well is this Cope-Ex thing with the IAF a regular feature or is it something like once in 4 years/once in a blue moon thing ??

I don’t think so.. First, IAF Mirages have RDM radars installed. Those are monopulse, pretty hard to upgrade to active AAMs.

How naive ? Upgrades can be more fundamental than tweaking an old radar.

How does the Bis-upg carry the R-77 ?? Sometimes an upgrade could also involve changing the whole radar. What prevents the French from installing the RDY on the 2K-H.

If teh US pilots did actually outperform the Indians, would they be able to talk about it!? Afterall, as stated, the F-22 PR machine could have kept them quiet…..

well if that indeed is the case then why are they fretting and fuming @ it till now ?? They should all know indeed that they are really superior and keep up the ‘pretences’. And this 3:1 logic does not convince me one bit. It is nothing that the Americans were not aware beforehand and on top of that 2 fighters that accompany the strike fighter are a2g planes like the MiG-23/Jag/MiG-27, their presence would have accounted for diddly squat, so what the hell is this crying and cribbing right now about ???

Shouldn’t the USAF have had at least the same amount of success when they were part of the strike package, ie when they were part of RedFor?

Exactly ! Can’t get a clue as to why there is so much hue and cry now ?

It all just seems like a PR-ex gone really really bad.

PAF pilots have been flying RD-93 powered FC-1 since April 2004. To the best of my knowledge, these r pilots straight from PAF and not the employees of CAC or PAC. Has russia raised any objections regarding this matter thus far???

I would like to second this quote here.

why should Russia have any objections if PAF pilots fly FC-1 in China? The objection, if I understood the report correctly, is over export of engines to a third country.

Flying a plane is different from using the engines on a model that is intended for export from the user country. If I am not mistaken that requires ‘complete trust’ and ‘explicit permission’.

And no, the R-37M does not have any “reverse flick” capability.

Well sir it surely does. I don’t know how they do it though. It does launch in the normal way and then it does a 180 deg. And I don’t think all the R-37M varients have that facility. The reverse launched AAs in certain models of the Su-30 are nothing but R-37M’s with this capability.

DRDO, IAF differ on LCA schedule ?
By Sandeep Dixit

NEW DELHI, OCT. 11. The Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) is apparently not amenable to the request by the Indian Air Force (IAF) to accelerate flight-testing of the indigenously-designed engine, Kaveri, for the light combat aircraft (LCA).

Highly-placed sources say that while no official letter has been sent to the IAF, the DRDO is unlikely to accede to the suggestion.

The Chief of the Air Staff, S. Krishnaswamy, had recently said that though work on developing India’s first combat aircraft was “slow,” it was “progressing reasonably well.” He had suggested that the DRDO conduct a quality review of the project and accelerate flight-testing.

Sources said the DRDO feels that the flight-testing timetable should not be tampered with, as compressing the schedule can lead to unforeseen problems. It feels that development of the LCA is the most complex and difficult project it has taken up so far. It will be happy to continue progressing slowly, rather than speed up things and face difficulties.

Replacing U.S. parts

The DRDO is confident that without accelerating the LCA schedule, the IAF will receive the first squadron of indigenous fighters by 2007. However, the planes will be fitted with American engines. If all goes well, the second squadron should have Kaveri engines.

Though it will publicly not admit it, the IAF is not keen on having two squadrons with different engines, particularly American ones. With the armed forces having already faced trouble when the United States imposed an embargo after the 1998 nuclear tests, the IAF is not in favour of having a critical component of American origin.

The IAF persuaded the Defence Ministry to ask British Aerospace, makers of the advanced jet trainer (AJT), to replace all American components. The Ministry agreed to pursue further negotiations only after the British company complied with its request.

Of the 66 AJTs that will replace the MiGs for training rookie pilots, not one component is of U.S. origin.

As things stand, it appears that the IAF may have to reconcile itself to having American engines in the first LCA squadron, as the DRDO is not in favour of tampering with the testing schedule.

High on Hype: Indo-US Tech Transfer Deal is Meaningless

There is an air of expectation, if not euphoria, over Indo-US cooperation in the area of high technology transfers, dubbed ‘next steps in strategic partnership’ (NSSP). The debate highlights the extraordinary naivete of the Indian media and its willingness to be persuaded by shadowy off-stage figures and official spin-meisters that cooperation in sensitive areas reflects improvement in Indo-US relations on non-proliferation and defence issues. These ‘next steps’ envisage a liberal, predictable licensing regime for trade in civilian nuclear, space and high technology, and an expanded dialogue on missile defence which was agreed upon last year by prime minister Vajpayee and president Bush.

Technology transfers in these areas were embargoed by the US after India’s nuclear tests in May 1998. A long list of “entities” was identified with whom US firms and government establishments were prohibited from having commercial or other contacts. Later, these prohibitions were imposed by the P-5 and G-8 nations. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenar Agreement relating to technology transfers with defence applications, had, of course, earlier targeted India for not entering the non-proliferation treaty. Technology is Janus-faced; the same technology can have peaceful and military applications. Space technology, for instance, can be used not only for communications and education, but also for the manufacture of missiles. Atomic reactors can be used not only to produce power and isotopes for medicinal purposes, but also manufacture of plutonium for nuclear weapons.

Sections of the Indian media believe the Bush administration will relax the rigours of its technology control regimes. In regard to space cooperation, the United States will permit technology transfers for civil applications to the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) by removing it from the embargoed list of “entities”. Apparently, integrated satellite launches are also visualised that would have components from both countries, enabling them to jointly exploit commercial possibilities in space technology. Are these hopes — of the US relaxing its technology exports policy and making India an exception to their operations — realistic? Are expectations being fanned by the US to generate a “feel good” glow in its Indian interlocutors, and garner the votes of the NRI community? Are these hopes only a reflection of India’s fervent wish to acquire technology needed to improve its space programme?

Actually, space technology transfers are covered by the provisions of the missile technology control regime, expressly designed to control the spread of missile and space technologies. There are reasons for scepticism, despite current hopes in India that the US would allow limited exports of nuclear power plant components, subject to security considerations. The transfer of civilian nuclear technology from the US has remained embargoed since India conducted its peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, under the provisions of the NSG guidelines (1974), reinforced by the US nuclear non-proliferation Act (1978). These norms prohibit the transfer of nuclear technology to India for three decades, particularly because India has rebuffed the imposition of full-scope safeguards, implying acquiescence to international inspections over its entire nuclear programme, civilian and military.

The US did not continue supplies of low-enriched uranium for the Tarapur Atomic Power Plant after 1974, despite the existence of an Indo-US agreement (1963) which had the force of an international treaty. Finally, the US persuaded France (1982) to undertake these fuel supplies. So harsh are the rigours of these denial regimes that India was unable to obtain even spare parts or safety equipment for its Tarapur reactors, despite the attendant environmental and health hazards. Anil Kakodkar, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, found it necessary to remind the last general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about the inconsistencies between the stated objectives of the CNS (IAEA convention on nuclear safety) and the restrictive practices that exist for trade even on safety measures. Therefore, the embargo on safety equipment continues against India, and is unlikely to be lifted since that would erode the regulations governing the NSG guidelines and the domestic legislation of the United States.

These verities might explain a trial balloon floated by Mitchell Reiss, a state department official in the US that India might like to consider placing its civilian nuclear programme under international safeguards.

Aware of the legal constraints under which the US is bound, as also its obligations to its allies and partners in the NSG, MTCR and the Wassenar agreement, Strobe Talbott, former US deputy secretary of state, has been cautioning his Indian interlocutors not to invest too much hope in the next steps. He has discounted beliefs that a new leaf is being turned in Indo-US relations, or that a dramatic change in American high technology transfers policy is imminent despite India refusing to be a non-NPT signatory and putting its nuclear programme under international safeguards. Talbott, incidentally, was the main US official to implement the non-proliferation policies of the Clinton administration, and surely knows the limits of US flexibility. He had urged the former Soviet Union, incidentally, not to transfer cryogenic engines to ISRO in the early nineties. Should we then hope against hope?