Why would BrahMos help? Are you implying they could use the Su-30 for nuclear delivery?

Perhaps the reason is that they prefer a fighter that is a bit more survivable than the Su-30 in high-threat environments for the nuclear role…?

Safer to launch a nuclear-tipped BrahMos from the Su-30 at standoff range than overfly the target to deliver a dumb bomb with the Rafale.

If we are to compare apples to apples, the Typhoon would have been the winner in the MMRCA contest, in the first place. She didn’t, case closed.

Except that questions have been raised about the legitimacy of the Rafale’s L1 position in the MMRCA race as well. The then defence minister A.K. Antony had put in a noting in the file asking for a review of the bidding procedure, and objections had been raised by some members of the CNC with regard to the life-cycle costing.

MoD raises objections over Rafale’s lifecycle cost

Less than two months after the Indian Air Force (IAF) chose the French Rafale fighter jet for its medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) project, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has raised objections over its lifecycle cost, thereby pushing back the date by which the contract could be signed with the manufacturers, Dassault Aviation.

Top IAF sources said the two MoD members on the Contract Negotiations Committee (CNC) have questioned the low lifecycle cost that was earlier worked out in respect of the Rafale which was chosen over the Eurofighter Typhoon for the Air Force’s MMRCA programme that envisages supply from Dassault 126 aircraft for a massive $20 billion, the largest open tender military aviation deal in the world.

The sources said that the “differences” that have cropped up among the CNC members are centred around the Rafale’s lifecycle cost which the MoD representatives have declared to be far less than what it should be.

“There is no unanimity among the CNC members… and failing a unanimous decision, the Rafale acquisition could well get pushed back,” sources said. While the maintenance cost of a Saab-Gripen single engine aircraft is over $3,000 per hour, that of the far superior Rafale could be estimated to be much higher.

The MoD representatives’ assessment that a Rafale’s lifecycle cost should be higher appears to have stemmed from the defence establishment’s historical reliance on Russian aircraft. According to sources, the MoD officials on the CNC are “not satisfied” with the lower assessment of the lifecycle cost.

The MoD’s disagreement with other CNC members comes at a time when the committee will also have to review other “items” involving the Rafale, including the cost of air frame, engine, avionics, weapons system and spare parts support among others. It is learnt that the MoD representatives raised their objections some time after the commercial bids were opened and continued to object to the low computation of a Rafale aircraft’s lifecycle cost in some recent meetings of the CNC.

The ‘miscellaneous’ blunder in India’s Rafale deal

In what appears to be a rerun of the Scorpene project, around 50-60 ‘un-priced’ items are believed to have been listed as miscellaneous’ in Dassault’s offer for the Rafale which emerged as L1 or the lowest bidder in the MMRCA tender ahead of the Eurofighter.

MoD sources claim that it is these sundry articles that have emerged as the principal financial hurdle in negotiating the Rafale deal on the basis of its Life Cycle Cost based on keeping the fighter operational for four decades.

It appears that subsequent pricing by Dassault of these so-called miscellaneous but critical items — like in the Scorpene tender — in its deliberations with the MoD’s Cost Negotiation Committee, are responsible for significantly inflating the Rafale contract cost, jeopardising the vendors L1 status and delaying its closure.

Official sources indicate the Rafale procurement has reportedly more than doubled from Rs 42,000 crore (then around $9 billion) earmarked for the MMRCA tender, when it was floated in 2007, to around $20 billion.

Rafale was never supposed to encounter any action, unless there were fighters coming in from Iran or Pakistan.. which was veeeery unlikely.. just as the F-35 has about zero chance to encounter anything else than “exercises” you speak about…

The ISAF’s air corridor to Afghanistan (a land-locked country) came via Pakistan. And while the Taliban regime before its fall was recognized by UAE & Saudi Arabia, Iran strongly supported the Northern Alliance as well as the new Afghan republic. The F-35’s chances of seeing action against North Korea may be slim but they’re certainly higher than the probability of the Rafale engaging Iranian or Pakistani aircraft.

Point is, if the Rafale F1s ‘prototypes’ were good enough for an operational role, so are the F-35 Blk 2Bs. None of which impinges on Switzerland, Belgium or Finland’s choices, since all of them are being offered the F-35 in a mature Blk 3F/4A configuration.

The Rafale F1 did what it was supposed to do – perform fleet protection (and air superiority missions over Afghanistan, as with any no fly zone) but they were preseries examples and destined to be upgraded lateer on, which is why they ordered a limited number of these.. and only once the aircraft was considered fully developed to fly. The capabilities were added later on. The F-35 was produced in high numbers even before its flight envelope was fully tested.

There were about 90 F-35 2Bs produced which might seem like ‘high numbers’ to you but relative to the overall size of the program its a modest figure. And the variant’s capabilities match or exceed that of the F1; the USMC has no qualms about putting them into combat.

As for zones, the Afghanistan was (and still is, a real war zone) and a pilot who’d have a malfunction would be in serious trouble even if he ejected safely over taliban areas… isn’t it strange that everybody wants the “combat proven” sticker on its product ASAP and yet, the F-35 that’s, officially at least, operational, goes to completely opposite side of the planet from the part of the world where it would put to good use its primary capabilities, which consist of dropping stuff that goes ka-boom on bad guys?

Primary capabilities according to who? Its a multi-role fighter designed to replace the F-16 in all the latter’s tasks. That include air combat and if a conflict were to break out with North Korea, the F-35s would be among the first into the fray. Its at least as productive a task, as flying air superiority missions over Afghanistan.

As far as Belgium, Finland et al. are concerned they will be receiving their jets in a mature 3F configuration with the program having clocked over 200,000 flight hours at that point.

Only a test evaluation would give a definitive answer. Only the rafale and the Typhoon succeeded scoring above the minimum threshold back in the days. But then LM would need to provide a solution to allow aircraft testing. And there are other test scenarios as well that would not automatically favor the F35.

Testing conditions can be replicated but the basic point is that the idea of the F-35 being somehow hampered at interception missions is a total canard.

There are costs involved when you decide to introduce a new weapon into your inventory. Logistical costs, costs of maintaining that weapon and the costs of actually making sure that it covers all your threats. This beyond first creating the requirements for such a weapon and conducting testing to see that it actually meets those requirements in the first place. You just don’t put out an RFI and buy a few missiles for a long term program, you have to create all those things for a new weapon, for it to be effectively used by your combat forces. As explained already, the objective of the increment-2 program is to field a capability that you couldn’t at a short time-line (hence LRASM). You won’t go out and buy an inferior weapon for that program to the one you fielded as a GAP FILLER.

The costs involved with integrating the the JSM on the F-35C are minuscule (even after factoring in the paperwork & red-tape) relative to the Harpoon. That takes care of internal carriage – for 340 F-35Cs, to be delivered over next two decades.

For more demanding roles there’s the LRASM & its future variants – because even though it was selected as a gap filler, an upgraded Harpoon will still be the inferior weapon system – at least until a new ASM enters the picture and that’s not happening in the near future.

@BIO

– The F-35C will equipped with an anti-ship missile in due course. Its pretty much inevitable – you don’t need a immediate road-map to foresee that. The JSM can be carried internally and will face no integration costs, while the LRASM is already being integrated with the SH. The Harpoon has pretty much been sidelined, though probably not eliminated.

– As far as surface fleet is concerned – again, LRASM for the Arleigh Burke & JSM for the LCS & frigates are almost a done deal.

They can run a competition to formalize it, if sole-source is politically unacceptable, but the results will likely remain the same – an expanding order-book for the JSM & LRASM and a gradual draw-down of the Harpoon stocks.

Where does the JSM come into the picture? It is not a part of any USN acquisition strategy. LRASM as per rules has to compete if it is to go beyond the “interim and urgent need” requirement for a few hundred missiles and there is no indication that the OASuW Increment 2 is geared towards buying LRASMS.

The LRASM as things stand won’t replace the Harpoon unless the USN gives up the need to maintain an Active seeker which it has held as close requirement over the years. It is also a larger weapon employing a different concept. As to the JSM there is no requirement for an IIR missile with the USN to replace the Harpoon. It will be quite unlikely that this variant ends up de-throning the Harpoon especially with the ER variant in flight testing.

The Harpoon ER & MTS are upgrades/retrofits for existing missiles – they cannot soldier on ad infinitum. And the JSM & LRASM integration on the F-35 & SH respectively, is already funded, and they’ve also been shortlisted for the LCS/frigate OTH contract. Its pretty obvious which way this is going to go.