The french can count on two arguments to justify the spendings:
1/ independance in regard to the USA (many, in french population will approve that)
The may approve of it in principle, but unless they look forward to paying taxes, single-handedly sponsoring a hugely expensive sixth-gen fighter program is unlikely to be popular.
2/ huge costs and upgrades difficulties with the Typhoon which, despite having sold more, costs more than the Rafale… not forgetting that other countries won’t accept to participate in development of an airframe that covers capabilities they consider they don’t need
The Eurofighter program cost more the Rafale program as a whole. Individually however it was far cheaper for the UK & Germany than it was for France.
|What happens if an order is placed in 2018? Why does it all have to be done and dusted by 2017 or do you mean that on the assumption no orders are taken by 2018 then Typhoon goes out of production in 2019?
If an order is placed in 2018, there’ll probably be a 1.5-2 year gap in deliveries (2019-2021). I doubt that’ll be enough for EF to close the production lines (esp. if the 2018 order is assured), but any longer without firm orders and the overhead + labour will make the project far too expensive to continue.
Some software issues can be addressed with a simple patch. Some software issues cannot be addressed with a simple patch.
What software issues can the Blk 3F potentially face, that cannot be fixed with a patch?
I’m not sure there’s no logical basis for ordering something that works and not ordering something that does not.
If we’re painting in absolutist black-and-white shades, I ought to point out that if the software ‘does not work’ (as opposed to being fielded with bugs), the aircraft will fall out of the sky.
Does that mean Block 3F software which does not work yet will really have to work before an order for block 10 can be signed? Or can the bar be lowered/goal posts be moved so that Block 3F software is deemed to work when it doesn’t?
It makes no real difference. Unlike defective hardware, software issues can be addressed with a simple patch, with the recurring cost of applying it, being insignificant. Also, the entire fleet will be upgraded with the Block 3F software, not just the Lot 10 aircraft. The two are linked only due to a bureaucratic/legal requirement; there’s no logical basis for it.
So, my opinion is that the next fighter platform in Europe will be french, and probably again “french only”, as the needs in France are beyond what others use and are willing to pay for (naval operations, for example).
While its technical capacity is not in question, that would require France to fund the entire program on its own. Might have been doable when the Cold War was still on, but how feasible that is in the days to come, remains to be seen. The same would apply if UK or Germany decided to run a similar project entirely in-house.
Thanks, I guess part of what I am trying to get straight is how imperilled European Fast Jet manufacture actually is – relevant here if only because the F35 team are always referencing the imminent demise of the competition. It turns out that Typhoon is very likely to be in production beyond 2020 and Rafale will be kept going for as long as Dassault/France need to in order to maintain their manufacturing base.
Depends on export orders. With the existing Kuwaiti order, it would be hard pressed to cross 2020.
Country – Approx Delivered/Ordered (extrapolating others from UK’s delivery rate)
U.K. – 142/160
Germany – 130/143
Italy – 87/96
Spain – 65/72
That’s only enough orders to take them, at best, to the end of 2017. That leaves 24 units for Oman, 24 for Saudi Arabia and 28 for Kuwait. Deliveries will likely cease in 2019, unless fresh orders are placed by 2017.
Software fix readied to prevent further F-35 delay
Accordingly to the article, the software patch should reduce the malfunction described to once every 8-10 hours, deemed an acceptable level. That would be a malfunction rate of near 50% per 4 hour mission, wouldn’t it?
Not necessarily. If the system is choking due to timing misalignment, which would accumulate over time, the crash instances wouldn’t necessarily be randomized. Or in other words, the probability isn’t evenly distributed. Shorter sorties will likely be less prone to such failures.
To quote an earlier article, 8-10 hours is pretty standard for existing fighter types, even though the F-35’s software is more complex by an order of magnitude –
“If you don’t get that right, the system just clogs,” Bogdan said. “We’re seeing as we add different radar modes and as we add different capabilities to the [distributed aperture system] and the [electro-optical targeting system] that the timing of the software of the sensors to the timing of the software of the main computers is misaligned, and when it gets misaligned the system kind of chokes.”
The JPO is seeing this choking effect, where the plane’s systems shut down and need to be rebooted, about once every four flight hours with both 3i and 3F software, Bogdan said. The goal is to get to one event every eight or nine flight hours, which is in line with legacy airplanes, he said. – Link
I feeling blessed every time I see JSR post something and I’m oblivious to it all.. until someone ruin it with actually responding to his drivel..
Exactly. If you respond to drivel, you’re an enabling the dissemination of more drivel.
F-35 does have a strange effect on some people, doesn’t it – there is a tender, F-15 is announced as the tender winner yet good ol’ Spud sees that as F-35 winning the tender. You would have done well working in the Ministry of Truth in George Orwell’s ‘1984’ where the job was to rewrite history to more accurately reflect what the Party would have liked it be! 😉
More like an outcome of the fact that the ROKAF/MND wanted the F-35 and only the F-35. Not the F-15E, not the Eurofighter. Just like in Norway, Netherlands, Australia, Japan, Israel, Canada, (Denmark?).
Yes, the F-35 didn’t ‘win the tender’ (which ended up being a sham), but it was selected over all its competitors. You may call that selection ‘unfair’, but if the operator places a premium on stealth capability (and they all seem to do that, despite new-age internet philosophies), and if the Europeans/Boeing don’t have a product that offers that, that’s just fate/luck whatever you want to call it. They can take solace in the fact that the F-35 isn’t cleared for export to the Middle East, else the going would have been far harder for them.
And two hundred F-15C/D’s who are being (very) expensively rebuilt.
Has the SLEP been greenlighted then? I was under the impression that its just one of the options being evaluated by the USAF, pending the structural analysis report. (I’d be happy to be corrected though.)
What’s Left on the Air Force Checklist To Make F-35s Operational?
Lara Seligman, Defense News
WASHINGTON — The clock is ticking down to the Air Force’s deadline to declare its F-35A jets operational before the end of 2016.
Although the joint program office (JPO) and contractor Lockheed Martin still have several major hurdles to overcome, both industry and government officials are confident the team will beat the Dec. 30 cutoff date.
The Air Force can declare initial operational capability (IOC) for the F-35A when the first operational squadron is equipped with 12 to 24 aircraft, and airmen are trained, manned and equipped to conduct three basic missions: close-air support, interdiction, and suppression and destruction of enemy air defense. The Air Force has a five-month window of time between the objective date, Aug. 1, and the threshold, Dec. 30, to meet those requirements for IOC.
The team is making progress toward those requirements, but there is still a lot of work to be done. Lockheed and the JPO are lagging behind schedule to finish work on the latest version of the jet’s logistics system, and the Lockheed-JPO team still needs to complete a critical software fix. On top of that, the team has to finish retrofitting the fleet with the latest structural modifications. Meanwhile, the reprogramming laboratories that build the plane’s vast databanks are overloaded.
But as airmen begin to actually use the fifth-generation fighter jet, Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Harrigian, director of the F-35 integration office, sees momentum picking up. Lockheed has delivered 87 airplanes for the Air Force, and pilots at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, and Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, have flown almost 25,000 hours on the jets, Harrigian said during a March 9 interview. Operational F-35s at both Hill and Luke have successfully employed weapons; meanwhile, the Air Force deployed six jets to Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, in February.
“They are really starting to pick up momentum on how they are preparing themselves from kind of the people perspective for IOC, because at the end of the day, you can get the airplanes, but it’s ultimately our airmen that are going to operate them,” Harrigian said.
Pilots are beginning to understand the plane’s power and maneuverability as well, he said. A Norwegian pilot at Luke recently wrote about his experience flying the plane in a March 1 blog post for Norway’s Ministry of Defence. Maj. Morten “Dolby” Hanche wrote that the F-35 is capable of a significantly higher angle of attack than the F-16, providing a pilot greater authority to point the nose of the airplane wherever he wants.
Hanche criticized the plane’s tendency to shake, or “buffet,” at high G-loadings and high angles of attack. However, Harrigian said this buffeting is actually a good thing — pilots use these cues to help them understand where they are in the flight regime. When the F-16 initially flew, the lack of buffeting was actually seen as a negative attribute, according to Tom Lawhead, the Air Force chief of staff of the F-35 integration office.
Bleeding energy during flight can be a problem for any airplane, and the F-35 is no exception, Harrigian said. But as more pilots get into the cockpit, they will figure out the best ways to operate the plane.
“No airplane ever has enough power. I mean, I flew F-22s and we wanted more power in the airplane. So this comes down to, how do you manage your power?” Harrigian said. “Our pilots are going to figure out how to do that.”
ALIS Delays
Despite progress in the field, the Lockheed-JPO team are lagging behind in critical areas. The team hoped to declare IOC as early as Aug. 1, but have backed away from that target in recent weeks. Work on the latest version of the F-35’s logistics system, the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) version 2.0.2, could delay IOC by 45 to 60 days, JPO chief Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan said recently.
Lockheed’s Orlando Carvalho, executive vice president for aeronautics, also acknowledged in a March 15 interview that IOC could push past Aug. 1. The delay is related to integrating the Pratt & Whitney F135 propulsion system with the latest version of ALIS, he said. Pratt currently does engine maintenance on its own computing system, separate from ALIS, according to Lockheed F-35 program manager Jeff Babione.
“It’s extremely important that we provide that capability to our war fighter and we want to make sure we get that right, so we are spending a little extra time, Lockheed Martin and its counterparts, working through the infrastructure to make sure we have a solid foundation that we can add that Pratt & Whitney capability on top,” Babione said March 15. “While it’s important we get this done within that window of time, that August to December for Air Force IOC, our primary focus is making sure that it works correctly.”
Pratt is working with Lockheed to provide three key propulsion-related capabilities in ALIS 2.0.2, according to spokesman Matthew Bates. While Pratt has delivered all the data on time for these capabilities, propulsion integration testing is subject to availability of the ALIS test environment, he noted.
“We are working with the F-35 Joint Program Office and Lockheed Martin to accelerate the test schedules and to ensure an ALIS 2.0.2 release with propulsion will not impact airworthiness, aircraft and engine availability, or spare parts management,” Bates said.
In an attempt to expedite the process, JPO and Lockheed set up mobile training teams to train airmen in the field to operate ALIS, Harrigian said. The program office will also set up a test of the system out at Edwards Air Force Base, California, to work out any kinks before the latest version of ALIS goes into the field, he said.
Software Stability Issues
Behind ALIS, the greatest risk to Air Force IOC is software development, as Bogdan has repeatedly said. The Lockheed-JPO team is racing to fix stability issues with the next increment of software, Block 3i, which the Air Force requires for IOC. In essence, a timing misalignment of the software of the plane’s sensors and the software of its main computers are causing a “choking” effect, where the jet’s systems shut down and have to be rebooted.
However, the team has identified the root cause and plans to flight test an updated software load at Edwards sometime in the next few weeks, officials said.
“We have put in a number of corrections for the problems that we observed on previous flight testing, so we’re anxious to see how that performs, if we do in fact achieve the stability that’s required for IOC, or if there’s still some more work to do,” Carvalho said.
Bogdan has said the JPO needs to have the software fixed by May 1 in order to meet the IOC target of Aug. 1. That leaves only about a month of wiggle room should the team find additional issues with the software after this next round of flight tests.
However, both Bogdan and Harrigian expressed confidence that this new software load will fix the stability issues. Lockheed CEO Marillyn Hewson is offering the F-35 program additional resources from elsewhere in the company to help fix the software issue in a timely manner, Babione said.
Whether the team makes the May 1 cutoff depends on if they find additional problems with the new software load, and what exactly is wrong, Babione said. Lockheed could fix simple “symbology” problems in a few days or a week, but if it takes some time to figure out the root cause, the program could see delays of a month or two.
“I think we’re going to learn a lot in the next month or two on how close we are with this product, and if we need to change it we will change it again,” Babione said. “If we can do that Aug. 1, outstanding, if it takes a little bit longer, we will get it done. I have complete confidence.”
Reprogramming Lab Overload
Another area of risk for Air Force IOC is capacity overload at the so-called reprogramming laboratories that will build the plane’s mission data files (MDF), vast databanks of information needed for combat that can be loaded into the plane. Just one reprogramming lab is currently up and operating, and it is overwhelmed with orders from international partners as well as the US services, Bogdan said.
The MDF is a critical capability that enables the F-35 to be a “smart” plane. The MDF compiles all the information about different assets in an area — from the friendly to the threatening — in a “brick” that operators can load into the airplane as a kind of reference volume.
The US Reprogramming Lab is on track to complete MDFs 1 and 4, required by Air Combat Command for IOC, by Aug. 1, Harrigian said. The various MDFs cover different areas of the world, although exactly what regions each MDF covers is classified.
Jets at Hill are already flying with an interim MDF load in order to test out the system and provide feedback back to USRL, Harrigian said.
“They are learning, they are getting better, but there’s still a demand signal there we will have to work through,” Harrigian said. “We’re looking to increase the numbers of labs that are out there to help the partners, to help the other services so that we balance out this load. … It’s really about making sure we have good tools for these guys so they can manipulate the data and get the files right.”
Finishing Retrofit Modifications
There are a handful of modifications that still need to be retrofitted into the fleet, Babione said. But notably, the Lockheed-JPO team is well on its way to fully implementing a crucial improvement to the jet’s fuel system that is required for IOC. The fuel system needed added valving and different tubing to ensure that the jet stays within its structural limits during high-G, aggressive maneuvering, Babione said.
The team finished retrofitting the first jet with the fuel system modification a few weeks ago — nine days early, Harrigian said. Two more jets are getting the modification and are expected to come out of the shop March 19. The plan is to have 12 fully retrofitted jets ready for the squadron by Aug. 1, he said.
“We don’t see any problem with modifying the airplanes to support IOC,” Babione said.
The Air Force’s requirement for its F-35A variants is 9 Gs, the most stressful out of all the services. The F-35B’s requirement is 7 Gs, while the F-35C is required to pull 7.5 Gs.
The Big Picture
Although the JPO is focused on meeting the Air Force’s IOC deadline, the team is also keeping an eye on the program’s trajectory into the next decade, Harrigian said. Beyond 3i, the JPO will continue to work on 3f, the software block required for full war fighting capability, which the Navy needs for IOC of its F-35Cs in 2018. Even farther out, block 4f will add crucial follow-on capabilities to keep the jet relevant into the future.
But in the meantime, F-35 pilots continue learning new capabilities of the jet each time they climb into the cockpit.
“We are more and more operationalizing the airplane, and getting the airplane into the hands of more and more airmen that are gaining a greater appreciation for how lethal the airplane is, how survivable it is and some of the different missions that we can execute with the airplane,” Harrigian said. “I think it’s healthy to have this discussion.”
“Blue sky marketing” was overshadowing major problems with the aircraft, its head Peter Goon told a Canberra hearing of a Senate inquiry investigating the acquisition on Tuesday.
Lol. Nothing new there.
“When the product fails recruit as many clients as you can, promote the product as loudly as you can, keep the cash flowing for as long as the market remains blind to its failure.”
Makes a rather insulting insinuation that the pilots and staff of all the air forces, including the RAAF, have been taken in, like children, by flashy marketing, and only the iron-willed Peter Goon and Carlo Kopp are immune to LM’s tactics.
Is that the same USAF that said it needed 360 aircraft, 280 minimum? It wasn’t USAF’s intention to cap production at 180 examples, rather they were told to make do with that and hope for the best with F-35.
750 aircraft is what the program was intended, at inception, to deliver. 187 or 280, it’s not replacing the F-15 in either case.
BTW if 280 had been ordered the ‘min reqd’ would have been 360. If 360 had been ordered the ‘min reqd’ would have become 450. It’s just the way the system works (world over).
it is you who seem to have difficulties to understand what you read..
strike eagle was an air superiority aircraft equipped for strike, which is the easiest way to convert an airframe, as it has the performance way above what is needed for strike in the first place. The F-16 was an exclusive air to air fighter, again, having extremely high flight performance… from which one could add what it took to make it strike capable. the F-35 was developped as a strike aircraft and they try to make pretend to be also an air superiority platform. They never dared with its predecessors, like the F-105, A-7 and so on.
The ‘Joint Strike Fighter‘ happens to be designed to function in a strike role and a fighter role. And if you look really closely, you may find the name reflects that. In modern lingo, that translates as ‘multi-role’.. maybe even ‘omni-role’ if we’re being all hip about it.
Nothing you can imagine and write around it won’t change that.
Me? I’m just reading plain English.
You can look in whole aviation history, you won’t find a single strike/atatck aircraft that became a successful air combat fighter, while you’ll find fighters made for air combat that made great careers in strike role or multi role aircraft (F-4, F-15, F-16 are nice examples of that)
Now if only it was called the ‘Joint Strike Aircraft‘ (JSA), you may have had a point. How about the Brits? Naah. They designated it the ‘Joint Combat Aircraft‘. Norway? Bought it under the ‘Future Combat Aircraft Capability Project’. Denmark? ‘Fighter Replacement Project‘. None of them have cottoned on, eh?
No, the F-35 dates its concept from the 1990’s where the F-22 was to become the future air superiority fighter of the USAF (air dominance fighter they called it here and there). It was even called the JSF if you remember (Joint Strike Fighter), for a reason. Its main job was supposed to be hauling of bombs and let the F-22’s clean the skies of bad guys.
The F-15E was called the Strike Eagle. Does that mean all the aircraft that Saudi Arabia, Korea & Singapore have bought are poorly suited to the air-to-air role?
The F-22 was the F-15 replacement while the F-35 was designed to be the F-16 replacement. The USAF, IsAF, ItAF, GAF employed the F-16 for strike with the F-15/EF/Mirage flying top cover. Does that imply that the F-16 is unsuited for an air-to-air role?
The capabilities of the F-35 played a major role in the capping of the F-22 production run. That should tell you more than enough about the USAF’s intentions.
Besides being primarily a striker, it was also to be affordable (which is why the made it “joint” between services) and a simpler platform from the high end F-22. Today, it is presented as even better (except for the dynamics) platform than the F-22 as it is the only thing they have in store, but, as the saying goes, you can’t make a race horse out of a donkey… My word is, as a striker it should do fine, for the rest, it will do as it can
Given what its competitors are going for, it is an affordable aircraft. And if all the jockeys are lining up to ride the ‘donkey’ rather than the ‘racehorse’, maybe, just maybe, its you that’s having trouble distinguishing between the two.