VnomadAnd unit cost is a function of the production rate which in turn is broadly linked to the size of the order. Hence the emphasis on economies of scale in my previous post..
VnomadI believe partnering ultimately creates a more expensive product. Don’t believe in it at all.
You’ve mixing up two different things.
Partnering increases the total development cost and timelines, but reduces the net liability for each individual state. Case-in-point: Eurofighter & Rafale. The EF cost much more to develop than the Rafale yet the amount billed to the UK treasury was lower than for France (albeit at the cost of a lower workshare).
There is however no substitute for economies of scale. Case-in-point: F-35. Has a manufacturing base spanning the globe involving a dozen countries with three different assembly lines, yet cheaper than its Western competition despite its sophistication. Achievable only because (in addition to its large domestic orders) over a third of its annual production is exported, thus suppressing the unit cost and further improving its export potential. The other obvious example is Airbus, which was able to emerge as a peer to Boeing only because of European consolidation.
Vnomad^ is it me or does it seem that Dassault’s NGF has a better likelihood of being developed than the Bae Tempest? It seems Dassault has greater ability to attract partners and funding.
BAe not so much, especially with Brexit… unless they can get a major win with getting Japan on board.
Better likelihood but not by much. BAE will likely end up partnering SAAB. They’ll have somewhat smaller budgets but a more agile development team than Dassault-Airbus.
End result will be the same – both aircraft will be adopted domestically in modest numbers, and achieve some minor export wins while getting smoked by the US PCA/FA-XX everywhere else, including Europe.
The only way for the Europeans to avoid fragmentation and achieve credible economies of scale, is for the UK & France to collaborate and that means finding an equitable workshare compromise (and getting past the Brexit snub). Easier said than done.
VnomadThe “first serials” are instead fully developed planes, built in the same serial line that would be used for the normal production andare at the same standard of the full rateproducion.
So it would not means that they would order just these two a.s.a. they are done they can award another one for the full scale production, obviously a batch a time as always.
I have no idea how this relates to my post.
VnomadThe scenario should go the MiG-23’s way. BVR capability. Better agility and turn-rates at medium-to-low altitudes. What gives one pause, is the MiG’s godawful handling, poor ergonomics & cockpit visibility. The Mirage would also have the advantage of the Aim-9L, which was the best IR missile of it generation by far.
I suspect the IAF pilot would much rather go into the same fight at the stick of a MiG-21bis.
Vnomad$1.4 billion is still $1.4 billion – wasn’t India’s actual expenditure on the FGFA project before they pulled the plug well below $1 billion, for reference?
Using total acquisition cost or procurement cost as a baseline is rather disingenuous – it misleadingly dilutes the impact due to the F-35 project having 3 to 10 times the production volume of a typical post Cold War fighter project. It’s a development problem, so relate it to the development cost – which makes it responsible for a 2.5% escalation all by itself (wonder if there is another problem which individually caused a greater impact?).
And $1.4 million would have been $1.4 million i.e. a large number in some other context, like say stationary requisitions.
Even a 2.3% increase in the R&D cost isn’t a monumental scandal given that its served a purpose. First the size of the fleet allowed for a massive pool of operational data feeding back into the development cycle. It allowed for a scaled ramp up of the production infrastructure (150 units/yr don’t pour out of factory from a standstill). It enabled an ageing fleet to be recapitalized, particularly wrt to the USMC and hugely increased the capability of other services inducting them, also enabling them to shift pilot training towards new operational concepts. Just as importantly, the expansion in capacity is enabling the program to service the aircraft’s extensive export orders and compete for more orders.
All in all, that’s $1.4 bn (spread over 10 years or so) fairly well spent.
If we want to apply similar specious reasoning to the LRIP contracts, two aircraft equals a paltry 0.08% of the planned production total for the F-35 whereas it might be about 10 times that for the Su-57 – so who’s off to a better start now 😀
Where did I compare it to the Su-57? Also, the LRIP-1 aircraft were pre-production models never intended for operational service AFAIK. I believe the AF-1 was used to test mission systems, while AF-2 was a flight sciences aircraft.
VnomadHow else would you define “harm” in this context but cost in time and money? The more airframes you’ve already built by the time a problem requiring a fix is identified, the more aircraft there are which need expensive remedial work, for example.
As mentioned, the F-35 programme did deliberately increase the level of concurrency over and above that typical of previous aircraft projects.
:sigh:
And I here I though the concurrency bogey had finally been put to rest.
Total Acquisition Cost: $406 billion ($345 bn procurement + $60 bn development)
Cost of Concurrency: $1.4 billion
So concurrency factor increased the procurement cost by 0.4% and raised acquisition costs by 0.34%.
And what is even more ludicrous is trying to present this behaviour as model of how programs are run, in order to put down other procurement programs where purchasing works soundly and quantities are only ordered done once the product is ready and to the entire satisfaction of the customer.
Just FYI, its how the F-16 was procured. 95 Blk 1 units were ordered, built, delivered and then upgraded to Blk 10 standards over the next five years. Similar iterative upgrades (include changes to airframe) continued to happen all the way down the line.
VnomadMind you, the Qataris have signalled options for more Rafales, Phoons and Eagles… Strange chaps.
To think just a few years ago, the QEAF used to consist of just 12 Mirages.. which it was trying to offload to another operator.
VnomadMaterials and labor costs in Russia and Turkey cannot be compared with material and labor costs in the US.
Even at a third of material and labour cost, it would still be a colossal sum considering the intended volumes. For an aircraft needing to be developed practically from the ground up, to be delivered at a distant point in the future, and carrying oodles of technical risk.
VnomadAs for the LHD’s Turkey will need alternatives to the F-35B in the event that an arms embargo is imposed by the US. Even then Turkey can use them as Helicopter carrriers with its T-129’s until it acquires its VTOL aircraft.
Helicopter carriers in that case. Because a VSTOL fighter will likely take over 15 years to develop. Having the Yak-141 design documents at hand, will only be of marginal utility, if that.
And given the very limited production run, the costs will be staggering. Just to put that in perspective, a USAF study estimated that it would cost over $10 bn to restart the F-22 production – an aircraft that’s been out-of-production for just over 5 years, with many experienced production workers still around, and who’s tooling was careful preserved for this very eventuality.
Attempting something far more ambitious, for a production run of couple of dozen fighters, is not an economically viable plan.
VnomadOfcourse the Yak-141 derivative would not be ready when TCG Anadolu is delivered in 2019.
It will not be ready for years after the other ship i.e. the one planned for 2029.
It would take at the least 5 years to enter service. It would be ready however for the commissioning of TCG Trakya. But should the US impose an arms embargo on the F-35B this route is inevitable for Turkey.
5 years huh? Like I said, you clearly don’t realize what kind of work would be required to take the aircraft from paper to production. And the Yak-141 exists only on paper at this point. The components that went into the Yak prototypes, are all out of production. The RD-41 & R-79, in particular, aren’t to be found in NPO Saturn’s catalogues, even if their blueprints have been archived somewhere.
And integrating their modern analogues onto the aircraft (we’re not talking minor stuff like MFDs, HMDs & MCs) will require a total redesign of the aircraft.
As for redesigning the LHD/Light Carriers for STOL aircraft- this is not possible as Turkey wants these vessels to focus on amphibious role.
The 300m vessel being designed however will be an aircraft carrier proper…
I was obviously referring to the 300 m vessel, not the Juan Carlos-derived ships. And I said CATOBAR not STOVL.
VnomadThe Yakovlev Yak-141 made its maiden flight in 1989. That is, it was a flying platform. Turkey would not be developing a VTOL aircraft from scratch but merely updating an existing aircraft design to modern times.
Without wanting to be condescending, I don’t think you have any idea how complex this little ‘update’ would actually be, given that the flying platform never actually went into production, putting the components of the aircraft beyond reach 30 years later. Practically everything on the aircraft will need to independently acquired or developed.
New vectoring turbofan engine, new lift jets, different transmission, different air frame materials, different avionics. All resulting in different weight distribution, different handling, different FBW… basically what you have is new aircraft that just happens to be unnecessarily confined by the 1980s design choices of a 1980s Soviet OKB.
The A 129 customization to develop the TA 129 has parallels in the the Israeli F-16I development. What you’re describing is more akin to the development of the Japanese F-2, only much much more complex since its a VSTOL aircraft. The idea that it could be delivered in a time-frame corresponding to the planned Turkish LHA/carrier is a nonstarter.
It would be a lot simpler & cheaper to just order the vessel in a CATOBAR configuration and develop the T-FX in a naval variant, while buying a fighter off-the-shelf in the interim. Or maybe collaborating with Russia on a naval Su-57.
VnomadThe general ‘philosophy’ of VSTOL had been demonstrated way back in the 60s.
VnomadKeyword- derivative of the YAK-141.
Yeah… that’s not achievable within the next two decades. Its not as simple as dusting out the old blueprints and ordering up a new set of molds.
You would recall the F-35B also uses technology that Lockheed Martin had obtained from Yakolev
A popular myth. The data from Yakolev was employed in the JSF risk reduction studies and to pad LM’s proposal to the DoD. None of the technology made it onto the actual aircraft – the F-35B employs a shaft driven lift fan (cold air) in contrast to the Yak-141’s twin turbojets. Its a very different principle. As for the 3 bearing swivel nozzle – that had its origins in the Convair 200 program (which, though cancelled, predates the Yak-141).
VnomadFrankly… Not the strong point of US offer… Hilariously their main partner is SABCA (a Dasault subsidiary)
Its a Belgian company regulated by the Belgian state, with Dassault being its largest shareholder. Its no more hilarious than Thales UK or Selex ES (owned by Leonardo) working as British subcontractors to the F-35 program.
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