Fonk,

There are two problems with this debate. The first is that we often (almost routinely) misunderstand each other. I said that: “”The Singapore bid was always based on Tranche 2 aircraft at EOC2+. Anything else is simply incorrect, based on press speculation and rumour.”

You then asked: “Since when 2 aircraft at EOC2+ were flown there?”

They weren’t, of course, and that’s not what I said, any more than Singapore were able to fly the F2/3 Standard Rafale C they require. What they flew in evaluation was necessarily not the aircraft around which the bid was formulated – in ALL THREE cases.

There’s also the problem that while you are well-enough informed on Rafale, I’m sorry to say that some of your Typhoon sources are a joke. You quote an unnamed BBC2 film (presumably the appallingly inaccurate and one-sided report on Newsnight by David Lomax) as though it should be taken seriously, and use figures from Jane’s. I have been involvced in producing entries on aircraft for Jane’s and I can tell you that JAWA relies on public-source, released brochure figures and that these are seldom accurate, except as broad guides, and are often aggregated figures from a number of sources when official figures are witheld.

I recognise exactly where your weight, turn rate, and Alpha limit figures come from, and can only say that I would not place much faith in them. Especially weight.

Hear me when I tell you that there are four basic weight standards for Typhoon. DB aircraft (with instrumentation), IPA aircraft (with instrumentation), ISPA aircraft (guess!) and production aircraft. There is no suggestion that Tranche 2 jets will be heavier than Tranche 1, nor that Tranche 1 jets will not gain full A-G capabilities when the later EOC CP software packages are incorporated. Nor has there been any change in airframe weight in the production aircraft since BT001 was rolled out – though the released figure on leaflets and brochures may have changed.

Similarly, you state with apparent authority that: “MoD was planing to fly them wihout the gun for some time as an economical measure…” which is quite true. You then say that: “BAe/QuinetiQ came up with a fix on the change of CG due to the weight difference and a ballast was designed and instaled on some airframes.” Which is entirely false. Ballast hasn’t been fitted to any production RAF Typhoon.At one stage it was expected that RAF Tranche 2 aircraft would fly without the gun, but even this is no longer the case. No RAF Typhoon has flown with ballast instead of the gun. No ballast set has been designed and manufactured.

You’ve made up your mind that they’ve beefed up Typhoon for the A-G role. You’ve decided that the A-G role was a late addition. I’ve been following this programme (and talking to senior people, engineers, TPs, RAF project people, OR blokes et al since long before EAP days. I can tell you categorically, and without fear of contradiction, that it has always been seen as a Jag replacement (and as an RAFG F-4 replacement) and that out of area ops (for the ACE MF case, for example) and low level ground attack have always been part of the spec.

With regard to the supercruise demo, you must bear in mind that Typhoon’s ‘clean’ limitations are not founded on what you or I would regard as a truly clean configuration. For Eurofighter GmbH the basic AAM fit (4+2) is clean.

Singapore’s supercruise requirement was clearly not based around an A-G loadout (self evidently) but may have been founded on a relatively clean configuration and half internal fuel – in the air to air role, supercruise may be most relevant when heading out from, or back to, the tanker.

There was a degree of surprise among those I spoke to that Rafale felt they had to wait for the cool of evening to supercruise, and absolute astonishment that they then failed to get the ‘tick in the box’.

Rafale was clearly closer (in timescale) to giving Singapore the operational capabilities it wanted,and this will have undoubtedly impressed the RSAF. However, everyone I’ve spoken to acknowledged that the Rafale airframe/engine combination impressed the evaluation team less than that of the Typhoon, while the MMI was ‘inferior by far’. Bear in mind too that Singaporean pilots flew DB aircraft which can demonstrate some T2 features, and were able to see exactly how all of the kit will work in the A-G role by flying representative sorties in the rig and in the active cockpit. There was clearly real concern, however, that there may be further delays, and that while Typhoon was a superior airshow/GH aeroplane in 2004, with the potential to be a better operational jet, it might still only be an A-A aeroplane with a fairly limited A-G capability in 2008-9, when Singapore need it to be a superior operational swing role fighter.

Mr Fonk,

Since you’ve avoided the usual personal abuse, I’ll respond, briefly, though with difficulty, because the language barrier makes it hard for me to understand many of your points (my fault, not yours).

“S’pore seems not to have been presented with the final multi-role aircrafts, another clue, the suggestion by some members of the British parliament to sell the early RAF Typhoon was some sort of confirmation of this.”

The Singapore bid was always based on Tranche 2 aircraft at EOC2+. Anything else is simply incorrect, based on press speculation and rumour.

“Third clue; as soon as they were offered to India they were rejected on the ground of non-existing A2G capabilities, i became yet more suspicious.”

There has been no formal campaign in India, no bid, and no offer, and therefore no rejection. Or have I misunderstood you?

“We could argue all day as to whether Mica is an adequate alternative to AMRAAM/ASRAAM,” from operational, performance, political, and logistical standpoints.”
It is, MBDA/EADS are there to guaranty that….”

Mica isn’t necessarily superior to AMRAAM if your air force is already an AMRAAM customer, with existing logistics support arrangements in place, and if you are buying a small fleet of aircraft to operate alongside larger numbers of F-16s and F-35s – even if you’ve already seen some of the drawbacks…… The jury’s out on performance/effectiveness. Mica certainly isn’t superior to ASRAAM from a performance/effectiveness point of view, but may have political advantages, and logistic advantages if you’re using the other version of Mica.

“performances would have been impossible to replicate with the the multi-role aircraft for the obvious reason of increased weight.”

I don’t understand, unless you mean the weight of the A-G weapons? The Typhoon is designed to be a swing-role/multi-role aircraft, and gaining that capability is a matter of some development work (that work is well underway) and of individual weapons integrations and clearances, not of beefing up the aircraft and adding weight. From an airframe point of view, Typhoon is already a multi-role aircraft, and has flown with four 2,000-lb Paveways, 4+2, and tanks, and with a single asymmetric 2k-lb PW.

“RAF Typhoon were ballasted with the equivalent of the gun weight for the same reason.”

I don’t understand. RAF Typhoons have the gun, even though it will not be supported in service.

“I do not think that there will be any problems integrating Israeli weapons to Rafale in the future.”

Probably not. Nor on Typhoon. Nor on any modern 1553/1760 open architecture platform. But it won’t be as easy as it will be on the F-15, because the work’s already been done on the F-15I, which is operated by a close Singaporean ally. That was the point I was trying to make.

“To a certain extand, the same story was repeated for Typhoon but Rafale designers included all the projected avionics to the preliminary design, by contrast, that of Typhoon were given the near-impossible task to adapt the design to new requierements for low-leve/high speed…”

I don’t understand. Typhoon’s designers always new that the aircraft was expected to replace the F-4 AND the Jaguar in RAF service, and that low level air-to-ground was always going to be part of the requirement. This was not a ‘late change’.

“Another factor which i think might have played a role, Rafale have to carry an equal-to-superior internal amount of fuel from the runway. 4,750kg vs 4,500kg.”

I don’t follow. I believe that the supercruise demo did not require full tanks, and that Dassault were free to fuel the aircraft as they saw fit.

Good day, as you always say.

Jacko.

Bombe Surprise, mon brave! Vous etes un singe trés mechant, et vous etes fou comme une boite des grenouilles.

Monsieur Fonk (‘cher Fonky’ pour son amis, but don’t tell him I told you) pense que vous êtes français, plutôt qu’un fripon d’une terre plus petite, et plus ennuyeuse, mais plus ‘fun’. Il ne serait pas si utile avec son conseil s’il connaissait comment vous aviez planifié de barbouiller ces mémoriaux, ni s’il connaissait votre utilisation d’expressions de camarades simiens mangeant commestibles moche …… (moche? fromagey, n’est ce que pas?).

J’ai desolé que vous etes quite such un grand broleur, mais je vous achete un biere anyway! Vive la Belgique!

If you think that the best (or even the most suitable) aircraft for the job is always selected, and if your mind is made up, then I can’t argue. But Austria was clearly tailor-made to be a Gripen customer and yet went for Typhoon, while Poland and Brazil are also seen by many as air forces which selected the wrong aircraft, for the wrong reasons. The UAE selected F-16 Block 60s instead of consolidating on the 2000-9. Closer to home, the UK AAC selected the AH-64 over the Tiger and Rooivalk (selecting the best, but not the most suitable, aircraft), and further back in time, the RAF purchased the Tornado F.Mk 3. There are numerous examples of political factors, price, industrial considerations and even bribery being the deciding factor in how an aircraft type is selected.

That starts to explain how it might be that “Singapore did not wait a little for Typhoon (even) if it was the best by far….”

But the reasons for Singapore’s rejection of Typhoon have been more clearly set out than that. My understanding is that, after a long and particularly searching and rigorous evaluation, the RSAF decided that they wanted the Typhoon, and were prepared to wait for it, but that there was no MinDef confidence that the required standard of aircraft would actually be delivered when the Eurofighter partners said it would. This may or may not have been something where reassurance could have made a difference, but a pessimistic risk assessment by the UK DLO, and dreadful mismanagement of the bid in the early stages sealed the fate of the Typhoon bid.

As a result of the political delays ‘dialled into’ the programme first by the Germans, and most recently by the Brit’s failure to sign Tranche 2 (and they’ve still only signed the industrial programme, and not the capability package contract) there is understandable cynicism as to Eurofighter GmbH’s ability to deliver Typhoon’s T2 capabilities within the tighter requirement timescales, and I would not see the aircraft being selected to meet near-term requirements, where the F-15, F-16/60 and Gripen (and to a lesser extent Rafale) all enjoy a clear advantage.

We could argue all day as to whether Mica is an adequate alternative to AMRAAM/ASRAAM, from operational, performance, political, and logistical standpoints. My guess is that the Singapore MinDef have an open mind about the weapon (otherwise Rafale would have been dropped from the evaluation) but prefer AMRAAM. Similarly, they might prefer Paveway and EPW, perhaps for reasons of commonality with other platforms, perhaps on price, or perhaps on performance. Until the final selection has been made, and until the reasons for that decision become known, we simply don’t know.

Finally, I should perhaps point out that even if the F-15T is selected to meet Singapore’s requirement, it may well not indicate that the Eagle was the air force’s preferred choice, and it certainly would not ‘prove’ that Rafale is inferior to the Eagle, any more than Korea’s decision to reject Rafale did. (Going by Fonk’s logic, the Korean decision would ‘prove’ that Korea thought that Rafale was inferior to the F-15K, which is far from the truth, I suspect). Price will play a part, the availability of particular weapons will be important, even the ability to integrate Israeli EW kit may have some influence and political considerations will be even more vital, and these are extremely hard to analyse.