Originally posted by XN923
a number of preliminary design studies possibly the result of air ministry specifications (later cancelled perhaps?) from the 30s for dedicated escort fighters. These were for the most part multi-engined and made use of the then-new multi gunned, powered turrets being introduced by the likes of Frazer Nash and Boulton & Paul

These weren’t really escort fighters per se, but an extension of the belief in self defending bombers (albeit one that showed a degree of flawed logic).The intention was that some proportion of the formation would be made up of (effectively) bomber aircraft that carried heavy defensive armament rather than bombs. It was rapidly realised that the problem with this was that on the way back from the target the bombers would be lightly loaded while the specialised heavy armament aircraft would still be carrying gunners and guns and therefore, even if all ammunition had been expended, would actually have inferior performance to the bombers they were supposed to protect.

The Air Min never issued an Op Requirement for such an aircraft and most of these ideas – like the Vickers ‘Battleplane’ – came from the industry.

Just about every major air power toyed with this idea during the 30s. The only (im)practical hardware that came out of such thinking that I can think of was the Bell Airacuda (which, I admit, was not quite the same concept, but similar).

As for the turret fighters, these were largely a product of the dull mind of Sir Edward Ellington, Chief of the Air Staff at a rather critical period (and later described by Freeman in a letter to Trenchard as ‘the worst CAS we ever had’). The RAF had serious reservations about the effectiveness of single seat fighters in successfully attacking bombers, but Ellington seems to have felt them more acutely than most and pushed through the investigation of all sorts of ideas: fighters attacking and firing in formation; fighters with wing mounted guns that could be moved in elevation and traverse in flight; and the turret fighter which was supposed to allow greater tactial flexibility than the fixed gun fighter which was committed (in his mind anyway) to the conventional stern chase attack. It could have been worse – his original concept of the turret fighter had two turrets, one forward and one aft, either with two gunners or just one, scuttling to and fro as the combat developed.

Fortunately Dowding, then Air Member for Supply and Research, showed rather greater faith in conventional fighters, so long as they had speed and firepower. It’s one of those wonderful ironies of history that it would be he who would later get to use them for real.

NiallC

Interesting indeed – and Erik Shilling should know.

To put some numbers on his comments, the Aircraft and Armament Experimental Establishment carried out formal performance tests on both a P40D (Allison) and P40F (Packard Merlin). For the D they recorded a Service Ceiling of 27,600 ft and a full throttle height of just 14,200 ft (332mph). For the F they recorded a Service Ceiling of 34,300 ft and a FTH of 20,400 ft (354 mph). The performance of the F, in terms of max speed anyway, is somewhat better (by about 20mph) than the similarly powered Hurricane II, which is not bad for an aircraft carrying 60% more internal fuel. But not good enough by late 42 when the need for escort fighters became so apparent.

Now that the thread has wound its way back to the question of escort fighters, a few thoughts.

Malcolm McKay noted in a previous posting the faith that was placed in the idea of self-defending bomber formations both by the RAF and USAAC. In the light of what eventually happened we tend to think of this as being naive to say the least, but we need to remember that the European combatants entered the war with aircraft schemed in the early to mid 1930s and many of their policies and doctrines were framed at about the same time. At that time the standard bomber defensive armament was a single rifle-calibre gun and the standard fighter armament was two such weapons firing through the propeller disc using interrupter gear that reduced the rate of fire to about 1.6 times that of the bombers’ single weapon. The fighters’ speed advantage over the bomber was slight – making repeat attacks difficult. The fighter pilot had to fly an aeroplane – indeed aim the whole aeroplane – while the bomber gunner could concentrate solely on his gunnery with a free mounted weapon. Under these conditions the RAF expected that the bomber gunners’ fire would be more accurate than that of the fighter. Under these conditions, even before you add the advantages of multiple bombers in formation being able to bring reinforcing fire to bear, it’s not hard to see why planners of the time felt that the bomber stood a reasonable chance of defeating fighter attacks.

A second point that figured largely in RAF policy of the time was that even if providing fighter escort had been desirable (which in their view it wasn’t), any fighter designed with 1930s technology and having the necessary range would be hopelessly outclassed by the enemy short range fighters it would meet over the target. At the time they were probably right – Messerschmitt Bf 110 anyone? It was only in around 1940 with the arrival of the Japanese Hayabusa and Zero and, a little later, the P51 that we begin to see fighter aircraft that combined both great range and competitive fighting abilities.

Lastly, a critical influence on RAF fighter design that it is usually ignored completely in most accounts of the development of the RAF’s fighters is the geography of the country. In the days before radar the first warning of the approach of enemy aircraft would be when they crossed your borders. London is less than 30 minutes flying time from the east coast at 1930s bomber speeds. Fighters of the day took between 7 and 11 minutes to reach 15000 ft. This leaves precious little time or space for interception. RAF planners saw this as their unique problem – anyone seeking to bomb France or Germany might by contrast have to fly hundreds of miles over enemy territory before reaching their target. This is the primary reason for the development of a peculiarly British type of fighter where speed and firepower were emphasised at the expense of range and manoeuvrability. It’s also an important factor in the emphasis the RAF placed on offence being the best form of defence – not because they had blind faith on bombing, but because, in their particular geographic situation, they had little or no faith in fighters as defensive weapons.

Just my two pence worth

NiallC

In addition to the recent Warpaint book you might be able to pick up a copy of the old Profile on the Barracuda (No 240) by David Brown. Test pilot Eric Brown also covered his impressions of flying the aircraft in his book “Wings of the Navy”. Considering that the Barracuda was by far the most numerous British-designed Fleet Air Arm type of the war it’s odd that no-one has published a full length book about it.

With respect to the various Marks:
Mk I: Merlin 30, 3 bladed propellor
Mk II: Merlin 32, 4 bladed propellor
Mk III: Mk II with a radome under the fuselage for ASV X radar
Mk IV: MkII with a Griffon (Not built)
Mk V: Griffon VII,VII or 37, extended span wings, larger fin and rudder. (30 built, remainder cancelled, possibly on grounds of extreme ugliness).

Both the Warpaint Book and Profile contain colour artwork for a/c that participated in the Tirpitz attacks. There was also by the way a two part series by Ray Sturtivant covering the operational history of the aircraft (including the Tirpitz attacks) published in around 1981 in a monthly magazine the name of which I can’t mention here:-)

NiallC

In response to dhfans comments: Possibly, but I don’t think so. I’ve realised that the side view of AM203 (the 3rd conversion) posted by Ian is very unflattering and makes the thing look even more bog-ugly than it really was. When seen from a front three-quarter view the intake looks to have about the same proportions as an early P40. I suppose we should also remember that the intercooler radiator is quite a bulky piece of kit – it takes up about a third of the radiator duct on a Spit Mk IX. BTW the dark square shape you can see at the rear of the cowling in two pictures posted by Ian is the exit louvre for exhausted air from the intercooler radiator. I think the two-stage Mosqito cowlings vented the intercooler rad in a similar way i.e. out to the side.

I suspect you’re right about the Typhoon wing – it was designed the way it was to preserve good low speed handling and get acceptable takeoff/landing performance at what, for the day, were very high wing loadings. Either way I’d bet it was Camms’ choice rather than something forced on him by the Air Min who interfered a lot less in designs than many accounts tend to imply. And were also a lot less conservative in their outlook than generally represented in the “Air Ministry = Stupid, but British aircraft industry heroically saves the day with inspired Private Ventures” school of writing.

NiallC

The intake under the nose housed the carburettor air intake (the Merlin having an updraft carb rather than the downdraft unit of the Allison – which had its carb intake on top of the nose) and the intercooler coolant radiator (which, obviously the Allison-equipped P51 didn’t have). AL963 – the fourth conversion carried out by Rolls – had the intercooler matrix relocated to the main ventral radiator duct, as per the production P51B/C, and therefore looked a little sleeker, but it should be remembered that the primary aim was to get the thing flying quickly with minimum airframe mods, not to produce something pretty:-)

NiallC

Ross: you posted this valuable piece of info about the RNLI search a while back on another board 🙂 and I meant to reply at the time, but didn’t because of some distraction or another. (Probably called “work”). There is however a problem or two with it: It’s quite clear that the other pilots in the section had no idea at the time where Alan Britton or P6980 had gone – either into the sea or on land. Why else would land and sea searches be mounted for the aircraft?

What we know is this:
1. The aircraft were firing on sea markers (at a location that Jerry and I think may be debatable)
2. The 2 other pilots in the section did not see, at the time, what happened to him or his aircraft.
3. Despite the above, the Sqn ORB cites the words of “the master of a ship who witnessed the affair” (but not, explicitly, the crash) noting that one of the pilots “seemed to go through his own spray”. This presumably testimony available later when the ORB was typed up – not necessarily the same day (or even week). The ORB also notes that “his aircraft was seen to dive straight into the sea” (Obviously not by the pilots. Possibly by the “master of a ship”. Who knows?). And “Neither the aircraft nor the body of the pilot was recovered”.
4. Hugh Saint, Westlands’ Technical Representative with the Sqn at the time reported the accident on the 12th in a letter to Westland (dated that day) giving no more detail than that the aircraft were practicing air firing “over the sea”.
5. Saint on the 13th reported to Wesland that the aircraft had still not been found and that the Observer corps were looking, aircraft were searching and that ground parties were also looking. (My own conclusion is that, a day after the accident, no-one is sure what has happened to the aircraft)
6. In a letter of the 14th Saint reports to Westland that the aircraft had been found in the sea and that it is believed that “the wreckage is to be salved”. The body of the pilot has not been found.
7. There is no record of a funeral for Britton
8. Britton is still listed as effectively “missing” by CWGC and, therefore, commemorated at Runnymede.
9. Form 78 for P6980 records it as “FA Ops Missing”. Not Scrap/RTP/Cat Anything. Just “Missing”.

I would generally not rely on any one or two or even three of these in isolation, but, on the balance of evidence, my best guess is that the aircraft went into the sea and was not recovered.

Bearing in mind the date given by Saint for the discovery of the wreck, this doesn’t actually contradict the RNLI report. If, on the 12th, the RNLI were told that the wreck had been found on land, perhaps the report was a miscommunication. Or a misidentification – i.e. that an aircraft rather than the aircraft had been found on land. Neither would be the first or the last of its type.

Interesting that the report comes from the Weston-super-mare Boat/Station though. That would support the location being Sand Bay rather than Sandy Bay since I’m sure a boat from there would not be working off Exmouth.

Ross: a couple of questions for you: Is there anything in the Weston-super-mare records for the 13th and 14th that might throw light on this, in view of Saint’s assertion that the wreck wasn’t discovered ’til then? Is there anything in the records that specifically identifies the aircraft believed down in the sea was Brittons’ Whirlwind? (I’d imagine not, but don’t know). And lastly, what of the records of the boat/station covering the Exmouth area at the time – just in case the Jerrys’ and my theory might be more than just that?

Jerry: As for Paul Mercer and P697, both the Sqn. ORB and the A Flight Diary record Mercer going into the sea just off Cherbourg. “B Flight lost F/O Mercer whose aircraft disintegrated on hitting the sea” according to the A Flt Diary. However that part of the coast is renowned for tidal action and shallow beach inclinations, so it’s entirely possible that the sea that Mercer hit was exposed sand a few hours later. Or that the Germans pulled the wreck out. In this area the changes in coast and estuary outline with changing tides were on more than one occasion cited by squadrons as reasons for some spectacular navigation errors. Either way, as you note, Mercer is still “Missing”, but, again, it would not be the first time a pilot got out of an aircraft within a mile or so of shore and still was not recovered. I’m asuming that the photo you have originates from that side of the Channel. If there’s anything in the context of the photo that indicates it was taken in England then that would of course be a whole different story.

NiallC

As HP57 has said, the only Magnesium alloy in the Whirlwind is the rear fuselage plating (just over 31 pounds of Mg according to Directorate of Production figures). That of course will have gone within months in salt water and there’s precious little other structure in the rear fuselage (just 3 formers) to keep the rest of the rear of the airframe together once that skinning has gone. Production Whirlwinds did not use magnesium prop blades although the 2nd prototype was equipped with Rotol (rather than de Havilland) magnesium bladed props during its evaluation. They were changed to the standard DH type shortly before its transfer from 25 to 263 Sqn.

As Ian has said the biggest problem is that they are all in very tidal water which may well have broken them up over the years and most of them went in at high speed to start with.

There are no accident reports for operational losses and, apart from Alan Britton’s aircraft in Sand Bay (which he may well still be in), all of the ones in the water are op losses. Aircraft Movement Cards (Held at MOD AHB with copies at RAF Museum, not at The National Archives in Kew) do not record the circumstances or location of losses, just the date and Category of damage. There are a handful of RAE accident investigations covering Whirlwinds, but, by definition those relate to aircraft that were recovered (and investigated) at the time. Other non-op losses are described on Accident Record cards (held by the MOD AHB with copies at the RAF Museum), but most, were recovered during the war.

One exception being the remains of P6966 recovered by Steve Vizard in the late 70s from a crash site in Scotland which seems to me like the only slight chance we have of seeing a Whirlwind in the flesh again – albeit largely a replica. Unless of course someone finds exactly where Westland tossed the remains of P7048/G-AGOI in 47.

NiallC