China had reason to check for them and remove them..do NATO allies have such a reason?
I am not saying its a gospel , just that it looks quite probable to me.

Your military plane starts emitting a strange, un-attributable signal mid-flight that you know nothing about?

Yeah, you might want to have your engineers have a look at that…

😮

Fair points, AD.

Indeed it would be an unprecedented and unconventional approach to acquiring a modern day tactical airframe on this scale. But I just foresee a future business model in tactical aviation where some degree of ‘Lease’ deals are factored into the overall production and procurement plan. With procurement for increasingly complex aircraft becoming more expensive (and risky), I feel it would be more feasible for many govts to acquire under such a risk-mitigating model.

It may well be feasible, but feasible doesn’t equal desirable. With a lease there is no ownership of the platform. If sudden operational developments require upgrade etc, there is no domestic capability to address this, you require “reach back” as you need the owners permission and capability to change anything significant on them. Acquisition risk is mitigated somewhat perhaps, operational risk is not.

I think that as we have seen in the past, only Governments in future that cannot truly afford the capability or indeed see it as a gap filler (Italy’s F-16A’s again as the perfect example) whilst awaiting your permanent solution, will see an aircraft lease as a viable option. There are simply too many operational hinderances that come with a lease to make it a truly attractive offer, no matter what the cost difference might be.

For a wealthy country like Japan, I don’t see any benefit at all from a lease.

Another view I have which I guess fits into this thinking, is that especially going forward it’s not the most prudent plan to operate an airframe for 40 yrs – squeezing out every economical life year. Upgrade costs and SLEP investments, as these jets get older, will just be such an under-estimated burden in itself i think. For the price of 2 upgrade cycles, I’d contemplate whether it could be more cost-effective to simply complete the short term 10-12-15 yr lease and upgrade to the next-best leased platform, factory fresh? I think for wealthier air forces at least, wanting to stay modern, that might be a plausible option – especially if there is a leap in TACAIR doctrine and capabilities one wishes not to miss out on, if locked into a 30-40 yr existing airframe life cycle. I could be off, but I feel under some circumstances for big airforces (e.g. convenient stopgaps) and for wealthy airforces operating under a couple hundred fast jets, it might be feasible for at least part of their structure. After the lease term, if it’s still a modern and capable jet perhaps only awaiting a timely upgrade… then there would surely be a next-in-line buyer for it (perhaps even picked up by USAF/USN for cheap?), or perhaps there would be an option to extend the orginial lease. imho.

Japan out of most Countries might vehemently disagree with this prospect. Look at the service they have got out of their F-4EJ/ EJ Kai’s…

Japan is looking at a significant upgrade to it’s F-15 fleet to keep it in service for many more years yet, so I don’t see that model being discarded in their particular circumstance just yet.

The problem with “disposable” tactical fighters these days is the cost. The acquisition cost and support costs (payable no matter which aircraft type) dwarf upgrade costs for a particular platform.

Look at Australia. We’ve operated A/B model Hornets since 1986. We’ve had one major upgrade project (that was in reality many upgrades all conducted in a rolling upgrade process from HuG 1-> 2 -> 3). These upgrades have kept the Hornet’s relevant for an additional 15 years of service beyond their initially expected period of service. The total price for these upgrades for 71x Hornet aircraft is approximately AUD$2.1 Billion.

Our 24x new Super Hornets (including all the infrastructure, training, support, weapons package etc) had an acquisition price of AUD$4.1 Billion…

There is simply no way anyone can afford these new acquisitions every 10 years. Our Hornet upgrade Project showed that for less than half the price of a new acquisition, we gained more expected life service than our new capability is intended to have for 3 times as many aircraft…

Again we revert back to the lease issues if we are going to lease the aircraft and with a lease we have even less operational sovereignty over them than we usually have (end-user licences etc).

As far as any next-gen SH R&D cost share is concerned, I think at least some of the aircraft sub-components development is already in motion and at least partly company-funded by various vendors? Some R&D could be rolled into a theoretical Lease deal too perhaps?? So no, I wouldn’t suggest any one country, including US or AUS or…x,y,z would front the R&D for an improved Super Hornet per se (or any type aircraft), as part of the business model. It would likely comprise of joint ventures and company innovation. imho. Cheers-

Depends what the enhancement is. As a small example, the Australian Government fronted the start-up cash for an Australian SME who had an idea for a new “cargo pod” for the Hornet/Super Hornet aircraft.

This pod has the capability to be reconfigured as a fuel tank, cargo pod or even a recon/targetting pod if one should choose and the SME that developed it, has now been selected to provide the pod for RAAF’s Hornet and Super Hornet fleet and (I have been informed) has also been awarded a contract to provide USN with similar pods for it’s Super Hornet fleet.

Again, you have to target your product nowadays, but that doesn’t mean that a Government can’t or shouldn’t invest in a particular R&D effort to deliver enhanced capability…

The world is aware actually..
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1382116/China-finds-spy-bugs-in-Jiangs-Boeing-jet.html

My point exactly. Not that they aren’t used (though taking one side of the story as gospel is always fraught with danger) but that they are relatively easily detected IF used…

Operational:

Japan’s requirements are largely defensive in nature. A2A-centric with limited A2G requirements. JASDF’s most modern platform, the F-2, is A2G-centric.

True, though as part of that defensive nature, Japan maintains a strong anti-surface maritime strike capability…

JASDF’s A2G requirements, such as they are, do not call for a stealthy, penetrating bomb truck but rather a stand-off missile truck. The F-35 is limited in internal carriage of anti-ship weapons and other cruise missiles, and external carriage both strips the F-35 of its greatest advantage over the other platforms, and – per data showing stuff-all benefit for F-35 from EFTs – likely compromises its range to an unusual degree. Super Hornet is of course a better missile truck than Typhoon, particularly Typhoon in its current state, but A2A performance – the primary criterion – is a different story.

Interesting, have you seen Japan’s requirements for the replacement of the F-4EJ/EJ Kai?

Considering they use the platform primarily for maritime interdiction with a secondary air defence role, this would suggest on the surface of it, that the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet would be the most suitable aircraft out of the 3 short-listed.

The F-35 is intended to have a strong maritime strike capability with 3 of it’s users, USN, Australia and Norway in particular focussed on this capability. From Block III onwards it will have the capability to carry internal and external AGM-154C/C1 JSOW’s which by the time JSF reaches IOC will have long had maritime attack modes added. Internal and external carriage options means that up to 6x such weapons could be carried by the F-35.

JSF Block III are also likely to have the Norwegian JSM integrated and sized for internal and external carriage requirements, meaning that an F-35 could again easily carry 6 such missiles if need be. If a “missile truck” is the required platform, I see little better than the F-35 from a purely load carrying point of view in this role.

I acknowledge that external weapons carriage would increase the RCS of the F-35 platform but then, low RCS clearly isn’t a massive factor in this competition given the choice of 2 non-LO platforms in a 3 horse race… I do wonder the exact truth of the matter with external carriage of weapons on the F-35. Without seeing flight test data or at least wind tunnel data, I do wonder at the “drag” they apparently cause.

Certainly there is a large variety of external stores due for certification on the F-35 and they cannot ALL increase drag in the exact same fashion so there HAS to be a variety of drag increasing effects from external carriage (as indeed there is for any aircraft).

I note also that the fuel tanks that will be certified for external carriage have also been modified from those originally intended and so I also wonder exactly which data set is being used to “verify” this alleged poor external fuel carriage performance. I believe it is a fairly commonly accepted rule of thumb that about 50% of fuel carried externally is used to overcome the drag of carrying that fuel in the first place, so I wonder about the oft quoted number that the EFT’s on the F-35 only provide 8% extra combat radius. That seems like an AWFUL lot of fuel burn to overcome drag to get an extra 70nm or so of radius given 2900kgs of fuel will be carried externally on F-35 with 2 tanks…

I note also that the F-22A has no apparent problem using EFT’s on long distance flights. Indeed it seems the usual option and it too is seemingly equally designed for “clean wing” flight, though of course there will a large difference in aerodynamic effects between the 2 designs.

http://pdf.aiaa.org/preview/CDReadyMASM08_1065/PV2008_376.pdf

It seems to me that though the weapons and pylons will increase the RCS, the shaping, materials and internal structures of most of the aircraft will retain their LO properties and I shouldn’t wonder that a properly designed LO aircraft would still maintain a lower RCS than non-LO aircraft even when carrying external stores. I understand also that the F-35 like the F-22 will be capable of ejecting the pylon AND the store, thus returning the aircraft to it’s full LO capability…

http://img213.imageshack.us/img213/9716/04e0130008uk8.jpg

As to the Typhoon, I am aware of a future intention to integrate Storm Shadow and Tauras SOW’s onto them, so clearly that aircraft will be a suitable candidate for a maritime strike weapon, should a user so require, however I’m not certain of the carriage options. I believe it would be inferior to an F-35 in overall number of maritime strike type weapons due to the configuration of hard point options on the aircraft, but I am happy to be corrected on this.

Clearly the Typhoon would prove an excellent A2A aircraft out of the options Japan has shortlisted, though none of the 3 aircraft will be lacking in that regard.

Regards,

AD

Who is the local company behind the Tiger in Australia? And is your simulator also built by Eurocopter?

Best regards,

Hey mate,

A newly formed company called Australian Aerospace is assembling, testing, delivering and (supposedly) supporting the Tiger and MRH-90’s.

They have also provided 2x EC-635 helos to the Australian Army on long term loan to help remediate the pilot proficiency concerns due to the delays in the program, as agreed under the Remediation agreement and support contract re-signed with the Australian Government in 2007.

http://www.ausaero.com.au/index.cfm

Thales and Kellogg Brown and Root are providing all the training platforms, simulators etc under contract to Eurocopter for the Tiger ARH program.

Regards,

AD

With so many problems, how can France successfully operate their Tigers in Afghanistan!?

Or do these problems apply to the Australian Tigers only?

Well given the Blackhawk disaster in 1996 when 15 SASR and 3 Blackhawk pilots were killed during a night time counter terrorism exercise, you’ll understand if Australia is somewhat cautious about nightime helicopter operations and the Tiger isn’t yet certified to fly at night or in bad weather for reasons that have not been fully made public.

I’m not so sure the French operation of the Tiger in Afghanistan IS all that successful. Yes they are there, but what exact missions are they capable of doing?

Given the Tiger gunship crash during a nightime operation in Afghanistan in February this year, which destroyed the chopper and injured one of the crew, with enemy fire specifically ruled out as a cause, perhaps Australia’s concerns are justified…

On top of which, we have experienced considerable issues with the lack of support from the manufacturer which were so severe that we ordered a ‘stop work’ penalty on the project in 2007 and refused to pay, until they got their production, delivery and support processes sorted out. They were (and still are) behind on contract deliverables, behind on deliveries of training, spare parts, simulators, EW software support system and ground maintenance training systems.

Because of this, our project is now over 4 years late (at present) and is likely to be some 7-8 years late by the end. MRH-90 is heading down the exact same path, with the added problem that there are serious airframe, engine and avionics issues with that aircraft on top of all the problems the Tiger had… Oh and they lied about the cost to support the Tiger in-service and the support contract had to be re-negotiated. Turns out it isn’t significantly cheaper to support than the AH-64D Apache afterall, which was one of the main reasons it was chosen in the first place…

And they tell us that NFH-90 is “available now”. Ha! The very first Tiger they delivered to Army in 2004 still isn’t “available”…

Well, french Tigers are in operational service… in A-stan since several monthes… and seem much appreciated by ground troops there.
What’s the problem with aussie ones ?

Cheers
AZ

Where does one start?

NVG’s don’t work. Can’t fly (in line with airworthiness safety requirements) in bad weather. EWSP system doesn’t work properly. Simulator doesn’t work properly. EW support system not delivered, let alone released to service. Poor manufacturer support. Poor development pace, hindered by a requirement to follow the lead service on this matter (France).

The list goes on and on.

Now these may sound like teething problems to some, but bear in mind we received our first Tiger airframe in 2004…

More than 6 years since we began to receive our airframes and we are still nowhere near IOC, which was planned originally for 2007…

MRH-90 is shaping up in an extremely similar manner, except the airframe and engines are even worse and is unofficially known as the “Land Sprite” within AAAvn (Australian Army Aviation. Land Sprite relating to Sea Sprite and it’s inglorious history… in Australia)