If you want general information, you can try asking here:
http://forummarine.forumactif.com/index.forum
There are already several posts on the early dreadnoughts.
If you have specific questions, I may be able to answer.
I doubt I’d have much to add to what the web site has to say. The gunboats were advertised as being intended for China service when in fact they were meant for the Tigris and the Danube. Brown’s The Grand Fleet gives a short passage on their design.
The real blow to the Japanese aviation pool was at Guadalcanal, which became a meat grinder in terms of airmen, sailors, and ground troops.
The Japanese were aware of American naval appropriations, but they were, frankly, delusional regarding their ability to take on American military strength.
I wouldn’t rate the Japanese airman losses at Midway as all that severe. I believe they lost 110 carrier aviators while the Americans lost 100. The Americans could make good their personnel losses more readily than the Japanese, but the loss of four premier carriers–that was something that the IJN never recovered from. I believe the Japanese completed only four purpose-built carriers during the entirety of the Pacific War.
I have a decent amount of information. What specifically are you looking for?
Off Samar, the Americans lost the destroyers Johnston and Hoel, the destroyer escort Samuel B Roberts, and the escort carrier Gambier Bay to gunfire. The escort carrier St Lo later fell victim to the very first wave of kamikazes. The major losses for the Japanese were the heavy cruisers Chokai, Chikuma, and Suzuya. The most interesting loss may be Suzuya’s, as she was destroyed by a bomb that didn’t hit her; a splinter came aboard and started a fire among her oxygen torpedoes, and the resulting explosion wrecked the ship.
The OoB for the entire Leyte battle is available at
http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/index_oob.htm
Alabama’s list is the result of mud deposits. She took only slight damage with no flooding. All the damaged aircraft are described as “repairable.”
“The Quincy, Vincennes, Astoria and Canberra were sunk.”
That was the Battle of Savo Island, the greatest defeat ever suffered by the USN at sea. Quincy, Astoria, and Vincennes were all from the New Orleans class, a very good design intended to show increased resistance to gunfire. Shows what happens when the right tools are used in the wrong way.
“I recall there was a battle also when a small auxiliary carrier survived a very large japaneese attack.”
It sounds like you’re describing the Battle off Samar, when a group of converted merchant ships/aircraft carriers woke up one morning to find the largest battleship in the world was sitting in their parlor. There’s a recent book, Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors, which has gotten rave reviews for describing this mismatch–a handful of destroyers and escorts charging an enemy force of four battleships, multiple cruisers, and destroyers.
“I recall also that an american pilot in a critically damaged plane, decided to crash his plane into a japaneese cruiser and sank it.”
This story arose at the Battle of Midway about a pilot named Richard Flemming who crashed onto the cruiser Mikuma. Unfortunately, it’s made up. Flemming was shot down, but he didn’t crash the cruiser. Even though this was early in the war, there had already been a case of a damaged Japanese airplane that crashed onto USS Enterprise, though without causing damage. There were more incidents of planes hitting ships in WWII than you might expect.
One of the battles that intrigues me most is First Guadalcanal, where American cruisers took on Japanese battleships and bested them.
Correct. The Japanese got a fair amount of information on the attack, but unfortunately I don’t have any record of what exactly they learned. I’ll bet they showed a special interest in the torpedoes and how most of them managed to avoid striking the harbor bottom.
We need to remember that Taranto was not a precedent, from a planning perspective. Under the direction of Adm Beatty, the British had planned a raid in 1918 on Wilhelmshaven by Sopwith Cuckoos carrying 14in torpedoes.
“The Japaneese were mainly inspired by the success of the British torpedo bomber attack on Taranto.”
It may be that the primary inspiration for the Pearl Harbor attack came not from Taranto but from Port Arthur. I don’t see much influence from the Taranto raid except as an encourager to go ahead with plans already being formed. As early as November 1936, Japan’s naval war college was setting an air raid on Pearl as the starting point for a war against the US.
Those with an interest in Midway will want to keep an eye out for a new book called Shattered Sword by Parshall and Tully. It derives much from Japanese source material which has lain inexplicably dormant for decades.
The British were the premier sub-hunters. The Germans, surprisingly, were very poor at it. German destroyers accounted for only one or two submarines during the entire war. (Not that there were a whole lot of German destroyers running around.) Apart from the great success in mining the outlet to the Gulf of Finland, German ASW was a flop.
Mitsuo Fuchida claimed to have had a spirited conversation on the topic of continued strikes against Pearl, but he has been directly contradicted on the point. Sad to say, but Fuchida was a great inventor of tales. He is largely responsible for the myth that the Japanese carriers at Midway had their flight decks crowded with planes when they were dive-bombed.
The disparity in resources pretty much cancel any chance of Japan taking out the Allied merchant arm. However, it would have been possible to force the Allies to divert some important assets to cover the merchantmen.
And Japan would have lost anyway, so….
The Japanese decision to forego attacks on merchant targets makes perfect sense, within the myopic worldview prevalent in the IJN at the time. The Japanese understood that their campaign would consist of a short period of dramatic victory, which they supposed would lead to profitable negotiations for an Allied surrender. Consequently strategic issues like anti-commerce warfare were irrelevant. Sinking merchant ships was irrelevant to the scenario they foresaw.