We’re talking about the initial austere A-G requirment.

We have the 1,000 lb EPW in inventory. We don’t have 500-lb EPWs (in any case, if you look at NEE, the 500-lb weapon isn’t really small enough in many cases).

AASM is a useful additional tool, in my view, despite its limitations and immaturity. Triple carriage is a real hum-dinger!

They’re doing a great deal of work on Brimstone. Don’t make the mistake of assuming that it’s the same as it always was…..

1,000-lb bombs are big, but the NEE isn’t that much bigger than for a 500-lb weapon. You can always drop inert ones where you need an MCDW/LCDW.

GBU-12 would be OK (still a bit big, perhaps) but we don’t have any!

Why no rockets, why no SDB?

Cost!

Kovy,

WRONG!!!

There was never a requirement for RAF Typhoons to carry three tanks in the air-to-ground role, even when we were looking at putting the LDP on an MRAAM station. Just like we never wanted to put three tanks on Jaguar.

Long range strike isn’t the name of Typhoon’s A-G game – it’s there for BAI and CAS, leaving interdiction to the Tornado.

As one of the RAF project team told me:

“I also recommended that they seriously think about the impacts of mounting on the forward MRAAM station. Firstly, the loss of a weapon; secondly, the MRAAM weapon release sequence would be screwed and any fix would be unique for that configuration. Lastly, the masking effects of the fuselage would severely compromise the engagement profiles.

The centreline fit means giving up the centreline tank that was only envisaged for ferry flights. The all round view for the pod from the centreline was about as good as it gets.”

You are right in one respect, however. An A-G optimised Typhoon might well have done things differently – different intakes, probably, no need for long moment canards, and draggy shoulder MRAAM pylons would have been good enough.

But Typhoon is optimised for A-A, with an A-G capability. 4 MRAAM, 2 SRAAM, 4 1,000-lb LGBs, and an LDP plus two tanks gives the Typhoon enough punch, and enough range, in my view.

Typhoon and Rafale are different aircraft, with different characteristics and subtly different missions.

Three tanks isn’t better than two unless you think you’re going to NEED three, and the RAF, Luftwaffe, EdA and AMI don’t think that they do.

Two tanks is, they feel, the right number for the role and the mission anticipated. Three tanks and four 1,000-lb bombs would be a VERY VERY heavy load, and would impact on handling qualities. So if you want a lighter load, do you carry three tanks and two bombs, or two tanks and four?

And there are downsides to putting an LDP in an MRAAM station, and these downsides are felt to outweigh any advantages.

The centreline gives a better FoV, easier integration, better masking characteristics, and a more rigid mounting, and doesn’t require any change to the MRAAM launch sequence.

If two tanks gives a better LDP integration and better accuracy than would be possible with three, then two is better than three.

The change was originally made to reduce the cost and timescale of integration in the interim LDP integration for the RAF’s Austere Air to Ground package. Once work began, the relative advantages of the stations became apparent, and the decision was taken that the centreline would be used for the full-up integration too.

Because NONE of the partner air forces view the loss of the centreline tank as significant.

The ability to carry fuel on the centreline pylon would only be ‘precious’ if the operators judged that carrying three tanks was necessary to meet their requirements. They don’t.

On the other hand, using the centreline mounting for Litening means that:

You don’t sacrifice an MRAAM
You don’t have to rejig the MRAAM launch sequence
You have a better FoV for the pod
Airframe masking algorithms are simpler

For goodness sake!

This dates from 1991 – just two years after the Berlin Wall had come down, before the realities of post Cold War defence spending constraints were apparent and before we’d had time to fully digest the lessons of Desert Storm, let alone to grasp the realities of the new strategic and geopolitical environment.

Four and a half years before the Super Hornet had even flown.

I’d be astonished if anyone still felt the same about the ideal composition of a CVW today as they did 16 years ago.

I hate to intrude in this UAV love-fest :rolleyes: but the signal-to-noise ratio is becoming intolerable.

1) UAVs
There are a handful of missions (those that are often categorised as ‘Dirty, Dangerous and Dull’) for which UAVs are very, very useful. CAS isn’t usually one of them.

The reason for this is that UAVs are slow and inflexible to respond and reposition compared to a manned fast jet, and because target location and identification is extremely difficult ‘remotely’ using sensors with a ‘sodastraw’ FoV.

Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the need for UAVs to be cued by offboard, on-scene assets in most real-world scenarios.

That’s not to say that Predator et al aren’t an invaluable adjunct to conventional manned platforms – just that they aren’t a REPLACEMENT.

2) Jaguar/Tornado
Before the US extended the main runway at Kandahar, Tornado and Jaguar could not use it. Either could do so now, however.

“Many assumed that the Jaguar could not have operated successfully in Afghanistan, and that it was this limitation that finally put paid to the type. Until last year it was true to say that the Jaguar could not have operated from Kandahar as the runway was far too short. However, once the Americans repaired it, the runway length available increased to 10,000 ft. By then, the entire Jaguar fleet had also received the Adour 106 engine upgrade, while the absence of any radar-guided SAM or air threat in theatre meant that the overwing missiles could be dispensed with, as could the ECM pod and Phimat chaff dispenser, lightening the aircraft significantly. Trials showed that in such a fit the Jaguar could take off with two tanks and two 1,000-lb bombs at temperatures of up to 35°C, and at temperatures of 45°C could take off with two tanks and two CRV7 rocket pods, with 150 rounds of 30 mm HE in both cases. Increasing the engine TGT by 25°C increased the maximum OAT to 48°C.

The option to send the Jaguars to Kandahar to give the Harrier some breathing space was looked at very seriously before the political issues came to bear. (The main political issue was that there was a very good chance of the Jaguar making a very valuable contribution in Afghanistan, which would have made it terribly embarrassing for the Minister to have to explain why the RAF had to retire such a capable platform because the cash wasn’t there to get it to its projected OSD). The only modifications required were to carry BOL-IR decoys in the overwing launchers and the provision of a secure radio; one aircraft was modified with both to prove the concept.

“Operationally, Kandahar was perfectly viable. Moreover, if we were to take off with a light fuel load, and tank once at height, we would achieve both a good weapon load capability, and have a good loiter time. The role was similar, if not the same as, the Bosnia job, but with more hot CAS. Doctrinally, and training-wise, we were ready. Also there was no fatigue present as a result of op tempo like we hear about in other forces, so morale (and resilience) would have improved immeasurably on the Jaguar force for going, and on the Harrier force for coming home – a double whammy.” Squadron Leader Bhasin explained.”

Tornado never had the same performance limitations, and could operate from Kandahar without the same restrictions.

What’s ARC?

Do you have a link, MiG Man?