JackonickoNo agenda. No lies. And accusing me of lying makes you a troll, and deserving of a ban.
Fonk talked about increased weight for limited A-G capabilities. That means Block 5. Everyone knows that Tranche 2 jets (which have a marginal increase in weight) will have FULL A-G capabilities.
I did not claim ‘9 in flight technical defects’ – you really should try reading what I write, rather than what you think I might have written, based on your paranoia about people being horrid about your beloved Rafale.
LardAssup, you’re a joke.
You say: “The evaluation flight allocated to the Rafales didnt LEAD to MORE flights. In plain english too!”
As always, you’re wrong.
1) In LardAssup’s own link, it said that: “30 flights are planned”. Rafale actually flew 39. Therefore there were nine unplanned extra flights.
Gripen flew 30 flights. 30 flights are scheduled for Typhoon. Rafale needed 39. Nine extra flights.
2) The phrase “The evaluation flights are part of current flying contingents and will not lead to additional flight movements at the respective airbases.” means only that the evaluation flights (for all three candidate aircraft, not specifically for the Rafale) were not extra to the normal flights at those bases, which were reduced to compensate. It does not mean that Rafale didn’t fly any extra sorties.
JackonickoA one year delay may be shorter than the delay on Typhoon.
Jackonicko“These extra flight were about testing OSF in A2G and the Damocles pod in A2A.”
This was supposed to be covered in the planned sorties, surely?
JackonickoIf we want JSF prices in then year dollars, we could do worse than to look at Av Week, where David Fulghum wrote that:
“16 F-35A/B/Cs in the 2009 budget will cost $237 million each. In 2010, 12 F-35A will cost $203.1 million each and 18 F-35B/Cs will cost $198.1 million apiece. For unit costs over the total program in then-year dollars, 1,763 F-35As will cost $96.8 million per aircraft, while the 680 F-35B/Cs come in at $122.6 million.”
Jackonicko1) I’m not calling you anything. I’m describing a position, which you now admit to holding.
You are doubtless aware that only one production representative JSF is flying, and one non-representative.
I would maintain that aerodynamically, and even structurally, Gripen NG is more mature and less risky than the F-35.
2) The USAF’s own JSF cost estimates are for a programme average of $83.131 m, with a price of $101.726 m in FY2012 and $91.223 m in FY2013, and $79.973 m thereafter. (That’s according to the USAF Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book (FY 2009 Budget Estimates). Page 43…). But that’s founded on the assumption that inflation will run at only 2% per year, which is unlikely in the defence and aerospace sectors, so the real price will be MUCH higher.
And that’s for the F-35A (the cheapest variant). Exports may make a small difference to the costs, but not by enough to counter the massive increases in programme costs, the worsening economic situation, and the fact that the programme costs are founded on a production RATE which no-one believes is possible, and which rely on an unsustainable rate of investment.
NB that in 2008 the GAO said that: “”Since last year’s GAO report, the JSF program office estimates that total acquisition costs increased by more than $23 billion, primarily because of higher estimated procurement costs.”
“Three independent defense offices separately concluded that program cost estimates are understated by as much as $38 billion and that the development schedule is likely to slip from 12 to 27 months.”
A $23,000,000,000 increase adds $9.2 m per aircraft assuming a 2,500 run. $38,000 would add $15.2 m…….. albeit not necessarily to the unit flyaway.
JackonickoIf the Swiss keep to what we are interpreting as being their word (and I think we may be being optimistic), we’ll know soon enough, and without relying on journos like me quoting unattributed sources.
It’s pointless second-guessing the detail of the Swiss requirement, as there’s every chance that we’ll learn exactly what they think is important in A-A and A-G.
If the report released doesn’t go into detail, or if it is as unsatisfactory as the Norwegian details, then the journalists will have to earn their pay, digging into what they can learn about what really happened. Some will have agendas, some will talk to sources who have agendas, and there’ll be the usual mix of claims and denial by the fanboys.
But this is the calm before the storm, and it looks as though all three candidate aircraft have strengths and weaknesses, and all three offer different advantages and disadvantages to the Swiss.
I suspect that much will depend on how Dassault’s hunger translates into the price the company can offer, and as to how seriously they take the Swiss need for US weapons to be integrated. If Dassault are as complacent and over-confident as some of the fanboys here, then they’ll lose this one.
Gripen will have to overcome the recent setback in Norway, with all that implies about cost, cost uncertainty, and programme risk.
Eurofighter will struggle with price – because one detects that the absolute number of airframes is accorded a higher priority than availability and capability by some of the important movers and shakers in Switzerland.
It’s an interesting competition, and a vitally important one for two of the contenders. But it could be just 22 aircraft – fewer than they’re talking about for Oman…… and it’s another competition where the best aircraft for the job may not be the one selected.
Spit IX,
Meteor will be integrated onto Rafale, and that may happen before it does on Typhoon.
Global,
Of course. They wanted to see nine more sorties because they knew Rafale was best. Makes you wonder why they bothered evaluating anything else….. After all, we all know that Rafale is “better by design” than the tubby Typhoon (with its long mammary harm) or the grotty Gripen.
Welcome to planet Fonk, where the sky today is a fetching shade of green.
He is back! He is angry! He has a long, Punky, moment harm! It’s Fonky part 4,444,447!
JackonickoI hate to say it, but the C-17 is built by US workers, who pay US taxes. Every penny spent on C-17 sluices around the US economy. You have to spend foreign currency on the A400M, and much of the money will flow outside the USA, even if you build them in Alabama.
Buy more C-17s and you keep a strategically vital line and plant going.
Buy A400Ms and you keep a European line going!
And crucially, while the A400M is cheaper than a C-17, it’s not ‘Hercules cheap’, and dollar for dollar, C-17 is better value. You have plenty of C-130s, and more C-17s would augment these nicely. C-5 upgrades are much harder to justify.
When it comes to tankers, you have two US-assembled options, both using major sub assemblies sourced from outside the USA. The 767 offers more US content by value, but is a much less effective tanker, when it comes to cost effectiveness and operational effectiveness.
Old shape,
You’re a naughty boy. You know that’s bol.locks. That’s mischief making, pure and simple. The A400M is deep in the do, but it is largely down to the FADEC now.
JackonickoA-G gets 20% of the marks in capability, but just 10% overall….. and that’s before priorities were changed. Less important than offsets, for example!
And without knowing exactly what weapons capabilities they want in A-G it’s impossible to say whether Rafale will score significantly more than Typhoon in this category.
If the Swiss want stand off precision attack capability (as I’d suspect), then full marks to Rafale, and rather less to Typhoon. But if they just want a robust PW/EPW capability, then Typhoon scores at least as well as Rafale, maybe better, and so does Gripen.
We simply don’t know, yet.
1.operational capability (60 %)
– A2A (50 %) eg 30% in total
– A2G (20%) eg 12% in total
– Recce (20 %) eg 12% in total
– growth potential (10 %) eg 6% in total
2. operational suitability (15 %)
– maintenance (30 %) eg 4.5% in total
– militia compatible (25 %) eg 3.75% in total
– compatibility with infrastructure of Switzerland ( 25 %) eg 3.75% in total
– noise pollution (20 %) eg 3% in total
3. Cooperation (25 %)
– industry off-set (70 %) eg 17.5% in total
– military cooperation (30 %) eg 7.5% in total
JackonickoDon’t be so silly.
The point is that nine unplanned extra sorties is not significant. It’s not a black mark against Rafale. Nor is one delayed sortie for Typhoon.
We don’t know the reason for the delay (in detail) nor do we know the reason for the extra Rafale flights.
You might want to assume that it was because the Swiss were so impressed that they just had to see more, and that the allocated sorties weren’t enough to demonstrate Rafale’s superiority!
But it’s just as likely that they had concerns, or that the Rafale (with its development radar set and other demo kit) went unserviceable in some small way.
We do know that the sorties were UNPLANNED.
Just because someone isn’t a completely biased Rafale fanboy and presents both possible explanations (instead of sticking only to those explanations that show Rafale in the best possible light) does not mean that they are ‘twisting and spinning’.
Talking of twist and spin, that was what I thought when I read someone saying: “Maybe the swiss have realised that you won’t win a war with just fighters. You need to be able to strike ground forces, enemy airbases, C&C and so on. And of course you need good recon assets.”
Because of course we know exactly what weighting the Swiss are giving to these different roles.
JackonickoLay off the Lockmart Kool Aid, Simdude.
Seriously. That stuff rots your critical faculties worse than crack.
I’m not gnashing my teeth, I’m laughing at the sheer stupidity of anyone credulous enough to believe these bullsh*t JSF cost figures.
Nor am I a fanboy for anything.
Firstly, the JSF is not ‘further along in development than Gripen NG’. The Gripen NG is a derivative of the Gripen and as such has a proven airframe (with 120,000 in service flying hours notched up), on which pretty well all of the handling/flutter/envelope expansion work is done and dusted. It incorporates systems that are mature (eg F414 engine) or well into development (eg AESA). Has JSF even cracked the 100 FH barrier yet? Only a cokehead or a braindead “oo ess ay” chanting redneck Lockmart fanboy would rate Gripen NG as riskier than JSF.
You’re right: LM has stated all along that the price for the JSF would be less then 60 million. They are lying. They are wrong. (Even they admit – shush – that they quote in 2002 dollars, but they’re wrong whatever year dollars they use). Who says so? The GAO, the USAF, and every serious observer of the military aerospace scene.
The GAO has NOT “stated all along that the average (for all three models) then year (2036) fly away price would be about 80 million.” As we’ll see.
Lockmart may have designed the JSF for affordability, but their record on cost control on F-22, C-130J, etc. etc. makes that an irrelevance.
The USAF’s own JSF cost estimates are for a programme average of $83.131 m, with a price of $101.726 m in FY2012 and $91.223 m in FY2013, and $79.973 m thereafter. (That’s according to the USAF Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book (FY 2009 Budget Estimates). Page 43…). But that’s founded on the assumption that inflation will run at only 2% per year, which is unlikely in the defence and aerospace sectors, so the real price will be MUCH higher.
We were promised a price of “$58.7 million for each of the first 368 foreign-bound fighters.”
Except that that was in 2002 dollars, so the real price was likely to be $80-90M with even modest inflation. Rather more than that, in today’s circumstances.
And that was just a predicted price, not an actual or guaranteed price. It was a deliberately attractive figure intended to ensnare the Aussies and was deliberately ‘optimistic’. Indeed it was specifically stated that this fixed price would “only be able to be offered if consortium numbers and schedules are maintained, and that it would likely add additional costs should partner nations start deferring or reducing their buys. But that’s never going to happen, right? The UK will opt for its full 150, and the Netherlands are hardly shaky at all…. :rolleyes:
What the GAO says:
GAO, 2005:
“JSF’s original business case, established when the program began in 1996, is unexecutable. The cost estimate to develop the aircraft has increased 80 percent, operational capability has been pushed out 2 years, and expected acquisition quantities have been cut by 535 aircraft. The JSF program is approaching key investment decisions that will greatly influence the efficiency of the remaining funding—more than 90 percent of the $245 billion estimated total program costs.”
“While relatively early in its acquisition program, the JSF program has
experienced design and weight problems that, if not solved, will affect
aircraft performance. These problems have led to increased development
and procurement costs and schedule delays so far. In addition, the
program’s customers are still not sure how many aircraft they will need.
The combination of cost overruns and quantity reductions has already
diluted DOD’s buying power and made the original JSF business case
unexecutable. Given continuing program uncertainties, DOD could use
more time right now to gain knowledge before it commits to a new
business case for its substantial remaining investments. The JSF’s current
acquisition strategy does not embrace evolutionary, knowledge-based
techniques intended to reduce risks. Key decisions, like the planned 2007
production decision, are expected to occur before critical knowledge is
captured.”
“The JSF program is DOD’s most costly aircraft acquisition program. The
program’s goals are to develop and field more than 2,400 stealthy strike
fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps and potentially
several hundred more aircraft for U.S. allies. International participation in
the development of this system is a vital part of the acquisition strategy.
The JSF is intended to provide greater capability and to replace DOD’s
aging fighter and attack aircraft. DOD estimates that the total cost to
develop and procure its fleet of aircraft will reach $245 billion, with total
costs to maintain and operate the JSF adding another $344 billion over its
life cycle. Since the program began in November 1996, it has experienced
technical challenges that have resulted in significant cost increases and
schedule overruns. During most of 2004, the program worked to
understand and define current development risks in order to prepare more
accurate cost and delivery estimates to support development and
production investment decisions planned over the next 2 years.”
“Increased program costs, delayed schedules, and reduced quantities have
diluted DOD’s buying power and made the original JSF business case
unexecutable. Program instability at this time makes the development of a
new and viable business case difficult to prepare. The cost estimate to
fully develop the JSF has increased by more than 80 percent. Development
costs were originally estimated at roughly $25 billion. By the 2001 system
development decision, these costs increased almost $10 billion, and by
2004, costs increased an additional $10 billion, pushing total development
cost estimates to nearly $45 billion. Current estimates for the program
acquisition unit cost are about $100 million, a 23 percent increase since
2001. Ongoing OSD cost reviews could result in further increases to the
estimated program cost. At the same time, procurement quantities have
been reduced by 535 aircraft and the delivery of operational aircraft has
been delayed.”
“Regardless of likely increases in program costs, the sizable continued
investment in JSF must be viewed within the context of the fiscal
imbalance facing the nation over the next 10 years. The JSF program will
have to compete with many other large defense programs as well as other
priorities external to DOD’s budget. JSF’s acquisition strategy assumes an
unprecedented $225 billion in funding over the next 22 years or an average
of $10 billion a year.“
and that was before the credit crunch!
GAO, 2008:
“Since last year’s GAO report, the JSF program office estimates that total acquisition costs increased by more than $23 billion, primarily because of higher estimated procurement costs.”
“Three independent defense offices separately concluded that program cost estimates are understated by as much as $38 billion and that the development schedule is likely to slip from 12 to 27 months.”
The GAO noted that it had: “no confidence in the ability of the program to estimate costs.”
I’m not against JSF. It promises to be a great aeroplane. But let’s not kid ourselves that it’s going to be a cheap one.
JackonickoThe A400M makes no sense for the USAF. Just buy more C-17s.
The KC-45, however, makes much better sense than the 767.
JackonickoQuite apart from the cost, and the need for Boeing’s involvement, integrating all of the Rafale’s French weapons on the F/A-18 would really help position the ‘Bug’ as a replacement for Mirage 2000s.
Offer Super Hornet with the option of AMRAAM, Mica, AIM-9X, ASRAAM and IRIS-T, and with all those lovely French A-G weapons to India, Qatar, and the like and Rafale loses much of its competitive advantage ……
He is back! He is angry! He has a song moomin harm! It’s Fonky part 4,444,446!
JackonickoNB That EF GmbH were asked to re-enter the process, and refrained from doing so. Unusually good judgement.
JackonickoZedro,
I raised the subject of the extra sorties when someone else raised the one delayed Typhoon sortie. The whole point is that neither is terribly significant.
Rafale needed a few extra sorties to complete its planned programme. (Perhaps Rafale went tech in the air, perhaps there were airspace issues, perhaps the evaluators decided they wanted to see something again, perhaps the pilot had the runs and had to abort). So what?
Typhoon went tech and missed a ‘last flight of the day’ slot, and had to fly it first thing next morning. So what?
Both Rafale and Typhoon were not being demonstrated in their current operational form, both having ‘down and dirty’ integrations of particular new kit, and both having revised software to allow them to give the Swiss a better idea of future capabilities. The Swiss are smart cookies, and wouldn’t expect these dedicated demonstrators to show the kind of deadbeat reliability and serviceability you’d expect from a service aircraft, in current service configuration.
Making a big deal out of either ‘problem’ smacks of desparate fanboyism to me.
He is back! He is angry! He has a lung marmite harm! It’s Fonky part 4,444,445!
JackonickoGive the man a coconut. This is about process.
It’s not that JSF isn’t a more capable aircraft, nor even that it isn’t a better aircraft for Norway. It’s about distorting the competitor’s costs to unfairly disadvantage it, and it’s about shifting the goalposts and redrawing requirements specifically to benefit one competitor.
One can see why EF GmbH viewed this as not being a ‘real competition’, and why they withdrew.
I have no argument with Norway buying JSF, only with them running a competitive process that was loaded from the start, instead of simply ordering their favoured choice.
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