Most industry professionals take JOUST (and later simulations) seriously – indeed it was validated by Rand.
Interestingly, EF GmbH (not BAE) are still using JOUST results and analysis in briefings and presentations. Laurie Hilditch (head of requirements capture) used it in a presentation to journalists on 9 December in Munich, for example. My source tells me that not one of those journos (who included at least one French writer) batted an eyelid, and none questioned its validity.
Or perhaps the comms guy used a comms message brief he’d been issued by EF management…….
But no, of course not. He answered off his own bat, and he was exactly the same source as JL used, who would naturally say a ‘senior industry source’ when he meant someone in the press office. :rolleyes:

Personally, I’m more interested in what was said, rather than wanting to be distracted by peripheral irrelevant bol.locks about who said it and when.
But not that interested, as much more remains to be revealed about ATLC.
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The comms boss has changed in recent months from a German who spoke and wrote perfect English to an Italian whose English is less precise.
Ah. I see. All weather weapons.
(Let’s ignore the fact that they’re not much cop unless you have all weather targeting, as well…..)
The Armée de l’Air has EPWII. Can’t M2K carry it?
It would have been easier and cheaper to add JDAM to M2K than to deploy Rafale, I suspect.
I’m puzzled by the Mirage 2000’s sudden lack of ‘all weather capability’.
That great big radar in the nose allowed the 2000N to fly the most demanding low level strike missions by day and night. In all weathers.
Ah, but you mean it has no FLIR and no TV. No OSF.
Well the near IR TV channel is of questionable usefulness for all weather air to ground ops, and the IRST…. well lets ignore the issue of cloud, and smoke, and just say that it is no longer being acquired, thanks to obsolescence and other issues.
That is what I meant, Scorpion, thank you.
Though I believe that deploying Rafale (rather than more M2Ks, which would have been more operationally useful and more cost effective) had four main aims:
1) To provide useful opeval-type experience under operational conditions
2) To demonstrate French commitment to deploy ‘the best that it had’
3) To get the combat proven label for Rafale for marketing purposes
4) To spread the operational load and relieve the deployment burden on the M2K force
I wish that the UK had deployed four Typhoons for exactly the same reasons, though by chance, their A-G capability would have been more relevant.
Arthuro,
My ‘fake polemic’ was in response to your point that:
“The strenght of the rafale and what really makes it superior to the typhoon (in my opinion) is that it can face a much wider range of operational scenarios……….”
This is true, and it is a point of strength for Rafale that many of us have always admitted, though you then claimed capabilities for Rafale that are planned, but that it doesn’t yet have (nuclear strike, recce, anti-ship, etc.).
However, you then went on to claim that Typhoon “can’t compete. Its only role is to escort russian bears and blackjack and make some nice pictures.”
Which is a grotesque and frankly rather stupid over-simplification, albeit one which has a certain irony.
I say ironic, since, by sheer good fortune, the Typhoon’s current very limited air-to-ground capabilities happen to be more relevant to CURRENT operational scenarios in Afghanistan than Rafale’s more extensive (and frankly more impressive) A-G capabilities.
Thus Typhoon can self designate LGBs, and can carry up to six 1,000-lb LGBs, dumb bombs or dual mode weapons. With ROVER, Typhoon has better time sensitive targeting capabilities, and with Litening III has an autonomous capability against moving targets.
In any other scenario, Rafale’s stand off capabilities would more than ‘trump’ Typhoon’s LGB capability, but not in Afghanistan.
Snafu,
If it helps to ‘build a case against me’, I’m quite happy to acknowledge that I view all of the AdlA Rafale deployments to Afghanistan as having been motivated MORE by politics and marketing than by actual operational needs or requirements, though the value of such deployments as part of an OEU type process should not be under-stated.
Again. I’d have supported the RAF sending Typhoons to Afghanistan in the same way.
I just don’t see either as demonstrating the operational relevance or applicability to Afghan ops at the moment, and maintain the belief that if you were narrowly focused on what was needed on the ground, in Afghanistan, you’d just send more Mirage 2000Ds or more Tornado GR4s/Harrier GR9s.
And I’d continue to deny that I’m bashing (or puffing) either type.
Nicholas,
I’m sorry I haven’t made it clear. I’m not saying that AASM is completely without relevance in Afghanistan, I’m saying that in the Afghan context it’s a niche weapon, of limited applicability, and that an autonomous ability to deliver dual mode IN/GPS-laser guided weapons is significantly more relevant and more useful.
In the example you give, JDAM or EPW would have achieved the same end as AASM at considerably less cost.
Thus, in the Afghan context, Rafale’s inability to autonomously deliver the ‘bread and butter’ weapon of choice for that mission is more significant than its ability to deliver AASM.
All that will change when an LDP is successfully integrated, and would not necessarily apply in another operational scenario.
I’m a big fan of Storm Shadow, but I’d accept that it’s irrelevant for Afghanistan.
Taygibay,
Climb down off that high horse, chum.
What I was driving at, and it may not be entirely clear from your over-cropped quote, was that the claim that Rafale scored 7:1 against Typhoon during ATLC “sounds like” (seems to be) counter-intuitive nonsense.
That is not quite the same as accusing the good colonel of being “delusional/psychotic/loaded on magic mushrooms”.
Indeed anyone reading the original post might notice that the phrase to which you object was immediately followed by an observation about a: “highly selective interpretation of underlying facts.”
The intelligent reader might thereby surmise that I was suggesting that what ‘sounded counter-intuitive’ and ‘nonsensical’ was in fact an ‘over-selective’ interpretation of something that happened.
I make NO apology for suggesting that the good colonel is guilty of making just such a misleading, partial and over-selective interpretation of events, and that this explains a claim that would otherwise seem, on the face of it, to be ‘counter intuitive nonsense’.
Blue Apple,
That’s great stuff. Thank you for the explanation.
Nicholas,
You couldn’t have a bigger fan of AASM than me – especially the innovative and sensible triple carriage option. If I were the UK CAS and could buy one extra weapon for Typhoon, AASM would top my list. I have said as much long, loud, and often. (I might wait long enough to have the IN/GPS, IIR and laser options, however).
I would, however, question its relevance in Afghanistan (beyond a niche) – ESPECIALLY in its original form, which effectively gives you a rather expensive, rocket-powered JDAM (not laser JDAM). It has bags of stand off range that will be of huge import in some scenarios (but not so often in Afghanistan), but it’s too expensive for many of the Afghan target sets, and it’s not a great match for Afghan requirements.
In another scenario, it would be FAR more useful than Typhoon’s current ‘one trick pony’ A-G capability of six PWII/EPWII/dumb 1,000-lb bombs.
But actually, until Rafale has an LDP, it’s not that relevant for the narrow confines of ops in Afghanistan.
Now you might reasonably point out that Rafale WILL get the kit it needs to be relevant in Afghanistan long before Typhoon will get the kit it needs to do what Rafale can already do in other, more difficult A-G scenarios, and you’d be absolutely correct. In ten or twelve months time, the points I’m making now will all have been addressed, whereas it will be five years or more before we see Typhoon’s A-G capabilities expanded significantly.
You might also point out that for all its apparent suitability for Afghan ops, there aren’t enough Typhoons to actually go and do the job, that the RAF made a big deal about EPWII and then made PWIV its ‘theatre entry standard’ weapon, thereby making the austere air to ground programme something of a waste of money, and a diversion of resources.
I won’t state any such thing.
I’ll just ask for specific examples of where I’ve ‘bashed’ Rafale, as opposed to pointing out a genuine current weakness.
If it’s bashing Rafale to point out that weapons integrations so far are biased towards the long range/stand off role (a role where Typhoon has no current capability, and where it has a genuine current weakness), and to point out that the Rafale currently has no autonomous LGB capability and no robust means of attacking moving targets, then I guess I’ve bashed Rafale.
And if it’s ‘bashing’ Rafale to suggest that small scale Afghan deployments are more to do with media ops and marketing than operational requirements, and that “Rafale’s Afghanistan deployment in 2007 was more a politically motivated one, not one based urgent needs or operational benefits”, then, like Scorpion 82 and Nicholas 10, again, I’m bashing Rafale.
And then factor in the obvious bias and prejudice of said author.
Indeed. Just as those with an atom of common sense will ‘factor in’ the ‘bias’ of the CO of EC 1/7.
Of course, if the author is as biased as you think, there’ll be no acknowledgement of any Typhoon weaknesses nor of Rafale strengths.
I wonder how jackonicko could ignore so much of the CBEMS/BANG
Good question, and one which forces me to admit that hitherto I have genuinely paid too little attention to weapons, and especially to the minutiae of bomb bodies. I know no more about the UK 1,000-lb bomb than I do about CBEMS/BANG – though I do remember that the NEE of the UK 1,000-lb bomb is not much greater than that of the UK 500-lb bomb. I’ve tended to simplistically think of PWII generically, with EPWII as an ‘add on’. I don’t keep all the details in my mind, so that when someone says GBU-12 or GBU-16, I don’t think “ah, 500-lb PWII” or, oh “1,000-lb US PWII”. I have to look them up.
Therefore, since I had notes to hand comparing EPWII with PWIV, I referred to them, and in doing so, missed the detail differences between UK and French and US PWIIs, and though I was naturally aware that they are based on UK 1,000-lb, French and Mk 80-series dumb bomb bodies, I’m delighted to admit that I’m not that interested in the differences between those original dumb bombs, and won’t be until someone spoon feeds me interesting morsels about them.
If such an article is published, then we’ll have to use our critical faculties and read it and judge whether the author (and it might just as easily be by any of the UK writers) has made it all up, or has stitched together a lot of second-hand tosh. We’ll have to read it carefully and judge whether the article shows signs of being based on conversations with those who were actually there.
We’ll have to judge whether the explanations sound credible, or (like the Colonel’s claims) like counter-intuitive nonsense – or a highly selective interpretation of underlying facts.
Nick, Snafu,
The Rafale has performed QRA, but in French service, the primary role of EC 1/7 is NOT air defence. In RAF service, the Typhoon’s primary role has always been AD, and we don’t have enough of them to fulfil that role.
The effort to get a MR OED (multi role clearance) was undertaken before it was realised that there would not be sufficient aircraft and pilots to be able to support deployments in that role.
We could probably still have made some token effort before the F3 force was reduced to save money.
Blue Apple,
Those were the judgements of the RAF AWC in comparing PWIV versus EPWII.
Not cruise missile range but still beyond most air defense system range.
1) It meets the latest requirements of NATO’s Insensitive Munition safety policy. UK EPW II does not. I wasn’t aware that CBEMS met the latest standard. I’m happy to be corrected.
2) It’s more accurate. It’s not just a function of the navigation module, it’s also down to more predictable ballistics.
3) It has more fusing options (and can be reprogrammed while airborne).
More options that the EPWII in French service, even.
4) It produces less risk of collateral damage, and the late arm system ensures that an off-course weapon will not arm
5) It’s lighter, smaller, but just as lethal
We usually compare the 500-lb PWIV with the 1,000-lb EPWII because they offer similar lethality.
6) It’s lower drag. I note your comments. You’re wrong. It’s still lower drag
7) It’s less jammable. I note your comments. You’re wrong. It’s less jammable.
8) It’s more supportable and maintainable. That’s not only a function of the
bomb body and fuse since every aspect of the weapon needs support and maintenance.
9) It’s cheaper
The RAF and the UK NAO say it’s cheaper. Perhaps we overpaid for our PWIIs? 😉
As a Rafale fan, Kovy, you should know all about not getting a force built up as quickly as had once been hoped.
Double it for Typhoon.
I don’t think that anyone expected that in early 2010 we’d still only have two Typhoon squadrons – nor that there would only be one F3 squadron. And if we had UKAD taken care of, you can bet your bottom dollar that Typhoon would have done Afghanistan by now, not just augmenting Tornado or Harrier, but taking over the commitment entirely.
This isn’t about the cost of Typhoon, per se, but of the slow build up of the force, which is in part about cost, but also in part about delays (technical, political and budgetary) and about the distraction and diversion of an export programme