JackonickoTMor,
Japan won’t get F-22. Japan has demonstrated its willingness to buy non-US with the EH101.
Giving up before you start is no way to sell airplanes, IMHO.
JackonickoWith the developing news in Japan do you blokes see Dassault changing its mind?
JackonickoGlitter,
Which current Typhoon pilot says that the MMI of the Rafale is excellent? Are you referring back to the Chris Yeo article, or what?
JackonickoJOUST is a long time ago, now, and getting information on it now is as hard as getting information on (say) the YF-17. There must be tons of stuff in decent libraries (RAES, for example) if you were really interested.
JackonickoTwo re-delivered. Two more going through. Only two left.
JackonickoYes, I had his permission, thanks. I didn’t modify anything in post 137, to my knowledge, I just cut and pasted from the (Air International?) article I was sent, by the author.
Did you have permission to quote AFM? :rolleyes:
Satorian,
“It is believed”.
By the journo writing the piece, obviously, and by his or her paper. That’s a standard form of words to use when your sources are insisting on being anonymous and unidentified, or when your evidence falls short of what would be required in a court of law.
I have very occasionally worked for FDN, and know all about this article, which was run past the lawyers (it said that BAE’s bid performance had been shambolic) and whose seriousness dictated that it was checked and double-checked by several journos. It was used as an example (along with controversial articles on A350, etc.) because while it angered the company, they had no grounds to complain because everything said was true.
I know that FDN ‘understood’ that Typhoon had been placed top in Singapore because they had been told by highly placed sources who didn’t want FDN referring to them by name or job title.
It certainly wasn’t ‘made up’ or ‘out of the blue’ but was the result of numerous interviews with people whose credentials were checked, or who were wearing RSAF flying suits with name tags and ID badges.
There was a general consensus among all of the RSAF people that Typhoon had won, and there was such a strong prevalent opinion that one RSAF officer banged the table to emphasise his displeasure that his team’s recommendation had been overruled. It was far from being a mirage.
Typhoon ‘apparently’ won because that was what was apparent after conversations with RSAF, EF GmbH, BAE, Boeing, RR, SNECMA, Thales and Dassault sources – but only ‘apparently’ because the Singaporean MinDEF did not officially confirm it.
JackonickoTyphoon hit by Singapore
Singapore’s decision to drop one of the three contenders for its Next Generation Fighter requirement only months before a final decision is expected was not only unexpected but has left the bidding team looking for answers to some searching questions.
Eurofighter GmbH and BAE Systems had some reason to be optimistic after the Typhoon reportedly ‘won’ the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) evaluation.
This was not a competitive fly-off, and was only one element in a broad evaluation, but the Typhoon demonstrated impeccable serviceability. It was able to delivery everything they wanted, including supercruise, when its competitors could not. Radar performance was reportedly far in excess of what Singapore had expected to see, and the aircraft was able to climb to operating altitude without making a tortuous series of turns to avoid Malaysian air space.
Neither the Typhoon, nor the Dassault Rafale, nor the Boeing F-15 can meet the RSAF’s requirements in their present form. But there was every reason to believe that the Typhoon in its Tranche 2+ configuration could meet – and comfortably exceed – Singapore’s requirement.
The fact that Eurofighter GmbH was able to fly Singaporean pilots in the active cockpit, demonstrating the planned capabilities and enhancements in a realistic simulated sortie, reportedly impressed the evaluation team. By the end of the evaluation phase, the Typhoon was, apparently, the RSAF’s favoured technical solution.
The aircraft was then rejected before either of its competitors, showing that it not only ‘failed to win’, but that it had become the ‘third choice.’
It is believed that the decision had little, if anything, to do with the Typhoon’s capability and planned capability per se, but was instead a natural reaction to what insiders called “a shambolic performance” by BAE Systems during the early part of the bidding process. It also apparently reflected Singaporean unease about the risks surrounding the advanced Tranche 2 capabilities it required.
In particular, the Singaporeans were concerned about delivery timescales and were said to be worried by the continuing inability by the Eurofighter partner nations to finally define the Tranche 2 and Tranche 3 Typhoon specifications.
Singapore wanted a delivery timescale that could “just about have been met with Tranche 1 aircraft”, but required Tranche 2 capabilities that are “road-mapped” but still unfunded, and whose development has not yet been started. Only a basic air-to-ground capability (using the Litening 3 laser designator and enhanced Paveway LGBs) has been set in stone, and this falls far short of the capability required by the RSAF.
Confidence in the Typhoon’s future capabilities may have been undermined by continuing doubts about the programme’s long-term future, with Britain’s Chief of the Air Staff casting doubt on Britain’s need for Tranche 3, and with the Liberal Democrat party seizing on cancellation of the project in the recent UK general election.
BAE insiders say that while in days gone by BAE had a formidable reputation for putting together watertight bids, with a highly-regarded bid centre and “red teams”, these withered after the merger with GEC. By the time the Typhoon campaign in Singapore began, the company no longer had the structures in place to put together a winning bid, with a sensible price and a convincing technical specification.
Belatedly recognising this, one of the company’s remaining marketing gurus (who had reportedly been responsible for the biggest recent Hawk sales successes) was drafted in to oversee the bid last autumn, and a price and specification was submitted to the Singaporeans in February.
Sources close to the bid have been scathing about BAE Systems and UK MoD middle/senior management, who are said to have been inefficient, obstructive or unhelpful to the bid team, though dealings with industry in the other three partner nations have reportedly been trouble-free.
Others criticised industry’s commercial performance, and compared it with Dassault’s “hunger”. The French bid was made by one government and one contractor, working closely together with a real need for a sale, and willing to make some offers which a consortium of four nations/industries, with a huge Tranche 2 order book already in place, were unable or unwilling to make.
After a week of frantic media speculation, Singapore’s MINDEF confirmed that it had “narrowed down the selection for the next fighter replacement programme to Dassault’s Rafale and Boeing’s F-15” and that it had “decided not to consider the proposal from BAE Systems any further.”
It added that the Typhoon was a “very capable aircraft”, but pointed out that “the committed schedule for the delivery of the Typhoon and its systems did not meet the requirements.”
Eurofighter GmbH has officially denied that there were any problems with the bid, and chief executive Aloysius Rauen praised BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, the UK government, Procurement Minister Lord Bach, the RAF, and DESO for their “excellent support”.
There seems to be a new willingness in the consortium to offer greater flexibility, and to consider the early adoption of particular capabilities to meet the requirements of export customers, after the failed Singapore bid.
BOXTEXT: ‘It is believed that the decision had little, if anything, to do with the Typhoon’s capability and planned capability per se, but was instead a natural reaction to what insiders called “a shambolic performance” by BAE Systems during the early part of the bidding process.’
JackonickoThat’s way too long to respond to in detail, and you just keep on ignoring evidence that’s there in black and white as you pick isolated phrases and over-interpret them to try and support a fixed conclusion that you’ve already reached, and that no amount of evidence or logic will shift.
With respect, I have spoken to people, and they made it clear that when it came to the helmet, technical difficulties were “the end of the story” – they had to abandon integration because of technical difficulties. You say that “the implication is that if there were more F-22s on order, then the cost of overcoming these technical difficulties would not be a factor.” The implication was that if there were to be a full buy of 339 they might (MIGHT) attempt integration, with no guarantee of success. I heard the words and caught the nuances.
Well, there was also the major joint training exercise Northern Edge in Alaska
Also? What do you think ONE was? (…..Op Northern Edge)
You assume that the F-22 team could overcome any difficulty if requirements dictate. That’s good patriotic stuff, but is it realistic?
The programme manager (and the ACC 5th Gen man) said exactly what I described – there’s no “if that’s what was said” about it. And he didn’t just say “we don’t expect” he said “we don’t expect EVER……”
You say that “the need (for an HMSS) is not sufficiently compelling” without having spoken to anyone, based entirely on your own opinion as an interested amateur. Plenty of pros believe that there is a compelling need, but that the needs of the F-35 programme and finances do not allow it.
You make frankly silly statements about holding the F-22 in reserve (which might not be possible especially during an expeditionary deployment, and which would be a politically difficult admission to make)
(“if the F-22 cannot be used as it was intended to be used, rendering both its stealth and mobility moot, then even if it had HMSS, it would be a waste to send an F-22 to do a job that the currently more numerous F-15C could do nearly as well.” So if it’s likely to be tough, you keep your best fighters at home……)
“These are RoE that would negate the F-22’s stealth advantage (because the aircraft becomes visible) and not it’s stealth capability, so you still wouldn’t hang ASRAAMs under the F-22’s wings.”
If you mean that the F-22’s stealth would still help protect it against SAM threats (a fact often neglected in discussions such as this), then you’d have a valid point. However, if we assume that this is not a major issue (e.g. flying defensive CAP over friendly/neutral territory or enemy IADS has been wiped out already) and that F-22s have to get within HOBS firing range in sight of the enemy, as you’ve been supposing, then there would be no reason not to carry external armament, as long as it’s needed.
Even if RoE dictate visual identification, you might still want to keep your F-22s as stealthy as possible. It doesn’t mean that you’ve wiped out the enemy IADS (indeed this might be happening in the build up to hostilities). You can’t assume that a willingness to engage in WVR combat is an acceptance that external stores can be carried, otherwise you’d never have bothered putting a short range missile in an internal bay.
You suggest that with a helmet and HOBS, a mutual kill is likely. Without it the enemy will simply get a free Raptor kill, or you’ll be forced to send F-15s, which will be hacked down in droves by the wrong adversary.
There is no indication that the USAF think that they’ll be able to hold back the F-22s until RoE and circumstances are perfect.
You are repeating dodgy Lockmart and USAF propaganda, and in doing so you are over-stating F-22’s Stealth capabilities, especially when it comes to IR. The aircraft will not be picked up ‘visually first’. Some threat aircraft may even get it on radar, or on another platform’s radar, via datalink before seeing it.
The USAF cannot put off the need for proper HOBS capabilities indefinitely – they could be needed next time out, and with no helmet and AIM-9M, the F-22 is sadly lacking.
You might not like it, but it has proved technically impossible (or impractical) to integrate HMSS onto the F-22.
Fighters without an HMSS and a HOBS weapon are severely disadvantaged in WVR combat, so in this area, the F-22 does have a major disadvantage in comparison to other fighters.
Your argument that HOBS missiles are ineffective (because all missiles are) and that we need to close to within guns range baffles me. It’s simply wrong, since close range missiles now can be fired off boresight with very short minimum ranges.
You miss a fundamental point, in that you judge that an HMSS would be “great for emergencies, but not a priority in terms of probable need” based on personal opinion, your life and your engineering job. I don’t mean to sound rude and I don’t want to be accused of ad hominem attacks, but you’re an uninformed enthusiast, for goodness’ sake. I’m a professional aviation writer, and it’s not that I disagree with you on the basis of my own opinion (which is worthless) – my argument is based on what I’ve learned, professionally (not on the web) by talking to a wide variety of real experts in the field, fighter pilots, engineers and programme people. And their opinions are worth much more than yours and mine.
”As for air-to-ground, why is it necessary now when it hasn’t ever been before? It might improve any fighter’s effectiveness in this regard to some degree, but the F-22 is not going to be hunting a wide variety of ground targets, particularly mobile ones–not unless it is given a full multirole capability, which would almost undoubtedly include integration with the appropriate helmet.”
I wonder if you’ve read anything I’ve posted. The benefits of a helmet for air to ground use have been clearly outlined, and they are all about getting eyes on and hitting targets quickly, about facilitating target confirmation with a FAC, and about targeting without warning the enemy. This is not a “shiny new gadget”, it’s a simple, cheap, battle-winning tool that has already proved to be of huge value.
The point about the Su-30 and MiG-29OVT was simply to counter the ridiculous claim that “Raptor can point its nose at least as well as the Su-30 can” and the claims that Raptor air displays showed that the aircraft was in the same league as TV ‘Flankers’ and Fulcrums’, which it really isn’t at this end of the envelope. I agree that this isn’t massively applicable, but the claim that Raptor is comparable is risible.
The key is that the helmet is of proven usefulness in A-A and A-G, and that lacking one is a major disadvantage. Moreover, integration of a helmet on F-22 was abandoned due to technical difficulties, and the programme manager doubts that the aircraft will ever get a helmet within the current planned production total. This makes the F-22 significantly less useful than it could be and imposes potential vulnerabilities in some situations.
JackonickoShall we believe the internet then, TMor, and believe that Typhoon will get Brimstone under the austere package, and that the austere LDP may not be Litening?
Or will we believe that the truth is rather less exciting and much less impressive…?
I hesitate to say that “I’ve now spoken to people and so now know the truth…..”
since there are those who don’t believe anything unless there’s a URL attached……
Satorian,
Things like this highlight the inadequacies of the internet.
I’d never heard of SILVE before May. It’s not been hyped in the way that JOUST was.
And no, it’s not QinetiQ. I believe it was developed by EADS-M and perhaps BAE. I think that Gambit was BAE.
(The online stuff on JOUST is fragmentary, contradictory and often of dubious provenance).
Try finding anything useful online on FCAC, too!
JackonickoRAF Puma, not ‘Army helicopter’
JackonickoSatorian,
I don’t know where you’d find details of SILVE online, nor on JOUST, come to that. I rely on hard copy material.
I can tell you that SILVE users include:
Saab/Gripen International
LCA Team/IAF
ATF/NAAO
Swiss air force
X-31/NAAO
BAE
McDonnell Douglas
SAAB
NAAO
Matra
MBDA
Dassault
US Defense Intelligence Agency.
The SILVE acronym isn’t spelled out in the study I have.
There’s reference to a 1 v 1 study called Gambit S, and I can find nothing on that, either.
But if I only believed what I could read on the internet, I’d be stuffed!
JackonickoTyphoon is only marginally stable at supersonic speeds, thanks to its greater instability at subsonic speeds. That’s why it’s more agile.
JackonickoInteresting that those from nations whose aircraft didn’t show well in JOUST automatically dismiss its accuracy, relevance and credibility.
“Were EFs facing Sukhois with equivalent AWACs support and with both sides having equivalent training and tactics, without assumptions of Soviet style GCI control. YES Details, details. Was the assumption made that the Sukhois would be backed up by state of the art deception SPJs? Etc? YES“
Parity was assumed in training, tactics, missile performance and radar. Multiple scenarios were flown, from 1 vs 1, to 1 vs many, to many vs many.
BVR tactics as examined by JOUST remain entirely valid if you have one side defending against an enemy who are progressing towards an objective, and if you need to kill the enemy and prevent that progression.
And the use of E-3D/E-3F does not obviate the need for decent onboard SA, and for the best possible MMI. You may be operating in heavy jamming, and AWACS may be somewhere else, doing something else. Nor does AWACS obviate the need for powerful onboard sensors – with ARMs inbound, or a tech fault, Rafale needs as much range as it can squeeze from whatever is mounted in that pretty but slender nose, and to pretend otherwise is silly.
If IRST, Mica IR and Link 16 were enough, the AdlA wouldn’t be spending money on supporting RBE2, let alone on getting an AESA.
And Su-30 is not even the equal of Rafale in BVR, when it comes to performance. It doesn’t supercruise, and it’s longitudinally stable at supersonic speeds, so doesn’t turn well at those speeds, while it bleeds energy like a b*s*a*d.
But I do need to be told off for getting muddled on BARS…… (thanks for pointing it out, I will go and do 100 lines) ….. though the underlying point remains that in migrating from a high powered inverse cassegrain array in the -27/-30 to an electronically scanned array in the 30MKI means a significant reduction in performance at the azimuth limit (and reduced range, overall).
Jackonicko“your original contention was that the findings at ID validated the results of the simulation.”
No. My contention was more subtle. That ID produced nothing that contradicted JOUST, and what the exercise did reveal were aspects of Su-30 performance that tended to confirm it rather than the reverse.
“1.The findings at ID were not sufficient to validate anything worthwhile (let alone reality or a simulation you claim to be closer to reality).”
Again, not really accurate. I don’t claim that JOUST is ‘closer to reality’, period, only that the simulation was merely more representative of real-world BVR.
“2. Whatever can be extrapolated from the little findings at ID, say that those two planes compare very evenly with each other.”
Certainly inaccurate. The ‘Flanker’ is a previous generation fighter with some useful WVR capabilities, but lacking the supersonic performance and agility and the MMI of more modern fighters, of which Typhoon is merely an example.
JackonickoIn other words, you dont know the specifics but are “extrapolating”
No I’m not. I’m repeating the generalities.
JOUST models were not “based on aircraft with more limited performance”, in fact, performance estimates for Rafale erred on the generous side, while the ‘Flanker’ was deliberately exaggerated (with parity in radar, missiles and pilot quality) so that it represented the worst case threat.
Unless you think that BARS offers greater range than Captor M, then it has less range than was assumed in JOUST.
JOUST included sorties with and without AWACS support.
“Anyone who depends on a simulation will have to face reality sometime.” No doubt that’s why Dassault have been such a good customer for SILVE…. Of course simulation is of limited usefulness – but it is useful.
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