Maybe you could tell Mr Saleem Hatoum, the “Sri Lankan” that?

May you read things in more clearler terms. I live and do business in Sri Lanka not that I am Sri Lankan

Thought this would put little cold water>

Taken from acig.org
http://www.acig.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=414

http://www.indianexpress.com/flair/20020217/1a.html

Defence analyst Ravi Rikhye says the IAF in 1965 was in the midst of a vast, supremely untidy expansion plan, with war the last thing on its mind

If Marshal of the Air Force Arjan Singh is honoured for a defeat, why was ACM P C Lal not honoured for a victory? This statement is in no way a criticism of a grand old warrior. He never asked for the honour or expected it. His story is inextricably bound with that of the Indian Air Force (IAF) in its formative years. He served his country in three wars, and helped lay the foundation for the 1971 Indo-Pak War victory. He deserves our respect.

Nonetheless, we would normally expect this honour to be awarded for a victory. Thirty-seven years after the event, we must have the courage to dispassionately accept that in 1965, the victory belonged to the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and not to us.

But then Indians have been so aggravated by false PAF claims about the war that they have failed to give credit where it was genuinely due. For example, Squadron Leader M M Alam claimed to have shot down five Hunters over Sargodha in 30 seconds. Such absurd claims cast doubt even on genuine achievements, of which Pakistan had plenty. Alam, incidentally, downed two Hunters, an outstanding achievement. The raw data tells the story.

The IAF had a 2.6 to 1 superiority in aircraft in the western command and the Hunter, our main fighter, was a better aircraft than the PAF’s Sabre. Yet we lost between 60-65 aircraft — including some in combat-related accidents — against the PAF’s loss of 25 aircraft. True, losses are meaningless outside the context of the outcome. In 1971, we lost more aircraft than Pakistan, but we dominated its skies. In 1965, we had a bigger air force and lost more aircraft without achieving much. Yes, the PAF did not achieve its primary objective of decisively defeating the IAF, but it managed to neutralise us despite the disparity in size.

We suffered three big defeats. At Kalaikunda and Pathankot, we lost 18 aircraft on the ground, and our major offensive effort, against Sargodha on September 7, yielded no results. Moreover, after this six-phase, 33-aircraft attack failed, Air Headquarters suspended further major strikes and ran out of ideas.

It is said that in the absence of a warning from the Army, the IAF was not on alert. Yet, the IAF had been at war with the PAF since September 1. If that was insufficient notice for a war offensive, then nothing would have sufficed. To add insult to injury, from the Indian Army’s perspective, the IAF may not have existed, whereas the Pakistan Army enjoyed good air support, for example, at Chhamb, Lahore, and Chawinda.

At Lahore, on September 6, the PAF launched 21 close-air support sorties along the GT Road and near Jassar Bridge. The PAF stopped the Indian 15 Division’s lead brigade from crossing the BRB Canal long enough to allow Pakistan to deploy its 10 Division, ending India’s hopes of a quick victory. Admittedly, at Chhamb, No. 45 Squadron’s obsolete Vampires slowed down the Pakistani attack against the beleaguered 191 Infantry Brigade. Nonetheless, the IAF lost four aircraft and also inflicted damage on 20 Lancers in one of the most serious, friendly fire incidents in the IAF’s history.

Of course, the PAF also had its failures, most importantly its long-planned first-strike, which on September 6, got off only half the planned sorties. The plan was to hit all the Indian main bases and warning radars with Sabres and T-33s, leaving the way open for a crippling night strike by B-57s. To the PAF’s credit, the B-57s got off twice as many strikes as planned, but because of the lightness of the day’s attack, India was able to evacuate all its forward bases and the PAF knockout punch hit nothing. And as in all wars, luck played its part: Had the bombs dropped by a lone Canberra that courageously penetrated to Peshawar fallen a little closer to the PAF’s flight line, a sixth of the PAF’s air strength would have been lost in a single blow.

We must also remember that in 1965, the PAF was at its peak. One of the best small air forces in the world, it was beautifully trained and organised, thanks to years of intensive American training. It had many advantages over the IAF: A compact territory to defend, better radar coverage, air-to-air missiles, an excellent and logical airbase structure, good maintenance, and sound strategic planning. It was a single-mission air force: Keep the IAF out of Pakistan air space.

By contrast, the IAF was in the midst of a vast, supremely untidy expansion plan. It had hundreds of inadequately trained pilots, lived in fear of a two-front threat (Pakistan and China), and had a bewildering range of equipment. It was in a state of creative confusion we outsiders cannot adequately comprehend, as squadron after new squadron formed on helicopters, transporters, fighters, as SAM squadrons came up around the country, and as a new training, maintenance and basing structure was created almost on the fly. And the IAF wanted to perform the full range of air war missions, so it excelled in none. In 1971, it was different: The IAF was ready and well trained, with a clear strategic mission, and an absolute moral superiority in the rightness of its cause.

Arjan Singh led an air force that had a peculiar ethos that was difficult. Till the Rann of Kutch, the IAF never seriously took the possibility of an all-out war with Pakistan. For example, camouflage netting began to be used only after the Kutch incident. Even when the IAF and PAF were clashing daily, it seems to have occurred to no one that general war might be imminent. The IAF functioned as a glorious flying club, and war was the last thing on anyone’s mind.

In 1965, our pilots displayed bravery second to none. Air wars, however, no longer are about brave pilots — if they ever were. They are about organisations and managing organisations. In this, one man, no matter how personally brave or competent, can make little difference. Marshal of the Air Force Arjan Singh was not to blame for our 1965 shortcomings. No other leader would have done better in the circumstances. The chief of a fighting service, however, gets the credit or the blame for the successful or failed outcome. Five-star rank connotes extraordinary achievement and victory. The 1965 War represents neither.

Ravi Rikhye also assisted Puspindar Singh in writing Fiza’ya: Psyche of the Pakistan Air Force, the first detailed analysis of the PAF
in its first four decades of existence.

Sofar only promises and titles. Last article in AFM showed that US is slow on realisation… If the ACM tells that hten we better believe that….

This exactly what phrozenflame said, none of this we want in this thread!

Saleem kindly proove what you have just said above please

2) PLease do tell us where you have heard the Il-76 figure from?

IAF plans to buy US plane

Srinjoy Chowdhury in New Delhi
June 2. — While India and the United States are winding up their current defence policy group meeting, the Indian Air Force is looking to buy an American plane — the C-130 Hercules aircraft for commando missions.
The IAF plans to buy about six such transport planes for a total cost of about Rs 2,000 crore in the coming years for special operations, which means special forces activity, para-dropping and perhaps, air-landed operations. The plane has the advantages of extended range, compared with the Russian-built An-32, currently with the IAF and also, size. This means it can carry more men for a longer distance. Besides, it could be refuelled in the air, an advantage, now that India has the ability to do so.
The plane being considered at is the C-130-J and some discussions have already taken place. The IAF’s Directorate (Operations) Transport and Helicopters has had a look. It is bigger (perhaps by 50 per cent) than the An-32s the IAFs have, but smaller than the huge Russian Il-76 planes, that can carry even a tank. They are proven as well. The famous Israeli rescue operation at Entebbe airport, in Uganda, involved these planes.
India has rarely bought weapons systems from the US in recent times except weapon-locating radars and specialised commando equipment of various kinds in small quantities. There is talk of acquiring the PC-3 Orion for the Navy but why so few C-130s are being bought is a question. Keeping them operational would not be easy either. The IAF, for instance, has about 14-15 Il-76 planes, of which only 8-9 are operational at a time. There is also the political issue. Will this government have close defence ties with the USA? The defence minister, Mr Pranab Mukherjee, may be meeting his US counterpart, Mr Donald Rumsfeld, soon. Many purchases could depend on the state of the bilateral ties.

How’s this for improving the paradrop capabilities which are already the best in all of Asia. So are the recon capabilities of the IAF.

i can give u guys the link but the story needs to be dound out yourselves…it used to be there…

http://www.thestatesman.net/page.ne…sess=1&id=44760

When I write sometime I don’t make things up, I have read in text or heard from a real source

Pakistan is buying Mirage 3 & 5 from everywhere because this aircraft its backbone. Dassault has bascially stopped making spare parts and is forceing the current useres to buy its new line of aircrafts.

Aries, your IAF last year bought 60 Mig-21 from an eastern european country, why did they buy those. IAF had to ground its fleet of 29 and 27 because lack of spare from your husky friends and even their fleet of 16 IL-76 only 8 are operational.

PAF still has a very sophisticated and high standard in training pilots and by comparision IAF still lacks behind PAF in skill training, acquiring good quality pilots and the infrastructure to train pilots.

Oh yeah, Indians really are better than any airforce in the world leave Pakistan alone but they have the THE WORST record on air safety now that is reaaaaaaaaaallllly greaaaaaaaaaaaaat. But this is not the thread to talk about the great air force of Inia.

Wolverine
Czech and Hungary, as NATO members, may be expected to contribute to NATO operations in the future. They require aircraft that are not only very good but also of NATO standard. Pakistan will become the only third world operator of such an aircraft.

Fifth would be the correct number after Sweden, South Africa, Czech Republic and Hungary.

The USAF, IDF/AF, IAF, FAF, RAF etc are the few who really stand out.

IncidentAF which stands out? Yeah right, they do stand out in the with aircrafts crashing like anything. Try not pimping IAF for marketing.