JackonickoActually, the SAAF Mirage F1 was shot down by one of the Cuban-piloted, Cuban-supplied MiG-23s, and not by an EAST German pilot. They lost another to a SAM.
Off hand I don’t know whether the losses were F1CZs or AZs.
The Iraqis lost several F1s, too.
I suspect that overall, kill:loss rates were about even.
JackonickoThe NH90 is not yet mature enough for fair comparisons to be made.
Even when it is, you’re comparing a Puma-sized aircraft with a much larger one. Better comparisons would be with Blackhawk and Cougar.
The key disadvantage with the Merlin has proved to be serviceability as a result of poor spares support, or inadequate spares provisioning.
If you support the Merlin adequately it has proved to be a revelation.
That is, however, an enormous ‘if’.
JackonickoThe NH90 is not yet mature enough for fair comparisons to be made.
Even when it is, you’re comparing a Puma-sized aircraft with a much larger one. Better comparisons would be with Blackhawk and Cougar.
The key disadvantage with the Merlin has proved to be serviceability as a result of poor spares support, or inadequate spares provisioning.
If you support the Merlin adequately it has proved to be a revelation.
That is, however, an enormous ‘if’.
JackonickoAC
“Right now in Afghanistan, the Americans are prepared to win the war at any cost, while the British are more towards a political settlement. That is all I am saying here.”
Only a political settlement will ‘win’ the war. Any attempt to “win the war at any cost” will only ever ensure that resistance will continue and intensify.
Rob H
Perhaps the age limit in bars would be problematic?
JackonickoAC
“Right now in Afghanistan, the Americans are prepared to win the war at any cost, while the British are more towards a political settlement. That is all I am saying here.”
Only a political settlement will ‘win’ the war. Any attempt to “win the war at any cost” will only ever ensure that resistance will continue and intensify.
Rob H
Perhaps the age limit in bars would be problematic?
Jackonicko“I think all these countries owe the US for saving their asses during the Cold War Period.” … not sure that deserves a intelligent reply.
I’m SURE that it doesn’t deserve one, yet nor should it be allowed to stand unchallenged. Allied servicemen died making their contribution to the Cold War, and this claim diminishes their sacrifice and disrespects their memory.
A more silly comment it’s hard to imagine. It’s a breathtakingly offensive example of the worst kind of misplaced, insular and arrogant American superiority complex.
Jackonicko“I think all these countries owe the US for saving their asses during the Cold War Period.” … not sure that deserves a intelligent reply.
I’m SURE that it doesn’t deserve one, yet nor should it be allowed to stand unchallenged. Allied servicemen died making their contribution to the Cold War, and this claim diminishes their sacrifice and disrespects their memory.
A more silly comment it’s hard to imagine. It’s a breathtakingly offensive example of the worst kind of misplaced, insular and arrogant American superiority complex.
JackonickoSchorsch,
Though there’s little direct experience left of Malaya/Indonesia (I think that there may be a handful of spec aircrew who flew in the later part of the Confrontation still serving), Malaya formed the foundation of UK counter insurgency doctrine for decades afterwards, and it is still being actively analysed and taught at staff colleges, etc. It led directly to the successful disengagement in the Persian Gulf, and to the UK contribution in Oman. It provided useful lessons from a SUCCESSFUL counter-insurgency campaign and is still viewed institutionally as being something we can learn from.
The USA hasn’t had a successful COIN campaign to draw lessons from.
Ante Climax,
Your comment about GWB being a visionary initially led me to think that you were being ironic or sarcastic, but to my horror, you’re serious, aren’t you?
People can draw their own conclusions about that, but I’d simply point out that what you see as ‘defeatist statements’ are actually pretty moderate and realistic assessments of the nature of the campaign in Afghanistan and what it’s aims should be. UK officers tend not to be mindless “HOO YAR”s who parrot simplistic and unrealistic slogans and so can come across as less gung ho (more considered) than some US officers.
As to the ‘success’ and ‘stability’ achieved in Iraq…..
:rolleyes:
JackonickoSchorsch,
Though there’s little direct experience left of Malaya/Indonesia (I think that there may be a handful of spec aircrew who flew in the later part of the Confrontation still serving), Malaya formed the foundation of UK counter insurgency doctrine for decades afterwards, and it is still being actively analysed and taught at staff colleges, etc. It led directly to the successful disengagement in the Persian Gulf, and to the UK contribution in Oman. It provided useful lessons from a SUCCESSFUL counter-insurgency campaign and is still viewed institutionally as being something we can learn from.
The USA hasn’t had a successful COIN campaign to draw lessons from.
Ante Climax,
Your comment about GWB being a visionary initially led me to think that you were being ironic or sarcastic, but to my horror, you’re serious, aren’t you?
People can draw their own conclusions about that, but I’d simply point out that what you see as ‘defeatist statements’ are actually pretty moderate and realistic assessments of the nature of the campaign in Afghanistan and what it’s aims should be. UK officers tend not to be mindless “HOO YAR”s who parrot simplistic and unrealistic slogans and so can come across as less gung ho (more considered) than some US officers.
As to the ‘success’ and ‘stability’ achieved in Iraq…..
:rolleyes:
JackonickoObligatory,
I don’t see any prospect of the Palestinians EVER being given a viable, coherent or contiguous country. Hell, the Israelis won’t even withdraw (illegal) settlements from areas conquered in 1967.
As to the status of Jerusalem, it was an international city, with Arab East Jerusalem under Jordanian control (like the West Bank) until Israel invaded it in ’67. I would disagree with Hawk Driver, above, in that establishing an international status for Jerusalem would provide a powerful symbolic gesture for the Arab side, and Arabs are big on symbolism.
The uniquely dreadful experiences suffered by the Jewish people in the holocaust entitles them to a homeland – but in my view that should be based on the area allocated to them under the UN partition plan, and should be based on sharing the area of the former Palestine with the Palestinian Arabs.
For decades, the Arab side was unwilling to ‘share’ – and certainly unwilling to see more than 50% of the former Palestine being given to the ‘newcomers’, and fought hard to prevent it, and then to reverse it. And for as long as the Arab side wanted to see Israel swept away entirely, I, like many Europeans, supported Israel in its struggle for survival against an implacable foe that would not compromise.
Since Oslo, however, the Palestinians have recognised Israel’s right to exist, and have been content to fight for a very much more modest settlement (based on Gaza, East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and on a ‘right to return’ for those displaced by fighting), but Israel is reluctant to allow even this, and won’t remove the settlements that are such an irritant in the Palestinian areas.
I despise terrorism and the cult of the suicide bomber, yet even I would see that Israel’s recent military action has been disproportionate, and that Israel needs to be pressured by the West to compromise.
At the last count, less than ten Israeli civilians had been killed by Hamas rockets, while Israel had killed more than 400 Palestinians, including large numbers of children. At least two families each lost five children. The claim that only 25% of Palestinian casualties were innocent civilians doesn’t seem to hold water, and still represents a disproportionate twenty-five-to-one rate of civilian losses (4 Israelis vs more than 100 Palestinians).
JackonickoObligatory,
I don’t see any prospect of the Palestinians EVER being given a viable, coherent or contiguous country. Hell, the Israelis won’t even withdraw (illegal) settlements from areas conquered in 1967.
As to the status of Jerusalem, it was an international city, with Arab East Jerusalem under Jordanian control (like the West Bank) until Israel invaded it in ’67. I would disagree with Hawk Driver, above, in that establishing an international status for Jerusalem would provide a powerful symbolic gesture for the Arab side, and Arabs are big on symbolism.
The uniquely dreadful experiences suffered by the Jewish people in the holocaust entitles them to a homeland – but in my view that should be based on the area allocated to them under the UN partition plan, and should be based on sharing the area of the former Palestine with the Palestinian Arabs.
For decades, the Arab side was unwilling to ‘share’ – and certainly unwilling to see more than 50% of the former Palestine being given to the ‘newcomers’, and fought hard to prevent it, and then to reverse it. And for as long as the Arab side wanted to see Israel swept away entirely, I, like many Europeans, supported Israel in its struggle for survival against an implacable foe that would not compromise.
Since Oslo, however, the Palestinians have recognised Israel’s right to exist, and have been content to fight for a very much more modest settlement (based on Gaza, East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and on a ‘right to return’ for those displaced by fighting), but Israel is reluctant to allow even this, and won’t remove the settlements that are such an irritant in the Palestinian areas.
I despise terrorism and the cult of the suicide bomber, yet even I would see that Israel’s recent military action has been disproportionate, and that Israel needs to be pressured by the West to compromise.
At the last count, less than ten Israeli civilians had been killed by Hamas rockets, while Israel had killed more than 400 Palestinians, including large numbers of children. At least two families each lost five children. The claim that only 25% of Palestinian casualties were innocent civilians doesn’t seem to hold water, and still represents a disproportionate twenty-five-to-one rate of civilian losses (4 Israelis vs more than 100 Palestinians).
JackonickoI hope that ‘Low Observable’ will forgive me directly quoting his recent post ‘in another place’.
Those who know who LO is, will be aware that he is arguably the pre-eminent defence aviation writer working today, and that he is certainly the leading observer of the JSF programme.
He says:
“Norway showed that JSF’s combination of capability, acquisition price and support costs are unbeatable.
If, that is:
You accept what the LockMart PowerPoints say about its capability;
You believe that the acquisition costs cited now are the price that you’ll pay when it comes time to sign a contract;
and that the support costs are what you’ll really see in service, once you are totally committed to reliance on a monopoly supplier;
and Santa, the Tooth Fairy and the Easter Bunny not only exist, but are ready to sign up for JSF as well.
The first problem for the jet’s competitors is that the customers can and will (quite rightly) ask for real numbers. If you want to know how much a Gripen NG will cost per flying hour, you can get a pretty good idea from the Czechs, coupled with US Navy data on the F414. The price of a Typhoon is there in black and white as part of a contract.
The second problem for the competition, in terms of capabilities, is that stealth allows LMT to close any public argument with “I could tell you, but then I’d have to kill you.”
JackonickoPFCEM
I’ve seldom seen so much error and disinformation in a single post.
You say: “THE MOST RECENT (public as of June 2008) FLY-AWAY PRICE FOR THE F-35A IS THE $58.7 MILLION (FY2008 dollars) OFFICIALLY STATED BY THE US DOD. That is the price quoted to Australia, Canada & Norway).”
George Standridge, Lockheed’s vice-president of business development for the JSF program, does not agree.
He made it very clear that that price was in FY2002 dollars (and is thus worth about $78 m today, allowing for defence sector inflation). Moreover, he also made it clear that the price was a short-term and conditional offer (available only to the JSF partners), and was dependent on all of the JSF Level 1 and 2 partners (Australia, Britain, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada and Denmark) signing up within a very tight timescale (long before development is complete) and dependent on all signing for their full commitments (368 aircraft), with no reductions. Recent statements from the UK and the Netherlands (and from Norway) make it clear that these totals (and in Norway’s case, this timescale) cannot be met.
Moreover, that price is contradicted by the USAF budget book, the price quoted to Israel, and the newer prices ferreted out by Aviation Week.
No-one would deny the extraordinary capability of the F-35 as a ‘day one, kick down the door’ bomber, but when operating with external stores, the F-35 becomes a slow, draggy aircraft, with few advantages over Typhoon/Rafale/Gripen NG/F-15SG, etc., and some disadvantages.
You list a number of areas where you deny specific Typhoon advantages, using DOES NOT and WILL NOT in caps for emphasis. In every case you are wrong, despite your caps.
1) The Typhoon DOES offer better air defence capability.
It’s faster, faster climbing, quicker accelerating, with better supersonic agility, longer radar and missile range (especially at azimuth limits). It has a helmet sight, an excellent IRST, and better MMI, with DVI. There are, of course, scenarios, in which F-35 stealth would be a decider….
2) The Typhoon DOES offer greater combat persistence.
It carries more AAMs than F-35, and can stay on CAP longer.
3) The Typhoon IS more deployable.
The Typhoon requires a smaller logistics tail, fewer groundcrew, less ground support equipment, and does not require specialist kit to maintain/repair specialised surface coatings. Nor does it suffer from many repairs being impossible outside US facilities.
4) The Typhoon IS cheaper.
We know that the actual flyaway cost for an RAF Tranche 2 Typhoon is £37.76 m. We know this because we know that the Tranche Two global production contract was was “worth €13 Bn” for al 236 Tranche 2 aircraft. That’s €55.08 m each. On 17 December 2004, when that contract was signed, the €/£ rate was 0.68545, so €55.08 = £37.76 m. For interest, that was then equivalent to $73 m (you can look up the exchange rates for that day at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/20041220/).
Except that the cost in Euros was fixed, so you should use current €/$ exchange rates, which make a Tranche 2 Typhoon $69.498 in today’s money.
And guess what, that’s cheaper than $96.8 m! It’s less than $83 m. It’s even less than the over optimistic, stabilised, post FY2013 prediction of $79 m……
5) The Typhoon DOES promise lower support & sustainment costs.
EF GmbH will contractually guarantee their support costs, and MMH/FH figures, which are lower than what JSF aim to provide, but haven’t so far offered to guarantee.
6) The Typhoon WILL be better networked.
It doesn’t rely on stealthy datalinks that are useless outside the bubble, and can communicate directly with AWACS and all other players, not only receiving the SRAP (Secure Recognised Air Picture) but also contributing to it. F-22 and F-35 can’t, and there’s no technology or contracts in place to ensure that they will be able to.
7) Because of 6 above, the TyphoonWILL be better suited to CAS and BAI missions, and to any mission when being integrated into the Global Information Grid is essential – eg complex scenarios where you can’t afford to have ‘loose cannon’ flights of F-22s stooging around unable to communicate fully with friendly forces, or eg real time recce/ISTAR, etc.
F-22 and F-35 will have formidable ISTAR capabilities, but if they can’t transmit their intelligence ‘take’ to the network, such capabilities are of little use.
8) The Typhoon carries more useful mixed loads, and has a better A-A capability, and so WILL promise better swing role capability.
9) The Typhoon WILL carry a large number of weapons that JSF can not carry internally, and so cannot carry in the only configuration where it offers any advantage over non-stealthy platforms.
The Typhoon WILL be able to defeat the threat of a developed ‘Flanker’ more often, with a better exchange ratio than JSF.
Apart from that, good post! :rolleyes:
JackonickoWhere do we think that Rafale has most chance of an export order?
I think that Brazil looks most promising, and I believe that India offers a good prospect. We’ll find out soon enough about Switzerland, but otherwise….?
Jackonicko“I don’t understand why the RN will be operating these two CATOBAR size carriers with an airwing of STOVL fighters and helicopters?
“Most inquiring minds are asking the same question.”
Well not really. The JSF is being procured as the Joint Combat Aircraft – and as such it is the intended successor to the Harrier. Like the Harrier, the JSF is not planned to be a dedicated carrierborne aircraft, but instead, a joint force asset which may operate from CVF, but which is probably more likely to spend more of its time in land-based operations.
The UK feels that a pilot trained to operate a STOVL aircraft can operate from ship or shore, with a relatively modest training (and especially currency training) penalty for shipboard ops. This has certainly been the case for the Harrier.
This belief is founded on the underlying assumption that it’s better and safer to stop, and then land, than to try to land and then stop – especially on a wet, pitching, rolling, relatively tiny deck.
It is believed that operating a CTOL aircraft would impose such a training and currency burden that the aircraft would effectively be unavailable for land based operations, and that it would be less safe.
Of course STOVL imposes both cost and payload/range penalties, but the UK is prepared to accept these.
Most ‘inquiring minds’ are aware of this debate, and its conclusions.
Nor is it accurate to say that 2005 was “the last year firm numbers where given publicly”. JSF cost figures have been given out regularly by Tom Burbage, George Standridge, General Davis, and others at successive open briefings at Farnborough, Paris, etc. Moreover, more recent, more accurate figures have been published elsewhere.
1) By the Congressional Research Service (who gave an average procurement cost (APUC) for the F-35A/B/C (which does not include R&D or other costs) estimated at $104.4 million per aircraft in 2006. They identified a 38% increase since 2001.
2) In the Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book. Fiscal Year (FY) 2008/2009 Budget Estimates published in February 2008, which gave the following unit flyaway cost figures for the F-35A.
$83.131 m – average Programme flyaway
$199 million in 2009,
$158 million in 2010,
$124 million in 2011,
$101.726 m in FY2012 and
$91.223 m in FY2013, and
$79.973 m to completion.
Those are unit flyaway costs, not unit system costs and not unit programme costs.
And those figures are founded on the assumption that defence industry inflation will run at only 2% per year, which is MOST unlikely.
3) In Aviation Week last month Av Week, Dave Fulghum wrote that: “16 F-35A/B/Cs in the 2009 budget will cost $237 million each. In 2010, 12 F-35A will cost $203.1 million each and 18 F-35B/Cs will cost $198.1 million apiece. For unit costs over the total program in then-year dollars, 1,763 F-35As will cost $96.8 million per aircraft, while the 680 F-35B/Cs come in at $122.6 million.”
The most recent flyaway price for the F-35A is thus $96.8 m, and for the B/C $122.6 m.
The average estimated flyaway costs given by Simdude above ($45 million for the A model $55 million for the B and $61 million for the C version) are thoroughly out-dated and discredited. Lockheed gave them in FY2002 dollars, to start with, and inflation alone has increased these totals significantly. Recent official USAF figures suggest that they’re out by nearly 100%!
In suggesting that selection of the F-35B: “has something to do with the fear of the RAF if the RN gets F-35Cs then the Typhoon becomes extraneous. The only thing the Typhoon has on the F-35B is range.” Simdude shows his anti-Typhoon bias.
No-one would suggest that JSF isn’t a better carrier aircraft than any Typhoon would be, nor that JSF’s Stealth doesn’t give it a fundamentally better “day one, kick down the door” capability, if you’re going up against an opponent with a sophisticated modern IADS (Integrated Air Defence System), and can’t use cruise missiles.
But Typhoon offers the UK things that JSF won’t, and that’s why the two complementary types are being procured. Quite apart from industrial factors and timescale (it will be ten years before we have a JSF squadron close to becoming operational), the Typhoon offers better air defence capability and greater combat persistence. It is more deployable. It is cheaper, and it promises lower support and sustainment costs. Until the USA sorts out the issues with stealthy datalinks, Typhoon will be better networked, and thus better sorted to CAS/BAI and to missions where being directly integrated into the grid are important. After Day One, Typhoon promises better swing role capability and can carry vital UK weapons which JSF can only carry in a non-stealthy fit.
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