Is there any way to differentiate between R-27ER and R-27EA? Length? Stripes? Radome? Anything else?
In fact it had been proposed conversions from R 27ER with SARH to such new standard like R 27 EA with ARH (Active Radar Homing) in the past through of the replacement from head seeker.
In case the difference would be about the R 27EP (anti radiation X-band) , once this version has been equipped with extended rocket engine that would increased the acceleration rates from the missile in order to obtain higher speed than others versions like: R 27ER / ET / EA.
Yet, I’ve never read anything about the conversion from R 33S with SARH to a new standard with ARH through the use of the head seeker from R 37M.
It seems that none version of the R 27 has been integrating with MiG 31B / BS or even in the prototypes of the second generation from MiG 31M since the 80’s. The MiG 31M had been equipped with R 77 that could be carried under the wings in four rounds, as the six rounds of the R 37 under the belly.
As the Berkut has already mentioned about the MiG 31 BM, as well in the case of MiG 31M such possible explanation for the R 77 that MiG 31M had been designed under requests from VVS. Then in the later 80’s the new R 77 would be used both in BVR as WVR functions against fighters, especially during takeoffs and landings at air bases near the opponent forces. Indeed the MiG 31B/BS has been keeping the R 60M for this function until today, but the R 60M or even the R 73/74 are only WVR missiles.
The R 40TD / RD (AA 6 Acrid) had been remained in production until 1991, in parallel with all the extended-range versions from R 27 ER/ET/EP. However the Soviet Union still had chosen to equip its MiG 31B / BS with R 40 during the 80s, and the Russia has keep this until now at least for the MiG 31B/BS with R 40TD, while in the MiG 31BM the R 40TD were phase out from service.
Despite all the time that the MiG 31 has been operating since 80’s, and even with all the information available today from Russia, but it seems that MiG 31 can not get off totally from a smooth mist that still obscuring some details.
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Do you think the missiles carried by Tu-22 Backfire and Badgers AS-4 and AS-6 kingfish and Kitchen could be used against naval targets like destroyers ? approx. 3000-5000 tonne ? or were these targets too small for these missiles ?
Those anti ship cruise missiles (ASCM) like the supersonic AS 4 and AS 6 has been often described in the West as ‘anti Aircraft Carrier missiles’, indeed those ASCM would be used first against both Aircraft Carriers and transport ships (troops, supplies, fuel, weapons, etc.) than against escort ships ( Cruisers, Destroyers, Frigates).
In the case of a task force headed by an Aircraft Carrier would be the primary target of this anti-ship long-range missiles like the ASCM, while the escort ships (Cruisers, Destroyers, Frigates) would be the secondary targets either.
The same would have been occurred as the convoy or task forces in support for amphibious landing operation, while the transport ships would be the high-priority targets and the escort ships would be secondary targets,
The basic concept of this strategy from Soviet Union should allow to concentrate the most possible effort with ASCM against the high-priority targets (Aircraft Carriers, Transports) in order to cause heavy damage in those Aircraft Carriers, and/or to sink the transport, as well to saturate the air defenses and also the ECM( Electronic Counter Measures) and even the ECCM( Electronic Counter Counter Measures) capabilities from those escort ships.
This may appear like a contradiction, once the escort ships would be capable to shoot down the ASCM by SAM( Surface Air Missiles) and most likely by jamming the active radar seekers from ASCM, so it should make more sense those escort ships were classified as priority targets, after all it first missions should be eliminates the air defenses from the enemy, in sequence to reach the mains targets from adversary.
However each ASCM has been launched against an escort vessel would be also one less against an Aircraft Carriers or transports ships, beyond that the escort vessels should be a lot more difficult targets to hit in reason that are: smaller, faster and maneuverable in general than Aircraft Carriers and transports.
But the more important aspect from escort vessels that it has been equipped for long time with ECM and chaffs launchers, as well the air defenses in layers, or in this case of short range air defenses( SAM, CIWS) would be quite effective against large missiles as ASCM that could be fired directly against the escort vessels.
In the case of Aircraft Carriers could be heavily damaged by those ASCM, that would withdraw from combat for several months, as well would be needed several months to mobilize the resources lost in transport ships already sink, although those transport ships could be quickly replaced by other civilian ships, however the cargo ( troops, weapons, spare parts and others.) would take much long time to be replaced in the event of a war from major proportions.
Probably the Third War would be over long before that,, once most likely the Third War World should have been counted in numbers of weeks before it would ended in a cease-fire or a nuclear holocaust, in the perspective from Soviet Union.
The concept from missiles as AS 4 and AS 6 had been reflecting the Soviet Union’s strategy since the 50’s, but in the 80s the Soviet Union also began to consider escort vessels as high-priority targets when it were equipped with cruise missiles BGM 109 Tomahawk with nuclear or conventional warheads.
In reason of this new threat from BGM 109 Tomahank, the Soviet Union had started the development of more compact and less RCS( Radar Cross Section) anti ship missiles as the subsonic Kh 35 that would match the Harpoons and Sea Eagle, as well the supersonic Kh 31A that will be anti ship missiles with less range than Kh 35.
Besides the Kh 31A and Kh 35, the Soviet Union could have been also developing in the late 80s a new type of cruise missile equivalent to anti ship version of the BGM 109 Tomahawk from US, which it were designated as Kh 57 that would be used by Tu 22M3 in anti ship missions, as well as a new version from air-ballistic Kh 15/AS 16 that would be equipped with active radar and conventional warhead that also would be used by Tu 22M3.
Just to explain the basic difference was that while Tu 22M3 could employ two AS 4 as normal weapons load, both Kh 57 and Kh 15/AS 16 could be carried at to ten rounds without any restrains for the Tu 22M3, or even to complete the two AS 4 with more six rounds like the Kh 15/AS 16 in the internal bay as were used with the nuclear version from Kh 15/AS 16.
The development of the Kh 35 and Kh 31A has been interpreted by many in the West with something like reconnaissance of the technological gap from former Soviet Union (or even Russia today). Once that Kh 35 and Kh 31A in the 80’s it were almost the same concept has been adopting by the West since the early 70’s.
This were assumed in reason for those large missiles like ASCM( AS 4 and AS 6 ) would have been become obsolete in face from its new air defenses system Aegis SPY 1 and new SAM with vertical launches from new Cruiser and Destroyers.
There were any doubts that Cruisers and Destroyers had been equipped with Aegis SPY 1 and vertical launches would be more effective to defeat the larges ASCM, but at the same way would be quite effective to defeat the small class for anti ship missiles like the Harpoon or even the Tomahawk.
In fact the Soviet Union did not change its main strategy with the use of the large and supersonic ASCM like the : AS 4, AS 6 and others anti ship supersonic cruise missiles that would be fired by ships,submarines and even coastal defenses.
Otherwise it had chosen to complete those ASCM with the less RCS like the Kh 35 and Kh 31A, or even the Kh 15/AS 16 and Kh 57.These small anti ship missiles along with large ASCM could obtain more rounds against these new Cruisers and Destroyers and then to saturate its air defenses at same time to allow its large and supersonic ASCM could reach these main targets like Aircraft Carriers and Transport ships.
The Kh 35 and Kh 31A could be used by the Su 27M, Su 27IB( Su 34), MiG 29M, MiG 29K as well as the Su 24M already in service during the 80’s.While the Kh 57 and the anti ship version of the Kh 15/AS 16 would be used by the Tu 22M3. The collapse from Soviet Union shutdown those plans from Kh 57 and Kh 15(anti ship version), as well as it has almost shutdown the plans from Kh 35 and Kh 31A.
True, which makes me wonder; A MiG-25 can carry 4xFAB-500s to M2,6 speeds and release them at any speed it desires.
What prevents a KAB-500S from being used in similar fashion? KAB-500L, or Kr, I understand seeker glass maybe a problem, but for GPS/INS guidance? That is, I am assuming KAB-500s are essentially FAB-500 bombs with add-on guidance system, similar to mark series and GBU kits.
I would guess that the seeker glass of the new KAB 250 IIR could not have been such problem with MiG 25RB and MiG 31BM, once the Soviet Union had been tested the R 40R (AA 6 Acrid) with IR( Infra Red) head seeker in MiG 25P since the 60’s.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R-40_%28missile%29#/media/File:R-40.jpg
The MiG 31B/BS had been using improved versions from R 40R since the 80’s, and AFAIK the R 40R were phase out only in 2010.Indeed the IIR head seeker in this new KAB 250 should be more complex than the old head seekers from R 40R to withstand high temperature.
Indeed this should not be big problem that can not be solved in the present time for Russia, after all the AIM 9X Sidewinder from US has been equipping with head seeker IIR since the 90’s.
However about the KAB 500S with GPS/INS it maybe would require a specific version for both the MiG 25RB and MiG 31BM, as well it had happened in the past with anti radiation missile Kh 58 while it were developed for the MiG 25BM .
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikoyan-Gurevich_MiG-25#/media/File:MiG-25_fig2agrau_USAF.jpg
Under the wings of the MiG 25BM the Kh 58 should have been withstand at the long exposure to heat, as well as it were demanded at this version from Kh 58 with new electric power source. Once the high altitude and supersonic speed from MiG 25BM had been increased the top range of those Kh 58 missiles.
I think the “speeds of several Mach number” means the bomb can be programmed different trajectories to hit target with very high velocity. Forexamble If the bomb dives vertically toward the target from the attitude of 5 km, the velocity at impact point will be from 520 – 670 m/s or Mach 1.5 – 1.95.
It is a good point, however in the link this new KAB 250 would have been equipped with a fragmentation warhead. Then in the case of high-speed dive this tactic has been purposed to penetrate hardened targets as bunkers and HAS, but such fragmentation warhead would not be suitable against those targets. Indeed it would be quite possible that new KAB 250 should have also equipped with different warheads , just like the KAB 500 and KAB 1500 that has been using several types from warheads since the 80’s.
This new KAB 250 has not been keeping the same concept from JDAM or those new versions with seeker heads like: laser, IIR and MMW. As well the JDAM-ER and Spike once it has been capabable to glide at long range at subsonic speed , or even like SDB I/II as GBU 39 and GBU 53 from US.
In general, the JDAM could be released at top speed from Mach 1.5, otherwise in the case of JDAM -ER and Spike the top speed would be around Mach 1.0.
This new KAB 250 had been shown at MAKS 2015 , just I would guess were designed with aerodynamic concepts that matches as BRV missiles. According as the description in the link this new KAB 250 would be able to glide at supersonic speed after had been released at the speed from ‘several Mach numbers’, in addition it would have been capabable to maneuvers in order to change the direction in flight, as it were mentioned description in the link.
In fact the series KAB 250L/S with laser and Glonass/INS head seeker has been appearing for several years, so its are nothing new, as the link indeed mentioned this legacy versions. However this new KAB 250 with IIR has show such different aerodynamic configuration from all previous KAB (250 L/S, 500 L/K/S, 1500L/K/S).
I also would guess that aerodynamic arrangement such similar to BRV( Beyond Visual Range) missiles would have been viewed for decreasing the aerodynamic drag during the fly from aircraft, likewise the own missiles BRV. In this case it will allow the aircraft to approach from the target at supersonic speeds both at high altitude or either at low altitude , that capability could be quite suitable for aircraft as: Su 24M2, Su 27M2, MiG 29 SMT, Su 30M2,MiG 31 BM, Su 34, Su 35 as the T 50.
Beyond those aircraft’s as far I know the Russia still has maintained small number of MiG 25RB that would be phase out from the active in 2020, in the past I read in some here those MiG 25RB were capable to release free fall bombs at top speed from ‘several Mach numbers’.
Thanks for the nice technological recap. Very useful (also to defuse some obvious trolling).
For your last quote: think this article would be useful to explain how the sat bombs hold a much more niche role in the Russian military doctrine when compared to the ( quasi obsessive) one they got in the US one.
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/warfare/2015/10/18/russia-shows-early-success-new-capabilities-syria/74041722/
Quite Interesting article in the link that had been placed in your post above about the view in Russia over the satellite guided weapons.
As well with the article in the link provided by Austin about the new KAB 250 bellow:
http://sputniknews.com/russia/20151018/1028696831/russia-supersonic-bomb.html
This new version of the KAB 250 has been described in the article that would be equipped with INS ( Inertial navigation system) until the head seeker wit IIR could be able to make the lock over the target, without any mention about the GPS / Glonass channel.
The description in article would put this new KAB 250 very close to the concept from KAB 500Kr that had been proposed in the past with head seeker with IIR but without GPS/Glonass receivers . However it was not described in the article about this new version of the KAB 250 would have besides the inertial navigation also a GPS / Glonass channel, maybe it were just omitted in the article.
About the image from new KAB 250 in the link I would guess that in rear fins there are four antennas from GPS / Glosnass. Maybe it would be more a backup of the inertial navigation system, since the latter would be the main navigation system until the head seeker with IIR will be able to lock on the programmed target.
As I don’t have much knowledge about the Russians, so I would guess they has not been relying at the same degree as the US about the concept from GPS / Glonass as primary system to designate targets , such as the US has shown so far in the case of JDAM series with GPS.
Although both KAB 1500S and KAB 500S had been testing since 2005 with GPS / Glonass receivers and INS, which would matches for the large series of JDAM from US, but so far it appeared that only KAB 500S were adopted by Russia in last year.
However I suppose the Russians has seen the KAB 500S more like guided bomb with inertial navigation as back up by GPS / Glonass receivers, once the GPS/ Glonass signal could be blocked or jammed in the event of confrontation with powerful nations able to accomplish this.
In case of the confrontations like in Syria today the KAB 500S has been certainly used at full mode with GPS/Glonass receivers as well INS, once the insurgents has not been capable for jamming the signal from GPS/Glonass.
By the time I know that heavy KAB 1500S with Glonass / INS has been tested in the Russian Air Force for years, yet I do not know if these were adopted for Russia or even used in Syria, just as the light KAB 250L/S.
About the new KAB 250 with IIR could have been only forgotten in the article the mention about the capability from GPS/Glonass receivers, otherwise it new KAB 250 maybe has been designed for confrontations more complex that has been tragically happening in Syria today, once this new version will more expensive than the legacy KAB 250L/S.
Most current Russian bombs can only be released at low mach or subsonic speeds. This probably fixes that. KAB-500S is basically 2006 era JDAM. This is 2008 JLDAM. And that makes sense since Russian radio electronic base basically hit 2008 this year.
I guess that is a little strange this KAB 250 designation for this new weapon, once previously KAB 250L / ES has been used for Russian LGB equivalents to North American GBU 10 Paveway or JDAM GBU 38 since 2005 . The previously KAB 250 would have been kits with head seekers from laser or GPS / INS that were attached to a GP( General Purpose) 250 kg bombs.
This new KAB 250 has been keeping the same concept of guidance system from North American JDAM / EO because this combination of GPS / INS and IIR(Imaging Infra Red), or even the Israeli Spice without datalink.Then it new KAB 250 could be described as high improvements from Eletro-Optical Guided bomb KAB 500Kr but with less weight from this last ones.
However this new KAB 250 would not a kit that has been attached to a GP bomb, but its look like that has been built on a single part or airframe as the SDB and SDB II from US. But this new KAB 250 has not been equipped with folding wings to increase the capability for more weapons could be installed inside the compartment bays from T 50 just ASFAIK at this point.
Perhaps most interesting should be the mention the capability that new weapon could be released in speed from ‘several Mach numbers’, that may also suggest beyond the T 50 that new weapon could be launched by MiG 31BM in high-altitude and high Mach speed in order to increase the range of these weapons.
Anyway the legacy KAB 250L / ES has been described that could be released at max speed from Mach 1.5, which would be more than adequate from: Su 27M2, Su 30M, MiG 29 SMT, Su 34, Su 35, Tu 22M3M, Tu 160M and even the T 50, in that last T 50 those KAB 250L/ES should have been equipped with folding wings.
Anyway the legacy KAB 250L/ES has not apparently been adopted by Russia or another nation until this present time.
Although specialized aircrafts has been used for ASW, SIGINT( Signal Intelligence) , ELINT( Electronic Intelligence), COMINT (Communication Intelligence), reconnaissance at high altitude and low orbits satellite reconnaissance, as well those assets were already available from Soviet Union in the 70s, but mostly those system were able to detect large civilian or military ships in blue water or even in the coast, but the coastal defenses and small vessels along the shore had remained a problem.
About the features of the Su 24M the capabilities to carry out attacks at low level and high speed, though even the ground mapping radar and Kaira laser designator/TV-optical system could not have mighty been enough to detect the coastal defense systems and small vessels as missiles boats near the shore.
Those systems has been describe above were not capable alone to completely replace the use from special ground forces in the reconnaissance and designation of the targets as coastal defense systems as missiles boat hidden in the shore.
In this case special forces even as combat frogman from Soviet Union could be released by submarine or mini-submarine near the coast in the case of presence of hostile naval forces and coastal defense, in case of SAM or fighters over the shore were a threat to the use of helicopters or to release paratroopers from aircraft’s along the coast.
It should be interesting to note that among the more traditional special forces( SEALS, SBS , Naval Spetsnaz and others) has been coming from navies around the world, which would among other missions the reconnaissance and target designation for both artillery of military ships and to attack aircraft , both for amphibious landing as to attack targets near the coast.
The infiltration of small groups from special forces in coastal regions where there were the intelligence reports would indicate possible activity from small vessels as missiles boats, such as bays, estuaries, cliffs, rivers, straits and channels as well as large ships even in harbor, in fact it would be very useful to Su 24M a as these strike aircraft could get the data from the target by special forces on the shore.
The Su 24M would penetrate the enemy territory in flights at ultra-low levels to avoid the air defenses from SAM and enemy fighters, and it could avoid the long range detection even by the naval forces near the shore.
In this case special forces along the coast, beyond the traditional optical devices and UHF/VHF/HF radios devices in the ’70s, a little-known system, and perhaps still has been used in new versions, that would be the man portable radars for both detection and designation from naval targets in adverse weather conditions (fog) or even during at night at close range from the coast.
Just to illustrate it could be mentioned that US had been using since the 60s with special forces equipped with those man portable radar to designate targets hidden in Vietnam forests. The man portable radars or even home beacon emissions has been the precursor from laser designator systems and GPS devices as well portable data links.
This portable radars worked through the emitting a concentrated beam from radar waves that were directed pointed against the target, or could be used as home beacon to identify the position of the special forces in the ground, and then it could be detected by ground mapping radars from combat aircraft like the A 6A Intruder, F 111A Aardvack, RB 57 Martin, EB 66 Destroyer, B 52D/F Stratofortress and AC 130 Hercules among others.
At this time there were not GPS and much less portable, beyond what even with accurate maps( most likely) from special forces would be very difficult, still under a dense forest, to obtain precise coordinates for attack aircraft, in this case those portable radar had been provided at this time better precision from aircraft attack, and security from Special Forces did not come under tons of unguided bombs released by attack aircraft’s.
In the case of special forces on the coast with portable radars or mini-submarines in shallow waters, though those emissions from portable radar could be detected by ships equipped with RWR( Radar Warning Receiver) , still those emissions would come from the friend territory’s coast, in this case they could not be classified as hostile and it does not alert the garrisons of the vessels.
The Su 24M after received the preliminary Intel as bearing and coordinates from the target could approach the targets with its main radar from ground mapping in stand by mode, without emitting signals that could be detected by the target, if necessary only with terrain following radar to fly at low levels , and get the target in passive mode once it would be illuminated by portable radars from special forces Only after the target would be detected in passive mode, then the Su 24M will pass to active mode or not if could be use the for the Kaira laser designator/TV-optical system to carry out the attack against the target.
Anyway in main aspect the maritime coast has been provided for the aircraft such as the Su 24M a high-capability to fly at ultra-low levels and high speed since it can use the adjacent ‘sea-runway’ to the coast during this flew, and still remain very close to shore and so to hide or even naval radars or SAM batteries far from the shore. In this case the greater maneuverability of the Su 24M has been compared to larger aircraft such as the Tu 22M2/3 would be an advantage in attack naval targets near of the coast.
After all the long range aviation from VVS and AVMF that were equipped with Tu 22 Blinder, Tu 22M2/3 Backfire, Tu 16K Badger had been designed to strike sea targets or ships in blue water as well far way from its air bases or the Soviet territory.
The Su 24M has had another capability over the Tu 22M2/3 once the Su 24M has been equipped with refueling probes that has been forbidden for the Tu 22M3 even today.
Once with its in-fly refueling capability the Su 24M could reach almost the same range of the Tu 22M2/3, but instead to strike sea targets in blue waters as the long range aviation, the Su 24M were highly suitable to strike sea targets in brown water or near of the shore ,as well close the harbors where the air defenses assets would be quite active.
I didn’t , but it seems like that the enormous number of Su-24 available to the VVS a fair number of them could be diverted to anti-ship missions esp against those vessels not equipped with SAMs
In specific the AV-MF had been fitted mostly with supersonic ASM ( Anti Ship Missiles) capable to reach long range, as well as attack aircraft’s both supersonic and long range capabilities. Just to mention the subsonic Tu 16K Badger that were equipped with supersonic ASM AS 6, the supersonic Tu 22 Blinder with supersonic AS 4 and finally the supersonic Tu22M2 / 3 Backfire with AS 4. Along with the strategic Tu 95K-22 from VVS equipped with AS 4 (Kh 22).
However all those srike aircrafts from Soviet Union has been mentioned above were designed as anti ship missions in blue waters, in another means at long range from shore or itself from Soviet Union.
About the former Soviet Union the Su 24M from VVS should not have been keeping the priority as the mission from anti ship warfare since the Soviet Union had a widely assets from anti-ship missions.But that was at the time of the Soviet Union.
Otherwise the main mission of the Su 24M from AV-MF that has been operating from air bases over the coast should be support amphibious landing operations from Soviet Navy( Russian Navy today), both in the Black Sea, Baltic, Caspian and even in the North Sea and the Pacific.
In order to support amphibious missions from Soviet Navy would be necessary first to eliminate the coastal defenses from the enemy, then in this case even with anti radar missions with anti radiation missiles Kh 25MP or even Kh 28 in the 70, and already during the 80s with the Kh 58 and later Kh 31 could be carried out in order to eliminate the coastal fire control radars that could guided both artillery and anti ship missiles, or even against fast boats has been eqquiped with anti ship missiles.
However despite the concept of this fast boats with ASM( Anti Ship Missiles) has not been widely used in Western navies, with the main exception of the Israel, Sweden, Norway and Finland, otherwise both the Soviet Union and China had become the largest operators of those small vessels as fast boat with ASM during the Cold War.
These missiles boats could be characterized as naval assets for brown waters, ie near of the coast, once those vessels has limited autonomy and conditions to support long stays at sea, even in the adversary meteorological conditions or ‘coarse sea’.
In sumary those missile boats has been conceived for a tactic as know as shoot and hide, once those small vessels just leave the coast only to strike a target, and return as soon as possible to the coast in order to hide from the enemy’s counter attack.
How those missiles boats has been capable to navigate and anchor in shallow waters, it can easily hide in rivers and estuaries as well as remain very close from islands or deep in fjords. This makes it highly difficult for detection by radar both from ships and and ASW ( Anti Surface Warfare) aircraft’s.
Heavy and large aircraft’s such as the Tu 16K, Tu 22 Blinder and Tu 22 M2 / 3 would not be much adequate for this mission, once it would operate over the enemy coast and airspace, in this case those aircraft could in range of enemy fighters and SAM , beyond that those maritime search radar from long range would not be effective in detecting these small vessels as missiles boats so close to the shore or even the coastal defenses.
However the Su 24M has been much more maneuverable as well as were designed to operate at ultra-low levels, thus more suitable both in attack against coastal defenses s as well as the detection thereof, in particular of the missiles boats almost hidden very close of the shore.
As the Su 24M could operate on advanced air bases more close from amphibious landing areas of the Soviet Navy, in this case the reaction time these Su 24M would also lower comparable with the large and heavy strike aircraft’s, in case of the Soviet or Russians ships would under attack from enemy missiles boats
In both cases only to mention how the PGM( Precision Guided Missiles) could be used by the Su 24M, the Su 24M with its optical system Kaira could use the versions from laser or TV of the PGM as the Kh 25 to achieve precision hits against small vessels like missiles boats and sink it, and still remain beyond of the range from AA from those small vessels, or short-range SAM or even MANPADS.
This would be the classical mission of Su 24M and even Su-24MR from the former Soviet Union both of the AV MF and even the VVS into a naval warfare against China and West Countries as NATO, however classic does not mean it would be unique.
Here is the new L-150-16M RWR/ELINT (станции непосредственной радиотехнической разведки/СНРТР) due to be fitted to the Su-25SM3 and then later Su-27 derivatives and has the ability to passively target both air and ground based radar emitters.
Pic shows before & after strike on 36D6 ‘Tin Shield’ by Kh-31. Interestingly, the graphic shows a version of the R-77 and not the R-27P/EP which may indicate an upcoming passive seeker for the former.
[ATTACH=CONFIG]240414[/ATTACH][ATTACH=CONFIG]240415[/ATTACH][ATTACH=CONFIG]240416[/ATTACH]
If the system L-150-16M RWR/ELINT could be able to get the bearing and coordinates from the target ( fighter) , then the Su 25SM3 should be capable to fire its R 77 missiles with ARH( Active Radar Homing), and in this case even such Su 25SM3 without air-mode radar could be able to fire this R 77 against the target.
While the target has been emitting signals that would be detected by this system L-150-16M RWR/ELINT, the target will be track by the launch aircraft , with the condition that aircraft would be is equipped with a X band datalink, then it will be capable to update the coordinates for the R 77 missile with ARH..
Just one curiosity AFAIK about the R 77 and R 37 missiles that both had been designed with digital active radar seeker in the X band, while the precursor from all ARH missiles as the former AIM 54A Phoenix and the all active service AIM 120 were operating in the Ka band.
Almost all experts in the West about active radar seekers has been claimed that Ka band will increase the precision or Pk from BVR missiles, once if it would be compared to X band that had been equipped the SARH( Semi Active Radar Homing) missiles.
Another advantage from Ka band in BVR missiles will increase the complexity from ECM devices in the adversary aircrafts, once the target should be capable to jamming both the radar in the X band from the launch aircraft, as well as the BVR missiles with Ka band seekers.
As I could remember about what I had read a long time ago, the choice of the X band in the digital-radar seeker from R 77, R 27EA (Extended Active) and R 37 had been done in order for all those BVR (Beyond Visual Range) missiles could also operate in passive mode, and with this capability it would be able to detect targets equipped with X band radars as all current fighters in service or planed.
In resume if the aircraft that had launched the R 77 was shoot down by the adversary, the R 77 would continue tracking as anti radiation missile in X band the opponent fighter without receiving any updated from the launch aircraft, so this R 77 could swift for ARH ( active mode) even if the target has halted the band X emissions.In this case the R 27P/EP( passive homing X band) will missing the target, but such as R 77 could hit the same in this ARH mode.
Thus R 27P would be replaced by R 77, while R 27EP could be replaced by the R 27EA and/or the R 37, as well as the ultra long range K 100 ( Kh 172) could be used in this same way.But that were mentioned long time ago.
However none of countries that has been using the R 77 until today, as far I known again, it has been commented about this suppose capability from R 77 to operate as an anti radiation missile against the X band radars.
I have to admit the Russian that was responsible for creating this chart with the Su 25SM3 firing the R 77 against the F 16 was very humble, because if it was an American who had created this chart the same would change the F 16 for the F 35 JSF without think twice.
Ah, sorry. The way the sentence was constructed earlier was not as clear. Glad that this has been straightened. Moving on.
In my humble opinion the first sentence from rcolistete has been quite clear and there are none problem with this.
Perhaps the only problem with this sentence in your opinion should be that it has not aligned with the marketing strategy from Gripen NG.
Lets moving on.
I think that 12.5%( 7,1t to 8,0t) from empty weight increment has not been something critical, and this problem could be even acquitted in the worst setting for the Gripen E.
However what should bring concern about this problem is the case of empty weight gain for the Gripen F( twin seat), since for this there are not an even crude estimate about this problem, since this project has not started by SAAB so far as I known.
After all it would have been expected that the Gripen F will be heavier than the Gripen E, so if there are already an empty weight gain that has been forecast for the Gripen E, then the Gripen F could have been increasing the empty weight even more than the 12.5% rate from Gripen E .
The worst should be that Gripen F has been planned to be produced in Brazil without a single prototype before the starting the ‘serial production’ in Embraer.
Only to remember the empty weight from a fighter has been directly related to the parameters of: speed, maneuverability, payload and range.
Otherwise maybe the Embraer will have a lot of time to develop the Gripen F, once I read about this issue from the 36 Gripen E/F has been acquired by Brazil perhaps only 10 Gripen E/F could be built in Brazil until 2025.
Every time I mention the Gripen F seems that it exists only in my imagination …
Can you show how a 900 kg mass increase results in 4400 liter external fuel decrease, please? I mean, why is the choice either 4 drop tanks vs. 1 drop tank. Why do you not consider three drop tanks or two drop tanks?
We are gone to do step by step together:
| width: 500 | class: grid |
|---|---|
| [tr] | |
| [td]Fuel Tank Capacity[/td] | |
| [td]Number[/td] | |
| [td]Total in liters[/td] | |
| [/tr] | |
| [tr] | |
| [td]1700[/td] | |
| [td]2[/td] | |
| [td]3400[/td] | |
| [/tr] | |
| [tr] | |
| [td]1100[/td] | |
| [td]2[/td] | |
| [td]2200[/td] | |
| [/tr] |
| width: 500 | class: grid |
|---|---|
| [tr] | |
| [td]Total of the 04 fuel tanks( liters)[/td] | |
| [td]5600[/td] | |
| [/tr] |
Then the 900 kg increment from the empty weight and the limit of 5,000 kg in external load that has been mentioned of the Gripen NG will not allow the use of the second tank of 1,100 liters as it was mentioned by rcolistete in his post , so the maximum external fuel capacity would be in this case:
| width: 500 | class: grid |
|---|---|
| [tr] | |
| [td]Fuel Tank Capacity[/td] | |
| [td]Number[/td] | |
| [td]Total in liters[/td] | |
| [/tr] | |
| [tr] | |
| [td]1700[/td] | |
| [td]2[/td] | |
| [td]3400[/td] | |
| [/tr] | |
| [tr] | |
| [td]1100[/td] | |
| [td]1[/td] | |
| [td]1100[/td] | |
| [/tr] |
| width: 500 | class: grid |
|---|---|
| [tr] | |
| [td]Total of the 03 fuel tanks( liters)[/td] | |
| [td]4500[/td] | |
| [/tr] |
As I could remember that the jet kerosene fuel has been keeping the lower specific weight than the water(H2O), but in addition the weight of the fuel is necessary to consider the weight of the tank housing, so as far as I could remember the relationship could be as close to 1: 1 to calculate the weight in kg of the fuel tanks in liters.
The increasing empty weight from all most the project to prototypes fighters has been more the rule than an exception.
All projects has always keep error margins, after all even with the best CAD / CAE software capabilities available today projects are not perfect yet, otherwise it would not be necessary to produce the prototypes in the first place.
So until the start of production of the Gripen NG maybe the problem with weight increment could be rectified with others solutions, but to deny the problem will not make it gone away …
Besides stupid also it has been said that did not know anything about Math, so it is better that someone review it.
I’m, afraid this is illogical.
Firstly, the “at least” – why at least? Doesn’t make sense. You’re saying that if one (of many) sources of costs increases by 30%, then all costs increase by 30% or more. No! In reality, that means that some expenses increase by up to 30%.
I have seen a lot of contradiction in your statements among recent posts, after all you’ve said in the text below that a fall in the value of SEK has been decreased the value of the Gripen NG contract at the same rate, even though that most of the cost from Gripen NG has not been composed in Sweden currency (SEK).
Looking at the SEK price & the SEK/USD exchange rate, I wonder about what goes on in the heads of some people. 39.88 bn SEK – call it 40 billion, for simplicity. Since January 2009, that’s been worth, at different times, from $4.3 bn to $6.6 bn, & today is $4.5 bn. Yet some can’t grasp the concept of exchange rate fluctuations!
Maurobaggio is a prime example. He doesn’t seem to understand that the contract is in Swedish kronor, not US dollars, & the fluctuating US dollar price is purely a result of exchange rate changes. He’s picked a USD price from one date, & stuck with it, ignoring any changes in the SEK/USD rate since then, & says that’s still the dollar price, although the SEK has fallen almost 20% against the USD.
The strange part of your statement are not based on any fact , once all the time from 2009 to 2014 the proposal of the Gripen NG had been maintained at US$ 4.5 billion with Brazil, only in the day the contract were signed the value has been corrected to US$ 5.4 billion for October 2014, so despite all the changes from Sweden currency that you had been mentioned that happened in this time.
After all if it were such important the value of the Sweden currency someone would have mentioned the contract with the Gripen NG could reach almost US$ 6.6 billion during this time from 2009 to 2014?
Perhaps US$ 5.4 billion has been the average between $ 4.3 to $ 6.6 billion that you mentioned in the text above.
And then we have the fundamental error you’ve made, which is to ignore the fact that the contract is in SEK, & regardless of what happens to the exchange rate & SAAB’s non-SEK costs, is fixed.
The contract with Switzerland for the 22 Gripen E it has been described either in Swiss francs and not in the Sweden currency , while for Brazil someones has been advocating that would be in SEK and not in the Brazil currency.
Why SEK goes for Brazil but not goes for Switzerland?
After all if Brazil will really produce locally Gripen NG then this should be in the Brazil currency. I am guessing the SEK has not been the official currency of Brazil, am I wrong?
How SAAB deals with currency fluctuations has been discussed. It does exactly what every other company in the business does: it hedges its contracts. There’s a big financial firm or consortium somewhere which will absorb any losses, & can afford to do so because it has the other side of other currency hedge contracts, so they’ll balance out on average, & it’ll make a profit on the deals from the fees it charges. Boeing does it, Airbus does it – everyone does it. It’s standard industry practice. The fees for the currency hedges are taken into account when setting the contract price.
Could you provide us with the name of this magnificent charity institution that has been keeping with all the losses without asking anything in return?
In my stupid opinion I think that in a the market economy the most important aspect has been the market value of the product, since when the costs fall the customers could have not aware about it, however when the costs has been increasing there are two options: drop in profit from the seller or to increase the value of the product for the customer.
In the last option the customers has been aware of the fact.
Looking at the SEK price & the SEK/USD exchange rate, I wonder about what goes on in the heads of some people. 39.88 bn SEK – call it 40 billion, for simplicity. Since January 2009, that’s been worth, at different times, from $4.3 bn to $6.6 bn, & today is $4.5 bn. Yet some can’t grasp the concept of exchange rate fluctuations!
Maurobaggio is a prime example. He doesn’t seem to understand that the contract is in Swedish kronor, not US dollars, & the fluctuating US dollar price is purely a result of exchange rate changes. He’s picked a USD price from one date, & stuck with it, ignoring any changes in the SEK/USD rate since then, & says that’s still the dollar price, although the SEK has fallen almost 20% against the USD.
Or does he understand, but choose to post falsely?
Not only the press uses the USD as a reference, as well as all international transactions, and due to this is the reason for all the financial world to watch and worry about the currency exchange rate from US$.
If the contract had been made in the currency of Brazil, so today the Brazil would be paying something like US$ 3.6 billion instead of the supposed US$ 4.6 billion because the same has been quoting in SEK?
After all if Brazil will produce the Gripen NG locally could be more appropriate then that the contract would have been using the Brazil currency rather than the Sweden currency.
If the contract value indeed had been reached almost US$ 6.6 billion since 2009, why there are no available references about it?
I remember the anger from some when it were mentioned by a source from press that the value of the contract were US$ 5.8 billion in November 2014 instead the correct US$ 5.4 billion from October 2014.
My answer for these ordinary question is very simple : the contract for the 36 Gripen NG from Brazil has been always quoted in US dollars.
The US$ 5.4 billion for 36 Gripen NG has been placed the same level of the contract with Switzerland in 2014 for 22 Gripen E at the value of the US 3.27 billon, then if the Switzerland would have been buying those 22 Gripen E with unitary cost around of the US$ 150 million, while in 2014 the Brazil could have been buying the Gripen E / F for only US$ 125 million in a contract of US$ 4.5 billion, then this fact would be very strange.
After the Brazil signed the contract in 2014 the value has been corrected at US$ 150 million for each Gripen E / F, which match with US$ 5.4 billion, the same unitary cost from Switzerland in 2014.
Indeed it were not fault from Saab and Embraer that the proposal of the Gripen NG had been resting for almost three years on the desk of the President of Brazil.
Although it were quite different contracts, among several the value of US$ 4.5 billion, once it had been created in 2009 .
After all the conditions in 2014 had been changed since the beginning of financial crisis in 2008 and not only about the value of the currency from each country.As well as the Gripen NG program has advanced considerably since 2009 and the cost from each component from Gripen NG could be increased since the beginning of the crises in 2008, once this estrange fact has been called as market value.
But If I am wrong about this , once the value of the Gripen E today had been really decreased by 20% because of Sweden’s currency, may be this is good time to make a new referendum in Switzerland.
Or does he understand, but choose to post falsely?
Please Swerve could review the information’s in my post are indeed correct.
By the way you’ve reported the Reuters to fix the value from US$ 5.4 billion to the US$ 4.6 billion,once the last time that I checked the value remains in US$ 5.4 billion the value of the contract from Brazil.
Thanks
Lemme see –
$7.4 bn / 1.35 = 5.5 bn euros at 2013 exchange rates.
$4.3 /1.06 = 4.06 bn euros at April 2015 exchange rates.A significant difference, but much, much less than the 70% margin derived from the USD figures, & probably a true reflection of the cost of set-up for licence production.
I remember seeing similar garbage (not by Mr Baggio) about Typhoon exports to Saudi Arabia, where the peak £/$ rate was taken as fixed by those who wished to claim that Typhoon was insanely expensive, rather than the (lower) rates prevailing when payments were made.
There are difference of values as well as the conditions of the contracts, so to assign the difference in values in reason of the monetary fluctuations has been quite out of context in this case of the Rafale F3, maybe this will help you to understand why the values are quite different:
If cost of tooling for Rafale is considered a sunken cost for French made Rafales then yes it can be a huge problem. Meaning the cost of paying for tooling to make french Rafales is not part of price of purchasing a new build Rafale from Dassault. If that is the case then it could very well cause a price blowout on Indian built Rafale as they would have to purchase identical tooling at likely higher costs because of ten years of inflation. They would then have apply those costs to a smaller overall Indian production run of 150ish planes compared to French production run of 300ish. The costs of tooling and factory set up in India would be most likely around three times the cost on a per plane basis then it is in France. That estimate is on the lowside by the way.
There is no real way for India to sign a contract for locally built Rafale and not include those costs in the contract.
Yet again, mauro-doesn’t-understand-arithmetic makes himself look silly by his failure to realise that the US dollar is not the only currency in the world, that exchange rates change, & that countries such as France & Sweden do not price their exports in USD.
I am confused because I do not remember how to react to this compliment. Maybe you can ask any Psychologist as I should react to this in order to satisfy your expectation about it compliment as well as others who could reading this, after all I had done this for years with remarkable success but now I’m out of shape.
The value in dollars only matters if the contract is made in dollars ie the buyer agrees to pay the seller in dollars. Dollars are used to express values for the purposes of comparison. If the Gripen contract is payable in Swedish krone, it doesn’t matter if currency fluctuations mean the equivalent dollar value goes up and down. What matters is movements in the relative values of the Brazilian currency against the Swedish currency. Who cares if the dollar value of a deal doubles if you are not paying in dollars?
In my remarkable stupidity I guess that you are correct about the relation among the customer and the seller.
But there are anthers subjects in this contract with Brazil and Sweden, since the suppliers chain from Gripen NG also has need to accept the SEK instead the US$ in their contracts with SAAB and Embraer.
As I think the Gripen NG has been keeping many components from other countries, then the value of Sweden’s currency can not be used as a reference to create the contract.
Otherwise that I guess that is unlikely because I have never seen something like this hypothesis as the Sweden currency could be the reference, so in this case it would be necessary that:
The GE from US has been accepted to receive 20% less for it F414G engine from Gripen NG;
The SELEX from UK has been accepted to receive 20% less for it AESA radar from Gripen NG;
The ELBIT from Israel has been accpeted to receive 20% less for it WAS from Gripen NG;
As well as all foreign suppliers from Gripen NG and the SAAB.
Even if 50% of the cost from Gripen NG would be in SEK still could be hard to adopt the SEK as refence, once large part from the cost could be formed by machines and equipments that could be imported in US$ or euros as well as raw material and tools. Just to mention the cost of the assembly line that will be installed at Embraer.
If this count were such simple then after the depreciation from the Brazil currency in the last 12 months the Embraer customers should be paying 40% less for aircraft assembled by the same, are they?
Please Swerve could you warning the Reuter to correct the information that Gripen NG contract with Brazil has been decreasing from US$ 5.4 billion to US$ 4.6 billion because the Sweden currency has been depreciated in relation of the US$?
http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/04/14/embraer-defense-idINL2N0XB2QW20150414
Thanks.