Sferrin – I hope you’re wearing Nomex :diablo:
Something less provocative. J-10 Facsimile ?
Bomb live unit.
[i]turboshaft[/i] might know more about it
You tryin’ to get me fired? :diablo:
There were a few details publicly released on the engine in the late ’90s, but most of this has disappeared following the renewed interest in high-speed strike. The Popular Mechanics article from earlier this year gave a fairly generous amount of public domain insight, including images of the YJ102R from which a rough impression of the engine’s architecture can be inferred, and is worth a read for those interested in the program. Other stats released earlier in the project include the engine’s length (approx. 4ft) and width (1 ft). Some data on the JETEC prototypes (XTL 16 & XTL 17) is also public realm, including their Fn/Wa achievements.
Much of this tech was developed in the late ’80s and has been waiting for a suitable application. High operating temps are key to the engine’s performance, and advances in metallurgy and cooling have played a key role.
The similarity to the J58 (axial-flow, single-stage) results from the similar operating environments, though none of the J58 team were involved in the J102 program.
Prolly explains why it appears that Lockheed is trying to turn an SR-71 nacelle into a missile
LockMart’s already been down that path with the ‘alternative’ D-21 studies. 😀
A D-21 cutaway actually gives a fairly representative impression of the newer project’s airflow, though you’ll have to work out for yourself where the payload sits.
Will this spawn a new age of very light supersonic general aviation aircraft?
I think you’ll be lucky to ever see Aerion fly, let alone a M3+ SSBJ. Handover $3M of greenbacks and content yourself with a Javelin for now.
To fully understand how Boeing won, you have to appreciate the mission creep that took place under the PRV/CSAR-X program, and the subsequent ‘reigning-in’ that took place to save the program from review/cancellation. As has already been stated, commonality (systems, not just airframes) suddenly become the key decision factor 85% of the way into the program, which is why the MH-47 (/HH-47) found itself in the sweet spot.
Initial initial/objective speed reqts for the Block 0 (originally Phase 1) aircraft were 135/185kt. Block 10 (originally Phase 2) targets were initially set at 200/300kt (which is why the V-22 and CRW were considered), but these are unlikely to be enforced.
I wouldn’t hold your breath to see Sikorsky sold off. UH-60M, MH-60M, MH-60R, MH-60S and CH-53K (plus pretty comfortabe civil bookings) are likely to keep it as the big dog in the industry (by annual $ revenues) for the next decade or two.
Previous thread on tri-engined fighters, including the oft-quoted NR349, here.
The 737 (& 145) also offers a degree of discretion, especially when pottering around at FL200. By comparison, an Electra- or Comet-based design tends to stand out.
‘Course, there is an argument that this increases the risk of another KAL 007…
It was at least 10 years ago, possibly 15, and it was indeed Avpro. There was an artist’s impression published in Flight or some such at the time.
Update on AC-130 DEW trials: Laser-cannon AC-130 tests begin.
A well-designed UCAS airframe should be able to withstand considerably more than 9/10G, but gas turbines (as opposed to rockets/ramjets) won’t. Blade rub soon becomes an issue at very high Gs, even with active clearance control.
In defense of the B-52 it can carry just about anything that can be dropped. The B-1 can’t.
The rumor always held that it was easier to integrate new weapons onto the vacuum-tubed B-52 due to its lack of an integrated avionics system, which enabled new loads to be scabbed onto the Buff with ‘stand-alone’ electronic interfaces patched directly into its cockpit. By contrast, it was reportedly harder to integrate new weapons onto the Bone due to compatibility issues with its 1980s/1990s electronics (despite the use of Mil-Std-1553).
That said, the AF subsequently replaced the B-52’s “Rude Goldberg’d” interfaces through the introduction of the ICSMS and, more recently, SWING.
This may all be B/S (I’ve never had any personal involvement with either system), and may also have been overcome through the addition of the Mil-Std-1760 interface to the B-1B. Can those with real-world experience on the aircraft add their insights?
realistically, this system won’t be affective until Beidou 2 is up
Will Beidou really have any applicability for conventional PGM guidance? I’d read that its latitudinal error was prohibitively large for such usage.
The ton-mile cost of these outsized lifters is what has led to hybrid airships being reconsidered as a viable option for long-range transport. CargoLifter failed to materialize due to programmatic and conops issues, but LockMart is currently taking another stab at the market – in spite of the DoD’s apparent disinterest – driven by market projections for several hundred craft.
it occurs to me I haven’t the faintest idea what the Germans named their aircraft
Der Taifun…
The aircraft were new-buy, not upgrades, undertaken as part of a Mk2/Mk3 batch purchase (though there are rumors that some of the Mk2/2A fleet may have had some Mk3-esque upgrades via UORs, such as the enlarged fuel sponsons).
The central problem with the Mk3s was that the MoD chose to specify a new configuration, rather than simply buying MH-47Es, with a mixed digital/analogue cockpit and a new weather radar & radome. Unfortunately, it soon became obvious that the new systems were not a drop-in for the aircraft.
In addition, there was fundamental disagreement between the UK (DARA/QinetiQ) and Boeing over which software standards the hybrid avionics systems & coding should be qualified to, which in turn led to a major fall-out over exactly how to qualify the aircraft. The T55’s FADEC software was part of this overall qualification problem, but only a partial component of it; a bigger concern was the possible involvement of FADEC glitches as a factor in the Mull of Kintyre crash.
The first of the Mk3s flew in October 1998 and was due to be delivered in February 1999, but they were formally rejected by the MoD in mid-2000. After being handed-over in 2001/2002 they ended-up in storage, where they allegedly suffered from corrosion due to being inadequately prepared for long-term storage.
The ‘fix to field’ program now being proposed for the Mk3s will delay EIS until 2010/11, and will add another £200-250m or so to the original £260m price tag of the fleet.
There have been some good threads on the snafu over at Pprune: Mk3 thread #1, Mk3 thread #2, Mk3 thread #3.