to the battlefield “right now” 6 AASM with a combo of INS/GPS and GPS/IR guidance + 4(6?) GBU 12 + Damocles + 8 BVR AAM (IR + EM).
In the near future that will be improved with 6 AASM with a possible combo of INS/GPS, GPS/IR and GPS/Laser + 4(6?) GBU 12/GBU 49 + Damocles + 8 BVR AAM (IR + EM). All this at far greater range and versatility than Typhoon.
Now take a two ship Typhoon flying right now, and tell me where is the superiority?
The point is that for some missions, the ability to use a cheaper dual mode weapon will be an advantage, and others where it will not.
Well given how broke the MOD is… More seriously the same weapons won’t be sold at the same price to two different air forces depending on the amount bought, their relationship with the US etc.
Now improving a existing kit improve flexibility, having a stand off weapon add a capability. Having both at reasonable price is a commodity. You see the difference ?
The greater the capabilities, the more effective an aircraft will be, the more effective, then the more “superior” can it be considered.
Just as there will be many occasions where stand off capability is a really vital advantage, and others where you are going to want to be able to engage targets that are directly below you. I read one article criticizing AASM for not being able to spiral down against such targets – a relatively unimportant shortcoming, admittedly, but a shortcoming in some scenarios.
How silly. How can you compare the operational advantages in survivability, countering access denial, stealth etc. offered by real stand off capability (60+km) with your unsourced rumours about not been able to spiral down, especially when other weapon types are integrated to take care of such trivial affairs.
It would be like saying Typhoon is superior in a very narrow area because it’s Paveway IV is cheaper than Storm Shadow…
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