The Typhoon name was officially selected by industry specifically for export campaigns (with some urging from the Brits, who were the only partner who really objected to Eurofighter as a name for the aircraft as well as the ‘manufacturer’). Finding a name that meant the same in all four languages, that didn’t have a latin/German/Anglo root, and didn’t upset the boxheads too badly was a long and complex process.

The Typhoon name was selected primarily because it was felt to follow the ‘wind’ theme of the Tornado – echoing the wartime fighter-bomber was a lucky coincidence for the RAF. Urban legend has it that Cyclone (Zyklon) was also a contender until our German chums realised that if the single seater was the Zyklon-A the two-seater would be the ………

The Brits quickly adopted the Typhoon name for their own aircraft, and Italy and Spain followed suit.

The German Government didn’t follow, but it wasn’t because the “Luftwaffe did not like the name at all.”

Many Luftwaffe blokes use the name, however.

“I understand the preference is for more Chinooks…..”

That depends.

Merlin’s performance in Iraq has won it many new admirers, and the aircraft does some things very much better than a Chinook.

If you need absolute capacity, or if you need to lift the heaviest underslung loads, then a Chinook is to be preferred.

But if you want to move troops quickly, quietly and in comfort, without forewarning the enemy, and if you want cost effectiveness, reliability and maintainability, then Merlin is better. (That’s why the US Army is absolutely right to pour money into CH-47F, but why US101 makes more sense as a SOCOM/CSAR CSAR-X option).

And if you’re buying new, it’s easier to produce an amphibious lift Merlin than a ship-capable Chinook.

In May 2004 I wrote the following, and many of the old lags on PPRuNe, who included engineers and TPs from the DLO and Boscombe Down were kind enough to be very complimentary about it.

The crux of the problem is that we couldn’t afford proper MH-47s and used some windfall money to fund a cheap and cheerful conversion of eight aircraft on the production line, which had been intended as HC2As. The upgrade included COTS elements developed for the Dutch Chinooks. It was assumed that there would be a read across from the Dutch safety case, and there wasn’t – and building a unique safety case for the RAF Mk 3s was hugely complex – requiring the checking and clearance of millions of lines of software code, which was prohibitively expensive. The instruments and displays work, but because they have not been properly cleared and proven to the UK’s very rigorous airworthiness standards (and because there are therefore unquantifiable risks of failure), pilots are not allowed to rely on them, which limits the aircraft to flying in VMC, clear of cloud, and not at low level.

The alleged corrosion dates from the aircraft’s time in the USA, not the UK:

“The purchase of the Chinook HC.Mk 3 has been described by Edward Leigh, chairman of the Commons Public Accounts Committee as “one of the most incompetent procurements of all time”, while the NAO contented itself with describing the procurement as ‘flawed’.

In July 1995, the MoD decided that eight of the 14 Chinook HC.Mk 2 helicopters then on order should be delivered to an enhanced (HC.Mk 3) standard, to meet the emerging requirement for a dedicated Special Forces support helicopter. When the original contract was placed in 1995, it was recognised that neither the HC.Mk 2 nor HC.Mk 3 programmes would deliver aircraft to the full requirement but that this would be met by retrofitting the necessary systems later. Of the 100 “essential elements” outlined in the requirement, the contract delivered 55. Most of the 45 elements not delivered, could not be included owing to immature technology, but the NAO was unable to discover an audit trail to explain why these remaining elements have never been contracted for.

The new aircraft was to have improved range and navigation capability, and was to be fitted with night vision sensors and a new radar. Instead of simply buying MH-47Es or a similar glass-cockpit Chinook variant ‘off-the-shelf’ (an option that was considered to be unaffordable within the funding available for the HC.Mk 3 programme) the MoD opted for a *******ised hybrid solution, incorporating elements of the existing analogue cockpit with new digital systems and displays, with a new weather radar in a reconfigured nose radome, with provision for a refuelling probe, and with the increased size fuel tanks associated with the CH-47SD and MH-47E

The eight aircraft were to cost £259 million and the forecast In-Service Date (defined as delivery of the first six aircraft)was set at November 1998. An avionics upgrade programme for the aircraft was put to contract in 1997 but unfortunately, it soon became evident that the displays for the weather radar and other systems would not fit inside the existing cockpit. There are persistant reports that the aircraft were stored (inadequately) while the final avionics fit was being decided and designed, and that the aircraft suffered corrosion damage during this period.

In March 1998, the In-Service Date was redefined to allow for some programme slippage and for the Military Aircraft Release work that would be required following delivery . The new ISD was set for January 2002.

Seven of the eight aircraft were ‘delivered to specification’ by the contractor between July 2001 and May 2002, although one was reportedly damaged when it was unloaded at Southampton docks. None have so far been accepted into service, however, and there have been reports that the aircraft actually failed its Military Aircraft Release trials.

Unfortunately the Chinook HC.Mk 3’s unique, hybrid digital/analogue cockpit is reliant on software. However, the contract did not specify that software documentation and code for avionics systems should be analysed in accordance with United Kingdom Defence standards in order to demonstrate software integrity. This was because it was (erroneously) assumed that since the systems and displays in the HC.Mk 3 cockpit were based upon those fitted to the Royal Netherlands Air Force’s advanced CH-47D Chinooks, there could be a ‘read-across’ on the basis of similarity with the Dutch avionics, allowing an adequate safety case to be constructed. Unfortunately, the HC.Mk 3 hybrid cockpit had a unique configuration and this assumption proved unfounded. As a result it has not been possible to demonstrate that the helicopter’s flight instruments meet the required United Kingdom Defence standards.

Although one of the main contractors for the avionics system indicated that it would allow access to some software data the process of proving that the software meets UK standards is time-consuming and extremely expensive. Moreover, because the legacy software in the hybrid cockpit is not amenable to the techniques required to confirm the robustness of new software design there is no guarantee of a successful outcome. Consequently, the Chinook HC.Mk 3 is currently restricted to day/night flying above 500 feet, clear of cloud, and in circumstances that ensure that the pilot can fly the aircraft solely using external reference points and without relying on the flight displays. These restrictions mean that the helicopters cannot be used except for the most limited flight trials, and may mean that the aircraft will have to be ‘de-modified’, stripped of their advanced systems and brought back to HC.Mk 2/2A standards before they can be used operationally, unless they are simply and quietly scrapped.

To bring the helicopters up to broadly the same standard as the existing Chinook fleet will require about£127 million, over and above the £259 million originally estimated, and the helicopters could then enter service in mid-2007 – nine years later than the original In-Service Date, and five years after the revised, ‘slipped’ date.

Problems have effectively kept the aircraft grounded (except for two aircraft used for trials) until today. There were reports that the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) would return all eight Chinook HC.Mk 3s to the US government for upgrade and use by US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in the ‘war against terror’, in order to boost the number of MH-47E Chinooks available to US special forces. Under the rumoured deal, the HC.Mk 3s would later be replaced by new MH-47Gs. In the House of Commons, Adam Ingram confirmed that “An approach was received from the United States last year about the possible purchase of the Chinook Mk 3, with the United Kingdom in turn purchasing the MH-47G.” but he added that “While informal discussions took place with the DoD, no formal approach has been received.” Rumours suggested that a US team inspected the aircraft and politely declined them!

As far as can be ascertained two aircraft are at Boscombe for trials, one is at an undisclosed location near Bristol, one is with Boeing Helicopters in Philadelphia (having never made it over to UK shores), being used in support of a UK Chinook capability enhancement programme and the remainder are in storage, being cannibalised for spares, or in use as GI airframes at RAF Odiham.

The Chinook HC.Mk 3 MAR flight trials have reportedly progressed despite the on-going contractual issues resulting from the MOD decision not to field the current aircraft into service, although the trials work is not intended to result in a release to service for the original planned configuration, but is instead focusing on those aspects likely to be common with the future, but as yet undecided, plans for the aircraft.

In recent months the HC.Mk 3s have mainly been used for clearance of the Allied Signal 714 engines, already fitted to the HC.Mk 3 but now being fitted to the HC.Mk 2 and 2A as a replacement for the Allied Signal 712. Much of the initial 714 engine and FADEC analysis was conducted on the Chinook HC 3 aircraft, one of which had already been instrumented as part of its MAR trials. These engine trials necessitated increasing the Chinook HC.Mk 3 clearance to 15,000 ft for high level engine shut downs and relights. Flight trials were reportedly successful, but issues with the integration of the engine with the HUMS and ADR of the HC.Mk 2/2A required some software changes before the new engine could be incorporated into the operational fleet.

It is believed that an unknown number of HC.Mk 2/2As may have been upgraded with some HC.Mk 3 features, including the enlarged fuselage side fuel tanks, probably under a UOR. Further details remain unknown.

The NAO comfortingly hinted that the HC.Mk 3 programme pre-dated the MoD’s introduction of its ‘Smart Acquisition’ initiative, with its tighter risk controls, and that today the programme would have been adequately de-risked prior to investment decisions being taken.”

That’s OK then. Could never happen again…..

Or until the next time Boeing need to invest big money for the long term, and the ever increasingly short-termist shareholders want their dividend……

Distiller, the UK is going for dual TRD, Italy may go for Crosseye alone or Crosseye/single TRD

The RAF took delivery of TIALD (two prototype pods) under a UOR in 90-91 and used it in Granby.

The full production integration followed some time afterwards, and the pod entered service on Jaguar first (’95) and then Tornado, and finally Harrier.

The upgrade to TIALD 400 (a change of one LRU) occurred on Tornado and Harrier first, as T200 worked well enough on Jag making the upgrade less urgent.

I don’t know if T500 has happened.

AFAIK only the UK and Oman use TIALD.

Eurofighter is fitted with two SaabTech AB BOL 510 180-round chaff/flare dispensers mounted in the outboard underwing missile launch rails, with two Elettronica Aster SpA chaff/flare dispensers in the actuator fairings further inboard. The latter can each carry 16 55-mm IR decoy flares, but I don’t have a name/designation for the kit.

I thought that Italy was still looking at Crosseye in the starboard wingtip pod, or at Cross Eye and a single towed radar decoy (which is an option), while the UK is, I believe, the only operator to have definitely opted for the duel ‘Aerial’ TRD fit.

I wonder whether the A400M will provide Airbus with invaluable platform from which really environmentally friendly commercial airliner technologies can be derived?