Edit: One quick question HK just wondering if you knew much about the Malaysian Gowind deal?. I was reading something like they were going to be shelling out nearly $400mn a unit for what is essentially a fairly ordinary FFL design?. Did someone get the numbers wrong on that do you know?.

I was looking at this just the other day… figured it might be interesting to compare to LCS, given the USN’s recent announcement that they’re looking at frigates again.

The only official figure I found is 9 billion ringgit, which indeed comes out to about $450 million per hull. That doesn’t sound inordinately expensive though. The equipment fit is quite high end (Smart S radar, Captas 2 sonar etc).

Right now PAK FA is at the same stage of development as Rafale in 1993 (~500 test flights).

And that’s being generous (not counting tests of the Rafale A demonstrator)…

So what’s a realistic FOC date for a couple of PAK FA squadrons, manufactured in India? 2025? Probably no sooner.

The recurring flyaway cost is about $60 million.

http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/logistics_material_readiness/acq_bud_fin/SARs/2012-sars/13-F-0884_SARs_as_of_Dec_2012/Navy/F-A-18E-F_December_2012_SAR.pdf

No, that’s in base year (2000) dollars. Add 13 years of inflation and the average recurring flyaway cost for 552 Super Hornets is what I said, about $75 mil.

Of course, customers may be more interested in the flyaway cost of Super Hornets being delivered today, which is a bit lower ($65 mil). But that’s only if they buy a full-production-run Hornet straight off the line (as the RAAF did). Such a low cost will no longer be achievable when production starts to wind down (next year?)… especially for export customers who choose to build the aircraft themselves (thereby foregoing the economies of scale).

All in all, the Super Hornet and Rafale economics don’t seem that different, which says a lot about Rafale given that Super Hornet is considered by all to be a very cost-effective benchmark.

$60-65 mn is realistic for a flyaway price circa 2008, when the initial MMRCA bids were submitted. Only someone with an agenda or a stupid bureaucrat would act like this number is still relevant, after 5 years of inflation, exchange rate movements, the addition of license and support costs etc.

Rafale’s current flyaway cost is €57.5 mn, so about $79 mn. (Official cost for a Rafale C at 2013 prices: € 68.8 mn incl. 20% VAT).

No possible surprises there… Rafale’s flyaway cost hasn’t changed in 14 years! (It was first reported in 1999, updated in 2004, 2005, 2012 and 2013, the only change each time was a bog-standard, steady 2% inflation escalation)

Indeed a nice pic. The proximity between the outer bomb and the outboard MICA looks pretty close…
Can anyone tell whether the wing mounted AAMs are rail or eject launched?

Rail launched, it seems.

Air&Cosmos 2386s, Dec 13:

F3.3 -> F3.4+ (in french)

[TRANSLATION]

The Rafale F3 – Well Established in the Forces

[INDENT]* Deliveries of tranche 4T aircraft started in 2013, including M39 pictured (first Rafale M with AESA radar, delivered last week to the CEPA naval test squadron). The AESA radar will be declared operational in the French Air Force in early 2014.

* Current standard is F3.3′, which completed testing in early 2013. Includes improvements to Link 16 and A2G fire control for laser guided bombs, and makes all aircraft compatible with AESA radars.

* Next standard is F3.4+, which will be ready in autumn 2014 and become operational after flight testing in 2015. Includes improvements to A2A fire control, man-machine interface, transitions between radar & digital map terrain following modes, and pilot safety aids (warning of “unusual position”, improved emergency braking). This will be the last standard prior to F3-R.[/INDENT]

Link fixed. Here are the 3 relevant documents again:

[INDENT]Fighter replacement aircraft – Technical aspects – ASR Evaluation
As detailed in my prior post.
http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=199194

Selection of a Replacement Fighter for the Avon Sabre of the Royal Australian Air Force – DECISION
Explains rationale for final decision of Mirage III over F-104G
http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=544956

New fighter project (Sabre replacement)
400+ pages covering the initial RAAF selection of the F-104A in 1955-57, including arrangements for Australian production.
http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=1085830[/INDENT]

RAAF technical evaluation

OK gents (and ladies?), find a comfortable seat… here’s 200+ pages of reading incoming!

The RAAF’s technical evaluation of its fighter replacement options is now available: 😎
http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=199194 (link fixed)

Here’s an interesting part… the Belgian perspective (page 151):

A visit was made to the Belgian Air Force HQ Brussels by Wing Cdr. Compton and Flying Officer Talbot on Feb 24th 1960, to discuss the adoption of the Lockheed F104 by Belgium, with Cnl. de Bueger, Director Superior of Operations and Lt Cnl. Delhaye, Director Superior of the Technique of the Force Aerienne.

It was stated that the primary Belgium requirement was for a tactical fighter capable of carrying a nuclear weapon at low level, cruising for 200 miles over friendly territory and 200 miles at high subsonic speeds over enemy territory. The F106 (Delta Dart) was considered the most suitable aircraft operationally but too costly. The F105 (Thunderchief) was the next choice, being a very strong aircraft and well suited to the low level mission, but the cost, particularly operating expenses, was too high. The final choice was restricted to the Lockheed F104 and the Dassault Mirage III. The F104 was selected because its range at low level was 20 percent greater than the Mirage iII.

The Mirage III was stated to be a superior interceptor, in particular in turning capability at altitude, and rate of climb with rocket motor was better than F104. The Mirage was easier to fly – Cnl. de Bueger had flown all the aircraft mentioned. Servicing and manufacture of the Mirage was considered to be far simpler than the other aircraft examined. An appraisal of the manufacturing problems, from Fokkers, was quoted as estimating the F104 as 30% more difficult to build than the Hawker Hunter, while the Mirage was classed as 15% less difficult to build than the Hunter.

The F-104 had the advantage that it would be available with a completely developed weapon system earlier than the Mirage. The Belgians require replacement aircraft as soon as possible.

They were adamant that the low level range was the deciding feature and strongly refuted any suggestions that economic or political factors may have influenced the decision.

And an equally interesting RAF perspective (p.167):

Towards the end of Jan. 1960 Sqn Ldr Merriman and Flt Lt Cockerell from Boscombe Down made 4 flights each in the Mirage III Nos 01 and 08. Sqn Ldr Merriman has flown the F-102, F-104A and F-106. Flt Lt. Cockerell is an expert in ground attack (previously involved in Hunter armament trials).

[LIST]Supersonic handling was very good, superior to US types flown (F-102, F-104A, F-106).
[*]‘G’ availability at altitude was far in excess of other types flown.
[*]Stick force per G and control feel were excellent.
[*]The overall acceleration from Mach 1 to Mach 2 was better than the F-104A, but decreased as Mach 2 was approached more rapidly than the F-104.
[*]In the ground attack role the aircraft was a very good platform… better than the Hunter.
[*]Instrument flying was very good.
[*]Both pilots were amazed by the versatile way in which the aircraft could be transformed from the interceptor role to numerous ground attack configurations.
[*]Serviceability was very good and the aircraft were always ready for flight.

[/LIST]

Also an interesting note that the Mirage IIIA reached Mach 1.5 in “full dry engine power” (page 171). Supercruise in 1959! :applause: