Why was it unpopular JEH???

You dont need any spares or stuff for operating Sea Eagles, all test equipment is already in India plus made locally etc. What you’ll need is some Bae help in refurbishing the missile if they havent thrown away all the design manuals. Stuff like warhead design & fabrication if the explosive is old or shows signs of cracking, propellant replacement, replacing some units which are old (ur spares will be useful here).

BDL (just saw their webpage) makes Milan series, Konkurs -M also torpedos and Ballistic Missiles- so machining/ replacing the warheads can be done, ditto for propellant replacement & stuff, if BAe provides the design data and some engineering crew who are still familiar with the system.

Thats my best guess FWIW.

I am in favour of refurbishing it AND acquiring new ASMs and spreading them out.

As Swerve says, advantage of light ASMs is you can field more.

If US supplies Harpoon with all spares/units/Test equipment so that it is sanction proof I would suggest its good for India .

SIPRI shows popeye price to be around 2 Million $ …
Thats very expensive, I think.

The advantage of US equipment is that price is amrotized over thousands of rounds and is generally cheap for its capability; So imagine that for a hundred million, you could buy same number of missiles or slightly lesser, thats certainly bang for buck.

Sea Eagle is old,- but is generally said to be one of the best ASMs of its time, on account of its design and lethality and quite useful even today. Theres a beautiful article on it somewhere. Perhaps Harry had posted it earlier?

Plus I have a soft spot for British made stuff I must admit.

I was also seeing LOD Video on the IAF Jaguars- they appear quite happy with the missile.

Exocet is also good, but is it really that capable??

The kings support is crucial and by all reports the coup dudes have it. The monarchy counts for a lot in Thailand.

IIRC, AN/APG-68(v)9 could get up to 10 history tracks for the TWS mode and ripple fire at 4 different targets. Guess what’s the official source of the 110km range, and against wich RCS target under wich probability of detection and clutter/jamming environment?.

Tell, tell!!

:rolleyes:

We can go round the houses debating this. But right now lets stick to facts.

Ha! Thats like a kurwa asking the pope to be celibate! 😀

Erieye = On course for delivery next year

You hoping hard? 😀

NO PHALCOON till 2008

Not required that urgently- Aerostat radars give coverage deep into Pakistan.

AMRAAM delivered next year – No Indian equivelent

No proof of AMRAAM deliveries.

Amraam vs Indian ECM (backed up by state of the art Israeli EW pods who operate AMRAAM)- status doubtful.

Indian AF planes with BVR versus Pak planes without…bad show!

Indian current BVR AAM inventory- 1140+300+>450…keep adding.

Pakistani radar coverage much more extensive then Indias. More modern radars covering a far smaller area

More laughable BS. I mean, dont you have any clue before you open your mouth and sink your foot in deep?

India doesnt need to cover all its area and landmass genius, only specific zones & critical areas. Earth to you, PAF doesnt operate Auroras which can fly around forever and attack from anywhich were.

Read up. From Strategic Air Defences in South Asia, Dr Sanjay Badri Maharaj, Indian Defense Review

Strategic Air Defences in India

India, with its vast airspace, maintains an advanced Air Defence Ground Environment System. This system, along with the civilian Air Traffic Control, is responsible for the detection, identification and, if necessary, the interception of aircraft in Indian airspace. The Air Defence network is also in the process of being upgraded to cater for ballistic missile threats. Before examining the system in detail, a quick overview is in order. India’s air defence network is essentially divided into two parts – the Air Defence Ground Environment System and the Base Air Defence Zones. These two components are closely linked and share information relating to air defence tasks. The Air Defence Ground Environment System consists of an array of radars along the Western and Northern Borders as well as a network of mobile systems in the North East and South of the country.

The ADGES network is responsible for overall airspace management and detection of intruders. The ADGES also controls and coordinates the air defences for large area targets. The Base Air Defence Zones, as the name implies, are tasked with the defence of high value targets – air bases, nuclear installations and key military installations. The BADZ is a scaled down ADGES network, limited to an arc of 100km. The BADZ is a far more concentrated air defence environment than the ADGES and provides the only gap-free air defence cover in most sectors. In addition to these networks, India is now establishing an anti-tactical ballistic missile screen – with new radars and weapons. It is not clear whether this will be incorporated into the BADZs or whether it will comprise a separate network. This ATBM screen is slowly taking shape and news of its structure is still awaited.

Indian Air Defences: Sensor Network

The Indian Air Defence Ground Environment System employs a three tier detection network. While this system is currently in the process of a major modernization program, the basic structure of the ADGES network will remain unchanged. The first layer, rather surprisingly, consists of Mobile Observation Posts. These remain among the most reliable of the early-warning mechanisms available to the Indian Air Force. The MOPs consists of two-man teams equipped with a HF/VHF radio set and field glasses. The personnel in the MOP are very well versed in the visual identification of aircraft as well as their general direction of flight. The MOPs are scattered along the borders at random intervals, ranging between 25 and 45 kilometres. The MOPs give the first warning of airborne intrusion, the general direction of the attack and, more often than not, the number of aircraft and their type. The MOPs are assisted in this task by personnel from the Indian police forces and Railway Protection Force who are given some training in aircraft identification. These agencies report via a communications system based on both HF/VHF radio sets as well as telephone lines. A more advanced communications system based on fibre optic cables and satellite communications is also available to assist the MOPs in reporting to the radar picket line.

The radar picket line, which lies about 150km behind the MOPs, consists of a number of radar clusters. These comprise three radar stations separated at a distance of the sum of their radii. The equipment issued to these clusters generally comprises one license-made Soviet ST-68/U and two P-18/-19 radars. These are then flanked by two P-12/-15 radars. The ST-68/U acts as the Control and Reporting Centre (CRC). This may have changed somewhat as the ST-68U, which was plagued with some nagging development problems, has largely replaced older Soviet-made equipment. Moreover, India has been license producing the French designed TRS-2215D 3-D surveillance radar for a number of years and has derived an indigenously built radar – PSM-33 Mk.2 from it. These have probably supplanted most of the older Soviet-bloc equipment. It should be pointed out, that these radars are all long-range surveillance types with ranges in excess of 300km and good performance against targets flying at all altitudes – even those employing electronic countermeasures (ECM). These radar pickets are responsible for giving accurate information on the intruding force to the Air Defence Control Centres (ADCC) located behind the radar picket line. The picket line and the ADCC are separated by a first layer of air defence weapons which are the first to engage the intruders.

The backbone of the Indian Air Defence Ground Environment system is the THD-1955 3-D long-range surveillance radar. This radar, originally of French design, has been license produced in India for a number of years. This radar, though somewhat elderly, still has sterling performance characteristics and is capable of maximum detection ranges of up to 1000 km, though in peacetime the Indian Air Force usually limits its power to a 400km detection range. These form the core of the ADCCs. ADCCs also keep in touch with the Base Air Defence Zone (BADZ) control centres. The BADZ is a scaled down version of the ADGES configuration and is geared towards the defence of key air bases and other high value targets. The BADZ is limited to an arc of 100km, compared to the hundreds of kilometres in the case of the ADGES system. Like the ADGES, the BADZ consists of three layers. The first of which are the mobile observation posts, followed by a mixed layer of weapons and their associated radars along with a picket line of low-level radars. These are in turn supported by anti-aircraft artillery batteries. This network is controlled by a ST-68U radar. The BADZ provides comprehensive and gap-free coverage over its assigned area of responsibility. Some observers have likened the BADZ set-up to the defence pattern of a carrier battle group. Any aircraft attacking a vital military target, therefore, not only has to get past the ADGES, but also the far more formidable BADZ. This has serious implications for the attacking force.

India’s air defences currently rely on a mix of MiG-21/-23/-29 and Mirage 2000 interceptors and thirty-eight squadrons of surface-to-air missiles. The SAM units comprise 30 squadrons of SA-3b Pechoras and 8 squadrons of SA-8b OSA-AKM systems and are deployed to protect key air bases as well as some major military/industrial centres. Though the SAMs are old, they have been updated periodically and, when operating as part of the BADZ, are deployed in such a manner as to minimize their shortcomings. In addition, a large number of L-40/70 radar directed 40mm anti-aircraft guns and man-portable Igla-1M SAMs are deployed to provide a ‘last-ditch’ tier of ‘hard-kill’ defences. It should be pointed out, however, that this system is geared up to the defence of point targets and not for overall area defence. It also lacks a viable capability against ballistic missiles. With this in mind, the Indian Air Force has begun a massive modernization of its strategic air defences.

The first signs that India was modernizing its air defences came when a massive order was placed for Sukhoi Su-30 combat aircraft. These aircraft, the first batch of which has now been delivered, are primarily long range interceptors, capable of intercepting targets at ranges exceeding 120km. When this is added to the fact that India’s ongoing MiG-21bis upgrade program is primarily aimed at enhancing the aircraft’s air defence capabilities and India’s program for an AEW aircraft has been resurrected after many years in the doldrums, it can be seen that India’s fighter defences are about to be dramatically enhanced. India’s interceptors are equipped with a mix of French and Russian air-to-air missiles. All aircraft are cleared to launch R-60 (AA-8) and Magic R-550 short-range missiles while the MiG-29, Su-30 and Mirage-2000 are cleared to launch R-73 (AA-11), R-27 (AA-10) as well as Matra Super 530D systems. India has also ordered R-77 (AA-12) missiles for its upgraded MiG-21bis and Su-30 aircraft and there is every likelihood that the R-77 will be fitted to the MiG-29s as well. To these dedicated fighter defences must be added India’s tactical strike aircraft – all of which routinely carry air-to-air missiles. The Jaguars, MiG-27s and MiG-23BNs can fire a mix of R-60 and R-550 short-range air-to-air missiles. Owing to the large number of these aircraft at the disposal of the IAF, it is impossible for their air defence potential to be ignored.

Further to these developments, news began leaking out about the deployment from 1998 onwards of an Anti-tactical Ballistic Missile screen. This system is to comprise the Russian S-300V ATBM (SA-12) and India’s own ‘Akash’ missile which has a considerable ATBM capability. In March 1997, the Indian press confirmed these reports, stating that one S-300V squadron was being purchased, with more to come in the future. These would provide a comprehensive defence against ballistic missiles as well as manned aircraft coming in from either Pakistan or China. These ATBMs may not be able to intercept all incoming missiles but they would provide an additional layer of defence. This ATBM screen is unlikely to be fully operational for close to 10 years. As can be seen, these systems will provide India with an extremely potent defence against both Pakistani and Chinese ballistic missiles and manned aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.

In the case of Pakistan, the problem is further compounded by the fact that any aircraft attempting to avoid these defences by going over the Arabian Sea, will be detected and engaged by the fighters and SAMs of India’s powerful Western Fleet. In fact, if they attempt a low-level penetration run against BARC or Mumbai, which would be a risky venture without external fuel, they would come within range of even India’s coastal patrol forces which are equipped with 40mm anti-aircraft guns and man-portable SAMs. Would Pakistan risk its aircraft against targets deep in India when the probability of intercept increases the further away from Pakistan the target lies? Therefore, India’s strategic air defences severely restrict the number and types of targets that would be potentially vulnerable to Pakistani attack. Moreover, when India’s air defence modernization is complete, and the Indian government seems to be committed to this, the prospect of any Pakistani aircraft getting through is remote. Ballistic missiles may have a better chance of succeeding, even with an Indian ATBM screen, but their ranges are severely limited. The old adage of nuclear deterrence – ‘one will always get through’ – is being challenged by massively enhanced Indian defences. This could, in theory at any rate, seriously upset the Pakistani nuclear deterrence strategy.

After this India has purchased:

* Master T radars
* 2 GreenPine radars
* 7 CAR 3D radars
*2 Aerostat Greenpine derived radars inducted with more negotiated
* Additional Indra II 2D Gapfillers

All ordered.

India recently ordered several regiments of the Spyder, again come with 100 km ranged 3D radars.

All older types being upgraded, many Flycatchers, Reporters on order as well.

No mass exodus of pilots wanting to leave PAF!

You think? Dude, your kiddie propoganda apart you think ANY AF in the world today is not having its transport fleet whittled by the private sector?

Bloody hell- talk to USAF crew about how many left for Delta, United.

You are so childish about the realities of the world when you try agit prop on an international forum that I cant but laugh.

My point is, the odds are evening up VERY quickly. In fact, by this time next year, I dont think there will be one area, perhaps as you pointed out in anti-radar missiles that IAF will be aheead in. SU-30 is the only thing PAF actually worries about. Even these are seeing major probalems.

So much more of your BS.

Which is why I said you are totally clueless. PAF sat out the Kargil War, so much for their “we are brave ghazis unworried about any aircraft”.

Even they wouldnt make such a claim. But no, they have you!!

Your forces are outmatched, period.

Whole world recognises this.

But you Pakdef lunatics still have wetdream after wetdream about how your BVRless magic fleet of F-7s and Mirage 3’s can defeat India.

Lets look at KEY areas.

1) AWACS
Eryiye next year

As mentioned earlier, IAF already has coverage deep into Pak via aerostats, Greenpine, plus operational datalinks! :rolleyes:

2) BVR
AMRAAM and SD-10 next year

Sure, they will be delivered overnight by Fedex and PAF will yell BVR and thats it. Give me a break. :rolleyes:

3) In flight refuelling
Aircraft ordered

More BS.

4) Ground radar
More modern and extensive coverage in Pakistan

Generic nonsense, and prime targets for the IAFs KH-31’s, ARMATS, KH-25’s and Harpy’s.

IAF has lost alot of its edge it had for past 10-15 years over PAF. The next couple of years will see that edge further eroded.

Yup, if you squeeze your eyes really hard, you’ll even see pink elephants dancing around the room.

Dude
Admit it! IAF is having major issues.

Derka Derka blakadalaka

“I shall yell at the top of my voice and whatever I say shall be correct”

PAF AMRAAMS should start being used the momment our first F-16 MLUs come online. In mid 2007 according to ACM.

Should? Right now theres debate in Pakistan about the F-16s…

In other words you are again gassing…should might, could!

US radars delivered already include 6 TPS-77and 6 L-88s. IN SERVICE.

Nice to know

Contact SIPRI

http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/REG_IMP_PAK_95-05.pdf/download

L-88 status uncertain,

Anyways, heard of the KH-31 and KH-25 ARMs. 😀

Your radars will be a good target!

Does Pak operate even ONE ARM type? 😀

This does not include teh upgrades to teh TPS-43Gs

Sorry for you!

India has not even ordered any new radar equipment.

What laughable BS.

* Master T radars
* 2 GreenPine radars
* 7 CAR 3D radars
*2 Aerostat Greenpine derived radars inducted with more negotiated
* Additional Indra II 2D Gapfillers

All ordered.

India recently ordered several regiments of the Spyder, again come with 100 km ranged 3D radars.

All older types being upgraded, many Flycatchers, Reporters on order as well.

The GreenPines btw, are strategic radars. But PAF has no ARMs. :p

Phalcons not getting there till 2008!?

Asking me a question?

Is KS-172 in service? Is it comparable with AMRAAM? Can it be carried by light jets? It is in NO WAY comaprable to AMRAAM and serves a different purpose.

LOL, is AMRAAM in service?

Whats so asinine is you parroting AMRAAM, AMRAAM- your opponent has AAM reserves (BVR) that dwarf yours, and yet you are stuck on stupid for an AAM that hasnt been delivered yet. Never mind how many more it plans to induct via its MRCA and others. ks-172s can be carried by Sukhois, more than enough to knock your blokes off from afar.
Anyways, its not like your fellows have decent ECM. :p

I dont knwo what the service level is in the older squadrons, but if teh IAF Bisons are the newest MIG-21 airframes, then we can safely assume the service levels of teh older sqaudrons are WAY below 55%

What utter BS. All IAF MiG-21s bar Mongols are being phased out. Only the Bisons are to remain and their service level is at 55-60%, pretty decent for ops in the first few years of induction of a substantially modified type. I can only imagine the conditions in the PAF, equipped with creaking Mirage 3’s and a vast fleet of Chinese made MiGs knockoffs.

Forget the “open debate” crap. The fiasco with forcing pilots to serve in the IAF when they want to leave can only serve to dent morale.

Nonsense. Debates are open and addressed, unlike Pakistan where a dictator runs the show and if you report anything “bad”, off with your head. Lets not go there old boy, enough distractions already. All military transport pilots are subject to rules, they signed up for it and have to serve by it. The PAF is no different.

And I can imagine what the morale in the BVRless PAF was all these years and still is, as they hope that at least some BVR AAMs arrive.

Modern and miltary for sure.

2/3 isnt so bad is it? :p