Japanese defense chief blames nationalism for suspicions against his country

WASHINGTON, May 14 (Yonhap) — Youngsters in Japan and its neighbors, swept up in nationalism and not having experienced war, are part of the reason why countries like Korea and China suspect Japan of re-militarization, Japan’s defense chief told a U.S. weekly.

Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma reaffirmed his country’s interest in prized U.S. F-22 fighter jets but said Tokyo needs more information on specific capabilities, much of which is secret under U.S. law.

Japan’s interest in the F-22s has sounded alarms in South Korea and other regional nations, victims of Tokyo’s invasions in the past century. The fighter jets are recognized for supreme stealth capability and other state-of-the-art features that the U.S. is not yet willing to share with other countries. Their foreign sales are prohibited by law.

Asked about South Korea’s response, Kyuma reaffirmed Japan’s peaceful intentions.

“It is important for Japan to maintain that reputation,” he said in an interview published Monday in Defense News.

But younger generations in Japan, China and Korea “have not the memory of having lost the war, reflected on the war, providing — or in the case of the Chinese and the Koreans, receiving — aid from Japan in the form of war reparations,” the defense minister said.

“The younger generation tends to be swept away by nationalism, and that is something that we need to be watchful for.”
Having been defeated in World War II, Japan is restricted to having self-defense forces. But backed by political and economic power, the country is seen as expanding the role of those forces as well.

His generation tends to be more sensitive about Japan’s relationship with its neighbors, Kyuma said.

“But a younger generation may tell you something a little different,” he said.

While expressing caution about Japan participating in weapons research or military sales, Kyuma said decisions will be made on a “case-by-case basis.”
Military sales are technically possible, he said, such as the export of patrol ships to Indonesia to help its counter-piracy and counter-terrorism efforts.

“There is a possibility for some of the defense systems, such as the equipment that is useful for countering biological and chemical systems,” he said.

On F-22s, Kyuma complained that Japan “cannot even look into” the capabilities of the fighter jet because of legal prohibitions.

“I have raised this issue with U.S. Secretary (of Defense Robert) Gates, requesting his assistance in Japan’s efforts to get the information,” he said.

Does IAF need more squadrons?

Last week, a letter from Indian Air Force chief Air Chief Marshal, SP Tyagi to Defence Minister Pranab Mukherji was leaked to several media outlets. The note suggested that if the ministry of defence did not get its act together, the Indian Air Force would lose its edge over Pakistan.

The IAF currently had 34 combat squadrons, down from its sanctioned 40, because of poor procurement planning, delays in the Light Combat Aircraft programme, and Mig-21 crashes. The IAF has 10 additional squadrons of transport aircraft and helicopters. Each squadron has between 18-22 aircraft.

Pushpindar Singh, of the Society of Aerospace Studies, says the decline could be even more drastic. By the end of next year, the IAF could have less than 30 squadrons. But will that be the disaster that it is being made out to be?

Air Commodore (Retd) Jasjit Singh, director of the New Delhi-based Centre of Air Power Studies, says that despite the enormous capabilities of modern aircraft and force multipliers like air-to-air refuelling and Airborne Warning and Control System type aircraft, India actually requires a larger force of some 50 combat squadrons.

Conventional logic would suggest that the IAF force levels, set in mid-1960s, when aircraft were far less capable and the threat to India greater, should naturally shrink. India’s relations with China are far better than they were at the time, and things are improving even with Pakistan.

More important, India is today a nuclear armed power, surely sufficient deterrent against the catastrophic defeat of the type we faced in 1962. Across the world, almost every major air force has shrunk in size as technology makes a combat aircraft vastly more capable, and costs touch the stratosphere.

Tyagi’s reference to Pakistan, always a knee-jerk issue in India related to that country’s plan to acquire new US F-16s. But the July testimony of John Hillen, the assistant secretary of state for politico-military affairs to the US Congress, suggested that the aircraft would have limited offensive capabilities and operate under certain unstated constraints.

The government, which has now taken the decision to fast track the acquisition of 126 medium range combat aircraft this week, has to balance the needs of security with the capital costs of modern aircraft. Where the Mig-21 of the 1970s cost Rs 10-15 lakh, the Sukhoi 20MKI has a price tag of Rs 250 crore each today.

The Air Force is being clearly optimistic if it expects the government to fund the replacement of very limited capability aircraft like Mig-21s, with modern fighters that can fire thousands of kilometers from their base and seek and destroy targets beyond visual range.

A senior defence ministry official, who cannot be named, says that the IAF seems to be driven by organisational imperative, rather than combat needs. His tart proposition is that a smaller air force, though more capable, would have fewer air marshals and commodores and independent commands and thus lose only in the bureaucratic sense.

According to Pushpindar Singh, the country could have a prudent deterrent capability with around 30 squadrons — comprising of a mix of heavy fighters like the Su-30s, the lightweight LCA and the proposed medium fighters which could be the F-16, Mig-35, FA-18 or the Gripen. Much more can be gained if the IAF focuses on its infrastructure of bases, air defence radars and missiles, and its computer and communications networking, as well as its transport fleet rather than focus on its fighter aircraft alone.

MIDDLE EAST NEWSLINE

EGYPT EXAMINES MiG-29 OFFER FROM RUSSIA

MOSCOW [MENL] — Egypt has been negotiating with Russia for the procurement of the advanced MiG-29 fighter-jet.

Russian industry sources said Egypt has examined the MiG-29SMT fighter. The sources said SMT, an upgraded version of the MiG-29, has been offered at a sharply-reduced price as part of a Russian effort to restore Cairo as a military client.

“Moscow is offering offsets that would make this deal extremely attractive to Egypt,” an industry source said.

The sources said Russia’s state-owned arms export agency Rosoboronexport has been negotiating with Egypt since 2006. They said Rosoboronexport has offered to provide the MiG-29SMT as part of a larger Russian program to develop Egypt’s natural gas reserves and build nuclear energy facilities.

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KOMMERSANT

The Whole Russian Army

In honor of Defender of the Fatherland Day [February 23], Vlast is publishing the third updated and amended edition of the handbook The Whole Russian Army [for the previous editions, see Nos. 17-18 of 2002 and No. 18 of 2003]. As fully as possible for the journalistic format, it shows what today’s Russian army is, its units and formations, where they are deployed, and who commands them. As usual, we draw readers’ attention to the fact that all information has been taken exclusively from public sources. We have used materials of more than 1000 Russian and foreign media, analytical reports and reviews, and other publications and Internet resources.

No Secrets from Our Side

A lot of funny stories appeared after the publication of the first handbook The Whole Russian Army. They originated mainly with secret bearers, although we specifically indicated in a footnote that “secret bearers have nothing to worry about.” But for some reason, they did worry. For example, Anatoly Kvashnin, who was chief of general staff at the time, arrived at work on Monday May 13, 2002, and suddenly noticed that very issue of Vlast Nos. 17-18 on his desk [no one had ever put this magazine on his desk before this]. He started leafing through the handbook. Then he turned purple and called one of the district commanders and shouted, “Are you just sitting there?! They’ve revealed the entire deployment of your command.” He immediately ordered an investigation into how anyone could have stolen all the military secrets from the General Staff, not even CIA agents [which the bosses might have understood] but someone on staff. But I can’t personally confirm this story. It’s probably a tall tale. But I personally have no doubts about the authenticity of the other stories. For example, I remember how an exhausted captain called the editorial office and asked for the magazine, “because the comrade admiral ordered delivery of a handbook but there aren’t any left in the kiosks.” I then suggested making a collector’s edition of The Whole Russian Army for generals and admirals, laminated with each map about two meters, so they could hang it on the wall and close the shutters. I also remember how my coauthor, Sasha Stukalin, once went to the book market as usual on Saturday to buy military literature. There, on a counter among the memoirs of Marshal Bagramian and the book Armored Weapons, he saw Xerox copies of our handbook. Black and white for 100 rubles and color for 250. “The colored ones are already bought up; take these while there’s still some left,” the vendor advised. Stukalin was indignant, and then calculated how much we would have earned if we had copied the handbook ourselves and sold it. Just recently, I got a letter begging for help. “Someone stole the map showing all the units in Russia. I can’t find the magazine. Please help. Send this map. Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr P., Stavropol.” In response to the question of what this was for, he replied, “We need maps of all of Russia. We’re making a stand out of them in secret class.” What could we do but send them?

by Mikhail Lukin, Director of the Information Center of Kommersant Publishing House

As of the beginning of 2005, we can speak of three characteristic features of the Russian army. The first is a relative stabilization of the number of land forces and expected reductions in the strategic missile forces, the air force, and the navy. The second is a de facto breakdown of full conversion to contract recruitment. The third is the ongoing aging of inventories of armaments and military equipment. Since President Vladimir Putin came to power, the government and the Ministry of Defense have managed to reduce and optimize the numerical strength of the armed forces to some extent by separating out a certain number of relatively efficient formations. One might also say there has been a certain improvement in the troops’ combat training; the amount of resources allocated for this has been somewhat increased.

This primarily concerns land forces, the personnel of which will evidently be maintained almost unchanged in the next few years. The relatively modern armaments remaining from Soviet times are in principal sufficient to bring them up to strength. In 2005, there are plans to purchase 14 T-90 tanks, 3 BMP-3 and 10 BMP-2 infantry combat vehicles, 5 BMD-4 airborne combat vehicles, 92 BTR-80 armored troop carriers, and 2 Iskander missile systems. To all appearances, these purchases are mainly aimed at minimum support for their manufacturers.

The situation is much worse with the high-tech types of armed forces. Their equipment is rapidly becoming obsolete and breaking down after exhausting their reserves. In the last few years, expenditures on arms purchases and R&D have increase several times, and an Armaments Program to 2010 is being implemented. But practice shows that all these efforts are having little effect – arrivals of new or even simply updated types of equipment are negligible. There is no reason to expect that the situation will soon change. However, military brass continue to gratify themselves with illusions of mass rearmament – after 2010.

In reality, what is happening shows that Russia’s present state and economic systems are incapable of earning the necessary funds for the full maintenance of any sizable armed forces. This means that further reductions in missile forces, the air force, and the navy and a deterioration of their military potential are inevitable. In 2004, the strategic missile forces acquired only six silo-based Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles; and for 2005, there are plans to purchase four more silo-based and three new mobile Topol-M missiles. It is perfectly obvious that these purchase rates do not compensate for the withdrawal of this class of Topol from reserves (at the end of their service life), let alone the writeoff of other, more powerful classes of ballistic missiles. As a result, it is not surprising that there are plans to disband two more missile divisions in 2005.

The air force is in an extremely difficult situation. The aircraft fleet has become morally and physically obsolete. Meanwhile, in 2005, the air force will get only two new planes – one Tu-160 strategic bomber made of Soviet stock and one Yak-130 training craft. With regard to the modernization programs, at the end of 2004, the 23rd air regiment in Dzemgi received the first seven updated Su-27SM fighters, and the same number is supposed to be delivered in 2005. At this rate, modernization of Su-27 fleet alone would take more than 40 years. Modernization of other types of aircraft is progressing even more slowly – a matter of single units. The forces will not see a single new helicopter in 2005. Despite the high degree of depreciation of the helicopter fleet, activity is limited to the modernization of several Mi-24P machines and continuing development of experimental Mi-28N and Ka-52 machines. There was a lot of talk last fall about the imminent reduction of the air force by another 18 air regiments.

The placing of the first S-400 anti-aircraft missile system on military service at the end of 2004 was good news for air defense. Delivery of these systems to one or two divisions per year will evidently continue.

The navy’s priority, as always, is the development of strategic nuclear naval forces. This concerns the construction of Project 955 type nuclear-powered submarines and the development of Bulava ballistic missiles for them. The construction of a number of new designs of lead surface vessels has also started in the last few years. However, all these programs are gradually turning into protracted building activity, and this is with an acute shortage of funds just for keeping existing vessels in operation and repairing them. Just recently, Navy Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Kuroedov warned at an officers’ meeting that maintaining the status quo inevitably meant a drastic reduction in the fleet after 2010.

Last year finally buried the hopes for a rapid conversion to a contract recruiting system. The Ministry of Defense’s main efforts were aimed more at enlarging the draft contingent by attempting to eliminate deferrals and exemptions from the draft for a number of categories of young men. There were continuing complaints about the quality of contract reinforcements, which together with the ongoing problems of hazing and lack of discipline among conscripts, is evidence of a serious crisis of the entire system of recruiting and training the ranks. The monetization of benefits dealt a considerable blow to the financial position of officers and contract recruits.

In general, it is far too premature to say that the Russian army is emerging from the crisis or even to speak of the completion of military reform. The main negative trends in our armed forces are not only not being overcome, but in many cases are also continuing to intensify.

by Mikhail Barabanov

The authors would be grateful for any corrections, which can be sent by email to: [email]lukin@kommersant.ru[/email]. (no classified information please).

Doubt it. Looks like someone crashed a Flanker into an F-22.

looks like a stingray, too, or a rayfish, whatever…

[I”]Algeria, Russia hold negotiations on arms sale”[/I] (posted by Tango III)…

…same subject below but by different address…

Russia
Algeria could become Russia’s main military partner – paper
13:08 | 29/ 03/ 2007

Print version

MOSCOW, March 29 (RIA Novosti) – Algeria could become Russia’s main military partner if it signs a new package of contracts worth $7 billion with Russian defense producers, a leading Russian business daily said Thursday.

In early March, Algeria sent an official invitation to Russia to participate in tenders to build a helicopter-borne frigate and jointly construct new ships for its Navy, Kommersant said with reference to the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation.

In addition, Russia is in talks with Algeria to sell Su-32 fighter-bombers, Mi-28N Night Hunter helicopters, additionally supply Su-30 Flanker fighters, MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters, Pantsir S1 short-range missile-gun systems and T-90S tanks. The contracts are expected to be signed in 2007-2008, Kommersant said.

Until now, India and China have been Russia’s main military partners, with their order portfolios until 2010 estimated at $10 billion and $8 billion, respectively, Kommersant said.

In March 2006, during a visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Algeria, both countries signed a large package of contracts worth about $8 billion, including the delivery of 28 Su-30 MKI Flanker multi-purpose fighters, 34 MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters, 16 Yak-130 trainers, four S300PMU air defense systems, 38 Pantsir S1 short-range missile-gun systems, 185 T-90S tanks and 218 Kornet-3 anti-tank missile systems.

However, a host of problems could still hinder the plans, Kommersant said.

Oleg Demchenko, president of the aerospace company Irkut, said the company has fulfilled its contract on the delivery of 28 Su-30 MKI Flanker multi-purpose fighters to Algeria, but that there are currently no talks on a new contract, while the Nizhny Tagil-based Uralvagonzavod in the Urals has shifted the timeframe for the supply of the first batch of T-90S tanks from 2006 to 2007.

Talks on the construction of frigates for Algeria have come to a deadlock because three factories are bidding for the project, Kommersant said.

But the contract for the delivery of Pantsir S1 short-range anti-aircraft guns could become the most problematic deal. The Tula-based instrument-making design bureau currently has obligations to deliver the systems to Algeria, Syria, the UAE and to a fourth unidentified country, Kommersant said.

“Considering that deliveries to the UAE have been significantly delayed, problems with the other countries are also quite probable,” Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, was quoted by Kommersant as saying.

http://video.google.fr/videoplay?doc…79047&q=mirage

i don’t speak French, arthuro…

is the video downloadable?