Jackonickoit seems to to its job well since the rafales could fly pretty much safely in an enemy airspace when others delayed their entering until the defences were soften up
Even that’s speculation. Perhaps the French just had a more ‘robust’ attitude to risk? Perhaps the French sigint effort before the air campaign had given them the belief that the Libyan AD network wasn’t much of a threat? Or perhaps it was down to SPECTRA. We don’t know.
JackonickoI don’t think I’ve ever thought of Opit as being that, TMor. But maintaining some grip on reality when it comes to the relative merits of SPECTRA and dedicated Elint systems doesn’t necessarily mean that one isn’t a fanboy.
JackonickoI wish I’d bought popcorn.
JackonickoJonesy,
The problem in Sierra Leone was that the GR7 at that point ONLY had the 1,000-lb bomb. Not a weapon with great ‘discrimination’ or proportionality. No CRV7. No AGM-65. No gun.
The Jaguars had no problems in Afghanistan. They didn’t go. And however asthmatic the Jag was, it managed ok in Iraq, Oman, India, etc. and the Jags on the Azores could have brought a lot of relevant effect to the table for Sierra Leone.
And every time we’ve used a carrier since 1982, land based air could have got their faster and cheaper, and would have been more cost- and operationally-effective once in place.
they need to give the RAF their Deep Strike budget back and increase ours
“Ours” referring to the Navy’s budget, Jonesy? That speaks volumes for your neutrality on this issue.
Nocuts,
The problem was that the Navy said that they wanted, and could man, half of a four squadron JFH, and could do so without changing their training requirements. The requirement for QFIs and QWIs was transparent from the beginning, and the RN raised no objections until after they proved that they could not man their half of JFH.
And the quality of the new FAA pilots was variable, and included crossovers from Rotary who would never have got an FJ recommend in the RAF, and chopped RAF FJ pilots who had failed to get a single-seat/FJ recommend at Valley. And all of this while experienced RAF Harrier pilots were being let go as the RAF now had fewer cockpits to fill. Despite this, the RAF did give the RN more FJ training slots than it had had previously, but this was still insufficient for the FAA to be able to man its second JFH squadron.
Many had predicted this from the start.
JackonickoI meant something much more radical.
An aircraft with the STOL capability of the Caribou/Buffalo and the rough field capability of the Andover (which could take off and land on a ploughed field!). A simple, affordable fixed wing aircraft that could replace Chinook or Osprey over a significant proportion of their mission sets, but that retained the operating cost advantages of a fixed wing transport.
JackonickoBecause it’s not a dedicated Elint system, whereas ASTAC is.
The clue is in the name (Analyseur de Signaux TACtiques).
SPECTRA is an active and passive airborne countermeasures and defensive aids system.
JackonickoLiger,
Had Collins even mentioned the pros and cons of STOVL, and then made a reasoned argument that CATOBAR was superior, then that would be analysis.
But to simply make unsupported claims is something else entirely, and is unworthy of the author and of the title he was representing.
As to you, you managed to talk utter nonsense about JFH and the reasons for its demise, the reasons for the demise of UK fleet air defence, the performance of the Harrier and its pilots (and the reasons for that) in Sierra Leone, and the readiness of the light blue squadrons to go to sea if required.
You’re also wrong about the impact of the CV training burden, and the effect it has on the ability of CV squadrons to undertake extended deployments ‘off the boat’. Very, very few carrier squadrons have undertaken extended expeditionary tours ‘off the boat’, and when they have done, getting them back on it has been a long and costly process. It’s perhaps something you can afford to do when you have more carrier wings than carriers, but the UK is looking at something like 40 F-35s, and we need these to be flexible enough to be able to chop from shipboard ops to land-based at a moment’s notice – something that’s possible with STOVL but not with CATOBAR.
And finally, just to round off your marathon of wrong-headed naval-gazing (see what I did there?) nonsense you get it wrong when you describe the training requirements for full qualification for Rafale M pilots.
As you say:
Depending on how you want to read the past experiences, the Joint Force experience did not work that well at all.
It did not work well, but not for the tired old prejudiced ‘wicked crab’/’heroic jack tar’ reasons that you trot out.
It didn’t work well:
Because the Navy could not hold to its end of the bargain and was unable to man its ‘half’ of an organisation that had been 3/4 RAF before it went joint.
Because the Navy itself never resourced or prioritised it, or the career structure necessary for a professional air power organisation.
Because the size of the CVS meant that it could do carrier strike or fleet air defence adequately, but not both, and if it did fleet air defence it became a self licking lollipop.
Because carriers were occasionally useful after 1982, but never actually necessary, let alone essential.
I remember watching in amazement as a Jag squadron sat in the Azores, ready and cleared to go and operate from Dakar, Senegal (HNS assured, a base identified and permissions in place) with closer bases 75% lined up, only to be held back so that the carrier could get there.
And when it got there, its aircraft had no suitable weapons, so the FJ contribution was effectively limited to ‘noise’ (shows of force). And yet the RN puffed out its corporate chest and boasted of this great success for carrier air power.
JackonickoAnalysis?
Where is the analysis? Where is even the most cursory description of the advantages and disadvantages of STOVL versus CATOBAR?
All I can see is Peter Collin’s opinion (unsupported by much in the way of reasoned argument, and certainly without any analysis at all of the alternatives) that we should do what the US Navy do, that we should not “reinvent the wheel” when reintroducing the carrier strike mission from around 2020; and that we should “instead use the template that the USN provides and read this experience across almost directly.”
I would have expected better from a former Harrier GR pilot, even one who has been out of a frontline cockpit for more than a decade, since any Harrier man should be only too aware of the inherent flexibility and versatility of STOVL, and in particular of the lack of training burden imposed by taking a STOVL jet on board the boat.
JackonickoWith the growth and potential growth in the Middle East, China, and India, there ought to be a big enough market to sustain a new offering, particularly if it brought something new to the market.
And with its expertise in composites, flight control systems, etc. BAE Systems ought to be able to design a great new civil aircraft.
A new super-cruising Biz jet, perhaps? A STOL regional jet? An economical VLJ based on the Hawk’s wing design?
Or may be the company should look at some military requirements – a high flying and agile platform for ISTAR and EW (think U-2/RB-57/Canberra replacement)? A STOL transport to replace aircraft like the Caribou, and to present a low cost alternative to Chinook? Or maybe a new generation basic trainer? Or a niche CAS/ground attack aircraft in the mould of the A-10, optimised for the post Cold War environment?
JackonickoOne element which is known is that rafales flew close or in Libyan airspace to spy SAM systems and update their jamming libraries a few days prior to the military intervention.
If they did, then the AdlA are not the highly professional and sensible force that I thought they were. You’d use dedicated Elint platforms to gather that kind of information, since the data gleaned would be of higher fidelity.
JackonickoIt’s also worth pointing out that while Rafales may have been the first FJs operating in Libyan airspace, we simply don’t know the extent of unacknowledged coalition air activity in Libya before that – the various Elint/Comint platforms probably remained outside the range of Libyan air defences, but the Special Forces insertions almost certainly did not.
And had Libya’s defences been anything like as impressive as Iraq’s were, more than ten years earlier, the scope of Allied air operations would have been very much more constrained.
JackonickoWhile that chart is from a Magazine which name we don’t have, and as such we cannot check the date or the author, it correctly state that EFT doesn’t currently have IMINT or ELINT systems. Nor does it have anti-ship weapons, or SEAD/DEAD capabilities which Rafale currently enjoy.
I don’t often get the chance to agree with Mildave, but I find it hard not to on this.
In part, at least.
Patently, Typhoon doesn’t currently have either recce (IMINT) or anti-ship capabilities. Both are planned for integration, but without a customer requirement, neither are likely to happen soon.
It doesn’t have a nuclear strike capability like Rafale, either, and is unlikely to ever get one. Nor can I see anyone bothering to integrate a buddy refueling store.
Nor is Typhoon an Elint platform, or a SEAD aircraft.
As of today, Rafale can do lots more things than Typhoon. Loads! Multi-role versatility is clearly something that Rafale has in spades, while Typhoon’s multi-role capabilities remain modest, and even after P1EA, Typhoon will lack Rafale’s range of air-to-ground weapons integrations.
I suspect that it’s going to be five years before we see Brimstone and Storm Shadow in frontline service (though all bets are off once export customers start seriously integrating their own weapons in their own timescales – who would have predicted AASM on Typhoon in the near future before last week? Not me!)
But yes, Rafale does multi-role more comprehensively than Typhoon and probably always will. Great job Dassault. Take a bow on a great job well done. I wouldn’t want to take anything away from that achievement.
But some people do seem a bit too keen to over-state or over-hype Rafale’s capabilities. While Rafale currently has better SEAD capabilities than Typhoon, it isn’t what I’d call a proper SEAD aircraft (in the way that the F-4G was, for example, or the Tornado ECR). And while there are plans to integrate dedicated SEAD weapons on Typhoon, I don’t know of similar plans for Rafale.
And we can argue all day whether DASS or SPECTRA is better, but at the end of the day, we can surely agree that while both can detect, locate and identify hostile emitters, regardless of which can do so better, NEITHER can do so with the degree of accuracy and precision that a proper, dedicated Elint aircraft can?
JackonickoThe Wyvern was designed to be capable of true anti-ship missions, with a torpedo capability, and was not an air-to-air fighter at all. Hence S, not FGA.
The same was not true of the Sea Hawk, which began as a fighter (F) later gaining a ground attack capability (FGA).
The SR Strat Recce designation dates back to the Victor, at least.
The GR designation can’t have indicated strike, as the Harrier GR.Mk 1-3 were GRs, yet never carried nukes.
Or can it, as, if memory serves the Harriers were originally intended to carry WE177, which was at least fit checked, and may have been trialled (there’s a picture of a WE177 on a Harrier on that big UK nukes site).
Can this be why non-nuclear Navy Phantoms were FG.Mk 1s, while nuclear capable RAF Phantoms were FGR.Mk 2s?
Does the R in FGR or GR somehow indicate strike?
JackonickoThe problem with your proposals re South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands is multi-faceted.
1) Argentina has even less claim on them than it does on the Falklands.
2) They are nearly 900 miles further East, or more than 1,300 miles away from the closest point on the Argentine coast (this is the distance from London to Minsk). Port Stanley is 450 miles from the closest point in Argentina, equivalent to the distance between London and Berne. The proximity to Argentina is exaggerated, in other words.
3) Their possession would give Argentina increased rights to Antarctica and mineral and fishing rights in their territorial waters. It would effectively reward Argentina for its aggression and hostility.
JackonickoB does not necessarily equate to ‘high altitude’.
I suspect that had the RAF bought the NA39 first, it would have carried a GR designation.
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