Another take on the issue:

Quote:
Plane wreck

The Washington Times

March 11, 2008

By Frank J. Gaffney Jr. – The Pentagon has had a dirty little secret for years now: Foreign suppliers are an increasingly important part of the industrial base upon which the U.S. military relies for everything from key components of its weapon systems to the software that runs its logistics.

With the Air Force’s Feb. 29 decision to turn over to a European-led consortium the manufacture and support of its tanker fleet — arguably one of the most important determinants of U.S. ability to project power around the world — the folly of this self-inflicted vulnerability may finally get the attention it deserves from Congress and the public.

The implications of such dependencies were made clear back in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. In the course of that short but intense operation, American officials had to plead with the government of Japan to intervene with a Japanese manufacturer to obtain replacement parts for equipment then being used to expel Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait.

The obvious lesson of that experience seemingly has been lost on the Pentagon. In the nearly two decades after, it has sought to cut costs and acquisition timelines by increasingly utilizing commercial, off-the-shelf (or COTS) technology. Under the logic of “globalization,” COTS often means foreign-supplied, particularly with respect to advanced computer chips and other electronic gear.

Such a posture raises obvious questions about the availability of such equipment should the United States have to wage a war that is unpopular with the supplier’s government or employees. Then there is the problem of built-in defects such as computer code “trap doors” that may not become obvious until the proverbial “balloon goes up” and disabling of U.S. military capabilities becomes a strategic priority to foreign adversaries, or those sympathetic with them.

Even the Pentagon and intelligence community recognized this sort of train-wreck was in prospect had Huawei, a company with longstanding ties to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, been allowed to buy 3Com. The latter’s “intrusion prevention” technology is widely used by the U.S. government to provide computer security against relentless cyber attacks from, among others, Communist China.

Now, unfortunately, the Air Force has set in motion what might be called a “plane-wreck.” Opposition is intensifying on Capitol Hill, on the presidential hustings and across America to the service’s decision to make the European Aerospace, Defense and Space (EADS) consortium the principal supplier of its aerial refueling capabilities for the next 50 years.

There appear to be a number of questions about the process whereby the decision was made to reject the alternative offered by the nation’s historic supplier of tanker aircraft — the Boeing Co. These questions (for example, concerning the ability to operate on relatively short and austere runways) seem likely to result in that corporation protesting the source-selection of a much larger Airbus aircraft over Boeing’s modified 767.

Even more telling may be other considerations that argue powerfully against a reliance on the EADS-dominated offering. A number of these considerations were identified in a paper issued by the Center for Security Policy in April 2007 and re-released last week (click here to view the paper). Evidently these were not taken into account by the Air Force:

• One of the owners of EADS, the government of France, has long engaged in: corporate other acts of espionage against the United States and its companies; bribery and other corrupt practices; and diplomatic actions generally at cross-purposes with America’s national interests.

• The Russian state-owned Development Bank (Vneshtorgbank) is reportedly the largest non-European shareholder in EADS with at least a 5 percent stake. It is hard to imagine that, just when Vladimir Putin and his cronies are becoming ever more aggressive in their anti-Americanism and efforts to intimidate Europe, we could safely entrust such vital national security capabilities as the manufacture and long-term support of our tanker fleet to a company in which the Kremlin is involved.

• The enormous U.S. taxpayer-financed cash infusion into EADS will probably not only translate into more money for the slush funds the company has historically used to bribe customers into buying Airbus planes rather than Boeing’s. It will also help subsidize the Europeans’ space launch activities — again at the expense of American launch services.

• EADS has been at the forefront of European efforts to arm — over adamant U.S. objections — Communist China, Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela and Iran.

• As the Center for Security Policy paper points out: “Through its aircraft production division, EADS is a huge jobs program for anti-American labor unions that form the backbones of some of Europe’s most powerful socialist parties. By purchasing products that employ these workers, we will be feeding those who would rather bite our hand than shake it.”

These and other aspects of the selection of the Airbus tanker (notably, preposterous claims about the number of American jobs that will be created by contracting out our tanker fleet to the Europeans — see Michael Reilly’s essay at http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org) seem to assure that this decision will indeed be a political plane-wreck.

The tragedy is that the replacement of our obsolescent aerial refueling fleet has already been unduly delayed. The further deferral that now seems inevitable may mean we wind up literally sacrificing aircraft and their crews or at least the national power-projection capability we need while this mess is sorted out.

Frank J. Gaffney Jr. is president of the Center for Security Policy and a columnist for The Washington Times.

I agree entirely. The U.S. should not be subsidizing corrupt, anti-American companies from European countries. Not only should the Airbus tanker deal be overturned, but also the US101 presidential helicopter deal, the Coastguard’s Deepwater program (whose airborne component is almost entirely European), the C-27J Spartan tactical airlifter program, the UH-72 light utility helicopter program, and the M777 howitzer. Nothing less will do.

Additionally, all KC-130s need to be reengined with non-French engines NOW (ground them immediately, says I) and the U.S. needs to remove from service all equipment built by U.S. companies that have merged with European companies. We can start by retiring the Bradley IFV, the AAV7 IFV, the Paladin howitzer and the Cougar MRAV. That’ll teach them to try to steal U.S. technology.

Furthermore, the U.S. government needs to enroll civilian support to fight the subsidized, socialist, double-dealing Europeans. First immediately ban U.S. airlines from buying Airbuses or planes with Rolls-Royce engines, and also ban U.S. companies from launching satellites using the Ariane launcher or European engineering software. People also need to forget about buying Volvos, Mercedes or BMWs when a Chevy will do.

Finally, since you never know who the Europeans might leak U.S. technology to (hint: China), the U.S needs to stop selling them F-35 fighters, AEGIS destroyers and Chinook helicopters. In fact, the F-35 program needs to be shelved and replaced by Boeing’s X-32 competitor, since the F-35 has too many European parts. Who said the filthy Euros need have the last laugh? :diablo:

GO AMERICA!

Lurker? It took me eight hours to respond.

I’m not sure that they flew six 1,000-lb LGBs and a tank.

Yes it’s a relatively short range configuration (that’s why we have tankers), but you could obviously fly full A-A, four 1,000-lb bombs and two tanks. But the real reason to criticise this loadout is that it’s based on 1,000-lb LGBs, which are too big for many current scenarios.

What Typhoon lacks is a 250-lb (or 500-lb) PGM, and a stand off PGM like AASM (or a Brimstone variant, perhaps?). I’d also like to see an early integration of CRV7.

I would tend to agree that Rafale is a better heavy attack aircraft than Typhoon, though since EF can carry a pair of Storm Shadows (or four or six big LGBs), I’d say that it has a pretty respectable heavy capability. But yes, Rafale has a definite advantage, whether that advantage is ‘real world relevant’ or not.

Just as Typhoon has real world advantages in the A-A role.

Fair enough.

Here’s a picture showing the loadout I mentioned. It’s also discussed in one of the Eurofighter Reviews.
http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=1194908

Speaking of “real world relevant” advantages, a couple of extra percentage points in Thrust to Weight, aerodynamic instability or radar range may not be particularly relevant – especially if you’ve gone back to refuel in friendly airspace… 😀

But apologies for digressing from the topic of this thread.

…Block 5 standard, which adds surface attack and reconnaissance capabilities to the aircraft’s existing air defence capability.

Thus, the upgraded two-seat aircraft are now Typhoon T Mk 3s (abbreviated Typhoon T3), and the upgraded single-seater aircraft are Typhoon FGR Mk 4s (abbreviated Typhoon FGR4). The FGR designation denotes Fighter, Ground Attack and Reconnaissance.

Any details on the reconnaissance capabilities incorporated into Block 5 and planned for the future?

I was under the impression that there were NO reconnaissance capabilities planned before Tranche 3 (2012-2018), and even for Tranche 3 I haven’t heard any concrete talk of integrating a reconnaissance pod. Seems like none of the partner nations feels any urgent need to replace existing assets. According to the link below, the RAF has only said that the Typhoon will be equipped for reconnaissance missions “in due course” (which sure seems a lot like “not in the next decade, mate”).
UK Parliament

Anyway, maybe the “R” in the FGR designation is a decade too soon. Hopefully it won’t become like the “R” in the Sea Harrier FRS.1…

The empty-weight of Su-30 MKI is 17,700 kgs and weight in ‘normal’ fighter configuration is 26,600 kgs. The fuel-load in this config is 5020 kgs. Thus, the weapon-load is 3300 kgs. As per vayu sena website, on a fuel load of 5270 kgs, the combat radius is 1,500 kms.

Hence, the figure is 3,300 kgs at 1,500 kms on an internal fuel of 5270 kgs.

Abhimanyu,

I was confused by what you were saying… until I realized that you’re the one who’s confused. You’re being creative with your sources:

FACT: SU-30MKI has a range of 3,000km on internal fuel (Vayu sena)

YOUR INTERPRETATION OF THE “FACTS”: This is with 5,270 kg internal fuel. Not only is that statement not supported by Vayu sena, but it’s also patently impossible. All you need to do is compare to other contemporary fighters:

– MIG-29M: Ferry range of 2,000km with 4,737 kg internal fuel (6,082 l) and possibly 2 AAMs
– Eurofighter Typhoon: Ferry range of 2,600km with 4,996 kg internal fuel
– F-35C: Ferry range of 2,593km with 8618kg internal fuel

So you’re saying that the SU-35, which is much larger, draggier airframe than the MIG-29M and Eurofighter Typhoon AND has 35-40% more thrust can go SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER with only a couple hundred more kilos of fuel? That’s magical thinking.

More likely, the 3,000km range quoted for the MKI is with full or near full internal fuel – that would be realistic when you compare to the performance of the F-35C, which is much closer to the SU-30 in terms of drag.

Some faithfull believers can not be bothered by facts and I am aware of that.

Speaking of facts, here’s what I found in publications from the 1960s, using the fabulous Google book search tool… Sens – looks like you’re wrong on this one. :p

@ Pioneer – hope you like all the details. 😀 Here goes:

Article 1 (during Le Bourget 1961)

“The civil engine being shown is the RA.29/6 turbojet of 12,725 lb. of thrust. This version of the civil Avon powers the Caravelle 6. The company is also showing an RB.146 military Avon of 12,220 lb. of thrust with a reheat system that gives it an augmented thrust of 16,000 lb. In this form the engine is installed in the Dassault Avon Mirage IIIO. The same engine also powers the latest version of the Saab Draken, but in this case it has a Swedish reheat system.”

“The Avon Mirage, as we showed in a special article in our issue for Dec. 2 1960, has been developed as an export version and the 16,000 lb.s.t. (with reheat) Avon 67 engine makes it one of the most potent weapons in development in Europe. An SEPR 841 rocket pack is an optional extra to obtain optimal performance at altitudes above 60,000ft., but even without this aid the Avon Mirage takes only a fraction over six minutes to reach 50,000 ft.”

Source: “The Aeroplane and Astronautics, May 25, 1961”, compiled in The Aeroplane and Commercial Aviation News, 1966, pp. 586-587

Article 2 (the Dec. 2 1960 article mentioned above)

Rolls Royce Power
For export, a prototype Mirage III is being built, powered by a Rolls-Royce Avon Mk. 67 or R.B.146, which is similar to some Lightning powerplants. The R.B.146 delivers 12,500 lbs static thrust and 16000 lb. with reheat, compared to the 9370/13200 Ib. of the Atar 9B in the Mirage IIIC. With an assumed intake efficiency of 85%, the British engine will maintain 12600 Ib. thrust at M=2 and 36000 ft. Installation of the R.B.146 involves virtually no modification, and this engine has a considerably better specific fuel consumption than the Atar.

The engine compartment remains unchanged, the turbojets being almost identical in diameter except for the Avon’s slimmer afterburner. The R.B.146 slides forward on the same two lateral rails for installation as the Atar, after removal of the double-skinned rear fuselage. Rear fuselage doors give additional access, although the engine continues to be reached principally through the fuselage mainwheel wells for servicing. No change in intake configuration is needed despite the 3% increase in mass flow of the Avon, except for the alteration of the shock-cone supersonic movement ratio. Weight increase with the Avon is about 640 lb., which causes a slight aft CG movement. Time for an engine change is quoted by Dassault as two hours.

As the other component of the intercepter powerplant, the SEPR 841 rocket pack is completely self-contained, with an integral 69 gal. tank for the nitric acid propellent, and a six- bolt attachment to the rear-fuselage recess. A telescopic spline-shaft picks-up via a pneumatic clutch with the separate turbojet accessory gearbox to drive the rocket pack pumps, which feed TX Furaline from a 32-gal. tank in the gun bay and the acid propellent to the combustion chamber. Rocket operation is controlled by a three-position switch in the cockpit which permits almost instantaneous election of half or full thrust (1,654 or 3,374 lb. at sea level). At full power, which reaches 3.704 Ib. at 52459 ft., there is a continuous output of 80 sec., which is naturally doubled at half-thrust.

The specific consumption of the SEPR 841, which is manufactured by Hispano-Suiza, is 0.0048 Ib./lb./sec. at sea-level, and 0.00435 at 52500 ft Through the widespread use of light-alloy parts, stainless steel being limited to the turbine and some parts of the oxidizer circuit, the unit has a total dry weight of only 452 Ib. From the maintenance viewpoint, it is cleared for 50 flights between major checks. It is jettisonable for safety in a belly landing, and when not required, is replaced by a finned fuel tank of up to 130 Imp. gal. capacity.

Source: The Aeroplane and Astronautics, Volume 99, Number 2563, Dec 2. 1960”, compiled in The Aeroplane and Commercial Aviation News, 1966, pp. 709

Article 3 (exact publication details unknown)
Currently shopping in the international fighter market are Australia, Israel and Switzerland, the main contenders being the F-104, and the Mirage III of Generale Aeronautique Marcel Dassault. There is also the excellent SAAB Draken, which is something of a dark horse, except in Switzerland, where the choice has narrowed between it or the Mirage.

On purely a technical basis, the “export” Mirage III, powered by a Rolls-Royce R.B.146 turbojet, seems in a strong position. It is the only M = 2 interceptor which has shown a take-off and landing performance, with a full operational load, of less than 1,000 yd., plus a grass field capability. It is also a more recent design than the F-104, and is therefore that much further from obsolescence, the F-104 having originated from design studies in 1950, when Korea showed the need for more advanced American military aircraft.”

Source: The Aeroplane and Commercial Aviation News, 1966, pp. 707