Nick_76Back in 2006 CAS ACM Tanveer Mahmood mentioned acquiring 4 aerial refueling aircraft from the Ukraine, as it stands today I dont know how far that has gone whether they are still waiting maybe someone in the know can update?.
Thanks for the info. As it stands, its not confirmed yet that these IFR aircraft have been ordered.
Those adders would have to get pretty close to get a successfull kill on the AEW&C, what is the maximum range for those around 100km? and I dont think anyone would expect to hit a moving target that far off. The Erieye platform is likly to detect the inbound fighters before they get anywhere near, but your right in saying they could have some affect as is the case in times of war.
I would say ~60-80 Km for a reasonable chance of success. But here is the issue, if I surge your escorts and even then attack the AEW&C from beyond the NEZ of the missile, wont your AWACs move away? Suppose I make multi-axis attacks from every direction, wont it cause a mess? That is my point. The AEW & C is by no means invulnerable against a committed foe with superior numbers and equal/better technology.
“Pakistan was preparing to use nuclear missiles against India during the Kargil war”, this was alleged in a book that mentioned a conversation between Nawaz sharif, pak pm and Bill clinton. I wouldnt discount any possibility sometimes a conflict escalates very easy and both sides havnt got a crystal ball to read what the other is thinking.
True, but it would still be very rash of Pakistan to constantly lower its nuke threshold as India’s conventional forces rise in power. Since it would also invite retaliation, disproportionate as well, from India.
In a limited conflict I cant see over a hundred planes from the IAF engaging the whole of the PAF,
If India takes on the PAF, it will definitely employ more aircraft than the PAF can commit, in theater.
if that happened it would be all out war which again referring to what I wrote above will reach the nuclear thresh hold and end up causing a nuclear exchange.
All out war doesnt mean that the nuclear threshold will be breached. A defeat leading to the dissolution of the Pakistani state, an event of that magnitude, is what will lead to nuclear exchanges. If all India does is hammer the heck out of X AFB, the PAF will survive to fight another day, and online forums will go on and on about who really won.
What I would expect is a low intensity exchange where a dozen or so aircraft could be involved in an area lets say Kashmir – where the IAF may want to bomb some so called training camps. In such a case JF-17s/F-16s/ F7s (as point defence fighters) backed with Erieye and ground radars would be able to hold their own against flankers/fulcrums/bisons ect. I dont see any distinct advantage. If we play the numbers game that is a different story but you have to look at it in the context.
This is the kind of thinking which led to Kargil and 1965, that the Indian side plays to whatever rules the Pakistani side has appointed to have itself win. In war, there will be no set rules. If it suits India, it will attack Pak bases deeper in Pak. If it can wrest local air superiority even otherwise, it will do so.
Its simply a function of what the Air HQ determines, with its given scenario. And in almost all cases till now, the GOI has gone along with the professional reccomendations.
Nick_76I don’t understand your point? Do these ppl in any way influence the official policies of Pakistan or PAF? I despise Bharat Rakshak forum because of its vehemently racist attitude, but while I do not consider it a reliable source (in spite of the fact that some of its contributors are professionals) simply because of this, I’d b stupid to think of it as a representative of Indian armed forces’ policies.
My point is & was lets be more rational in forecasting than these other chaps who let their emotions run away and talk about 100 JSFs in the PAF, 100 EFs etc and then talk about taking out the IAF on the first day of war etc.
Second, BRF is of course hard on Pakistanis – but its irrelevant to call it racist, Indians and Pakistanis are the same race.
Third – in terms of reliability- it is quite definitely a place where the more lurid “India will get Raptorz LOLZ and beatz China” posters are disposed of & data sourcing/citing is encouraged.
Yes. I do seriously think that. Pak decided to conduct those nuclear tests in 1998 (for its own reasons) in spite of promise of modern weapons that would have gone a long way to bridge the gap vis-a-vis India. The more the conventional gap grows, the more Pakistan will rely on its nuclear weapons as the ultimate detterrent, and the lower will be the threshold.
Pakistan conducted its tests because it thought that with nukes, it could up the proxy war against India and full conventional war was no longer possible since India would back off.
Hence Kargil, which disproved the above (India was prepared to escalate if the war didnt go its way) and now Cold Start, which is a clear statement of Intent by the IA to defeat PA locally without dismembering Pak & hence initiating a nuke exchange.
Second, please look at the development of nuclear doctrines and how threshold estimates are calculated. If Pakistan starts relying more on its nuclear deterrent, India will also respond likewise & may even rescind its NFU pledge.
This would invariably tell on Pakistans threat perceptions as well and may place it an unworkable position. Spending on nukes isnt any cheaper for Pak than on conventional weapons. Ultimately, one way or the other, Pak is between a rock & a hard place.
The only solution is for Pak to ditch its focus on India, resolve outstanding issues with a “you keep what you have, we do the same” basis and work on its own economy. Confrontation with India, one way or the other, is pointless and has already caused Pakistan to make many pyrrhic and self defeating choices.
Ultimately, Pak has to make the choice and stick by it, for its own sake.
As for rational choices, although im no pacifist I dont consider war to be rational to start with.
Nuclear warfare is a step from which no country can return from, unlike conventional warfare. The result is far more thought is given in this respect.
If Pak has thought nukes through, it would have paid due heed to how much of a weapon of last resort they are, and not just lob them whenever it feels its getting outfought.
Over past few years, there have been hundreds of negative news reports in media about US/Pak relations. So Im not sure what difference these new reports will make. WOT is in their mutual interests and they will collaborate as long as their interests ramain that…mutual.
The difference is that the present establishment is on its way out. The Democrats or even the new Republican admin who take over may not share the same largesse with Pakistan or even be as liberal. The US economy is also not in the pink of health. As money becomes scarcer, so will funding.
Ties with Pak first took a slight downturn after the departure of Colin Powell who shared a personal rapport with his fellow general Musharaff. But the latter managed the relationship well. Once Musharaff left, the USG is having a torrid time with the new civilian Govt which wants to scale back on the anti Taliban ops in FATA/ NWFP. Not to mention the ISI issue.
Add the democratic resurgence in Congress & the renewed focus on the administrations actions, and its clear that the days of blank checks and do what you want with the money, may be coming to an end.
As for Russians being ok, it was India who had to pay more money although it was Russians who did not stick to the their own contracts (regardless of the reason).
Given India has got deals which would have cost substantially more if it went elsewhere, and are still worthwhile from the Indian POV, the Russian price increases, bar the Gorshkov, are negotiable and dealt with.
In the past, India has faced similar hurdles with every other supplier, from BAe systems (Hawks and Jaguar) to France (Mirages and Scorpene). Why would the Russians be an exception? Rising materials costs, inflation make a huge impact on margins and arms manufacturers dont work for charity.
While you are at it, please also look at the prices paid by India over the years for Russian weaponry – they were heavily subsidised by the Russian Govt. Today, commercial rules apply.
Russia is indeed India’s strategic partner, but they thought of their own interests. In spite of billions of dollars India has poured into their market through MKI and potential of loads more, Russians asked for more.
India has got its moneys worth via the MKI & many other programs. Consider, how many aircraft manufacturers the world over share radar IP, engine blade technology and aircraft metallurgy for their best product at the time, for per unit costs which are half those of comparable systems?
This is the reason why India joined up for the PAK-FA as well.
All said and done, if India was truly arm twisted to the degree you suggest, Russian items wouldnt be preferred or the sole vendor choice in programs such as the 5G, the MRTA and the Brahmos follow on.
Nick, Pakistan is a small nation with fragile economy and easily arm twisted. India, I thought, was a totally different ball game. Can you say that all the issues have been resolved? Full ToT for T-90, engine for brahmos, Gorshkov etc?
The Gorshkov does not involve TOT. Its a procurement program. (A frightful mess as well)
There was no full TOT for the Brahmos to begin with. The program envisaged engines being provided by NPO-Mash, and the entire missile being assembled at India. The remaining components, such as the FCS, the TELs, the C3I would be designed and developed by India. Subsequently there was much hype about the fact that the entire missile wasnt being made in India!
Why would it, when DRDO didnt plan the same, and the follow on, the Hypersonic Brahmos has the engine being developed by DRDO? In a JV, the two parties provide respective strengths – if the TOT costs for acquiring engine tech make the Brahmos more expensive than imports, and if a newer version has to be anyway designed within the decade to keep it viable, whats the point?
The T-90 issue will be resolved. Its a matter of time & will involve some negotiation, but it speaks volumes that the Army has ordered another 347 T-90s from Russia. They dont consider this a big deal.
All in all, Indias problems dont stem from Russia alone but its own policies, which are improperly budgeted, take far too much time to execute via RFPs and what not, and insufficient emphasis on local R&D. If the Army were to be less egotistical, it would rely on Arjun and derivatives instead of doing the T-90 jig.
And No, Im not relying on the worst case scenario. All Im saying is that India will not be able to deploy all of its major weapon systems on its western border, especially when India is moderinisng to face the (growing…as many put it) threat from China.
Please reread what I wrote. As I pointed out, India’s planned MRCA acquisition plus a chunk of the Flanker fleet are meant for China. The remaining aircraft are still competitive and superior to what Pakistan is inducting and planning to induct.
Not to mention force multipliers et al, which are now in their second phase of induction.
While the PAF is yet to take delivery of its first IFR, its been a couple of years now since the IAF has deployed IFR, and even used it for intercontinental journeys. And is now to acquire a second batch. These are not for Pak but more for China.
And ‘Given the trouble the PAF has had with the RD-93 export issue’, but Excuse me. If i remember correctly (and please feel free to correct me if Im wrong), PAF officials always maintained from the begining that there were no engine-related issues. Chinese, OTOH, mostly kept quite. It was mainly Indian newspapers that quoted umpteen sources about Russia not allowing the engine sale to PAF.
The troubles Pak had with the engine issue were widely reported by both Janes and Russian news sources. Indian papers just did what they always do, they copied and repasted the news.
So Im not sure who went to greater troubles. My personal opinion is that Russia was pursuing a wait and watch policy, and their decision to sell RD-93 to Pakistan was a message for India (their officials are on record saying that Russia will also find alternative markets if India does the same).
Your personal opinion is fine, and you are entitled to it.
But its by no means certain that the PAF will continue to rely on the RD-93 for the entire production run and there isnt a Chinese engine intended to replace the same, and second, Pakistan simply doesnt have the wherewithal to purchase even on a fraction of the scale of India.
Russians talking of alternative markets refers to Latin America where their penetration is a fraction of what it could be, and even Africa and parts of the Middle East.
Consider the package deals with Venez, with Algeria for instead. Pakistan isnt able to afford a few squadrons of a top of the line 4+ Gen fighter, how will it even replace a purchaser like India who buys a 1600 tank run, 230 A/c run etc?
IMO, this “Russia will sell to Pakistan” is a great white hope for many online Pak fora discussions which tends to stick in some folks minds – because of the US- India rapprochment and hence some Pak folks think that a similar volte face will occur between Pak & Russia.
If only things were so simple.
And no strategic partnerships are not that easy to be balanaced. India used to call Iran its strategic partner only a few years ago, only to vote against them in IAEA under US pressure.
India and Iran were never strategic partners, hype apart, and wont be so for the conceivable future.
They were and are nations who dont step on each others toes for the most part & engage in savvy quid pro quos as the occasion demands. During earlier times, Iran helped India on some occasions & India did likewise.
India may have voted against them in IAEA, even so, India also tempered the comments against Iran by several states and made sure that Iran wasnt ganged up on. And you may also note the recent visit to India by Ahmedinijad where both sides discussed energy ties.
So India has done its balancing act fine.
Consider this – would Russia even ask India to take part in its preeminent, jewel in the crown 5G program if India was deemed to be in the US camp and against Russian interests.
If so Nick, then fair enough. But I must say that people like us ought to give due consideration to our phraseology on such multinational forums.
My phraseology has been to the point and consistent. I have reiterated the same basic theme – that a light fighter force- unless it dwarfs a heavy/medium one in orders of magnitude and technology, is at a disadvantage thanks to range and payload considerations. Especially if we speak of deterrence, which implies an offensive role, not just hit and run Vn era style guerrilla warfare.
Nick_76http://www.hindu.com/2008/07/07/stories/2008070759891500.htm
DARE wants BEL, IAF to fund EW suite for MiG-29s
BANGALORE: The Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE), which has the wherewithal to develop an electronic warfare (EW) suite that could be installed on MiG-29s, has asked Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and the Indian Air Force to put up a substantial portion of the around Rs.170 crore required for developing the equipment. The MiG-29s are being upgraded in Russia.
This is in keeping with the new line of thinking of its parent body, Defence Research and Development Organisation, namely to incorporate industry and the user into a project right from the start by getting industry to financially commit itself to the project. For its part, DRDO will ensure that the industrial partner will secure the production order for the equipment.
Talking to The Hindu just before his retirement, Director R.P. Ramalingam said his laboratory could offer a state of the art EW suite for the MiG-29, including a radar warning receiver and a self protection jammer, provided the production agency came up with funding.
“BEL is prepared to put up a portion of the project’s cost, but this will first have to be cleared by their board. BEL also wants an assurance that the production order for the EW will go to them.”
With each EW suite expected to cost Rs. 15 crore, the production order for BEL could be around Rs. 1,000 crore.
{So each of the ~ 66 MiG-29s will have a new Indian RWR + SPJ}
Industrial funding would ensure enhanced commitment for a project: “Industry can even take an active part in the project’s research and development phase spearheading DARE’s efforts,” Mr. Ramalingam said
A director with BEL, who did not wish to be named, said that with the government asking research laboratories to find funding themselves, there was no alternative but for industry to step in from the initial stage of a project and also fund it.
http://www.domain-b.com/aero/mil_avi/miss_muni/20080707_drdo.html
DRDO to test Astra BVR missile soon – launch likely from a Sukhoi-30MKI news
07 July 2008
New Delhi: Indian defence scientists may be preparing to test the Astra, an indigenously developed beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile. Reports suggest that the test flight could be conducted from an Indian Air Force Sukhoi-30MKI fighter aircraft “anytime in the next 45 days.” Reports have cited top DRDO officials as their source.
Indian defence scientists have recently tasted success with a string of missile programmes, the most recent being the Akash surface-to-air missile. A successful test flight of the Astra programme will place India into a select group of nations that boast of such a technology. These include the US, France, Russia and China.
A beyond-visual-range missile enables fighter pilots to lock-on and shoot down enemy aircraft almost 80-120 km away.
According to DRDO scientists, the Astra is a futuristic missile, which has already been tested on the ground to prove its avionics, guidance and other sub-systems, including propulsion. It was first tested in March 2003, without control and guidance systems and once again in March 2007, this time at low altitudes and short ranges.
t is equipped with a radar fuse and a pre-fragmented warhead, and reports suggest that a laser fuse is being sought to be developed. Earlier assertions by defence scientists have suggested that the BVR missile would have a range of 80km in head-on chase and 15 km in tail chase.
Defence works to unmanned vehicle production, DEMA comes of age
Posted online: Wednesday, July 09, 2008
Pune July 08
First lot of ‘off-the-shelf’ products to include mini UAV and fuses for armaments; land sought at Talegaon, Dehu Road for Defence industry cluster
For over 15 years, the city-based Defence Equipment Manufacturers Association (DEMA), a consortium of 38 small and medium enterprises, developed and tested sub-systems and components as required by the Defence sector. Realising that the time has come to graduate into active production, DEMA is now working on the first lot of ‘off-the-shelf’ products which will include a mini Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and fuses for armaments, to be ready by 2010.
“Now we will be developing and producing multi-disciplinary systems and put them up for ‘off-the-shelf’ purchase,” said DEMA President D S Kamlapurkar. Around 10 of DEMA’s members have formed a separate manufacturing entity —- by the name of DEMA Mechatronics — which will engage in the development, manufacturing and marketing of the complete systems.
By 2010, DEMA Mechatronics plans to build up the capacity to produce around 100 UAV’s and 2 lakh variable time fuses and around 50,000 proximity fuses per year. “We will initially manufacture around 2 lakh variable time fuses and gradually increase the number to 5 lakh per year,” said Kamlapurkar. “We are also venturing into indigenous production of proximity fuses.”
“The UAV will be an upgraded version of the Vihanga Netra, the first effort of the DEMA consortium using Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) funds,” said Yogendra Jagirdar of Jagirdar Aeroproducts, which is in charge of designing and making the UAV aircraft, its field-testing and operation. “This will be our second attempt at manufacturing UAVs after the Vihang Netras,” he added.
There will be additional features like night vision compatibility, map overlays and the ability to lock on to a target. It will be a wheeled version, compact compared to the Vihang Netra, and weighing 25-40 kg. It will possess a range of 10 km, an altitude of 1.5 km and a speed of 100 km per hour.
Dema is planning the UAV for the civil sector as well. “The UAV can be used for non-defence forces as well, like the police or even paramilitary troops for surveillance,” said Kamlapurkar.
While fuses and UAVs are DEMA’s priority projects for full-fledged production right now, some of its members are also involved in producing moving targets and the association will gradually delve into the production of smart weapons.
“At present the Vihang Netra is being used as a moving target and we are planning to produce more targets for defence use. We also plan to produce smart mines, which are activated by remote, shoulder rocket launchers etc. The technology is already a part of some other products and we will just have to adapt them to develop the proposed products,” explained Kamlapurkar.
Dema has been requesting the Ministry of Defence and the State and Central governments to grant 5-100 acres for a Defence industry cluster near Pune. “The plan is to allocate each unit on one-acre plots. We have located land at Talegaon and Dehu Road,” said Kamlapurkar who added that DEMA would be sending a detailed proposal on the cluster demand to the MoD soon.
Nick_76The total number is 32 (original) +2 (goodwill) + 26 (ex-US) +18 (new) + 18 (options) = 96 aircraft
Out of the 26 (ex-US) only 10-12 have been confirmed as being delivered.
The 18 options have to be paid for by the Pak Govt. – again deferred.
Second, what timelines are we looking at?
This is also borne out by the number of MLU kits ordered. This makes confirmed order of 78 plus the 18 options. Always better to keep options open rather then commit when you dont have to. But all indications are they will indeed exercise those options.
I differ, because the new Govt has not exercised the options, has it?
And the current Pak-US spat over the WOT may lead to a bit of arm twisting over F-16 deliveries, which after all are being delivered by the US, gratis.
Its a key bit of leverage they have with the new Chief of Army Staff Ashfaque Kiyani
The only talk i have heard of aid recently has been attempts by the US to triple the aid to pakistan. The US-Pak relationship this time around is different and not based only on WOT. There are several other factors driving this and aid stoppage isnt something they are concerned about.
The media is full of reports about Pak diverting US aid for WOT for conventional conflict vs India & given the recent political issues (strike within FATA by the US etc), it may well indicate a cold chill, time will tell.
Aid stoppage is not going to happen, but Congress riders on it being more civilian and COIN oriented will affect military procurement.
The only talk recently has been of tripelling the aid to pakistan. But even if we take the worst case scenario, do note that the F-16s and associated equipment is paid for out of PAFs own acquisition budget. Not the US military aid. As far as the Pak govt goes, i dont see them curtailing the defence budget. At most, they may go for more chinese equipment but i dont think the US will give up its influence that easy.
PAF’s own acquisition budget is boosted by the US Mil aid which goes directly to the Pak exchequer.
Take it away, or put riders on it on how it is to be spent, and obviously the PAF spending will have to take the new reality into account.
We can only predict about the future. But it’ll be either the J-xx or the JSF from 2020 onwards. And the JSF will be quite affordable by 2020 as it enters the mass production stage.
We arent even sure about how many F-16s will end up in PAF service, let alone future Pak-USA ties, but you are already talking of the JSF, which is surely too early to tell.
And the J-XX, which even the Chinese posters dont speculate much about
I agree that mirages will start retiring starting 2010. Out of the current 200 odd mirages, i dont expect more then 100 to last beyond 2015. I had thought that all would retire by 2017 but now that they are the cruise missile lauch platform, i suspect they may remain in service a bit longer then that.
We still dont know how many CMs have been ordered & in what number to justify a large launch force.
Only a designated unit, one of the ROSE ones could have been picked to conserve on deployment costs, which would seem rational.
Another factor is the recent surge in oil costs – this is bound to have had an effect on the PAF as well.
In the 90’s, KSA used to provide a substantial amount of oil to Pak gratis – I believe this practise has been discontinued, so this could be an additional factor for the services to consider as they try to reduce operational costs.
Anyways, if all the Mirages leave in the next decade, thats practically 80% of the Pak strike capability disappearing, which makes the F-16 fleet even more overworked.
Especially considering that the new JF-17s, which first batch should be operational within the next 5 years have only A2A and no PGM capability & that the aircraft will require another couple of years before FOC and only then series production can begin.
My mistake. Yes, it does appear pak navy has an air arm. But not one that would justify 3 hawkeyes in my opinion. Perhaps they will use one. I wont be surprised if the AF uses the other 2.
Its the issue of serviceability issue for a limited acquisition of 3 aircraft alone. At any given time, 1-2 will be flight capable, while one would be either in reserve or being serviced. And the Hawkeye is crucial for the PN since Pak has a dearth of realtime surveillance options to keep track of an IN flotilla.
The Hawkeyes job is to “fix” the IN flotilla so that P3s have a chance to target it. The IN’s Aircraft carriers job is to target the Hawkeye or the missile launch carriers in turn.
It wont be handed over to the PAF to use as they see fit.
Nick_76Sorry Nick, but unfortunately I dont have unlimited time to spend on these forums and spell everything out. Briefly though, when you stated (in response to my statement about ‘the possibility’ of taking JF-17 units to 250) that Recent talk is just that forecasting for public consumption, I merely responded by saying that we have been hearing about this possible increase in numbers since 2004 or so, which is not very recent. However, I toally agree with you that threat perceptions change, and this is precisely why I had already said that ‘all is open for discussion and changeable‘. OTOH, if curtailing the numbers of JF-17 is your personal opinion based on your own thinking, then so be it. All I can say is that thus far PAF has firm committment for 150 machines…which is by coincidence quite to 8 squadrons.
So – semantics apart – we can agree on the following:
1. There are no firm numbers for numbers of JF-17 ordered till date. Original plans stood for 150 and the numbers can be downsized/ rightsized still.
2. The 250 number is not confirmed as of yet either.
OK, my mistake. But Nick, if i remember correctly this did not seem to be the case a few weeks ago when there was some discussion LCA R&D dates. There was no talk of ‘public consumption’ or ‘indication’ there when people were quoting sources which had been involved in the programmes.
Please dont argue semantics for the sake of semantics.
LCA program dates are development dates as done by the Project Managers – they can slip/overshoot whatever. We are right now talking of orders placed- and as I have repeatedly pointed out (and am doing so again)- I only use confirmed orders placed by the IAF and commitment expressed to Parliamentary bodies to that effect.
Which is: 20 + 8 + 7 aircraft (from the IAF) ordered, out of six squadrons (120 aircraft) planned! This despite many forecasts of 220 aircraft and more from IAF & DRDO sources both.
Given that, you should also do the same, than rely on comments about “perhaps 250”, or “perhaps 400”. Which as we agreed upon can change based upon the threat perception.
I think Nick, you are making an assumption here (and I would like to know on what grounds) that PAF will remain stagnant over next two decades.
Point being that apart from speculation “PAF will do this, PAF will do that”, there is precious little to go on.
National defence is intrinsically tied to economic development and allied support for nations which dont have a robust local production ability eg China can churn out F-7s and J-8s irrespective of external factors to a large degree. PAF otoh is reliant on above two factors, which right now are limitations.
It has truly made hay out of the War on Terror, agreed – and acquired/ repaired many capabilities, but how long will it last? Thats the point about being dependent on external aid.
After the new Govt came, we have had many reports of fudged economic data from earlier & claims of a refocus on civilian priorities. Also, the increased focus in the US on Pak spending is also a dampener, from the Pak POV.
OTOH, Pak fora talk of JSFs being inducted, a 200 strong F-16 fleet and what not – I find these unrealistic in the extreme.
Well Nick, IFR assets are already on order. As for LRAAMs, yes I have been hearing about them for longer than I care to remember.
How many IFR assets have been ordered, and you do realise that the PAF needs them far more than the IAF.
The IAF can even hit Pak bases with Bisons- it has Jaguars, MiG-27s and MKIs which can range deep without IFR into Pak, as it is. Even the Mirage 2000s. Eg at Kargil, Mirage 2000s would fly from Central India, bomb in Kashmir & return – without IFR. Now consider the distances involved, and the assets, especially the rank & file Mirage & F-7 & tell me, who needs IFR more?
Even without LRAAM, do you think a SAAB AEW&C platform wont be affected by half a dozen RVV-AEs fired at it? The IAF has the numbers to “surge” the escort package as well.
I guess, you have to make do with the best you have. Dont you?:) I think Pakistan has known for a long time that in terms of weapons, India will always have the edge…and this is precisely why they have the sort of nuclear doctorine they have. And I could only assume that with passing time the threshold on Pakistani side will come down further.
Are you even serious to suggest that Pak will keep lowering its nuclear doctrine? What happens then, when India rescinds its NFU, is this a risk which any sane Pak security manager will take, surely not.
Second, even in the case of nuclear war, Pak comes out the loser – which is worse, to lose a brief conventional conflict & make political concessions or be wiped out? Any Pak military leader with a clear head, would make the rational choice.
Nick, I dont think you need to remind Pakistan that they dont have the sort of budget to compete with India. I think PAF realises that fully well, but I hope you realise that its precisely because of this big bully brother attitude that India does not have too many friends in its immediate neighbourhood.
I am sure Pak has a lot to teach India about making friends – like Afghanistan loves Pak & so does India. On any given day, I think we both know the reality, so lets leave the political gerry mandering aside please.
Second – I am not reminding Pakistan, I am just pointing out to you, that your forecasts for the PAF may edge on the unrealistic.
In any case, how many of these machines will you be able to deploy on your western borders in a war with Pakistan? Will IAF be willing to ignore all other sectors and deploy its full strength on its western front? On another note, every other day I hear about Chinese increasingly violating LAC. Do you think, IAF will ignore all that? Right now PLAAF has hundreds of flankers, is updating them, and producing J-10s at 2-3 per month? What does IAF intend to do about that?
Which is the point about the IAFs MRCA acquisition & its PAK-FA project.
For the PAF, the current MiG-29/ Mirage/ Bison & MiG-27 fleet backed up by a core of Flankers is sufficient, which is what I have reiterated.
Second, the entire bit about Force Multipliers is exactly that – India doesnt require them as much against Pak, but against the PRC which is why they are being acquired.
The IA for instance has moved from 9 attackers to 1 defender axiom, to 2.5 to 1, on account of better technology.
Second, the PLAAF also has to do a split between IAF & its other threat perceptions. The J-10s coming in will help to offset the earlier numbers of obsolete fighters being moved out.
Please understand the difference – the IAF plans for a two front war & hence their urgent representations to the GOI when they felt that strength was declining (which GOI addressed to some degree by upgrade clearance, extra MKIs etc). But you are relying on this worst case scenario as “fact” – when it has never occurred so far.
All 4 conflicts with Pak & the PRC never intervened directly.
PAF will be getting 28 refurbished F-16s from US, and the contract is for 60 MLU kits. I think, this should give a good indication as to how many F-16s PAF will have.
Which are the numbers I posted above. And the MLU orders are IIRC “notifications” by the DSCA.
Nothing is guaranteed Nick…but interests. Using this very logic though, does IAF have any guarantees that Russia will not supply flankers/Migs to PAF in coming years either directly or through China? Re-export of RD-93 for JF-17 was an indication, and why do you think that happened? I have no doubt that India will go ahead with signing the nuclear deal with USA in near future, and it wont be all that easy for India to balance its strategic partnerships with both US and Russia at the same time when the latter two have such diverse interests.
Given the PAK-FA project & the variety of projects planned w/Russian cooperation, I’d say that depending on “hopes” of “Russia will supply flankers/Migs to PAF in coming years either directly or through China” is moonshine to be honest.
A few Mi-17s and a few engines are one thing, to hope for export Flankers & MiGs, to add to the PAFs logistical menagerie is to stretch the currency of hope a bit too far.
India has so far managed to balance its relationship with the Russians & US- economic incentives allow the same. The Russians have been ok with it – most issues between India & Russia are on account of inflation & price disputes- and to date, all have been resolved.
Incidentally, this is why it is also rational that the J-10 wont come to Pak till the local Chinese engine ramps up to full scale production & acceptable standards of MTBF etc. Doubt whether AL-31FNs will head to Pak anytime soon. Given the trouble the PAF has had with the RD-93 export issue, I doubt they will want to go through the same pain again & years of wrangling via the PRC’s intervention.
That is why I said 2015 to start with.
In addition to AMRAAMs, there will be SD-10 and most likely MICA, thought their present BVRAAM on Mirages is likely to have gone by then. As for numbers, I dont think any AF will be using them like normal ammo rounds. They are expensive weapons, and even IAF pilots wouldn’t use them unless they are quite reasonably sure about traget and success.
“Most likely” is not a confirmed order is it? By your own standards, I may add ” I have been hearing about the above from ages”.
But hearing it and having it happen is another thing.
As of now, all we know of are the AMRAAMs, the SD-10 at least is logical given that the JF-17s are mostly A2A and PGM integration will only occur later.
Mica & French avionics? Its on paper – yet. Like all the talks the PAF had with Thales & Dassault to purchase the Mirage 2000-V including detailed evaluations only to fail @ the financial stage.
Well, again you have come to the wrong conclusion about me ‘assuming’ something.:)
Have I? Even SOC mentioned the facts as they stand. I mean, talk is one thing, but the truth is that the PAF has no Sparrows etc.
So lets end this discussion on a good note, and we will start it all again when IAF will have all MMRCA, Phalcons, LCA, LRAAMs in operational service.:)
The point being made was that even without a significant chunk of the above programs, the PAF will have a tough time facing current challenges.
Which brings me to the original point which I was making, which irritated you to no end and hence this entire diversion.
That the PAF will have to replan its planned JF-17 centric force structure to be more than a “force in survival” and actually be a “Deterrent force”, as you insisted it already was and its current planning would make it.
To be a deterrent, it will have to acquire capabilities which actually deter the IAF and IA not just pose the former, a challenge which they have already planned for & can meet. That was my simple point.
Nick_76There is no obsolete SA-2 based junk as there is no obsolete MiG-21 based junk in both forces in general. Both are parts of a net-work and when updated with a state of art tracking system or AAM-system still have some bite to be taken seriously.
Sens this is all theory – in reality, despite upgrades, the IAF S-125s arent getting any younger, and the PAF SA-2 based SAMs are also likewise. Also, unlike the IAF S-125s, I havent heard of any upgrades being performed on these old clunkers. Add the performance limitations of these early gen systems, and I am not too sure the PAF will retain them.
My guess is that the new SPADA-2000s will replace these missiles at the earliest.
The hype about some state of the art weapons is not justified, because that are prone to counter measures like the “old-systems” before, when not upgraded constantly.
Point is that IAF already has countermeasures to current gen systems in service such as SARH missiles. IIR seeker equipped missiles would be much harder to counter.
Range is no value in itself, without the most advanced IFF to make some use of. Do never aspect, that your opponent will fight to your most favorable conditions. The one with the tactical surprise has the first fire and kill opportunity always.
Simplest IFF – I have no birds in the air, fire at anything that moves. Jokes apart, range does matter, it testifies to the ability of a missile to conduct sustained maneuvers over a period of time when fired well within its max envelope. Not just conk out within a couple of turns.
Nick_76This is one post (or reply) from you that smells ‘professional’ from 1st to the last word. Very well phrased and I find myself in full agreement with you.
Good to hear that
Nick_76The confirmed F-16 order is for 96 birds (including the confirmed option of 18)
http://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article14.html
http://www.f-16.net/news_article1869.html
Shows only 18 F-16s ordered. Plus 2 delivered for goodwill by the USAF.
The US has also offered to provide 26 F-16s from its fleet, refurbished and brought upto Block 50/52 standards. But its also not confirmed; out of the above, 10 F-16s were to be handed over this year, all in all. They would be MLU’ed separately
Like I said, around 60 aircraft in all. Thats just 3 squadrons worth. And given the new chill in Pak- US ties, more supplies may be delayed.
Second, “confirmed options” doesnt compute, does it? Options are after all, options. Recently, the new Pak Govt cancelled/ delayed the 18 F-16 options iirc.
JF-17 wont be alone. The J-10 and the F-16 will be there too. But you are correct about the 150 number. The confirmed order is only for 150 as yet. The 250 is something the Air chief talked about. However, they may go for the extra J-10s if the J-x is delayed.
But even the J-10s arent confirmed yet, which was exactly my point.
Please remember these plans were drawn up when the PAF was happy with the way things were going with US assistance. Now, the press is full of reports over US displeasure over the new Pak Govt go slow in the WOT, and doubts about continued financial assistance.
The point is – if the Pak AF has to pay its own way for each acquisition without US mil assistance, it will have to reduce/ scale back its plans even further. Which is probably why the above plans havent been confirmed, whether about J-10s or extra F-16s.
If the PAF stops JF-17 acquisition at 150, then they may well go for extra J-10s instead. But given that the JF-17s are to be made locally, i doubt they will stop at 150. Also, even thought the J-10s are not yet ordered, they are officially part of the planned PAF acquisitions. The only reason PAF may not get more then 50 J-10s is if the chinese J-X 5th gen plane comes along around 2020. That may change the PAF plans a bit.
My take is that if US aid to Pak is curtailed, and the new civilian Govt (justifiably) looks towards non military expenditure as a priority, then even the JF-17 program will be inducted/ take place slowly, with the J-10 orders- if placed, taking over from the JF-17.
J-XX or whatever is a paper plane at this point of time, its costing, its development, everything is unknown – let alone whether it will enter service in 2020 and whether the PAF can afford it.
And I just checked the Mirage 3 bit, a few years back, the PAF CAS, said that the Mirage 3 ROSE1’s would last beyond 2010 and that he was ok with them, but they had been heavily used and ideally he would prefer new aircraft.
We are already at 2008..
The PAF missed the bus on this IMO.
The ROSE1 Mirage 3’s should have been made BVR capable, and a few nonupgraded Mirages attached to each squadron to pull the regular flight hours and safeguarded the remaining airframe life on these birds. Would have been useful capability.
All Hawkeyes around the world are for the navy officially. But that hasn’t stopped their use by the airforces. 3 hawkeyes for the navy is an overkill if you ask me. They are likely to be used by the AF. Pak Navy doesnt have its own air arm as far as i know.
Pak Navy does have its own air arm – it operates the LRMP fleet of P3s and Atlantiques- which btw, for Paks size is quite a challenge for India.
The Indian Navy has only two real areas of concern viz Pak Navy- the sub fleet (which is being countered with the renewed focus on modern sonars of various types on all IN ships + new choppers) and the Pak LRMP fleet.
After all – that is why the IN is so bent upon the Gorshkov- it provides the essential outer air cover from the PNs missile carriers. This, despite the IAF being available for suppression of PN & onboard assets for close protection such as the Barak, Kashtan, Shtil etc.
Which only goes to show that at the end of the day, every service prefers to build its own capability.
The PN’s Hawkeyes are definitely meant for the PN and PN alone. The PN would justifiably claim they need it for monitoring their area of ops.
But they havent been ordered yet as well, only an indication of sale provided by USG, ie tentative clearance by Govt. pending Congress ratification.
Nick_76Probably not. Posting 15 in a row tends to get your posts ignored.
Tell me about it. The posts may be full of data and passion, but simply too much text. 😀
BTW, is this “Blackcat” from earlier on Forum? Same defence of Russia and Gorshkov.
Nick_76More on the Indian Army’s recent exercise – Brazen Chariots, intended to validate Cold Start
Nick_76Full scale war does not make sense between atom-forces.
No real winner, just losses to an unpredictable degree.
After the first week of fighting the UN will force a stop at all.
Sens, look up Cold Start, the Indian Army’s new doctrine.
Ok, found a good paper on it.
Dr Kapila is an Indian Army instructor.
INDIA’S NEW “COLD START” WAR DOCTRINE STRATEGICALLY REVIEWED
by Dr Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations: India unveiled officially its new war doctrine on April 28, 2004 at the Army Commander’s Conference that took place last week. Obviously, the need for a new war doctrine was decades-long overdue, but it seems that the lessons of the Kargil War reinforced by the severe limitations imposed on the Indian Army in the run-up to and during Operation PRAKARAM in 2001-2002 hastened the Indian military hierarchy towards this end.
General Padmanabhan the Chief of Army Staff at the time of Operation PRAKARAM had initiated the process of formulating a new war doctrine and the fruitation now seems to have taken place after a series of major joint exercises between the Indian Army and Indian Air Force including massive live fire power demonstrations.
It seems that the new Cold War Strategy would now be discussed at various levels of three Services and fine tuned. Needless to say that in any future conflict scenario where a “blitzkrieg” type strategy is going to be followed; joint operations involving the Indian Army, Indian Air Force and Indian Navy would be an imperative.
Security requirements did not permit the spelling out of adequate details of the “Cold Start Strategy” by the Chief of Army Staff. However, it is not difficult to visualize what this new war doctrine conceptually incorporates as it is said to revolve around the employment of “integrated battle groups” for offensive operations.
Such strategy did exist in NATO and was being taught at the Royal British Army Staff College. Camberley, UK which the author attended in 1971. In NATO terminology, “integrated” groups for offensive operations existed at three levels. The highest was “ combat group” and “combat command” based on a divisional or brigade Headquarters (armoured/infantry mechanised) under which were a flexible number of “battle groups” (based on an armoured regiment/mechanized infantry battalion Headquarters) and the lowest was the “combat team” (based on an armoured squadron/mechanized infantry company Headquarters). The groupings at the each level were task-oriented in terms of varying composition of armour and infantry elements with integrated attack helicopters of the Army Aviation and the Air Force besides close support of ground attack Air Force squadrons. Also, was integrated Army Aviation surveillance helicopters. Command and control helicopters were available too.
Media, reports indicate that the new “Cold Start Strategy” visualizes the use of eight “integrated battle groups”. For the purposes of this strategic review the eight “integrated battle groups” being talked about will be taken to mean eight integrated armoured division/mechanized infantry division sized forces with varying composition of armour, artillery, infantry and combat air support- all integrated. This would be a fair assumption to be made for our discussion in case the intended aim of this new war doctrine is to be achieved.
The unveiling of a new war doctrine throws up a host of factors for discussion in terms of why a new war doctrine is required, what are the attendant factors in putting it into operation, the limiting factors that may come into play, the responses of the enemy to such a new war doctrine and a host of other associated considerations.
“Cold Start” War Doctrine-The Strategic Conceptual Underpinnings: In the absence of more details, and rightfully not spelt out due to security reasons, the strategic conceptual underpinnings of India’s new war doctrine can be envisaged as under:
* Indian Army’s combat potential would be fully harnessed. The distinction between “strike corps” and “defensive corps” in ground holding role will be gradually diminished.
* The offensive military power available with defensive corps in the form of independent armoured brigades and mechanized brigades, by virtue of their forward locations would no longer remain idle waiting to launch counterattacks. They would be employed at the first go and mobilized within hours.
* Strike Corps may be re-constituted and reinforced to provide offensive elements for these eight or so “battle groups” to launch multiple strikes into Pakistan, fully integrated with the Indian Air Force and in the Southern Sector with naval aviation assets.
* Obviously, then, India’s strike corps elements will have to be moved well forward from existing garrisons. It also means that Strike Corps would no longer sit idle waiting for the opportune moment, which never came in the last three wars. The Strike Corps remained unutilised.
On another plane that is at the politico-strategic or politico-military level this new war doctrine seems to be aiming at the following:
* Cutting out long drawn out military mobilization running into weeks.
* The above results in loss of surprise at the strategic and military level.
* The above also gives time to Pakistan’s external patrons like USA and China to start exerting coercive pressures and mobilizing world opinion against India as witnessed in Operation Prakaram.
* Long mobilization time also gives the political leadership in India time to waver under pressure, and in the process deny Indian Army its due military victories.
* The new war doctrine would compel the political leadership to give political approval ‘ab-initio’ and thereby free the Armed Forces to generate their full combat potential from the outset.
Cold Start Strategy” is Aimed at Pakistan and is Offensive Oriented- The Pakistan Army, (not the Pakistani people) has a compulsive fixation for military adventurism against India, notwithstanding the Islamabad Accord January 2004.
India in the past has been hamstrung in cutting Pakistan to size due to a combination of United States pressures coming into play in the run-up to decisive military action and the hesitancy of India’s political leadership. Military surprise was lost due to long mobilization times. The “ Cold Start Strategy” can be said to be aimed militarily at Pakistan and is offensive-operations specific.
“Cold Start Strategy”- The Indian Political Parameters That Need to Come into Play: Such an offensive strategy can only be successful if the Indian political leadership at the given time of operational execution of this strategy has:
* Political will to use offensive military power.
* Political will to use pre-emptive military strategies.
* Political sagacity to view strategic military objectives with clarity.
* Political determination to pursue military operations to their ultimate conclusion without succumbing to external pressures.
* Political determination to cross nuclear threshold if Pakistan seems so inclined.
If the above are missing, as they have been from 1947 to 2004, Indian Army’s new war doctrine would not add up to anything. For more detailed views on this subject, see the authors recent book: “India’s Defence Policies and Strategic Thought: A Comparative Analysis” (reviewed on SAAG website as “Igniting Strategic Mindsets in Indians:; SAAG paper no. 657 dated 09-04-2003)
India’s National Military Directives Need Change: Indian Governments, irrespective of political hues have shied away from enunciating India’s national interests from which flows all military planning. However, what can be called as a sort of national military directive, which the Indian Army under political compulsions stands fixated is “No Loss of Territory, Not Even an Inch”. Heads have rolled in the Army on this account in past wars.
“Cold Start Strategy” with its inherent character of mobile warfare using mechanized military formations, and especially where defensive formations may be called upon to undertake such operations, may at times involve some loss of territory in plains warfare.
If the above is not acceptable then strategically and militarily the status quo needs to be maintained with Indian Army fixated on linear defences. This author had argued against this as early as 1985 in an article “India’s Linear Fixations” in the Combat Journal of what is now called the Army War College.
India’s Strategic Military Objectives Needs to be Made Clear: India’s strategic military objectives need to:
* Shift from capturing bits of Pakistan territory in small scale multiple offensives to be used as bargaining chips after the cease fire.
* Focus on the destruction of the Pakistani Army and its military machine without much collateral damage to Pakistani civilians.
All the three armed forces have to synergise operations towards destruction of the Pakistan Army as it is that which enslaves Pakistan, impedes democracy in Pakistan and indulges in military adventurism against India, including proxy wars and terrorism.
It is for nothing that the Pakistani military rulers and the Pakistani Army have hid from the Pakistani nation the causes of their military failure against India in 1971, 1999 (Kargil) and a catastrophic defeat in January 2002 if India’s political leadership had not restrained the Indian Army during Operation Prakaram. “Cold Start Strategy” should therefore be aimed at the destruction of the Pakistan Army’s military machine. India’s Army Commanders can infer what this implies.
“Cold Start” War Doctrine-The Imperatives of Dedicated Air Force Close Air Support and Dedicated Ground Attack Squadrons: The Indian Air Force (IAF) would have a very crucial and critical role to play in the successful implementation of this new war doctrine. The “Cold Start” eight or so “battle groups” cannot undertake “blitzkrieg” type military operations without an overwhelming air superiority and integrated close air support.
The IAF would therefore have to proportionately assign its combat assets to cater for the following:
* Achieve overall air superiority so as to paralyse the enemy’s Air Force or render it so ineffective as to be unable to seriously affect the area of operations of the “Cold Start” offensive “battle groups”.
* Dedicate a fair portion of its combat assets for the air defence of the Indian homeland.
* Earmark dedicated close air support and ground attack squadrons in direct support of the “battle groups”.
The IAF would be hard pressed to execute the tasks from within its existing combat assets. Earlier, the IAF could initially allocate all its combat assets to achieve air superiority as any operations by “strike corps” would hope to subsequently follow.
In the new war doctrine scenario all these tasks would have to be concurrent. It was such a visualization that made this author in his strategic papers (“ India’s Strategic and Security 2004 Imperatives”: SAAG Paper no 884 dated 06.01.2004) reiterate that the IAF needs at least 70 combat squadrons. India has the financial resources to afford them. In any case even disconnecting from the new war doctrine requirements the IAF needs 70 combat squadrons in the context of India’s revised strategic frontiers discussed in an earlier paper of this author.
Indian Navy Aviation Support for “Battle Groups”: Besides its traditional tasks of sea control, naval blockades etc. the naval aviation support for the “battle groups” operations is a welcome step in filling some of the voids of IAF combat assets besides dividing the enemy’s aerial combat strength.
The Indian Navy, more importantly should concurrently be focusing in the new war doctrine scenario on amphibious operations deep in the enemy’s rear, so that Pakistan is forced to fight on three fronts, and in the process its resistance is fragmented.
India Will Have to Use Conventional Short Range Battle Field Missiles (SRBM) and Cruise Missiles: The entire success of ‘Cold Start” war doctrine would overwhelmingly rest on the application of long range devastating fire power and this would perforce have to include conventional SRBMs and cruise missiles.
Use of SRBMs and cruise missiles will not only help in softening enemy’s ‘Vulnerable Areas’ and ‘Vulnerable Points’ but also thicken fire support assisting “battle groups” operations. These assets would more increasingly be required in support of “battle groups” operations in case of bad weather when IAF combat power cannot be applied.
Associated with this would be India’s imperatives to accelerate her ICBM development and production which is India’s sovereign right. “Cold Start” war doctrine without ICBM back up would be susceptible to external pressures.
Inventories of these weapons have to be significantly expanded and the time is now to jump-start India’s defence production apparatus to this end.
Special Forces and Air Assault Capabilities Expansion and Employment in New War Doctrine: The successful implementation of the new war doctrine for force multiplication effect, for reinforcing the offensive punch and for exploitation of fleeting apparatus in fast paced military operations would call for sizeable employment of :
* Special Forces
* Air Assault Divisions.
* Air Cavalry brigades.
* Light infantry divisions with air-transportable combat power.
In the ‘Cold Start’ war doctrine scenario widespread use of the above forces including the capture and holding of airheads behind enemy lines would confuse the enemy, divide his reaction and counterattacks and spread panic. The Indian Army’s capabilities in this direction are limited and need to be comprehensive enhanced.
Logistic Support For Cold War Doctrine: Such operations which can be expected to be swift, fluid and rapidly changing directions of attack cannot rest for logistic requirements on Indian Army’s conventional logistic support which is ground based and wheel-based and incapable of swift cross country mobility.
Indian Army’s own aviation assets and heavier utility helicopters of the IAF would need significant mustering for logistic support of “Cold Start” battle group.
India’s strategic stockpiles of fuel, ammunition and military hardware spares along with “War Wastage Reserves” will have to be maintained at full levels at all times to enable “Cold Start” war doctrines to take off. Without these at full levels ‘Cold Start’ operations may end up as cold start.
Pakistan’s Responses to India’s “Cold Start” War Doctrine Enunciation: India’s ‘ Cold Start’ war doctrine stands discussed in a recent Corps Commanders Conference of the Pakistan Army, and even amongst their strategic experts. Curiously, the discussions of the latter seem diverted to Pakistan’s special relationship with USA post 9/11 and there appears to be an implied assurance that the “special Pakistan-USA military relationship” would take care of the challenges posed to Pakistan by India’s new war doctrine. Pakistani strategic analysts view the enunciation of India’s “Cold Start” war doctrine as :
* Putting pressure on Pakistan prior to peace talks.
* The growing Pakistan-Bangladesh nexus is also curiously drawn in as an Indian concern requiring new war doctrines.
Surprisingly, no major military analysis has emerged so far Probably, it would take time to digest and come up with responses.
Pakistan’s Military Challenges Arising From India’s “Cold Start” War Doctrine: Strategically and militarily, it can be visualized that Pakistan would be faced with a number of military challenges arising from India’s new war doctrine, namely:
* India’s “surprise” factor in terms of when, where and how “Cold Start” battle group would be launched.
* Fighting the air-battle in an environment where the IAF has a significant superiority in numbers and quality of numerical strength.
* Devising a credible anti-ballistic missile defence.
* Re-constitution of Pakistan’s “strike corps” and its three ‘Army Reserve’ formations which were so far configured and located to take on India’s three “Strike Corps”.
* When and how does Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent and its doctrine of “First Use” comes into play.
* How to offset India’s overwhelming long range artillery fire support.
* How to counter India’s force projection capabilities deep in Pakistan’s rear.
Pakistan cannot combat the Indian challenges by the oft-repeated bravado statement that “One Pakistan Soldier is equal to ten Indian Soldiers” leading to strategic wags countering “what happens when the Eleventh Indian Soldier emerges”.
If the “Cold Start” doctrine is applied in its purist form, then in terms of military operations it does not become a game of military numbers but a game in terms of military technological superiority in terms of weapon systems, firepower and aerial combat assets besides the force multiplication effects of the Indian Navy.
Pakistan would have to divert sizeable financial resources for its weapon systems build-up to counter this doctrine. Of course, it can look to its external strategic patrons like USA and China for assistance and military largesse, but there is a limit here.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrent and the Myth of Pakistan’s Low Nuclear Threshold: The Indian political leadership and its national security establishment fed on US academia planted stories (probably officially inspired) of Pakistan nuclear deterrent and Pakistan’s low nuclear threshold have been inordinately awed by its fearful consequences.
Though this aspect is a subject of detailed analysis in a separate paper the following observations can be made:
* Pakistan has declared that it will go for nuclear strikes against India when a significant portion of its territory has been captured or likely to be captured. Secondly, when a significant destruction of the Pakistani military military machine has taken place or when Pakistani strategic assets (read nuclear deterrent) are endangered.
* India’s “Cold Start” war doctrine does not seem to be allowing Pakistan to reach at the above conclusions by indulging in deep long range penetrative strikes.
* The Indian doctrine seems to be aimed at inflicting significant military reverses on the Pakistan Army in a limited war scenario short of a nuclear war.
* Nuclear war fare is not a “commando raid” or “command operation” with which its present military ruler is more familiar. Crossing the nuclear threshold is so fateful a decision that even strong American Presidents in the past have baulked at exercising it or the prospects of exercising it.
* Pakistan cannot expect that India would sit idle and suffer a Pakistani nuclear strike without a massive nuclear retaliation.
* Pakistan’s external strategic patrons can coerce or dissuade both sides to avoid a nuclear conflict, but once Pakistan uses a nuclear first strike no power can restrain India from going in from its nuclear retaliation and the consequences for Pakistan in that case stand well discussed in strategic circles. Pakistan would stand wiped out.
When the obvious intention of India’s new war doctrine is not to cross the nuclear threshold, and it seems declaratory in content, then a higher responsibility rests on Pakistan’s external strategic patrons that their wayward protégé does not charge foolishly and blindly into the realms where even fools or the devil do not dare.
Pakistan’s crossing the nuclear threshold has crucial implications for USA and China too. In fact a USA-China conflict can be generated which may have its own nuclear overtones. Therefore it is incumbent on both USA and China to strategically declare that they would not countenance any Pakistani first nuclear strike against India i.e. crossing the nuclear threshold.
Pakistan proclivities to threaten nuclearisation of an Indo-Pakistan conventional conflict is more of a blackmail to force USA and China’s intervention. And if sincerely both USA and China are interested in South Asian peace and global security then Pakistan’s nuclear proclivities have to be pre-empted now with a strategic declaration against Pakistan as above.
India, in any case, has to be prepared militarily, eitherway, notwithstanding any such caution that may be imposed on Pakistan.
Concluding Observations: From the Indian perspective, enunciation of a new war doctrine was long overdue and it is significant for the following reasons:
* India now plans and is ready to act offensively against Pakistan for any perceived acts of strategic destabilization of India and proxy war and terrorism
* India moves away from its defensive mindset of last 50 year plus.
* India will now prepare to undertake offensive military operations at the out set.
* India has in declaratory tones enunciated that it will undertake offensive operations short of the nuclear threshold
The Indian Army, despite any limitations in its hierarchy of not being forceful to make the political leadership in the last 50 years plus to adopt strategies which are strategically desirable but may be politically distasteful, has done well this time to bring India’s war doctrine in public debate. The vast majority of the Indian public will be in support of any war doctrine that puts Pakistan into place and forces it to desist from proxy war and terrorism against India.
From the Pakistani perspective the following needs to be recognized with the enunciation of India’s new war doctrine:
* India will undertake offensive operations against Pakistan without giving Pakistan time to bring diplomatic leverages into play against India.
* India has declaratorily implied that in such offensive operations against Pakistan it will not cross the nuclear threshold nor prompt Pakistan into crossing it. Should Pakistan opt for crossing the threshold the onus lies squarely on Pakistan.
The United States and China have not come out with any response so far. Nor should they since national security interests of India need to be respected, as those of a responsible, politically stable and a mature regional power which has exercised restraint even to the extent of being ridiculed for its restraint.
Since a nuclear conflict initiated by Pakistan has global overtones and has the potential to bring them to conflict with each other, both the United States and China need to strategically declare that they will not countenance Pakistan, initiating a nuclear conflict in South Asia. Alternatively both USA and China, as Permanent Members of the UN Securing Council initiate steps jointly, to bring Pakistan’s (failed state WMD proliferator) nuclear assets under international control to be released only in the event of a nuclear threat.
Lastly, it needs to be reiterated that India may never have to put into effect its new “Cold Start” war doctrine if the United States and China restrain their wayward military protégé i.e. Pakistan from military adventurism and military brinkmanship. Also if United States and China wish to add value to their relationships with India, they need to desist from equating India with Pakistan when it comes to the prospects of the nuclear conflict in South Asia. India’s strategic maturity is not in doubt; it is Pakistan’s strategic maturity, which is in doubt. A nuclear conflict will take place in South Asia, only if the United States wants it and lets Pakistan permissively cross the nuclear threshold.
(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email drsubhashkapila @yahoo.com)
The part in bold deals with the IAFs contribution, which is why in part imo, the IAF is now seeking to go for punch and quality both, and not just letting matters be.
They realise that the next war will require a lot of them as they support the Army.
Nick_76The plan to the PAF is to have a 1 is to 3 ratio. They believe this is more then enough for them to have credible deterrence against the IAF. The PAF is never going to match IAF in numbers which is a much larger and better equipped force. But the 1 is to 3 ratio is something PAF is comfortable living with.
The planned structure of the PAF is for
100 F-16s (all Amraam and HMS equipped)
Planned is right. Because current orders are ~ half of that.
150 to 250 JF-17s (all SD-10 and HMS equipped)
Again, timelines & like I posted, JF-17s alone wont cut it.
50 to 100 J-10s. (all SD10 and HMS equipped)
Again, no confirmed orders afaik. Please correct me if I am wrong. But I do think the J-10 will quietly replace the JF-17 in the PAF planning.
5 Erieyes (+ hawkeye2000 perhaps? not sure what happened to that)
I though Hawkeye 2000 was for PN
The above is more then enough for all the PAF needs given that it will be defending and not an attacking force and as such will be fighting over its own territory.
Like I said – you are taking the maximal optimistic numbers- I havent seen any confirmed orders approaching the same, yet. Plus timelines need to be considered, when these will be inducted, operationalized etc.
Nick_76If they really wanted to make a difference they’d turn to China for the HQ-9. Should be cheaper than a comparable Russian-made system. They have some experience with Chinese strategic SAMs after all, with their single HQ-2 battery near Islamabad 😀 India is of course currently no better off in the SAM regard, relying primarily on a bunch of S-125 batteries to defend military airfields.
IAF S-125s have been upgraded over the years with more modern solid state electronics plus optics for tracking/engaging targets in heavy EW & FLIR for night time ops. They are backed up by SA-8’s, and finally airmen with Igla’s. The IGLA-S is also being procured iirc. Even so, they need to go.
IAF’s SAM problems can be summarised as such: “a taste for wine, a penny in the purse”. The Akash recently cleared trials, but the IAF has ordered 2 squadrons to begin with, hoping they get more moolah for more fancy longer ranged stuff if they procrastinate/ whine enough. But with the IAI-DRDO JV to develop a 70 KM LRSAM for the IAF running into a brick wall (allegations of IAI shady dealing). The Trishul finally cleared trials. But it wasnt good enough for the IAF, nosirree, never mind the similar Defender system is in production and being exported. So they ordered the latest gee whiz Spyder.
Now the Spyder deal (for some 18 units iirc) stuck likewise, thanks to the IAI go slow.
End remsult, ore Akash are likely to be ordered in 3 years time, after the first two squadrons are delivered.
By 2012, there is a plan to operationalize and induct the two tier ABM system at key cities, which are currently guarded by the old S-125’s. The second missile in the ABM system is the AAD, which is performance wise, very competitive, even if expensive, as a SAM.
So at the very least, the Akash & the above will take over from the S-125s bit by bit. Come the next Govt, in a couple of years time, expect some big ticket deals.
The Spyder and LRSAM are likely to be cleared for one.
Coming to the PAF, the HQ-9 @ 70-90 Km is good, but I doubt whether the PAF can afford it in substantial number.
Nick_76Recent talk? It was as early as July 2004, Alan warnes of AFM quoted JF-17 Chief Project Director talking about the possibility of increasing the number of JF-17 beyond 150.
2004 is recent? 😮
Things change in a matter of days when it comes to threat perception.
Were the specifics of the IAF’s MRCA contest, its upgrades, its extra 40 MKIs, etc etc all known in 2004 “for sure”? I think not.
Like I said – if the PAF goes all JF-17, the winner is the IAF, but I think the PAF will plump for a third fighter as well in more number, and come to its senses and rationalize on somewhere around 6-8 squadrons of the JF-17.
If PAF has to cut its requirements due to financial/other crunches, i.e. J-10/F-16, I think it would make more sense for them to make it up with more JF-17. However, what i find surprising is that ‘coming from a PAF official its for public consumption (which is plausible)’, but ‘coming from an IAF official, its always from the horse’s mouth’. Speaking frankly, have you have uttered the very words when quoting IAF/DRDO officials?
I have always taken the IAF’s/ DRDO’s pronouncements as “indicative” – not the cent per cent, will be so, in this manner “onlee”!
For instance, I have pointed out that current IAF minimum @ very least planning for the LCA- confirmed, stands at six squadrons, with a couple from the Navy, and with the possibility of several more, because of force perceptions and funding. But I quote the minimum requirements despite there being umpteen sources citing a LCA order of 220 from the IAF itself and many more after that. Doesnt hurt to be conservative, does it? I am fully aware of the fact that even as the IAF had originally planned for upto 400 LCAs to replace its vast MiG-21 fleet, the threat perception from China changed, so they upped the numbers of MKIs and MRCAs to compensate.
Same applies to the PAF. Fact is that the JF-17 simply isnt substantial enough to combat a heavy + medium fighter force. 250 Gripen NG’s? Ok – you have a chance. 250 JF-17s with 2-3 squadrons of F-16s and a couple of J-10 squadrons, all inducted over two decades? Its not good enough.
With regard to ‘defend itself’, well if Bisons (when was the upgrade contract signed exactly and have they been continuously upgraded) can hold their own against F-15Cs/F-16 blk 50s (one of IAF former ACM called them equivalent of F-15), I dont understand why JF-17 won’t be able to defend itself when operating in the presence of Erieye, refuellers and SAMs etc.
Read into the context. The Bisons are good when they operate to their strengths and when there are other fighters ie force, not just force multipliers to cover their weaknesses.
When there are Flankers to trade the long range BVR shots by F-15s for eg at Cope India.
Now where are your Flankers? How long can you keep your JF-17 in the air? How many IFR assets will you acquire to obtain similar ability? What happens when your “eye”, the Erieye has to move back out of ops because it has LRAAMs heading its way?
Or when the GBAD ADGES is degraded thanks to repeated Kh-31 strikes? The IAF, has numbers AND quality on its side. The PAF, in your example, will have to make do without BOTH. The Flanker vs JF-17. The Phalcon vs the Erieye.
No ARM’s vs ARM’s..who has the initiative? Start thinking in the total sense, where you are under threat from a quantitatively superior force, and with technology also on their side, and a network more comprehensive than yours – is it fair?
Just for a quick check – while you are talking of the future, as near as it may be- IAF MKIs already datalink with each other, and there are 3 squadrons operational, with a squadron being added each year. They need no Phalcon to do so. The Bars, as you’d know is quite powerful in its own right to serve as a long range sensor. The IAF MiG-29s already had the Lazur system. The Su-30K’s came with another one, which I doubt the IAF would have chucked, should work fine with the Su-30 MKI as well.
Being flexible…this is what some call it.:) They are keeping all their options.
Options dont come from thin air. They have to plan now to execute tomorrow.
For all my jibes at the IAF, for once they have managed to cover themselves despite the umpteen delays in the MRCA program. They did this, by ordering 37 new build Jaguars to DARIN2 standard, and 40 new MKIs, not to mention the new LCHs, and the extra force multipliers which are already inducted and more tranches are being procured. I wouldnt have believed they could manage it, and they still arent out of the woods fully, but they did get some quick fixes in place.
But what options does the PAF have? Does it have the budget, the wherewithal to pull these tricks?
Handful? They had 32+2 F-16s (excluding the 4 recent arrivals). If you add 18 new ones with 28 refurbished ones (all will arrive before 2015 and upgraded), that takes the total to 80, and I think the option for 18 Blk 50s would also be exercised at some timepoint in future. All in all they will have 5-6 squadrons of F-16s, which will roughly speaking be a quarter of PAF’s strengh. Although this might be handful for IAF, that is not the case with PAF. All these machines will be AMRAAM capable (and HMD compatible…yes the cueing systems have been ordered), and Im sure you are aware that PAF has already ordered 500 AMRAAM for these.
For one, nobody knows for sure how many F-16s of the original batch are fully ops, being refurbished & being brought up. Second, with the current political problems between the US & Pakistan, are these F-16s even guaranteed?
Also consider the time that will be taken in bringing these upto a common standard. About 500 AMRAAMs- the IAF fleet is SPJ equipped and there is a towed decoy program underway. And at BVR exercises, undertaken at much closer ranges, ~20 nm, where the missile should have much more striking power, the F-16 hasnt exactly swept its opponents away in IAF eval. That apart, in terms of BVR rounds ordered, SIPRI has the IAF numbers & even the declared amounts, dwarf the PAF acquisition.
In addition, PAF is already in negotiations with Chinese for 300 SD-10 (I think that would be for their first batch of JF-17s), and their talks with French for RC-400/MICA are already in advanced stages. A lot of this will materialise before 2015. As for Rose Mirages, well they are already carrying a certain type, but lets keep everyone guessing (I wont say no more on this topic).:) BTW Have you ever seen a picture of a Rose Mirage with Mica (i tried to find it, but cosuld not)…though Im not saying it is or isnt MICA.
You cant find a picture of the ROSE with a Mica because it is not operational with the PAF. There was a demonstration picture of the Mica/ AASM with a ROSE Mirage at Paris for advertisement purposes, done up by Sagem. That was it, and the exhibitors admitted as such. Looks like you seem to have accepted it as fact, oh well.
And no, one cant “keep everyone guessing” because according to PAF fora, the ROSE Mirages have everything from a Jedi holocron to the Death Star, itself. It gets old, pretty quickly.
And coming to “negotiations”/”in advanced stages” – whats the point of shopping lists? I can start off with the Meteor being in IAF service since its on offer with the Gripen-NG, the EF and the Rafale per reports. This kind of speculation goes nowhere.
Frankly, bar one news report in Pak press which was a verbatim copy of some text on a Pak fora, there appears to be little to no secondary confirmation of even the SD-10 order.
As for the logic of putting new BVR type on Rose Mirage, well wasn’t I saying the very same thing about datalink on Bison?
Not really- my point was that a lot of the stuff on the Bison can be reused, you do realise that? Its key avionics components are standard across the MKI, the Jaguar Upg, the MiG-27 Upg as well. Its weaponry is common to the MKI and the MiG-27 as well, and the MiG-29 soon. So the IAF is not introducing anything new with the Bison- a lot of stuff on it can go to the other aircraft. That is not the case with introducing a third “hidden” BVR missile on the ROSE Mirage’s- all 42 in number, which are to be scrapped within the decade or soon thereafter. And the other fighters have political issues in reusing the ordinance.
I could only smile.:)
Smiling is perhaps the only thing left, when a rebuttal is out of grasp. If the PAF fights merely for its own existence, then all its doing is “tying up the IAF”, but the point is the IAF upgrades & force enhancements may not even allow that. In both 99 and 71, the PAFs impact on the war was all but absent. Conserve “ones assets” is fine, as a strategy & even understandable to an extent – but unless the ground war is won..the AFs existence is pyrrhic.
But Im so glad that sane minds in both countries seem to be getting the upper hand for the time being at least.
Professionals dont depend on crystal ball gazing. The IAF & the PAF will both prepare for what they have to face.
OK I will. But If i get sometime, I will also try to find an article containing a Mig-29 pilot’s experiences of its radar. May be you could then shed some light on superiority of the radars on IAF Mig-29.
Which would be interesting- “if” the radars on the IAF MiG-29s were still the same as those on non upgraded Warsaw Pact MiG-29s. The IAF MiG-29s have gone through basic upgrades to bring them to more modern N019 variant standards. And RVV-AE compatibility was also confirmed sometime back. Also, the IAF MiG-29s also received, without any fanfare- the new Tarang M1B RHAWS. And unlike several nations – the IAF operationalized the Lazur datalink system for the express purpose of reducing the original non upgraded N019s shortcomings. It was reported in 2002 itself.
And all the above is moot anyways, since the IAF has already signed up for a new MiG-29 upgrade, which includes:
The Zhuk ME btw, is, as a system more powerful, at least in A2A, to the APG-68 the PAF is getting.
In the meantime, I could only salute IAF’s love for peace as they let those rogue F-16s get away.
ROE’s- as simple as that.
The IAF’s MiG-29s locked onto the PAF F-16s across the LOC, forced them to disengage from the MiG-27 package that the MiG-29s were targeting, and that was that. Their job was done.
You can read more about it on Acig.org where a PAF pilot talks about it. He incidentally mentions that one of the F-16 pilots was a greenhorn who was very shaken by the experience and ribbed about it by his peers on landing.
Nor was the above the only incident. There were other MiG-29 lockons on F-16s as well. A public vidclip of a MiG-29 Pilot talking about the F-16s is available on the net too.
Occams razor – the PAF certainly had no Sparrows in 1999.
Nick_76That only makes it all the more suprising that Pakistan has yet to try and deploy anything remotely resembling a modern ground-based air defense network. It’s not as glamorous as a fleet of brand new F-16s but can be very effective if designed and deployed properly.
All about money, really. They simply dont have the money to either develop their own systems or purchase real high end stuff.
Their radar network was quite good a time back, but subsequent economic problems & sanctions bit into it. Now, with US largesse and purchases of lower end Chinese systems, they are revamping it. They have a fair amount of earlier Crotale and RBS-70 systems, and the Chinese QW series. Then there is the Flak/Ack-Ack coverage.
All in all, the radar coverage should be quite good and in fact, with the Erieye it will be sufficient for their needs. Only problem is that the IAF is planning to take out those systems in depth and stocking up on a range of modern ARMs.
But PAFs true lacunae are in medium – high alt SAM systems, which could have at least defended these radar systems. They just have some truly obsolete SA-2 based junk.
Recently, they have purchased a bunch of ASPIDE based SAM systems, the SPADA-2000, but given how much Pak is paying for a bunch of SARH systems with only 25 km range, these wont deter long range attacks by MKIs using Kh-59 or Brahmos, or Kh-31 P. I have a feeling they have been ripped off, and some Generals lined their Swiss accounts. The VLS Mica would have been a much better (and more formidable) purchase. And a truly PITA (For the IAF) would have been the Aster.
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