The USN believed that carriers were an essential tool in the NATO environment and I for one believe they were correct. They were against the UK carrier run down and even offered USN reserve carriers as an option to CVA01 following its cancellation. In addition the UK remained in the Five Power agreement and also maintained at least a nominal out of NATO area role throughout this period. So I think an argument for carriers could be made. Whether it would have carried the day in the absence of the CV01/Phantom funding pressure of the mid 60s we can never really know. The fact that both Healy and Wilson later went on record to say that the carrier cancellation decision was one of the harder ones they made in government does suggest that they did recognise the efficacy of carriers.
It is worth remembering that when we talk about the manning of a carrier that a not inconsiderable portion of the crew was air group. That is associated with the operation of the squadrons on an air station or on a carrier. This is relevant because the UK maintained a number of carrier capable fast jet squadrons (Phantoms an Buccs), some even dedicated to maritime strike and maritime air defence right through to the 1990s when they were withdrawn from service. They were not trained for carrier ops because no carrier platforms existed for them to operate from.
As for frigate numbers, could the RN have dropped from 70 to 65 or even 60 without undermining NATO I would say yes, particularly since a number of them were rather obsolescent place fillers.
Could the RN have manned Vic and Eagle in the 70s? Well Hermes’ crew in 1982 was listed as 980 plus airgroup. The two tigers had crews of 850, so drop those and 3 or 4 frigates and there you are. Carriers rather than jury-rigged cruisers would have had the side benefit of putting more ASW Sea Kings to sea.
I sort of work in the history business professionally and one of the mindsets you need to try and avoid is the thought that because something happened in a particular way in history that it was somehow inevitable. History is the sum of often very subtle influences and relatively minor changes can have a profound effect. If the RN had stuck with the Sea Vixen and not asked for anything more than some upgrades and refits then I think it is entirely possible that the carrier force could have sailed on into the 70 relatively intact, though perhaps moderately reduced. The carrier programme of the 70s/80s, the historical Invincibles, would then have turned out very differently and probably very different to CVA01 too. Of course we can never really know, but it is at least fun to speculate, and also perhaps a little sad.
Have enjoyed reading the thread so I hope you don’t mind me adding my two pence worth.
I think that although the cost and manpower issues during the 70 were very real they would not have prevented the RN running fleet carriers during that time. I have a naval review dated from the end of the 70s that lists the RN as 67,770 regular service personnel with 29,100 regular reserve and 6,500 volunteer reserve. If the 7,770 were to say man 3 fleet carriers that still leaves 60,000 to do the rest of the work, which must surely be possible if sensible decisions are made.
In fact more realistic decision making really is at the heart of avoiding the carrier crisis. If in the early 60s consideration had been given to value for money and sustainability rather than trying and failing to keep up with the USN then a different chain of event could have emerged.
The Phantom is the biggest problem as it could not fly from any existing carrier, even the biggest and most recently refitted Eagle, without major modification of the aircraft and the carriers. Some of which such as the relatively new Hermes would never be able to operate it. At the same time the buy of the Sea Vixen continued till 1966! How can this be value for money? How can such waste be sustainable? If the sea Vixen by dint of necessity is the fighter for the 70s the updates that were offered for it, new engines and a new radar becomes sensible spending and will keep it basically viable.
The deadly necessity to urgently replace the current carriers is deferred and limited investment in the Sea Vixen and Buccaneer is all that is necessary during the financial crisis of the late sixties. It allows a breathing space to react to the fact that the age of empire is over and a new NATO centric defence situation is arising.
If the carrier force stays at the heart of the navy then they draw in money and manpower and get allocated roles within NATO, North Atlantic, Arctic and the reinforcement of Norway. Expensive manpower intensive frigates like Type 22 don’t get built as the need for lower manning lower cost ships more more akin to Type 23 is required. Replace the Counties hull for hull with an 8 ship programme with something in between the Type 82 and 42. Perhaps rather like the later Type 43 with all gas turbines.
Also when trying to work out what was possible it is perhaps sensible to remember what was actually maintained during this period. Air stations like Lossiemouth and Yeovilton stayed on the MOD books and maritime attack Buccaneer squadrons were also maintained, albeit light blue manned. The RAF also probably had funding for fighters with which they claimed to be defending the fleet! Funding that in an alternate history could have been RN.