Mercurius, you are welcome.

Modern BMD systems are very recent; most, like India’s, are being developed in this decade itself. Thus, the characteristics of all known types of ballistic missiles–including MIRV–must have been considered by the developers.

It must be rememeberd that the Indian BMD system already dedicates 2 missiles for a single target, i.e. in the endo and exo mode. The following statement by Dr. Saraswat quoted by the article posted by abrahavt :

Thus, the above can be used in case of failure of interception in the medium stage and also in case of a saturated attack.

That statement means nothing as far as saturated attacks are concerned, if anything it suggests doubts about the ability of the upper stage to intercept the warhead. I suspect that this 99% figure is derived from the combination of both systems.

Just becouse something is developed recently it does not mean that it is capable of dealing with current or future threats, especially in the very complex and difficult ABM situation.

Right,

John (you know who you are!) I bow to greater wisdom. This is hopeless. One last throw of the dice in as simplified form as it can be made:

1, CVF is NOT INTENDED to be a sea control platform. Its role is Carrier Strike. This is mostly because there is no-one we conceivably could have to face, alone, who could successfully implement sea denial ops against us before CVF’s Mid-Life Refit. No-one at all…even if they do possess BrahMos or Club missiles.

2, STOVL CVF is going to be capable of generating strike sorties against first-day-of-war targets 450nm distant with freefall ordnance and circa 600nm distant with CASOM. It will be capable of generating 100 plus sorties in the first 24hr surge of combat operations and will be able to, comfortably, sustain 72 sorties a day for a further 10 days. These sustained rates are comparable with that attained by US CVN’s, on ops, in the 100-110 sorties per day region with 20 more planes in the airgroup. For a ship costing a fraction of a CVN to purchase and operate this is capability that cannot be understated.

3, In the unlikely event that, over the next two decades, a foreign power evolves the capability to deny blue-water transit to a CVF group then, at MLR, we will be able to refit the CVF’s with the, by-then, fully mature EMALS technology. That is, of course, if catapults etc are necessary for enhanced sea control capability by that time.

I really don’t know how to make this any clearer so I’ll give up trying at this point.

I am going to make the assumption that you are referring to me, however I have no idea who John is and once again you are deliberatly mixing and confusing what I say.

I was not for any moment suggesting a peer rival to the UK, indeed the greatest lesson of the Falklands is that a country does not have to be a peer rival to inflict heavy casualties on an opposing naval force, how many Exocets and How many SuEs did Argentina have? How large was the Argentine Fleet? I have made it perfectly clear in multiple posts that I have not been talking about peer rivals, yet you insist on continuing as if I have been suggesting that some belligerent peer rival will appear within the next 20 years, I can only assume this is becouse you have no answer to what I am actually saying.

I do not dispute the fact that the B will still have considerable range, however it will still be reduced compared to the C and the C can carry Storm Shadow just as the B can- the point is that by comparison the B will take a range cut. In order to mount a surge attack to the same distance as the B the C would not need tanker support, the additional fuel it carries would easily allow it to loiter whilst the rest of the package was launched, probably with some left over.

In addition to the ability of the C to loiter the need to multiply the number of aircraft in the package will be reduced by the incresed amount of ordnance that the C carries compared to the B and your comparisons to the events of 1982 are of questionable validity, again due to both the increased effectiveness of ordnance and the increased amounts being carried. Further more the highly constrained nature of the 25 de Mayo as an aircraft carrier by 1982 make comparisons with a 74,0000tonne CVF designed from scratch for ‘modern’ ops far less useful than what you seem to wish us to believe.

I never suggested that the CVF’s were intended purely as sea control ships, this is another nasty habit of yours, putting words in peoples mouths. The point is that carrier strike are not completely independant from one another, in fact they merge quite obviously and that is the point I have been making.

Further reading your posts again points out that you still have this absurd notion that all the UK will be doing for the next 30+ years is counter insurgency. We only have to go back to 1999 (just 8 years) to find an operation against a reasonably effective opponent, before that there is the 1991 Iraq campaign, and before that the Falklands. The assertion that you are making over and over again that all the UK will be doing in the coming decades is COIN operations against third world countries with no AD network and no strike capability is completely absurd and can be recognised as such by only a cursory look back at recent history and yet you continue to rant about ‘chasing insurgents’. Further more you are underestimating the time frame involved, you mention ‘two decades’. Clearly, with F-35 and CVF combination unlikely to enter service before the latter half of the next decade and with the F-35 likely to have at least a 30 year service life, we are actually looking at four decades.

I would urge you to stop repeating your most ridiculous comments, notably ones about potential adversaries, time scales and ‘the first day of war’ as they have already been shown to be of no value.

I am stating facts….simple as. The requirement is for Carrier Strike. STOVL fits the Carrier Strike mission profile. You seem upset that the RN doesnt want more from its CVF’s….fine. You have that right – just understand that it bears no relationship to operational reality.

So because I am in the minority I am wrong?. I would point out that I was in the minority, and forced to repeat myself ad nauseum, on the Gorshkov threads. There I was also arrogant, self-important and all the rest. Get the point?.

The future is predominantly asymmetric warfare. You dont need to be a graduate of BRNC to appreciate that – one would hope.

As I’ve asked where is the threat?. China or India?. What we have in the CVF/SSN force, as envisaged, will cope with an opposing single CVA-group force in blue-water if needed. We are not going to try and invade either country with a couple of CVF’s, 3Cdo and the Para’s!. Once again you resort to nebulous fantasies to try and justify a spend that has significant impact on the size and shape of the future RN.

Your words I believe were ‘surge excuse’. The word ‘excuse’ suggesting you believe this to be trivial…you also failed to note the other advantages in your dismissal. I sought to point them out. I fail to see how that puts words in your mouth.

It is not enough to say that threat systems may exist in future that will threaten the carriers Sealord. You have to look at force mixes. Some idiot halfwit in Venezuela might buy three dozen evolved Flankers plus wunder-missiles of every shape and size, but, if his MarPat is based on a couple of C235’s what threat is he?.

To deploy the saturation strike of BrahMos or Club missiles you indicate means having a large number of launch platforms, a large number of trained pilots, a large support infrastructure etc, etc. Is a regional-power level nation going to be able to generate that kind of force mix quickly or unnoticed if at all?.

Hopefully this will help you understand that just because nation-x may have a couple of operational PAK-FA squadrons by 2040 it means precisely nothing, in strategic terms, to a purchasing decision being taken in 2006. The best that any naval architect can hope to achieve is to build in adaptability to his design to allow it to meet future requirements. Fortunately the BMT lads were aware of this and the Thales CVF design derived from their work is going to be adaptable so that, should some regional-power develop a military capability that the existing Carrier Strike capability cannot handle by 2040, changes can be made at the time.

The fact that PA2 is a standalone design means that direct comparison is difficult. As an indicator of the cost difference the extra crew requirement for a full ALRE suite will be on the order of 150 personnel (US CVN’s ALRE complement is circa 205 for four C13 cats). 150 people multiplied by an average salary of about £15k each is about £2 mill per year so for a 20 year cycle, until mid-life refit, thats £40 million in salaries for the extra crew alone.

Then count in aquisition costs, sparing, personnel training (ALRE), shore based facilities, air crew training and all that good stuff and you can look at the cost difference between a CATOBAR and STOVL carrier being in the hundreds of millions over a 20 year operational cycle.

You are not stating facts at all, even one your one truly valid point you are failing to quantify the price difference. Further more your utter inability to recognise that the lifespan of the UK F-35’s will be 30 years plus, thus making planning solely on current scenarios a dangerous and ridiculous exercise. This is summed up perfectly by your belief that only ‘regional powers’ can posess a Flanker force, this is clearly nonsense as is your claim of requiring ‘large numbers of launch platforms’, A single Flanker can carry 3 Klubs and ultimately the same number of Brahmos. Thus a single squadron of 12 aircraft can carry 36 missiles. Why would any country want to make such procurements ‘unnoticed’ you are aware that arms dealing is legal are you not? The bizzare belief you have that for the next 50 years the UK will only be engaged in minor bush wars with perpetually embargoed third world countries is simply ridiculous. In the last 20 years alone the UK has been involved in at least 3 conflicts with organised and relatively capable armed forces, surely you can grasp that fact? What you fail to realise completely is that the foundation of modern defence planning is the prediction of future threats, when military procurement programs have lead times of up to 20 years it is imperative. That you do not realise this or that you choose to ignore it is rather worrying. As is you still trying to imply that I said the surge factor is irrelevant when I clearly did not.

What is truly unbelievable is that you persist with this strange insistence that you and you alone are correct and that it is your duty to convince everybody else of this becouse whatever they say is invalid. The problem is that for all you ranting and raving you have thus far identified only two valid points, both of which I agree with (and stated so in my original post) and that you have yet to quantify in any meaningful way.

I may add to my previous post, that the AAD has thrust vectoring in its Kill Vehicle, that is powered by solid propellant.

The following were described by Dr. Saraswat in an interview :-

The most important part may be the uplink from the LCC to the missile in flight. It gives real-time information to the interceptor about the instantaneous and predicted location of the target and directs the interceptor accordingly. With Thrust vectoring in the Kill Vehicle, the interceptor can also counter the target’s maneuvers.

Hence, MIRV targets may also be handled by this system. In phase II, the interceptor system for targets having ranges more than 2000 kms are to be developed.

How do you not get this, What targets manouvres van the kill vehicle counter, that is what counts. Sure it has the capability to manouvre but to what extent. You have to stop thinking in absolutes.

Gentlemen, please, this thread has shown that we all have views on the subject of the CVF and have already decided why we hold them. Continuing to go around in circles over and over again repeating the same arguments in the hope that eventually everybody else will accept them brings nothing to the forum and just becomes tiresome and pointless. Unless somebody brings something new to the debate (i.e. not endless posting on why CTOL os better than STOVL or vice versa) can I suggest we all just move on?

Indeed that was the intention of my initial post, as I quite clearly explained in that post I accept that other people have different views and that they are perfectly welcome. To a very large extent the issue is subjective, unfortunately Jonesey was unable to accept this and began his re-education program in earnest.

Here is my original post for reference: http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showpost.php?p=1191401&postcount=106

in phase-II DRDO will develop BMD against ICBM as stated by Dr. Saraswat. 😀

What range, and capable against what penaids, capable of engaging how many warheads?

Currently the F-35B is expected to have a 920 km radius with 2 GBU-32 and 2 AMRAAM, withe the same weapons the F-35C is expected at 1190 km (F-35A is 1160 km). Or a 270 km difference….

The Lightning II in RAF/RN service is programmed to carry:
Internally: ASRAAM, AMRAAM, Paveway IV, Brimstone (dual or triple carriers), SPEAR (possibly Paveway IV with wingkit)
Externally: AMRAAM, Storm Shadow, Paveway IV, Brimstone, drop tanks, SPEAR

The PWIII/EPWIII is to be retired 2017 and cannot be carried internally by any F-35 versions- the smaller GBU-31 can be carried internally by the F-35A/C.

Thanks for the info Peter. Clearly the F-35 will be in service with the UK for many many years, it seems sensible to have as much internal weapons carriage as possible in preperation for the future.