Arthuro,

The SFO investigation into alleged bribes in Saudi Arabia was triggered by trouble-making left wing journos, whose methods and practises were worthy of a documentary – really astonishing gutter stuff.

And though a Rafale fanboy may be disappointed to hear them, here are some pertinent points.

1) The alleged bribes had absolutely nothing to do with the recent Typhoon deal (Al Salam) but rather with Al Yamamah (Hawk and Tornado) in the 1980s and 90s. The Typhoon deal is squeaky clean and entirely untainted.

2) Britain’s most senior law officer decided that there was so little evidence of any wrong-doing that there was no chance of a successful trial.

3) Because the Saudi deal was conducted on a government-to-government basis, with BAE acting only as a sub-contractor, any payments by BAE to Saudi were specifically authorised by the UK Government. If anyone was guilty of anything it was the two Governments. (That might be a heartening thought to the most Anglophobe among us, but it’s frankly not credible).

4) All payments were authorised and legal.

I suspect that there was low level corruption by EADS in Austria.

There is no evidence of wrong-doing by Gripen International, and anyone who has had any dealings with them would (like me) laugh at the idea that Gripen’s export successes have anything to do with bribery.

“When was the last time you were on a American Super Carrier….?”

Last year.

I’ve been on seven USN carriers, including Forrestal and Enterprise – and not just at anchor or tied up alongside. I’ve witnessed flying operations on a Nimitz-class by day and night.

I’ve also been on two of the three CVS, and have seen Harrier and Sea Harrier ops (day only). In 1977 or 1978 I had an orientation visit aboard the original Ark Royal and saw a single F-4 launch and recovery.

I’ve never flown onto or off a carrier in a fixed wing aircraft (only by helicopter), but I can claim to have attacked HMS Hermes in a Canberra TT18 and Invincible in a Hunter T7.

I learned to fly with blokes who went on to spend their careers on the Harrier force, and who adapted to flying from CVS without any drama.

I don’t claim or need to be an expert on carriers to know the difference between the training burden imposed by STOVL and CTOL ops, and to know how much of the time JFH operates from CVS, and how much from traditional land bases.

Scooter,

You clearly don’t have a clue on this.

The US Navy is a complete irrelevance to this argument.

The USN operates full-sized CTOL CVNs. The RN has STOVL through deck cruisers, and the FAA is smaller than a single USN CVW.

The difference between STOVL ops at sea and conventional carrier ops is massive. One requires the kind of investment in skills, training and infrastructure that you suggest, and the other does not, as RAF Harrier ops from CVS demonstrate.

Scooter,

Comparisons with the USN are entirely irrelevant. In the USN, aviation is a career field. In the RN, it isn’t. The US Navy has one of the world’s largest and most capable air arms in its own right, with a full spectrum of capabilities, and big enough to have ‘critical mass’. The RN does not, and the FAA is a small, specialised, and narrow operation.

For an RN officer to ‘get on’ he needs to desert the cockpit early and shin up the greasy pole by going and driving boats.

Anyone commanding a carrier will have been out of the cockpit so long (if they were ever in one) that their aviation expertise will be irrelevant.

In any event, as long as the air boss is an aviator, who cares about the boat-driver?

As to RAF pilots needing more training to operate from ships…. Nonsense! The whole point about STOVL is that it makes the transition from land-based to shipborne ops easy – as the Harrier force have been proving for DECADES. Were we about to buy CTOL F-35C, then the force would have to be dedicated to the carriers and could not do much else. With F-35B, carrier ops will be just one (relatively minor) part of what the force does.

As to the RN’s part in Joint Force Harrier so far, it’s demonstrably the case that the RN has signally failed to adequately resource and man its fair share of Joint Force Harrier, after having insisted that it should have 50% of the organisation’s squadron numberplates and executive positions.

The Navy has struggled to provide adequate pilots for JFH, and has failed to stand up its planned second squadron.

We don’t need and can’t afford a dedicated air arm that will do nothing but carrier ops. Even the carrier adherents don’t want that.

The task of the Harrier Force is to deliver effect. Sometimes it will operate from NATO standard air bases with full infrastructure, sometimes from a more austere airfield, sometimes from a road strip or a supermarket car park, and sometimes from a carrier deck.

The carrier is, in other words, just another operating base. As such, operating aircraft from it is best left to an organisation that prioritises air power, that regards aviation as a career field in its own right, and whose primary purpose and mission is to deliver effect by air.

If you were operating from a conventional cat and trap carrier (or even a STOBAR carrier), the weight of argument would be very, very different.

Ante_Climax,

I hope that the above answers your queries too!

RAF Merlins have issues. Most are bound up with spares and support contracts. The aircraft itself is a huge success.

As stated above, the CH-149 problems are historical,

Since placing a (subsequently cancelled) order for what was then the EH101 Merlin in 1987, AgustaWestland’s AW101 has followed a somewhat rocky route to the top in Canada, according to Defence Helicopter.

http://mags.shephard.co.uk/rotorhub/2009/DH/dhmayjune09/pageflip.html

Some extracts:

The Canadian Merlin, now known locally as the CH-149 Cormorant has had a turbulent history, involving bitter political argument, cancellation (with associated penalties), re-selection, and then a service career mired in controversy, media criticism, and a struggle to overcome poor availability.

The CH-149 is based on the civil Series 500 version of the EH101, making it something of an ‘orphan’. Had Canada purchased ‘proper’ military AW101’s from the start spares and support would have been easier.

Canada ordered just 15 Cormorants, on the basis that they were much more capable than the CH-113 Labrador helicopters that they were to replace. Unfortunately, however, because Cormorants are actually capable of doing both ‘Search’ and ‘Rescue’ parts of the SAR job, and because they can do so when no fixed wing search asset is available, or in conditions that would ground other aircraft, they have been tasked more heavily. As a direct result it is acknowledged that Canada does not have sufficient airframes to do the job, and this has only been exacerbated by poor availability.

Canada did have its share of tail rotor half hub cracking problems, though after years of redesign, testing, and recertification, AgustaWestland has delivered new titanium half rotorhubs, which no longer have cracking problems.

Unfortunately, Canada does not enjoy unfettered access to spares for its Cormorants, and because the original purchase was made in an era of fiscal restraint, not enough money was allotted to the programme. As well as procuring too few helicopters, Canada also opted against purchasing the spares stocks that had been recommended by the manufacturer, diverting spares and support funding to other things (famously including a ‘shiny new hangar’). The DND hoped that spares and support funding would be topped up subsequently if serviceability fell short. It was not.

In the past Cormorants have frequently sat grounded because they lack spares, and the Wings have frequently had to resort to cannibalisation, leaving one or more aircraft as a ‘Christmas tree’ (source of spares).

“When aircraft are sitting grounded because they are lacking parts, and it is simply a matter of funding those parts (which we were warned we would need) then the blame lies with the government.” “It really is not the machine’s fault if you aren’t willing to buy the necessary spares. If we had parts, we would have availability. It really is as simple an issue as that.”

The problems were exacerbated by awarding the maintenance and support contracts to IMP, as part of a flirtation by the Government with alternative service delivery. Using military personnel or the manufacturer to undertake the maintenance would have been quicker and more cost effective. IMP does not have the data rights (Design Authority) for the Cormorant, and for anything outside routine procedures, they need to gain approval from AgustaWestalnd or even call in the manufacturer to do the work. There are a number of components and sub-systems that IMP Aerospace is not allowed to touch, including the transmission and rotor heads.

“We tried to do things on the cheap, and it came back and bit us in the ass.” A Cormorant pilot told Defence Helicopter.

As a result of this parsimony, the Canadians have been getting poorer availability from their CH-149s than the RAF get from their Merlins in theatre, in less-than-optimal conditions in the Iraqi desert, on operations. That shows what the Merlin can do, when properly supported.

The simple fact is that given adequate spares support and a good maintenance programme, the Merlin’s availability and serviceability can be exemplary (as other operators have found).

Unusually, Cormorant force insiders credit the manufacturer with helping to improve matters. “The Cormorant has had a really rough teething period due to Government mismanagement. We are slowing getting through our problems, one by one, with the manufacturer’s help, and they are more than listening to us and helping us get our birds airborne. AgustaWestland are trying to get spare parts to us faster, they have also modified inspection requirements, and they have been quick and responsive in developing fixes to the issues we’ve had. They are sending reps more often so they are more frequently in the communications loop and they better understand our needs. This is all part of how the platform is maturing.”

Moreover, despite the problems with availability, the Cormorant has proved popular with its crews, and extremely effective in operation. No other SAR helicopter could have completed the rescue of 16 men from the Camilla, a ship 450 km offshore, or the December 2002 mission that saw a Merlin medevac a sailor 1,600-km, in conditions that no other helicopter would even have been airborne in. With serviceability and availability improving rapidly, many believe that the Cormorant has finally ‘turned the corner.’

How fast at low level?

Your simulation sounds super realistic, TMor.

Just sitting in on the planning of an airfield attack by Jaguars made my head hurt – timings, required separation, the constraints that would be imposed by blast effect radius, the likely persistence of smoke and debris, etc.

Flying in the backseat of a T2 the few seconds I spent over the disused airfield target was about the most terrifying minute of my life. It seemed impossibly fast, and knowing that three other Jags were converging on the same airfield at much the same time was an ‘attention getter’ and a half.

The next time I flew in a Jag over Germany it was very different, with a low flying limit of 1,000 ft, so the world slid by at a more manageable rate.

DJ Cross,

That’s not what the F-15 blokes found on Red Flag…..

Nor is it what the Rafales found on the Jag’s last TLP…..

Obligatory,

The Tornado had speed on its side over Jag, but Jag was small, hard to see, and with better masked jetpipes. Again. ‘Flag after ‘Flag, Elder Forests, Priories, and the like demonstrated that whatever else it was, Jag wasn’t a sitting duck.

Typhoon 1,

No radar meant no emissions for the Jag, but it also meant no low level NoE in IFR, and a less robust night capability.

The Jaguar was an interim aircraft for RAF Germany – for obvious reasons. The role was primarily nuclear and the Jaguar made a nonsense of the two-man principal. The aircraft was basically a Hunter FGA9 replacement for rapid deployment and regional reinforcement roles.

By the standards of the day, NAVWASS was almost unbelievably good (I flew a great deal with NAVWASS, and I remember only too well how impressed everyone was by it), and FIN1064 was better again (though I’m barely qualified to comment, as I only flew the 2A a handful of times) but Tornado marked a huge step forward, with its ability to use radar offsets, etc.

The RAF Jaguar was a magnificent machine – especially in its final incarnation – but comparing Jaguar and Tornado is like comparing Hunter and Canberra B(I)8, or Tempest V and Mosquito B.35. They were different classes of aircraft.

A Herc wouldn’t have the performance, nor the degree of operator comfort required for sustained efficiency. Nor is it a good platform for the required antennas. And it’s small. You can put a capsule in the hold, of course, as the Yanks do with their Senior Hunter aircraft, but the result is an Elint aircraft with a very limited number of operators.

A C-17 might be a better option, or maybe even an A400M.