For the end user, flyaway prices are useless trash invented by those striving to hide real cost of the aircraft. The only cost that really counts for the end user is the system procurement cost and operating cost. Everything else is bullsh!t (unless you got a special situation where you want to replace one aircraft under special conditions, for example an attrition loss)
Eh? Doesn’t change the fact that the flyaway cost is not $150-180M (the figure offered for the Gripen was the flyaway cost).
As for the procurement cost, its usually about 150% of the flyaway cost so… $120-150M. Which corresponds well with the Israeli contract (approx $140M).
User ‘Apps’
NO YES
Helmet Mounted Display System
YES YES
:rolleyes:
Well it’s coming to the end of it’s service life with its primary user, and there’s unlikely to be any major upgrades in future – at least Gripen will still be manufactured into the near future.
The last F-16 was delivered to the USAF in 2005, it can hardly be closing in on retirement. Israel received its last F-16 in 2009. Then there are plenty of others who just got done with their orders – Turkey, Greece, Poland, Pakistan, Morocco. Also there are also a few countries still taking deliveries – Egypt, Oman, Iraq etc. Follow-on orders are expected from UAE.
Point is, there is little to suggest that the F-16’s upgrade prospects are bleak compared to the Gripen, going into the future.
That is correct. At the same time, similar export pricing puts the F-35 into $150-180M category.
Anyway, the most intriguing figure and the main reason for the dangerously cut down numbers for smaller air forces is the projected operating cost.
Flyaway cost isn’t $150-180M. Its $110M currently and will fall to $85M or so at full production.
The purpose of the air force is not to buy US fighters. The purpose of an air force is not to seek commonality with the fighter that the US has chosen to buy so that as a NATO member one flies the same aircraft as the US. The purpose of an air force is not to severely curtail the country’s defence capability by buying a US fighter that one’s country cannot afford.
I take it that you are suggesting that if a country cannot afford F-35 than the alternative is not to buy the obvious alternative that it can afford (Gripen for European F-16 users) but to downgrade to much less capable lower cost aircraft. Why would a country do this?
The truth is that the F-35 will cost European F-16 users far more than they were led to believe by LM. That is a major headache for them (Norway excepted).
Again.. what is air force’s purpose? What mission is it exactly that you can’t do with X no. of F-35s, can do with Y no. of Gripens, but can’t do with Z no. of lower cost aircraft?
Had the European F-16 users known that LM was feeding them false hopes of F-35 affordability they might have approached SAAB with a proposal for a share in producing a post Gripen C design (perhaps incorporating the Eurojet engine).
If they wanted a F-16 class replacement, well.. the F-16 is still in production. No training hassles. Same support infrastructure. Transferable spares, munitions etc.
What’s the flyaway cost of the Gripen E? From the Swiss and Brazilian orders, it seems to be firmly in the $70M+ category.
My words exactly… In order to avoid dragging this debate into an Euro-vs-US campaign, I certainly would not mind if my country purchased an US-made aircraft if it was in Gripen class when it comes to acquisition and operating cost. But agreed, Euro-made stuff is preferred anytime, for obvious reasons. Gripen is the way to go for me.
Which raises the question – what’s the purposes of the air force? Why maintain it at all? Or alternatively, why not get an air policing force – Hawk 200/T-50?
Here are some quotes for you.
Sounds like the fanbase just keeps getting stronger…
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130306/DEFREG02/303060011/
They sound like problems specific to the LRIP 2 & 3. The aircraft didn’t have a working HMDS and the radar is still under development. Shouldn’t affect the final product.
However, using an analysis performed in DOD but not publicly
reported, we calculated the likelihood of a nonstealthy aircraft being hit if
it flew the same number of strikes as the F-117 (that is, 1,788), with a
general probability of hit equal to 0.0017.40 This calculation showed that 0 hits would be the most likely outcome for a nonstealthy aircrafthttp://forum.keypublishing.com/showthread.php?126574-GAO-summary-of-Desert-Storm
0.0017 x 1788 = 3.04 casualties.
And as it happens two F-111s were hit and one F-15E downed; all during night flying.
There’s also the Israeli Radar and Lightning LDP pod to consider as well.
The LDP is not intrinsic to the aircraft’s flyaway cost (also excluded are jamming pods, reconnaissance pods etc).
The radar utilizes an Israeli data processor unit, so that cost will figure into the import content.
JSOW-C1 (AGM-154C-1) is the anti-ship variant, and has the Rockwell Collins dual-waveform (UHF and Link 16) Strike Common Weapons Datalink (SCWDL). This allows it to engage moving and relocatable targets at sea. Developmental Testing (DT1) conducted in 2010-11 showed that a single F/A-18 was capable of using the weapon to strike moving sea targets.
Hmm… learnt something new today.
Is this being acquired for anti-ship roles or is just capable of hitting naval targets (like the B-1B Paveway test against a boat)? I ask since a glide bomb can’t be used in a sea-skimming profile and with its low terminal speed, it would be an easy target for CIWS. (Even with its LO properties, it would still show up on radars at 4-5 km at least, not to mention IR/EO sensors.)
Anti shipping is one of USN’s primary missions for IIR homing JSOW C1 using the Broach warhead. Since it is LO, it is more survivable against CWIS.
I believe the JSOW-C is a solely land attack munition. Being a glide bomb its probably not very suitable for high speed terminal maneuvers required of an anti-ship missile. The USN’s surface/aerial anti-ship complement consists primarily of Harpoon variants AFAIK (though I think the SM can also be used in the anti-ship role).
that price is more likely misinformation to get contract. India is not competitive in aerospace field that it can make things so much cheaper unless the quality of product is way down.
You’ve been informed about the development cost ($1.2B). And you’ve been informed about the production cost ($26M). As for it all being ‘misinformation’, that’s only your opinion and, true to character, its worthless.
Gripen has higher production rate along with higher productivity/automation/experience labor. LCA real price is some where closer to $70 to $80m . these costs are estimates.
The price tag was for the Tejas not for the Gripen.
$26 million is the cost formally quoted for the 20 aircraft that are already in production.
The hardware may be flying, with the exception of the side looking AESAs. But I doubt the software currently meets operational needs – there would be design/development opportunity there. There is also the manufacturing/assembly work split to be finalized between Russian companies and Indian companies.
Not really. By the time, the Indian companies get a handle on the project, it would have moved onto the next stage of development. Its unlikely they’d be any value addition before 2020. And even beyond that the Indian input would lead incremental improvement at best.
A program like this is worth committing to, either early/at inception – when there are potential technological and industrial benefits that can be harvested down the line; or later/at maturity – when the weapon system’s performance and cost are known and can be assessed with relative accuracy.
Its futile to chase after the mirage of co-development at this stage. They need to pull out and let the PAK FA’s development conclude before making any decisive calls.