It is because it has a few hundred kgs of testing and telemetry equipment on board. Removal of those will reduce weight, but we still go by the 6.5 ton benchmark, as it is displayed by HAL placards at the Aero-India and DefExpo shows every other year.

Just out of curiosity, do each of the LSP aircraft have “testing and telemetry equipment”? Are there any figures on the weight of these production versions?

It seems that a key part of this “plan” is the use of tankers, the document mentions KC135 and KC10. Israel doesn’t operate these aircraft…
In fact it is tremendously vague on exactly when and where the tanking will be able to take place, it mentions on the way to and the way back from Iran…presumably at some secret off world location that grants immunity to large, heavy, fuel laden tankers mooching around…
In addition you don’t seem to have picked up on the section which states: “These estimates were done assuming a 100% aircraft and weapons operational reliability and the strike force not encountering any Iranian Air and Ground Defense.”
Yea right…:rolleyes:
Or the section re 100% of the tankers being allocation to the op, thus leaving the air defence without any a2a refueling at a critical time. 😮

I think what both you and swerve are missing is the context in which this report was written, i.e. when relations with Turkey were significantly better than they are today. The proposed route through the northern Syria/Turkish border has been talked about ever since the possibility of an IDF strike was raised, and assumed the close military alliance between Israel and Turkey would come into play for a possible strike against Iran. However, with recent events, that now seems extremely unlikley;

http://www.debka.com/article/8854/

However, despite all the significant issues and technical problems with a possible IDF air strike, it is still being widely speculated and discussed, read into that what you may;

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703757504575194223689622084.html

Also, one of the strengths of the IDF over the regional and indeed Iranian air defences, is the IAF’s strong EW capabilites, which came into play in the Syrian strike, which the report does mention;

http://www.airforce-technology.com/features/feature1625/

http://www.airforce-technology.com/features/feature1669/

(Aviation Week & Space Technology, Nov 25, 2007):
“Israel’s capabilities are similar to the “Suter” network-invasion capability that was developed by the U.S. using the EC-130 Compass Call electronic attack aircraft to shoot data streams, laced with sophisticated algorithms, into enemy antennas. The passive, RC-135 Rivet Joint electronic surveillance aircraft then monitored enemy signals to ensure the data streams were having the intended effect on the target sensors. Israel duplicated the capability when it fielded its two new Gulfstream G550 special missions aircraft designs. Both were modified by Israel Aerospace Industries’ Elta Div. in time for the 2006 Lebanon war. The ground surveillance radar version can provide data streams from large active, electronically scanned array radars, while the intelligence version provided the signals surveillance and analyses.”

Regarding aerial refuelling, I think the report does show that this is to be done over northern Syria, spanning 440 nm, page 69 I think.