That logic hinges on the fact that a carrier is only a response to a direct threat though. Its not. It is an instrument of French foreign policy. An instrument that France has already determined has value for them as they have built and deployed their CVN. What they are doing with PA2 is completing that capability package as, at the moment, they have the most untenable situation of all. This being a national requirement, however nebulous it may appear to some, that has had a large expenditure against but provided a part time solution at best.

PA2 is not a new capability under the heading of ‘shiny new toy’ and should not be considered as such. PA2 is the completion of the requirement that saw the creation of CdeG and is about the only thing that would justify the spend for a navy to have a carrier capability that is not guaranteed-available 24/7/365.

I never said PA2 was a new capability. The fact is that French defence spending is limited by Frances lack of threat and magnified national power that comes from being part of the grand western alliance. Thus the fundamentals required to propel such a procurement do not exist. The capability offered by PA2 would be impressive but that reality is that French fleet is more than able to perform the basic functions required of it without CdG. And let us not forget that CdG herself is a product of the cold war, a look at her design tells you that without even considering the time lines involved.

The question is not ‘Does the French navy need PA2 to have an effective carrier force?’ but ‘Does France need a an effective carrier force?’. The fact that they do not currently have one answers that question. In the absence of threat there has to be a desire or need for power to act as a driver for such procurements, without it they do not occur. Defence policy is not made by Military’s or even Defence Departments but by public and political class perceptions of need and want, consequently whether France gets PA2 is not a question of whether the French navy needs it for an effective carrier force but whether the French people decide they need or want to spend the money on it.

This raises a much wider doctrinal issue, the usage of fleet carriers for power projection in the post Cold War era is largely defined by their usage in the 1990/91 Gulf War, in that instance there use was remarkably important, the platform for strike aircraft was vital. Unfortunately GW1 has turned out not be the model for intervention in the 2000’s, for continental European countries at least. Consequently vessels such as the Mistral class are more cost effective and why France is procuring three of them.

From the American point of view, the Nimitz class are no longer ‘Super’ carriers but ‘standard’ sized carriers, so that is their baseline intellectually. Also in the CTOL/CATOBAR context, there are minimum requirements in terms of deck size to operate the current generation of aircraft, so these define their view of a ‘light’ carrier. To be fair anyone planning on entering the carrier club should beware of defining what can be afforded simply by physical size, as steel is still relatively cheap and constiturtes a very small percentage of the overall cost of any modern warship. For example increasing the size of a ship on the drawing board by 10% to 20% may well only increase cost by 1%, as most of the cost of the ship is tied up in expensive radar and weapon systems (eg Aegis, PAAMS etc). HMS Ocean was reported to have cost little more than a type 23 Frigate, mainly because she had only basic self defence weapons and sensors.

And she only has direct diesel propulsion (no expensive gas turbines or electric motors) and she was largely built to mercantile standards. Furthermore that figure is very misleading as there were huge variations in the costs for the individual Type 23s. HMS Norfolk (first of class) came out at £135.5 million whereas later units drifted between £60 million and £96 million. At least part of the savings came from halving the man hours required by each unit during the production run. By comparison Ocean came out at about £154 million.

Interesting what you say about the steamers on Sovremenny’s. I do not understand why this can not be fixed, i mean, the Sovs are great ships, they are among the few ships that actually have some decent air-defence and anti-ship missiles. They do lack some ASW capacity, but togehter with an Udaloy they would be a decent force.
Kuznetsov are using the same boilers as Sov’s and she has been very active latest years. I never heard the chinese complain about the boilers on Sov’s either. Do the chinese Sov’s stay at pier as much as the russian Sov’s? There must be a reason the chinese ordered two more, it can not be for the SS-N-22 missiles alone.

I have read reports that they are doing overhaul on at least some of the Sovremenny’s, will we see them delievered with new boilers?

Steam boilers/turbines are inherently harder to maintain and more unreliable than gas turbines, when one is operating on a limited budget with personnel of questionable quality as the Russians are the preference will also be for gas turbines.

The reason for Kuznetzovs activity is that she is the only carrier in the Russian fleet.

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090302/120372238.html

VLADIVISTOK, March 2 (RIA Novosti) – The Admiral Panteleyev destroyer will replace the Admiral Vinogradov destroyer on an anti-piracy mission off the Somali coast, a spokesman for Russia’s Pacific Fleet said on Monday.

“The Admiral Panteleyev will leave its main base in Vladivostok in April and head for the Somali coast to take part in the international operation to fight piracy in the region,” the spokesman said.

Russia’s Admiral Vinogradov destroyer has been involved in the anti-piracy mission around the Horn of Africa since the beginning of January and will leave the area in the near future, he added.

Both warships are Udaloy class missile destroyers, armed with anti-ship missiles, 30-mm and 100-mm guns, and Ka-27 Helix helicopters.

According to the UN, Somali pirates carried out at least 120 attacks on ships in 2008, resulting in combined ransom payouts of around $150 million.

Around 20 warships from the navies of at least a dozen countries, including Russia, India, the United States, China and Arab states are involved in anti-piracy operations off Somalia, which has been ravaged by years of civil war.

Somalia’s new unity government plans to tackle the problem of piracy by creating a maritime corridor through the country’s territorial waters with international assistance.

Another Udaloy, again one of the active ones, turned up in India in 2003 and undertook exercises with Japan in 1998 and USN in 1995. However as is standard with Russian Navy Ships it has an embarressing past: It accidently fired a shell (100mm) at a town in the Khasansk region in September 2000.

That this is another Udaloy and that we rarely if ever see Sovremenny’s far from home suggests that the latter are not held in high esteem by the Russian navy. I would suggest that their steam propulsion plant is the primary reason and that it causes maintenance concerns.

Talking about Russian carrier dreams…………

http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/1010/42/374891.htm

Navy Admits Aircraft Carrier Spilled Oil
02 March 2009DUBLIN — The Russian Navy finally admitted Friday that it caused an oil slick off Ireland’s southwest coast — 12 days after European and Irish marine authorities first spotted the threat and linked it to the Russians’ breakdown-prone aircraft carrier.

Ireland’s government and coast guard also offered a much bigger estimate for the size of the slick than the Russians did — 10 times as big. But they agreed with a Russian Navy statement that the slick was unlikely to pose a major risk to Ireland’s coastal habitat, thanks chiefly to unusually mild seas that were keeping the slick offshore.

In Moscow, Navy spokesman Igor Dygalo said unspecified ships spilled 20 to 30 metric tons of oil. It was Russia’s first public admission of involvement, although Navy officials admitted their role in a private meeting last Monday in Dublin with Irish Coast Guard commanders.

The Irish Coast Guard said Friday that the size of the remaining slick involved an estimated 300 tons of light crude. It said the mishap occurred when Russia’s only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, was being refueled by an accompanying tanker.

The Kuznetsov has been plagued with technical problems since entering full service in 1995, suffering lengthy dockings for repairs.

Since leaving its Arctic base in Severomorsk in December, the carrier has been accompanied by a tanker and at least one tugboat in case of a breakdown. In January, while the carrier was operating off Turkey’s coast, a fire on board the ship killed a crew member.

Ireland estimates that it has already spent more than 250,000 euros ($325,000) monitoring the slick by helicopter and screening shellfish for pollution. Its transport department has asked the Russian government to reimburse Ireland for some of that expense.

Fair enough. My point is that even limited carrierborne organic air power is preferrable to none. 😎

And my point is that this a decision that has to be made upon the needs of foreign policy and economy.;)

Lessons of history?! Now you.ve done it! Certain posters here dont believe in that! Prepare for PARAGRAPHS of why you are just wrong and “history” means nothing!n

The only lesson in that example is the detachment of politicians from their decisions and more specifically defence policy. As has to be pointed out here all to frequently the UK won the Falklands war despite apparently being chastised by the loss of its fleet carriers.